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State v Norbert [2025] PGNC 111; N11228 (19 March 2025)

N11228

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR NO. 656 OF 2023

THE STATE

V

MIRIAM NORBERT
Prisoner

BULOLO/LAE: POLUME-KIELE J
7, 14, 21, 28 FEBRUARY, 4, 19 MARCH 2025

CRIMINAL LAW: Trial – Sentence – murder - Criminal Code Act – Section 300 (1) (b) - whether appropriate to impose maximum penalty prescribed under law –First time offender- No prior conviction, - Incarceration appropriate - relevant considerations

Cases Cited
SCR No 1. of 1984: Re Maximum Penalty [1984] PNGLR 418
Avia Aihi v The State [1982] PNGLR 92
Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR 105
Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653
Manu Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789
The State v Lukas (2022) N10347
The State v Bulu Yasangara (2007) N5478
State v Komboni [2015] PGNC 63; (2015) N5991
Kuri Willie v The State [1987] PNGLR 298
Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38;
Paulus Mandatitip and Anor -v- The State [1978] PNGLR 128
Steven Loke Ume & Ors v The State (2006) SC836
State v Taulaola Pakai (2010) N4125
Thress Kumbamong v. The State (2008) SC1017

Counsel
Ms. S Joseph for the State
Mr. J John for the prisoner

SENTENCE

1. POLUME-KIELE J: The prisoner pleaded not guilty to one count of murder contrary to Section 300 (1) (b) of the Criminal Code. On 16 October 2023, a trial was conducted and closed its case. On 9 August 2024 the court heard submission on verdict. On 7 January 2025, a verdict of guilty was returned and the accused was convicted of one count of murder awaiting sentence.
   
2. The Court heard submission on sentence on 28 February 2025 and I reserved my decision which I now deliver.
   

Brief facts

3. The background facts of the case is set out in the judgment on verdict delivered by the Court on 7 January 2025.
   

Penalty Provision

4. The penalty provisions for the two charges are set out as follows:
   

“300. MURDER.

(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Code, a person who kills another person under any of the following circumstances is guilty of murder: –

(a) if the offender intended to do grievous bodily harm to the person killed or to some other person.

(b) if death was caused by means of an act–

(i) done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose; and

(ii) of such a nature as to be likely to endanger human life.

(c) if the offender intended to do grievous bodily harm to some person for the purpose of facilitating–

(i) the commission of a crime other than a crime specified by a law (including this Code) to be a crime for which a person may only be arrested by virtue of a warrant; or

(ii) the flight of an offender who has committed or attempted to commit an offence referred to in Subparagraph (i);

(d) if death was caused by administering any stupefying or overpowering thing for a purpose specified in Paragraph (c);

(e) if death was caused by wilfully stopping the breath of a person for a purpose specified in Paragraph (c).

Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life.

(2) In a case to which Subsection (1)(a) applies, it is immaterial that the offender did not intend to hurt the particular person who was killed.

(3) In a case to which Subsection (1)(b) applies, it is immaterial that the offender did not intend to hurt any person.

(4) In a case to which Subsection (1)(c), (d) or (e) applies, it is immaterial that the offender–

(a) did not intend to cause death; or

(b) did not know that death was likely to result. (b) ...
Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life

Allocutus

5. In administering the allocutus, the prisoner was given an opportunity to speak on the question of penalty. The prisoner elected to speak. She apologise for what he has done and says sorry to everyone involved. Sorry to the family of her late husband. Say sorry to the Court, police and CIS Officers. She also asked for leniency and mercy of this Court and to consider a fine as penalty as she has a young family who need her to care for them.
   
6. In light of this, the Court requested that the Probation Officer, Bulolo to prepare a Pre-Sentence Report on behalf of the prisoner. The Pre-Sentence Report is available to the Court for its deliberations on penalty.
   

Pre-Trial Detention

7. The prisoner has been in remand since 12 April 2023 and thus has been held in custody for a period of 1 year 11 months 14 days to the date of this judgment on sentence.
   

Pre-Sentence Report

8. I have had the opportunity to peruse the Pre-Sentence Report prepared by Ms Jane Taibob of the Community Based Corrections Office. I appreciated the feedback and suggestions contained therein. This Court will take into consideration these assessments in its determination of the severity of the penalty and decision-making process.
   
9. According to the Pre-Sentence Report, the prisoner is 37 years old, now a widow with two daughters. She is from Bima Village, Yangoru/Sausia District, East Sepik Province. She is the eldest of 5 siblings, is educated and she was employed as an Auto Electrical Mechanic prior to her remand.
   
10. The prisoner says that she had gone through a lot with her late husband and is still facing trauma and misery. She, however, feels sorry for her daughters as she is unable to support them financially and emotionally. Thinking of her daughters trying to survive outside by themselves is really hard. She states that she never meant to kill her husband. She was only trying to protect herself from him when he started beating her up. She states that most times she does not fight back but that time she decided to defend herself because she had enough of being assaulted. She says that she is sorry and is willing to reconcile and pay compensation to say sorry to the deceased’s family.
    
11. Whilst noting the overall feedback and comments gathered for this Pre-Sentence Report, I am amazed that the general attitude of the persons including the prisoner that the deceased is a “womaniser” and that the deceased more or less brought all these on himself. Perhaps I will say this, “womaniser” or “not”; no one has the right to take someone’s life. Life is precious. It is irreplaceable. No amount of gold is going to bring that life back. Hence, I am of view that there is no genuine remorse at all.
    
12. I also note that the Pre-Sentence Report summarises that the prisoner as a person who is confident and is mature and concluded that the prisoner can be considered for a Probation Sentence if the Court considers it and recommended that the offender be placed on a noncustodial sentence of not less than 4 months and or not more than 4 years under Probationary Supervision conditions. In that the prisoner shall serve part sentence and part on probation. And shall keep peace and be of good behaviour during the probation period and not reoffend. The offender shall reconcile and make peace with the deceased family, such peace reconciliation shall be facilitated by the CBC (Probation Office) and so forth. Other conditions as this Court deems fit. The prisoner reports once weekly to the Probation Office, Bulolo and that she abides by all Court Orders imposed on her during the period of her probation.
    

Mitigation factors

13. Factors in favour of the prisoner is that she is a first-time offender.
    

Aggravating factors

14. On the other hand, the aggravating factors against the prisoner are that this was a premeditated attack, It was a multiple stab wounds were inflicted on the most vulnerable part of the body, with a dangerous weapon, that is a knife was used in the attack. It was a vicious attack and there was a strong desire to inflict grievous bodily harm resulting in the loss of a life. Such an offence is prevalent. The killing occurred within a domestic setting, such killing in a domestic setting is unnecessary and could have been avoided, by way of obtaining an IPO or seeking assistance from the family sexual violence Unit. Such offending in a domestic setting is prevalent. .
    

Issue

15. The issue for determination is the appropriate sentence to impose on the prisoner.
    

Sentencing Principles

16. It is settled law in this jurisdiction that the maximum penalty for an offence should ordinarily be reserved for the worst type of case, under consideration, (SCR No 1. of 1984: Re Maximum Penalty [1984] PNGLR 418, Avia Aihi v The State [1982] 92, Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR 105, Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653. It is also well settled that each case must be treated with its own set of facts and circumstances: Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38. The Courts have unfettered sentencing discretion under s 19 of the Criminal Code Act and the Courts are not necessarily bound by the maximum and minimum tariffs suggested by Supreme Courts (Thress Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC1017.
    
17. For this present case, you are convicted for the crime of murder a very serious crime for which the maximum penalty prescribed under s 300 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code subject to s 19 is imprisonment for life.
    
18. Section 19 discretionary power provisions as to punishments are as follows:
    

^“(1) In the construction of this Code, it is to be taken that, except when it is otherwise expressly provided–

(aa) ...

(a) a person liable to imprisonment for life or for any other period, may be sentenced to imprisonment for any shorter term; and

(b) a person liable to imprisonment may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding K2,000.00 in addition to, or instead of, imprisonment; and

(c) a person sentenced on conviction on indictment to pay a fine may be sentenced–

(i) to be imprisoned until the fine is paid, in addition to any other punishment to which he is sentenced; and

(ii) instead of being sentenced to be imprisoned until the fine is paid–to be imprisoned for a term (not exceeding the term provided for in Subparagraph (i)) if the fine is not paid within a specified period (which period may be extended as the court thinks fit); and

(d) a person convicted on indictment of an offence not punishable with death may–

(i) instead of, or in addition to, any punishment to which he is liable–be ordered to enter into his own recognizance, with or without sureties, in such amount as the court thinks proper, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a time fixed by the court; and

(ii) comply with such other conditions as the court may, in its discretion, impose; and

(e) a person convicted of any offence on summary conviction may, instead of being sentenced to any punishment to which he is liable, be discharged on his entering into his own recognizances, with or without sureties, in such amount as the court thinks proper, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a term not exceeding one year; and

(f) when a person is convicted of an offence not punishable with death, the court may instead of passing sentence, discharge the offender on his entering into his own recognizance, with or without sureties, in such sum as the court thinks proper, conditioned that–

(i) he shall appear and receive judgment at some future sittings of the court or when called on within a period specified by the court; and

(ii) if the court thinks fit, he shall in the meantime keep the peace and be of good behaviour and comply with such other conditions as the court, in its discretion, imposes.

(2) Imprisonment in accordance with Subsection (1) (c)(i), for non-payment of the fine–

(a) shall not extend for a term longer than two years; and

(b) shall not together with the fixed term of imprisonment (if any) extend for a term longer than the longest term for which he might be sentenced to be imprisoned without a fine.

(3) In a case to which Subsection (1) (c) applies, the court may give such directions as it thinks proper as to the enforcement of the sentence of imprisonment, including a direction that the person sentenced appear at some future sittings of the court or when called on, by notice in the prescribed form, to show cause why the sentence of imprisonment should not be executed because of the non-payment of the fine within the specified period or any extension of that period.

(4) If under Subsection (3) a person directed to appear, or called on by notice in the prescribed form, to show cause why the sentence of imprisonment should not be executed because of the non-payment of the fine within the specified period, or any extension of that period, does not appear at the required time and place, a Judge may issue a warrant to arrest him and to bring him before a Judge.

(5) Imprisonment under Subsection (1) (d) for not entering into a recognizance–

(a) shall not extend for a term longer than one year; and

(b) shall not together with the fixed term of imprisonment (if any) extend for a term longer than the longest term for which he might be sentenced to be imprisoned without a fine.

(6) When a court sentences any person convicted under Subsection (1) (d) to a term of imprisonment, it may further order that–

(a) the offender be imprisoned for such portion of that term as it thinks proper; and

(b) the execution of the sentence for the remaining portion of the sentence be suspended on his entering into a recognizance, with sureties if so directed, in accordance with Subsection (1)(d) but further conditioned that, if called on, he shall appear and receive judgment in respect of his service of the portion of the sentence.

(7) A Judge may, on being satisfied that the offender has committed a breach of any of the conditions of a recognizance under Subsection (6), forfeit the recognizance and commit him to prison to undergo the suspended portion of his sentence or any part of it.

(8)[9] [Repealed.]

(9) Notwithstanding that restriction of movement is not specified as a punishment for an offence, a court may, in addition to any other punishment or punishments imposed, also impose restriction of movement in accordance with Section 600.

(10) When a court is considering the punishment or punishments to be imposed in any case it shall also consider whether, in the circumstances of the case, restriction of movement is an appropriate punishment.

Murder, s 300 (1 (a)) – Criminal Code

19. The crime of murder is a serious crime. Thus, the question for this court is to consider whether this present case falls within the worst type of case that warrants the imposition of the maximum penalty of life imprisonment as held in in SCR No 1. Of 1984: Re Maximum Penalty [1984] PNGLR 418; Goli Golu v the State [1979] PNGLR 653; Avia Aihi v The State [1982] 92; Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR 105; Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38; Steven Loke Ume & Ors v The State (2006) SC836 and Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789.
    
20. Similarly, it is also important to ensure that when the Court exercises judicial discretion, careful consideration must be taken particularly in situation where there are issues relating to the sanctity and value of human life. Human life is far more precious and valuable than material things and as such no amount of remorse or compensation will restore the life lost. Therefore, the unlawful taking of another person’s life is a serious and horrendous crime and the perpetrator must be punished accordingly.
    

Sentencing guidelines

21. The Supreme Court has specifically established sentencing guidelines relating to the crime of wilful murder. These guidelines set out in the case of Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789. In that case, the Supreme Court has established a sentencing guideline for homicide cases which had left the National Court with wide discretion available to it when fixing a sentence. In that, the Supreme Court did carefully consider the sentencing guidelines and gave detailed sentencing guidelines for manslaughter, murder and wilful murder which is useful to consider and can be useful when sentencing for wilful murder. The various guidelines to be taken into consideration in order for the Court to determine the appropriate sentence for wilful murder offences are on the following scale of sentence for a conviction of wilful murder.
    

Sentencing tariff – Wilful murder (Manu Kovi v The State (supra)) guidelines

22. Bearing all these observations in mind, this court now asked itself as to what purpose will incarceration bring to the community at large, particularly when such atrocity occurs. The attack and the force within which these wounds are inflicted does indicate that the prisoner had intended to cause real harm to the victim. It was a very vicious attack. Further, the medical report indicates that there was a strong desire to inflict grievous bodily harm; in that there was evidence of the deceased was stabbed multiple times (3 times) on the back and twice on the thighs. The victim succumbed to his injuries.
    

Submissions on sentence

23. In their submission on sentence, both counsel submitted that the issue before the court was whether the present case is one of the worst types of case under s 300 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code which subject to s 19 attracts a term of life imprisonment. They pointed out that this court has considerable discretion to determine whether this court can impose the maximum penalty of life imprisonment by virtue of s 19 of the Criminal Code Act.
    
24. In his submission for the prisoner, Mr John submitted that in these circumstances, this Court consider the other alternative provisions of the Section 19 discretion and determine as to whether or not to impose: (i) a shorter term of imprisonment (s 19 (1) (a).
    

Sentencing tariffs in murder cases

25. Mr. John submits that the Court in the exercise of its sentencing discretion to consider the approach taken by the Court in the case of Ume v The State (2006) SC836 where the Court took into account all relevant aggravating circumstances, all relevant extenuating circumstances, and all relevant mitigating factors. The Court must then balance these factors and determine a punishment which fits the particular crime. He submits further for the prisoner that consideration of aggravating factors is of course not new as they include pre-planning, degree of pre-mediation, weapons (if any) used, multiplicity of attack or injuries inflicted, any inhuman acts such as torture or cutting up the body performed after the killing, and so on. Likewise, in any extenuating circumstances, this concept is also not new, They relate to the circumstances of the commission of the offence, itself – factors which reduce the seriousness of the crime. These are relevant factors for purposes of sentencing in all criminal offences. Examples of extenuating circumstances include de facto provocation, duress, or coercion, the degree of and extent of the offender’s participation, the offender’s medical condition such as psychopathic personality, lack of sophistication or traditional customs, practices and beliefs which influence the offender to act in the way, she did.
    
26. As for mitigating factors, relevant factors to be considered include the offender’s youth, good personal and family background, personal antecedents such as good character, education, employment, and Christian background, first time offender, guilty plea, early confession to police, remorse, co-operation with the police, poor health and restitution or compensation.
    
27. The life imprisonment penalty being the maximum punishment for murder is reserved for the worst case of its kind. The facts of each case will of course be different and the punishment for each case to be determined on its own set of facts. In determining what would be an appropriate penalty, this court must consider all the facts and circumstances of the case carefully and in this regard apply the principles set down in the case of Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789.
    
28. In this case, Mr. John submitted that a starting point of sentence for murder be 10 years because of the presence of mitigating factors and aggravating factors with extenuating circumstances of defacto provocation as viewed in the case of State v Roy (2015) N5963 where the prisoner pleaded guilty to murder. A sentence of 13 years was given, 7 years was suspended due to defacto provocation. In another case, the State v Urado (2012) N5164, again a guilty plea. The deceased was having an affair with the prisoner’s husband. It is a case within a domestic setting, the deceased was stabbed with a kitchen knife, at his back. A starting point of 14 years was suggested due to mitigating factors, 12 years head sentence imposed. 5 years to sentence to serve and the balance suspended with conditions. In State v Pauline Kewa (2001) N9356, the prisoner pleaded guilty to stabbing her husband. Here a sentence of 13 years was imposed,
    
29. Overall, Mr, John submitted that the in this case, a starting point of sentence be set at 10 years to be partly suspended on terms and any other orders that this court deems fits.
    
30. Ms Joseph in reply submitted that this is a case where the offence falls into the worst-case category and therefore the principles established in Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789 must apply to determine the severity of sentence. She submits that a sentence within category 2 and 3 is appropriate penalty. In Manu Kovi v The State (supra), the prisoner pleaded guilty to the wilful murder of his wife. On appeal on the severity of sentence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and established the sentencing principles for all homicide cases which has been followed. Whilst she acknowledged that the mitigating circumstances in favour of the prisoner are important considerations; so too are matters relating to his aggravating factors. The maximum punishment of death is reserved for the worst case of wilful murder.
    
31. Ms Joseph referred this Court to the case of Henry v the State (2020) SC2063, the appellant was found guilty of the murder of his wife. He was sentenced to 27 years, on appeal, it was reduced to 23 years. In that case the deceased died after the appellant kicked her in her abdomen resulting in her enlarged spleen rupturing causing her death. In State v Laki [2011] N4905; The prisoner pleaded not guilty to murder. The prisoner’s wife was walking home from a disco when he confronted them. An argument led to a scuffle during the scuffle he assaulted and punched his wife causing her to fall down. As she laid on the ground, he took out a knife and stabbed her. He said that he did not mean to hurt her but only a touch however she died. After stabbing his wife, he ran away. He was sentenced to 25 years.
    
32. Overall, Ms Joseph submits that this case is comparable to the above two cases for the following consideration:
    

“The use of a bush knife on an unarmed, innocent, and defenseless woman is a vicious attack. Strong desire to kill. The injuries sustained were multiple bush knife wounds as per the medical report. The only difference is the charge to which the prisoner before the Court has been charged with Wilful Murder, however, she submits and urged this Honourable Court to consider the circumstances surrounding the offence”

Deliberations

33. Having heard submissions on sentence from both the Defence Counsel and the Prosecution on relevant issues including the mitigation and aggravating circumstances for and against the prisoner. This Court is now tasked to consider an appropriate sentence to be imposed. Firstly, I must say that the death was tragic and unwarranted. In this case, those community members affected by the victim's death, have lost a son, father, nephew and grandson, and valuable community member irrespective of how he is perceived by the prisoner and those around her. Furthermore, however, remorseful the prisoner appears to be, no amount of amity will bring the victim back to life. This sort of crime is prevalent. Here, a life has been taken away with such brutality. I note that there has been some dispute of sorts, however, instead of sorting out the dispute amicably between the people concerned, the prisoner participated in this offending, where an innocent man was subject to some brutal, vicious, and violent end.
    
34. Bearing all these observations in mind, this court now asked itself as what utility will incarceration bring to the community at large for such brutality? Particularly when such atrocity occurs within home and society as a whole. Given those sentiments, it is my considered view that the prisoner here must be placed in incarceration as this is the consequences of her actions and or decision to killing an innocent man however his way of life (“womaniser” or otherwise”. No life should be taken away so easily.
    
35. Furthermore, the number and type of wounds and the force within which these wounds are inflicted does indicate that the prisoner had strong intended to cause real harm to the deceased, and it was a very vicious and cold-blooded attack. In that, there was a strong desire to inflict real actual harm which had resulted in the death of the victim. I say this because there is evidence that the prisoner has had a whole weekend to walk away from the marriage. In fact, evidence suggest that she had packed up, cleared the house of any thing that she had planted around the house and was moving out of town, yet she waited for the victim to return home and attacked him by stabbing him multiple times on the back and things. These actions which infers pre-planning. It is equally important to also point out that the serious injuries inflicted on the deceased indicate that the prisoner intended to cause real harm to the victim, and it was a very vicious and brutal attack. In that, there was a strong desire to inflict real actual harm which had resulted in the injuries sustained by the victim. It was a brutal killing of drunk defenseless man.
    
36. I also refer and adopt the statement made by the Court in the case of the State v Bernard Hagei (2005) N2913, where the Court said, and I quote:
    

“There are so many wanton killings happening in the country at will as though life is some form of commodity or a replaceable item that can be borrowed or bought from the hardware shop in town. Killings in this country are becoming more daring without fear and there is no respect for sanctity of life. Brutal horrific and cold-blooded killings are becoming too frequent.”

37. I adopt and endorse the observations made by the Court in that case and apply it to the circumstances of this present case. This case was a premediated and brutal killing. Many wanton killings are happening in the country at will as though life is some form of commodity or a replaceable item that can be borrowed or bought from the hardware shop in town. The prisoner had no respect for the sanctity of human life.
    
38. Further, I also adopt and endorse the statement made by the Court in the case of The State v Yanis Ipiri (2008) N3512, where the Court stated, and I quote:
    

“Life is lived only once. It is therefore very precious. The sanctity and value of a human life is more precious than money, gold or wealth and the Courts do take a serious approach to treating life as sacred. No amount of compensation will ever restore a person’s life.”

39. It is not an easy task when determining an appropriate sentence to be imposed on a prisoner in your situation. This is because there is no formula; see State v Nemao [2015] N6131; State v Mera [2021] N10526; or mechanism through which a sentence is rated; see State v Nemao [2015] N6131. A Judge or the Court in all circumstances is guided by the particularities of a given case, circumstances, and antecedents of the offender and the interest of the State or society generally, including accepted objectives and purposes for sentencing. In addition, the Courts are also guided by the sentencing guidelines that have been established by case law and tariffs (in limited areas) enacted by legislation. However, overall, the court has very wide discretionary powers under Section 19 of the Code to suspend wholly or partly a sentence once imposed depending on the circumstances of a case. Furthermore, for purposes of consistency and parity, this Court is also guided by principles already established by case law in relevant facts and circumstances.
    
40. All in all, this is a case where you used a dangerous weapon, a knife to inflict grievous bodily harm on a drunk and defenseless man. It was a vicious attack with a strong desire to inflict grievous bodily harm which resulted in loss of life. Life is lived only once. It is very precious. The sanctity and value of a human life is more precious than money, gold and wealth and the Courts do take serious approach to treating life as scared. No amount of compensation will ever restore a person’s life.
    
41. I note that your counsel Mr. John has referred to some of these cases in his submission on sentence. Likewise, Ms Joseph for the State. References to these cases where relevant will be used to assist this court determine an appropriate sentence. Whilst noting the above, I also give some consideration to the mitigating factor in your favour. These are that you are a first-time offender and have expressed remorse.
    
42. In determining what penalty to impose, I accept and adopt the submission made by the State that this type of offence is very prevalent and thus a sentence must be seen as a personal and general deterrence. Thus, an appropriate starting point of sentence to impose on you would be within the range of 20 years to life imprisonment (which is within category 2 to 3 of the Manu Kovi (supra)) guidelines. In addition, given the criminality of your conduct and the fact that life can only be lived once, and no amount of compensation or remorse can ever restore a person’s life. Society must never lose sight of the fact that a life is scared and must be protected and to uphold the principles of sanctity of human life.
    
43. Consequently, I am of the view that a sentence of 20 years imprisonment for the charge of murder under s 300 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code would be appropriate. This is because the assault on the deceased was unwarranted. I must also state that by passing sentence, offenders are discouraged from re-offending and that others are discouraged from committing crimes of this nature and or taking the law into their own hands. Here, the victim however innocent has suffered injuries of varying degrees on his persons due to a range of degree of anger and behaviour which have involved the use of all kinds of weapons however lethal. In order to deter such behaviour, it is proper that a sentence of appropriate proportion be imposed on you and for this, I sentence you to a term of 20 years imprisonment, which is within category 2 of the guidelines used in Manu Koivi v The State (supra).
    
44. I also noted that you have already been in custody for a period of 2 year 2 months and 13 days. The next issue now is to determine whether such a pre-sentence period in custody be deducted from the sentence term of 20 years? This is allowed under Section 3 (2) of the Criminal Justice (Sentences) Act, so given that provision, I now deduct the period of 2 years 2 months 13 days of your sentence term of 20 years. This then leaves the balance of 17 years 9 months 17 days of the sentence term to be served at Buimo, CIS.
    
45. The next issue is to consider whether any of the balance of your 17 years 9 months 17 days sentence be suspended.
    
46. Firstly, suspension of a sentence is at the discretion of the Court, to be exercised on proper principles and if it is recommended by a Pre-Sentence Report (Public Prosecutor –v- Done Hale (1998) SC564). Secondly, suspension may also be appropriate if it encourages reconciliation and restoration of damaged relationships. (Public Prosecutor v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91).
    
47. For your case, whilst the PSR is favourable and has recommended that the Court consider probation sentence if it considers it necessary. At the same time, the PSR report considers that you are emotionally mature and interact that well with the community. I note also that there is indication or information that you will consider some form of compensation and reconciliation with the family of the deceased. However, come to think of it, I am also mindful of the fact that the deceased really does not have a family. This is because the family that were supposedly meant to be there for him in his time of crisis were not there for him. They did not even bother to attend to him at the hospital when he was dying. There is also lack of confirmation from the victims’ family on these matters. Given the foregoing, I find that such a recommendation does not reflect the fact that your reintegration into the community would be beneficial both to yourself, the victim’s family and the community at large.
    
48. Given this conflicting view, I am inclined to disregard the recommendation presented in the PSR Report. The views of the persons consulted do not really convey an expression of remorse or sense of loss of a human life at all. The views expressed are one of blame being put on the deceased in that it was he who was in the wrong and he got what was coming to him. I accept the submission made by the State that this is a case where there is a strong need for both personal and general deterrence. The assault was unprovoked where a lethal weapon was used. Furthermore, no material has been presented that warrants suspension of any part of the sentence. However, I do note that s 19 of the Criminal Code is still available to the Court.
    
49. With regard to the prisoner’s pleas for leniency and being a first time offender in court, this case can be distinguished from the case of Paulus Mandatitip and Anor v The State [1978] PNGLR 128 where youth was considered as a mitigating factor or the case of Kuri Willie v The State (1987) PNGLR 298 Hinchliffe, J (as he was then) discussed the need for courts to investigate alternatives to imprisonment when dealing with youthful first time offenders and the need to consider alternative mode of punishment to imprisonment. However although this prisoner is a first time offender and young man, the crime of murder which is committed with such impunity must carry with it some serious penalties as a deterrent factor and I therefore adopt the principle applied by Hartshorn J in the State v Taulaola Pakai (2010) N4125, where he stated that “Court’s should not lose sight of its duty to impose what is a just and fair punishment on an offender." A plea for leniency to avoid the suffering of one's family should have little or no weight when an appropriate sentence is being considered."
    
50. In these circumstances, this court considers that incarceration is an appropriate penalty. I therefore sentence you to 20 years imprisonment with hard labour. I deduct a period of 2 year 7 months 8 days being the period that the prisoner has been held in custody pursuant to s 3(2) of the Criminal Justice (Sentences) Act. This leave a balance of 17 years 9 months 17 days terms of sentence to be served in custody at CIS, Buimo.
    
51. In the exercise of discretion under s 19 of the Criminal Code, I suspend 4 years of the prison term of 17 years 9 months 17 days. This leaves the balance of 13 years 9 months 17 days of your sentence to be served in custody at CIS, Buimo.
    

Sentence

52. Having convicted you, Miriam Norbert for one count of murder under 300(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act, you are now sentenced as follows:
    

Length of sentence imposed: 20 years
Less pre-sentence period: 2 years 2 months 13 days
Balance of sentence to serve: 17 years 9 months 17 days
Amount of sentence suspended: 4 years
Time to serve in custody: 13 years 9 months 17 days

Sentenced accordingly.
________________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the State: Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the offender: Public Solicitor