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State v Aitowe [2025] PGNC 407; N11556 (23 October 2025)

N11556

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR NO 433 OF 2025

STATE

V

MARTHA AITOWE

GOROKA: WAWUN-KUVI, J
2 SEPTEMBER,16, 23 OCTOBER 2025

CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA-SENTENCE-Murder s 300(1)(a) Criminal Code-Domestic Setting- Wife killed husband- Frustration over husband continuously misusing her monies-Intention to cause harm-use of knife-single stab in the thigh-Death from blood loss-

Cases cited
Kumbamong v The State [2008] SC1017
Manu Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789
Marangi v The State [2002] PGSC 15; SC702
Public Prosecutor v Thomas Vola [1981] PNGLR 412
Kalabus v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 193
Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653
State v Koli [2023] N10183
State v Mark (2022) N9563
State v Dolo [2021] PGNC 246; N9110
State v Robin [2021] PGNC 165; N9022
State v Roth [2019] PGNC 33; N7770
State v Aosa [2017] PGNC 244; N6907
State v Dabube [2017] PGNC 177; N6825
State v Waieng [2017] PGNC 126; N6775
State v Peter [2017] PGNC 124; N6772
State v Maie [2016] PGNC 406; N6722
State v Pok [2014] PGNC 305; N5606.
State v Mara [2010] PGNC 140; N4133
State v Jako [2010] PGNC 119; N4110
State v Karapus [2009] PGNC 59; N3640
State v Kelly [2009] PGNC 34; N3624

Counsel
S Joseph, for the State
V Move, for the offender

SENTENCE

1. WAWUN-KUVI J: The offender was the deceased second wife. The deceased was a PMV driver. He was seated insider the PMV waiting for passengers when the offender walked in without a word and stabbed him in the thigh. He died from blood loss.
   
2. The offender pleaded guilty to the charge of murder under s 300 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
   
3. I must now decide the appropriate sentence.
   

Maximum Penalty

4. Murder carries a life sentence as the maximum punishment. The maximum penalty is, however, made subject to Section 19 of the Criminal Code.
   
5. The general principle is that the maximum is reserved for the most serious cases: Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653. This is not a case that warrants the maximum penalty.
   
6. Because it is a case that does not attract the maximum, I must first proceed to identify an appropriate range. But first I will determine the factors that are peculiar to the offender’s case.
   

Antecedents

7. The offender is 31 years old and hails from Korepa Village, Daulo in Eastern Highlands Province. She is the second wife of the deceased and has one son. She attends the Lutheran Church. Her parents are alive and reside in their village. She has an older brother.
   
8. She completed her education up to year 5 at Korepa Primary School.
   
9. She is otherwise in good health except when she experiences discomfort when she overeats and carry heavy things.
   
10. She owned a canteen or tucker shop prior to her imprisonment
    

Allocutus

11. The offender stated in allocutus:
    

“I would like to say sorry before God for breaking his sixth law. Secondly, I would like to say sorry to the Court, the lawyers, the police and the CIS for breaking the Constitution of the country. Thirdly, I want to say sorry for my husband, I did not mean to kill him but only to cause injury but somehow, he died, I am sorry. Fourthly, say sorry to his family, his first wife and their children for what I have done. I want to say sorry to my family for what I have done, and they bear this burden. Finally, I am not a good person, sorry to my children for leaving them behind. It wouldn’t happen if my husband did not misuse my market money. I won’t do that again. I ask for mercy and if the court can put me on probation.”

12. I find the statements by Kidu CJ in Kalabus v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 193 of assistance when determining whether the offender is truly remorseful. He said:
    

“Remorse and contrition are factors weighed in the matter of sentence in favour of accused persons, particularly if they are manifested in a plea of guilty. Whether remorse or contrition are shown by a plea of guilty depends upon the time and circumstances in which the plea is advanced. The earlier the expression of remorse or contrition after the commission of the offence the more favourable it will be for the accused. Remorse and contrition expressed at the trial weighs very lightly. It is easier to believe remorse expressed earlier than remorse expressed at the time of the trial, especially in serious cases like this one.”

13. Given that the offender surrendered to police and cooperated them making fully admissions, that she pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, I accept her statement in allocutus as a genuine sign of expression of remorse.
    

Culpability

14. The offence involves some level of premeditation. This is demonstrated by the accused’s own statement in allocutus and the facts which show that she went armed specifically to inflict injury on the deceased. I accept that the location of where she stabbed him demonstrates that there was no intention to kill him or cause serious injury but to inflict pain because of her frustration over the misuse of her money. Having some intent to cause harm but not death, the deceased culpability is mid-range.
    

Guideline

15. Counsel have relied on Manu Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789. Ms. Joseph for the State submits for a range between the 1^st and 2^nd category attracting a range of 12- and 20-years imprisonment. Ms Move for the offender submits that the facts of the case place it with the 1^st category of the murder cases in the Manu Kovi guidelines. She submits a sentence within the range of 12-16 years.
    
16. As I have said previously in other sentences, ranges submitted by counsel should not have significant disparity where there is a proper consideration of the guidelines and sentencing trend. The Supreme Court in Henry v State [2020] PGSC 147; SC2063 said:
    

“as to the further period of five years imprisonment that was added as a deterrent, the primary judge did not rely upon any case authority in which a similar deterrent period of imprisonment had been imposed. We are not aware of any such cases, and none were able to be brought to the attention of the Court by counsel. Whilst we agree with the primary judge’s comments concerning higher and stiffer penalties being warranted, the appellant is entitled to be sentenced in accordance with the principles and sentencing trends that had been followed to the time of his sentencing.”

[Emphasis added]

17. It is the duty of counsel to assist the Court with recent authorities and comparable cases.
    

Comparable cases

18. Ms Joseph submits the following cases:
    
19. Henry v State [2020] PGSC 147; SC2063: The appellant was found guilty of the murder of his wife. He had kicked her in the abdomen causing her spleen to rupture. He was initially sentenced to 27 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court found error where the trial judge had imposed an additional five years as a deterrent where it was not supported by case authority or the sentencing trend. The sentence of 27 years was quashed and subsisted with a sentence of 23 years.
    
20. Michael Miomi v The State (2005) Unreported Judgement SCRA 33 of 2004, The appellant stabbed his wife with a bush-knife. She died as a result. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 years. He appealed on the severity of sentence. The appeal was dismissed, and sentence was confirmed.
    
21. Marangi v The State [2002] PGSC 15; SC702: This was a conviction for manslaughter. The appellant appealed sentence. The appellant suspected the deceased of having an affair with her husband. She travelled from her village to her husband’s residence. She found the deceased lying on the couch watching TV. The deceased was seven months pregnant. She stabbed the deceased twice in her chest. The sentence of 9 years was confirmed.
    
22. Marangi v The State (supra) is a sentence for manslaughter involving co wives and the other two cases are of husbands killing their wives under vicious circumstances. Here the offender acted upon her frustration over the persistent misuse of her monies and intended to inflict pain. She stabbed him once in the thigh. Henry v The State (supra) demonstrates a case of wife beating with a strong intent to cause grievously bodily harm. The cases submitted by the State are distinguishable.
    
23. Additionally range of sentences cannot be developed out of these three cases for the reasons given above.
    
24. Ms Move submits the following cases:
    
25. State v Koli [2023] N10183, Toliken J: The offender pleaded guilty to killing her husband in a domestic setting. Her husband was a corrections officer. She was at home peeling vegetables for dinner when he arrived home drunk and started an argument with her. He then started assaulting her. During the assault she used a knife and stabbed him in his underarm. She was sentenced to 9 years. Five years of the sentence was suspended.
    
26. State v Dabube [2017] PGNC 177; N6825, Koeget AJ: The deceased pleaded guilty. She was assaulted by her husband daily. He was a drug addict. He came home and kicked the food she had cooked. She picked up their child and left. He followed her and assaulted her. She threw a knife at his feet. He cut his ankle. He died from blood loss. She was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.
    
27. State v Lom [2012] PGNC 63; N4725, Gauli AJ: The pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife. She discovered his wife with another man. He chased the man away returning to cut his wife in the leg amputating the ankle, her left hand amputating it and twice on her head exposing brain tissue. He was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment.
    
28. The cases of State v Koli [2023] (supra) and State v Dabube [2017] (supra) are manslaughter cases indicating no intention to cause grievous bodily harm, but death arose out of the offender’s unlawful conduct. While domestic cases involving spouses, they are distinguishable. The facts in State v Lom [2012] (supra) while involving the murder of a spouse is clearly distinguishable. The deceased was cut multiple times on vulnerable parts of her body with significant force resulting in the amputation of her limbs.
    
29. The cases do not support the offender’s proposed range of a sentence between 12 and 16 years.
    
30. I have found comparable cases involving the of murder a spouse with some de facto provocation:
    
31. State v Norbert [2025] PGNC 111; N11228, Polume-Kiele, J: The offender was convicted of the murder of her husband after a trial. After a night of drinking the couple had a fight. She stabbed her husband multiple times in the back and leg. She was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
    
32. State v Pupu [2024] PGNC 453; N11382, Kupmain AJ: The offender pleaded guilty to the murder of her husband. Between 10.00am to 12.30pm, the offender accompanied by three of her relatives went in search of her husband. When she found him, she argued with him. In the process of the argument, she stabbed him on his right thigh with a kitchen knife. The deceased died from blood loss. She was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.
    
33. I have also considered manslaughter cases which share comparable features. These cases involve wives stabbing their husbands in parts of their body which generally are not considered as vulnerable, causing their death:
    
34. The deceased and the offender are husband and wife. They have been married for many years and have (6) children between them. The marriage between the offender and the deceased was an unhappy one. On numerous occasions they would argue, and fight and the deceased would get drunk and assault the offender. The main reason for the arguments and fights was that the deceased had brought another woman into the family home and had chased away the offender and the children. The offender and her children had to go and reside with other people in their village.
    
35. State v Bagle (2022) CR No 1054 of 2021, Unnumbered decision delivered on 22 February 2022, Liosi J: The offender had an argument with her husband. During the argument she stabbed him in the buttocks. He died from blood loss. She was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.
    
36. State v Tony [2017] PGNC 125; N6774, Liosi AJ: The offender was a victim of domestic violence. The deceased had chased her and the children out of their home and brought another woman in. Later the deceased under the influence of alcohol went looking for her. As the deceased was attempting to break into the house the offender cut him in the hand and leg to prevent him entering the house. He died from blood loss. She was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
    
37. State v Nicholson [2016] PGNC 247; N6442, Liosi AJ: The offender and her husband had a quarrel over money. The argument led to a fight during which the prisoner stabbed the deceased on the right thigh with a kitchen knife. The knife penetrated the deceased thigh severing the main artery to the right leg. The deceased died from loss of blood. She was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
    
38. State v Muli (No. 2) [2016] PGNC 130, Ipang J: The offender and her husband had an argument. During the argument the offender got a wheel spanner and struck the deceased on his abdomen. His spleen was ruptured. He died as a result. She was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment.
    
39. State v Carol Alfred (2009) N3602, Makail J: The deceased accused the offender of not preparing his dinner. A fight ensued. During the fight the deceased armed with a torch struck the offender on her arm and head. She was injured and in the ensuing scuffle with her husband she stabbed him with a kitchen knife in his thigh. He died from loss of blood. She was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
    
40. The general sentencing trend in cases where the deceased was stabbed once in a non-vulnerable part of the body during a domestic alteration shows a range between 8 and 12 years. The case of State v Norbert [2025] (supra) is distinguishable because the deceased was stabbed multiple times in the leg and back indicating a more vicious attack with a strong intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
    
41. Having considered the facts of this case against the comparable cases in manslaughter cases, this case is distinct because those cases arose out of circumstances where death occurred during a fight, argument or assault. Here, the offender sought out the deceased specifically with the intent to hurt him and attacked him without warning. These circumstances indicate a sentence outside of the range of 8 and 12 years.
    
42. These facts place this case within the higher end of the 1^st Category and the lower end of the second category of the Manu Kovi guidelines, which attracts a sentence between 14 and 18 years.
    

Victim Impact Statement

43. I thank the Probation Officer Ms Jocabeth Kalagune for the Pre-Sentence Report. She interviewed the father of the deceased Mike Kafi who stated that the deceased had left behind his first wife and four children. She and his wife are aging and depend on their son for their livelihood. Life has become hard. His wife now does gardening to ensure they have food. They miss their son. They ask that the offender be punished for taking away their son’s life.
    

Factors in Aggravation

44. Factors in aggravation is that a life has been lost which cannot be replaced. There are four children without a father to support, five including the offenders on son. She used a knife to stab the deceased. There was some premeditation. The offence is prevalent.
    

Factors in Mitigation

45. Factors in mitigation are that the offender is a first-time offender, she pleaded guilty, she cooperated with police and made admission, and she committed the offence out of frustration over the husband’s continued misuse of her funds. She was remorseful.
    
46. Compensation of K9000 and two pigs was paid by her family to the deceased family.
    

Consideration

47. This is yet another case of domestic violence. The deceased continued to misuse the monies that the offender had given out as loans to third parties. When these third parties repaid the monies, the deceased would collect the monies and instead of giving the monies to the offender, he would use some of it. The offender was his second wife. She says she was frustrated which I can accept given the circumstances. However, these factors do not mean that the offender’s actions are condoned. She took the life of a human being. While she did not intend to kill him, the human body is not made of stone or steel. She had the opportunity to cease the relationship with deceased being his second wife and moving on with her own life; instead, she chose to stay and stab him out of frustration. She now must live with the consequences of her actions.
    
48. Given all the matters discussed in this decision, I find that a sentence of 15 years imprisonment is appropriate.
    
49. According to the charge sheet the offender has been in custody since the 11 September 2024. She has been in custody for 1 year, 1 month, 1 week, and 5 days. Pursuant to s 3(2) of the Criminal Justice (Sentences) Act 1986 the pre-sentence period is deducted, and the offender shall serve the balance of 13 years, 10 months, 2 weeks and 2 days.
    
50. The next question is whether any part of the sentence should be suspended. I have considered the principles in Public Prosecutor v Hale [1998] PGSC 26; SC564 and Public Prosecutor v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91. I have also considered the principle in Public Prosecutor v Thomas Vola [1981] PNGLR 412 where the same factors that were used to reduce sentence cannot be used again to suspend sentence.
    
51. I have considered the matters in the pre-sentence report. However, the offender is young and there is nothing to suggest that imprisonment will cause her hardship. The deceased family calls for a strong punitive sentence. Considering that the offence is prevalent, that a life has been lost and cannot be replaced, suspension is not appropriate.
    

Orders

52. The Orders are as follows:
    
    1. The offender is sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
    2. Pursuant to s 3(2) of the Criminal Justice (Sentences) Act 1986 the pre-sentence period is deducted, and the offender shall serve the balance of 13 years, 10 months, 2 weeks and 2 days.
    3. The CR file is closed.
       

Lawyer for the State: Acting Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the defence: The Public Solicitor