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State v Isara (No. 2) [2025] PGNC 387; N11552 (23 October 2025)

N11552

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR NO. 992 OF 2025

THE STATE

V

KESSY ISARA
(NO 2)

WABAG: ELLIS J
23 OCTOBER 2025

CRIMINAL LAW – MURDER - s. 300(1)(a) CCA – Sentence after trial – offender (first wife) struck victim (second wife) in the neck with a knife – de facto provocation – incident initiated by victim – offender with five children aged from 18 months to 12 – 18 years IHL – 6 years suspended.

Brief facts

The offender’s husband began a relationship with the victim. When the offender saw the victim with her youngest child, she took that child from the victim. The victim then tried to stab the offender with a knife which the offender avoided. The offender tripped the victim, who fell and dropped the knife. The offender picked up that knife and stabbed the victim in the neck, once, causing her death.

Held
(1) Charge of murder assessed as Category 2 by reference to Kovi.
(2) Sentence of 18 years, middle of the range of 16 to 20 years, imposed.
(3) Suspension of 6 years due to objective and subjective factors.

Cases cited
Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789
State v Londari (2025) N11530
State v Pundi (2025) N11536
State v Yapa [2023] PGNC 479; N10615

Counsel
J. Kesan, for the State
L. Toke, for the offender

SENTENCE

1. ELLIS J: Kelly Isara, of Aiyak village in Laiagam in Enga Province, was committed for trial on a charge of murder, a charge that was based on s 300(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1974 (the CCA). She was found guilty, following a trial in which her defence of self-defence was rejected.
   

Allocutus

2. After a conviction was recorded, the offender was provided with an opportunity to address the Court, prior to closing submissions. She said:
   

I am the mother of five children. They are all under-age. And I do not know who is going to look after them for me. They have a long way to go. They have the right to an education. I need to go and look after them. So, if this court can impose a penalty on me, I am asking this court to impose a penalty of less than ten years.

And I am asking this court to have mercy on me. And if this court can give me an open transfer. I say sorry to the good Lord. I have done the wrong thing and violated one of the commandments, the sixth commandment. I also say sorry to the State. I have also violated the Constitution of this country, and I also say sorry. I greatly feel sorry for the deceased and her close relatives. I have learned a lesson and this will be my first and last. I am asking mercy from this honourable court. I am asking this honourable court to have mercy on me. Again, I am asking mercy from this court, and I am asking this court to put me on a good behaviour bond.

Evidence

3. As the State relied on the evidence tendered during the trial, the evidentiary basis for the circumstances of the offence is to be found in the findings of fact, which are set out below.
   
4. No evidence was led for the offender during the sentence hearing.
   

Submissions for the offender

5. It was indicated that the offender is aged 34, is the third of four children of parents who are both still alive. She was said to have left school in 2007, while she was in grade 8. Having given birth to seven children, of whom 5 are still alive, the current ages range from about 18 months to 12 years. She was said to be a member of the Christian Apostolic Faith who has a disabled left hand, due to an injury inflicted by her husband.
   
6. A submission was made that this case falls within the second of the four categories set out in Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789 (Kovi), for which the suggested range is imprisonment for between 16 and 20 years. It was conceded that there were aggravating factors in this case: a knife was used, a life was lost, and this kind of offence is prevalent. Mitigating factors were said to be no prior convictions, no pre-planning, a single stab wound, and expressions of remorse. There were also said to be extenuating circumstances of the victim being a second wife whom the husband had permitted to live in the same house, de facto provocation, and the offence occurring in an environment of marital discord.
   
7. Reference was made to the decision in State v Yapa [2023] PGNC 479; N10615 (Yapa) where a sentence of 12 years was imposed, following a plea of guilty. It was contended that a sentence of 14 years should be imposed, with 9 months deducted for time already spent in custody, and that part of that sentence should be suspended. It was also submitted that compensation could be considered.
   

Prosecution submissions

8. Reference was made to the circumstances of this case, as recorded in the findings of fact in the judgment delivered this morning. It was noted that the victim was aged 25 years and was pregnant and that this offence is prevalent. However, it was accepted that this offence occurred in a situation of polygamy.
   
9. After noting that a dangerous weapon was used, this was a contested case, and that the maximum penalty was imprisonment for life, reference was made to Kovi, and to two cases decided by this Court earlier this month, namely State v Puni (2025) N11536 (Puni) and State v Londari (2025) N11530 (Londari). It was submitted that the sentence in this case should be higher than 16 years and 18 years was suggested.
   

Relevant law

10. Kovi is a Supreme Court judgment with the result that it binds judges at first instance. It provided guidelines for sentencing when the charge is murder, by suggesting sentencing ranges under the following four categories which are set out below:
    

Category 1 12-15 years

Plea No weapons used.

Ordinary cases. Little or no pre-planning.

Mitigating factor with Minimum force used.

No aggravating factors. Absence of strong intent to do GBH.

Category 2 16-20 years

Trial or plea No strong intent to do GBH.

Mitigating factors with Weapons used.

Aggravating factors. Some pre-planning.

Some element of viciousness.

Category 3 20-30 years

Trial or plea Pre-planned. Vicious attack.

Special aggravating factors. Strong desire to do GBH.

Mitigating factors reduced in Dangerous or offensive weapon used

weight or rendered insignificant eg. gun or axe.

by gravity of offence. Other offences of violence committed.

Category 4 Life imprisonment

Worst case - Trial or plea Pre-meditated attack.

Special aggravating factors. Brutal killing, in cold blood.

Findings of fact

11. The Court made the following findings of fact, as set out in the reasons for the verdict that were provided earlier today:
    

(1) The husband of the offender formed a relationship with the victim.

(2) On 28 January 2025, the victim was at a bus stop in Wabag.

(3) At that time, she had with her the youngest child of the offender.

(4) When the offender saw that, she grabbed her child from the victim.

(5) The victim then tried to stab the offender in the face with a kitchen knife.

(6) That was a brown handled knife, about 6 to 8 inches long.

(7) The offender moved her head and thereby evaded that blow.

(8) The offender then tripped the victim, who fell to the ground.

(9) When she fell to the ground, the victim dropped that knife.

(10) The offender then picked up that knife in her right hand and stabbed the victim.

(11) The offender stabbed the victim, once, on the right side of her neck.

(12) The victim was lying on the ground, unarmed, at that time.

(13) That stab wound severed the carotid artery and the jugular vein.

(14) That stab wound caused the death of the victim.

(15) Stabbing a person in the neck is likely to cause the death of that person.

(16) Stabbing a person on the body is likely to cause grievous bodily harm.

(17) It is a reasonable inference that, when the offender used the knife to strike the victim, she intended to cause grievous bodily harm to the victim.

Objective factors

12. The circumstances of the offence are as indicated in the findings of fact.
    

Subjective factors

13. The offender has had to endure (1) her left hand being injured by her husband, (2) her husband taking the victim as a second wife, (3) his permitting the victim to live in the same house as the offender, and (4) seeing her youngest child, a son then aged 9 months, in the arms of the victim. It was the last of those four matters that clearly initiated this incident.
    

Consideration

14. Being a decision of the Supreme Court, Kovi is a decision which binds this Court. While it only provides sentencing guidelines, it is clear those guidelines should be followed unless there are circumstances which clearly warrant a sentence outside the range suggested by that case.
    
15. The use of a weapon, namely a knife, clearly brings this case within category 2, for which the suggested range is imprisonment for 16 to 20 years.
    
16. The decision in Kovi is intended to assist in achieving the objective that like case are treated in a similar manner. This case does resemble the recent cases of Londari and Puni, this being another case where death resulted from a blow to the neck with a knife or a bush knife. A sentence of imprisonment for 16 years was imposed in each of those cases. However, both those cases involved a plea of guilty.
    
17. Having regard to the circumstances of the offence, the need for deterrence and the objective of consistency in sentencing, the Court considers that a sentence of more than 16 years needs to be imposed in this case. Imprisonment for 18 years, as suggested by the lawyer representing the Sate, is considered an appropriate sentence, noting that a sentence of 18 years is the mid-point of the range suggested by Kovi for this case. A reduction from the upper limit of 20 years is warranted by the fact that it was the victim who carried and first tried to use a weapon, namely a knife.
    
18. However, such a sentence makes no allowance for the de facto provocation, a term used to denote provocation that does not provide a defence under the CCA. It cannot be doubted that this offence would not have occurred if the husband had not taken a second wife, brought her live in the matrimonial home, and if the victim had not been carrying the offender’s youngest child at the time of the offence. In view of (1) that de facto provocation, (2) the offender’s expressions of remorse, (3) she being a first offender, and (4) the young ages of her five children (from 18 months to 12 years), the Court considers that six years of that sentence should be suspended, being the same period that was suspended in Yapa, on the condition that the offender be of good behaviour during a period of three years, commencing on the date when she is released from custody.
    
19. As to the suggestion that compensation could be considered, the Court does not consider compensation as an alternative to the operation of the criminal law. Where compensation has been paid prior to sentencing, the Court can take that into consideration. It could even be that a proposal to pay compensation might be relevant to the sentence that should be imposed. However, when this Court has to determine a definite sentence, an indefinite suggestion that compensation might be considered cannot be entertained.
    

Sentence

20. For those reasons, the Court considers that a sentence of imprisonment for hard labour for 18 years should be imposed. As the offender has already spent 9 months in custody prior to today, there is a period remaining to be served of 17 years and 3 months. Suspending 6 years of that period, on the condition that the offender be of good behaviour and be required to appear before the court if that requirement is breached, leaves a period remaining to be served of 11 years and 3 months.
    

Sentenced accordingly.

Lawyer for the State: Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the offender: Public Solicitor