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Gibbons v Koror State Government [2019] PWSC 10 (19 March 2019)

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
APPELLATE DIVISION

IBEDUL YUTAKA M. GIBBONS,
Appellant,
v.
KOROR STATE GOVERNMENT and GOVERNOR FRANCO GIBBONS,
Appellees.

Cite as: 2019 Palau 10
Civil Appeal No. 18-021
Appeal from Civil Action No. 16-116


Decided: March 19, 2019


Counsel for Appellant Yukiwo P. Dengokl

Counsel for Appellees Mark P. Doran

BEFORE: ARTHUR NGIRAKLSONG, Chief Justice
JOHN K. RECHUCHER, Associate Justice
R. BARRIE MICHELSEN, Associate Justice

Appeal from the Trial Division, the Honorable Kathleen M. Salii, Associate Justice, presiding.

OPINION[1]

PER CURIAM:

[ 1] l Yutaka M. Gibbons[2] is appealing the Trial Division’s determination that actions taken by former Governor Yositaka Adachi, including reaing office space in the Kore Koror State Capitol Building (“the Capitol”) previously used by Appellant, did not violate the Koror State Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and REMAND for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

[ 2] Before dsing the events ents precipitating this lawsuit, a brief review of the history of the Koror State Government is necessary. The Koror State Constitution was adopn April 13, 1983 and established three branches of governmeernment: the House of Traditional Leaders (the HOTL), comprising of the Ngarameketii and Rubekulkeldeu and headed by the Ibedul; the Administration, headed by the Governor;[3] and the Legislature, headed by the Speaker. From 1986 until 2002, the operations of the Koror State Government were housed in Bai Ra Meketii, which is owned by the Ngarameketii. This changed in November of 2002 with the completion of the Capitol. The Capitol had designated offices equipped with telephone and internet services for the Governor, the Speaker, and the Ibedul. Once the Capitol opened, the Legislature and Administration branches completely relocated to the Capitol. While Appellant maintained an office space within the Capitol, he and the HOTL continued to use Bai Ra Meketii.
[ 3] Formeernor Adachi was elas elected as the Governor of Koror State in 2006. He testified that over the next ten years, Appellant&#8217fice was essentially vacant. Considering it a waste of resources to pay for an unused interinternet connection, former Governor Adachi disconnected the telephone and internet services to the office. The HOTL later set up an internet connection at Bai Ra Meketii.
[ 4] On Janua, 2016, former Gmer Governor Adachi sent a letter to Appellant noting that the Office of the Governor required more office space for staff and indicating that he intended to take over Appellant’s office unless he received an objection. Darius B. Ellis, the Executive Director for the HOTL, responded to the letter on behalf of Appellant, indicating that Appellant would resume use of the office at the beginning of February. Despite this letter, the office remained unoccupied for the next six months. On July 28, 2016, former Governor Adachi sent a letter informing Appellant that the office had been reassigned and the locks changed. The office was given to Speaker of the Legislature Eyos Rudimch.
[ 5] Appellant filet against inst the Koror State Government and former Governor Adachi. Appellant raised several causes of action, asserting that r Governor Adachi violated the Koror State Constitution by (1) reassigning Appellant’8217;s office; (2) cutting off internet and telephone services to the office; and (3) eliminating a staff position within the HOTL. Following a two-day trial, the Trial Division concluded that former Governor Adachi did not violate the Koror State Constitution by reassigning Appellant’s office. The Trial Division also concluded that Appellant had failed to prove damages regarding disconnection of the internet because the evidence showed that the Koror State Government paid for the cost of internet service to Bai Ra Meketii when the HOTL submitted those bills for payment. The Trial Division did not address the purported elimination of the HOTL staff position.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[ 6] On appeais Court reviewsviews a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Ngarbechesis Klobak v. Ueki, 2018u 17 7. “Under the error rror standard, ard, findings will be reversed only if no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion based on the evidence in the record.” Otei v. Smanderang, 2018 Palau 4 10. <7] “8220;A trial co82t’s decision to entertain a claim for declaratory relief is reviewed for abuse of dtion.” Id. “A trial court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it b it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Kiuluul v. Elilai Clan, 2017 Palau 14 10 (nal quotation marks ands and alterations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[ 8] Appellanses three issuesssues. First, Appellant asserts that Appellees violated Article IV, § 2 and Article VI, § 1 of the Koror State Constitution by changin locks on Appellant’s office. Appellant next asserts erts that the HOTL are entitled to recover the costs of setting up and maintaining internet at Bai Ra Meketii. Finally, Appellant asserts that former Governor Adachi violated Article VI, § 2(5the Koror State Constitustitution by eliminating the staff position of Assistant Secretary to the HOTL. We address each contenti turn.

I. Office Space in the Capitol

A. Arti Article VI, § 1

[ 9] “The Houseraditionitional Leaders . . . shall be the supreme authority of the State of Koror for all matters relating to traditional law.&; Koror Const. art. VI, § 1ellant’s argument onnt on this issue is that thit this provision makes the HOTL “an integral part of the Koror State government,” which entitles it to office space within the Capitol. If, as Appellant contends, the HOTL is constitutionally entitled to an office within the Capitol, this right must derive from a specific constitutional provision.
[ 10] Intion to establishing hing the HOTL as a branch of government, Article VI, § 1 grants the HO8220;supremepreme authority . . . for all matters relating to traditional law.” This Court has interpreted this provision anting the HOTL absolute control over its own membership. See House of Traditional LeadeLeaders v. Koror State Gov’t, 17 ROP 101, 108 (2010) (“[T]he statement granting HOTL ‘supreme authority’ is in the context of the section titled Membership . . . . The language itself and the location of the clause reflect[] the intent of the drafters that HOTL’s ‘supreme authority for all matters relating to traditional law’ is in the context of membership.”). Appellant does not contend that former Governor Adachi attempted to revoke Appellant’s position as Ibedul or that reassigning his office has in any way controlled or influenced the membership of the HOTL. Therefore, this provision of the Koror Constitution was not violated.

B. Article IV, § 2

[ 11] Appellaxt contends that that former Governor Adachi violated Article IV, § 2 by taking over Appellant’s office and changing the locks. In relevant part, thivision states that the Koror State Government shall not &#8t “prevent a traditional leader from being recognized, honored, and given formal or functional roles at [any] level of government.” Koror Const. art. IV, § 2. Appellant contends th taby taking away his office, former Governor Adachi prevented him from being given a “formal or functional role” inKoror State Government.
[ 12] There can be no real dispute that the HOTL canL cannot serve a functional role in the government without a work space to accomplish their governmental responsibilities. Indeed, the issue in this case is not whether Aant is entitled to any office, but whether Appellant is entitled to a particular office. The Trial Division found that Appellant “kept some files and office supplies in the HOTL office at the Capitol, . . . but [he] never actually occupied the space.” For nearly ten years, Appellant used Bai Ra Meketii as his primary work space, and there is no indication that his choice to use his office there, rather than his office at the Capitol, in any way hindered his ability to perform a functional role in the Koror State Government. Consequently, there is no support for the argument that reassigning Appellant’s office unconstitutionally prevented him from being given a functional role in the government.
[ 13] Appellano argues that rhat revoking his office in the Capitol prevents him from being recognized and given a formal role in the governmeppellant relies heavily on the testimony that the Capitol building was originally constructtructed to house all three branches of government and claims that, by denying him space at the Capitol, former Governor Adachi was attempting to undermine the HOTL’s status as a branch of the Koror State Government. However, Bai Ra Meketii has long been recognized as a place of governmental authority and indeed, the entirety of the Koror State Government was housed there for nearly a decade prior to the completion of the Capitol. Even after the Capitol was completed, Bai Ra Meketii remained a well known and respected work space for the HOTL. By Appellant’s own choice, the HOTL continued to be housed in Bai Ra Meketii and the office in the Capitol served as little more than a storage space. As such, there is nothing inherently exclusory about the HOTL being housed at Bai Ra Meketii rather than at the Capitol. It was Appellant’s choice to operate from Bai Ra Meketii; he cannot now argue that his choice creates an unconstitutional limitation on his formal role in the Koror State Government.

II. Internet Expenses

[ 14] Appellaso contends that that he is entitled to recover damages for the out-of-pocket costs associated with setting up and maintaining internet access at Bai Ra Meketii time period at issue spans from June 2016 through March 20ch 2017. There is no dispute that the internet bills were paid by the Koror State Treasury from October 2016 through March 2017. As such, the only relevant time period is from June 2016 through September 2016.[4] The Trial Division found—and Appellant does not contest—that no requisition requests were submitted to the Koror State Treasury for this time period. Instead, Appellant contends that the HOTL had made regular informal requests to the Office of the Governor, but had been repeatedly denied.
[ 15] Whesuch a request was mwas made is a fact issue, reviewed for clear error. Appellant presented testimony in support of this argumen it is the province of the fact finder to determine how much credibility such testimony is y is to be afforded. See Ngiraked v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 2016 Palau 1 8 (&#82 do not reweigh the the evidence. We do not reassess the credibility of witnesses.” (internal citations omitted)). Here, the Trial Division determined that, because there was no documenevidence to support Appellapellant’s testimony, it was not credible enough to meet his evidentiary burden. Appellant’s testimony was undermined by contrary evidence establishing that the HOTL had been appropriated money for operational costs and miscellaneous expenses, as well as evidence that the internet bills were paid whenever the HOTL submitted requests to the Koror State Treasury. The Trial Court’s decision to credit the documentary evidence over the testimonial evidence was not clearly erroneous. See id. (“Where evidence is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, a court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. Elimination of HOTL Staff Position

[ 16] Finallyellant alleges tges that former Governor Adachi violated Article VI, § 2(5) of the Koror Stonstitustitution by eliminating the position of Assistant Sary to the HOTL. See Koror Const. art. VI, § 2(5) (&;[The HOTL] may recr recruit, hire, and supervise its own swhich shall be paid in acco accordance with law . . . .”). However, whether former Governor Adachi actually eliminated this pos is a question of fact prop properly left to the Trial Division to decide in the first instance. Here, Appellant raised this cause of action in the underlying complaint and presented evidence at trial, but the Trial Division did not decide the issue. Therefore, a limited remand is appropriate to determine whether the actions allegedly taken by former Governor Adachi actually eliminated the staff position of Assistant Secretary to the HOTL.

CONCLUSION

[ 17] We A the Trial Dial Division’s judgment in regard to Appellant’s office space within the Capitol and internet expenses. We REMAND for the limpurpose of resolving Appellant’s cause of action rega regarding the purported elimination of a HOTL staff position.

[1] Although Appellant requests oral argument, we resolve this matter on the briefs pursuant to ROP R. App. P. 34(a).

[2] We note the House of Traditional Leaders is not named as a party in this appeal. As such, we would typically treat Appellant as bringing this lawsuit in his individual capacity—not his official capacity—thus rendering him unable to represent the HOTL. However, the underlying case properly named Appellant as acting in both his individual and official capacities, Appellant’s briefing clearly indicates that he purports to represent both himself and the HOTL, and Appellees have not objected to this error. Therefore, we follow the parties’ lead and treat this appeal as if it were filed by Appellant on behalf of himself and the HOTL. Similarly, because former Governor Adachi was sued in his official capacity in the underlying case, and later replaced as Governor of Koror by Franco Gibbons, we assume that Governor Gibbons is being sued in his official capacity.

[3] The original Constitution of Koror State named the State Executive Administrator as the head of the Administration. This was changed when the Constitution was first amended on July 15, 1997, designating the Governor as the head of the Administration.

[4] Appellant asserts that the out-of-pocket cost for setting up and maintaining internet services during this time totals $2,979.99. A review of the trial exhibits shows that Appellant improperly calculated these damages by double counting nearly all of the expenses. Properly calculated, the potential compensatory damages total $1,529.99.


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