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Laitepo Engineering Ltd v Dagoba [2025] PGNC 347; N11489 (12 September 2025)

N11489

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS(JR) NO. 26 OF 2025 (IECMS)

BETWEEN:
LAITEPO ENGINEERING LIMITED
Applicant

AND:
MARAGO DAGOBA in his official capacity as the Administrator
of Hela Provincial Government
First Respondent

AND:
HELA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
Second Respondent

AND:
LAKARI WAMBE in his capacity as the Hela Provincial
Government Finance Manager
Third Respondent

AND:
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Fourth Respondent

WAIGANI: DINGAKE J
16 JUNE, 12 SEPTEMBER 2025

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by defendants to set aside directional orders of court – directional orders include order for an oral examination of the Hela Provincial Government Administrator and Finance Manager to determine whether there are monies legally available to satisfy debt; and the production of documents to establish availability of such funds – proceedings stem from defendants failure to settle plaintiff’s judgment debt – issues for determination- should Directional Orders be set aside for offending Claims Act - requirements to set aside order of court – Whether Plaintiff entitled to invoke Order 13 Rule 13 of the National Court Rules to enforce judgment debt – whether granting of Directional Orders offend Supreme Court authority of Atlas Corporation Ltd v Ngangan (1995] PNGLR 1 -Plaintiff was entitled to invoke Order 13 Rule 13 of the National Court Rules - Directional Orders were properly made and do not offend Claims Act - Orders consistent with, and give effect to principles outlined in Atlas Corporation Ltd v Ngangan - Defendants have not established basis for Court to set aside April Orders - Defendants’ Application to set aside Directional Orders dismissed

Cases cited

Atlas Corporation Ltd v Ngangan [1995] PNGLR 1

Counsel

Mr. Daniel Kop, for the applicant

Mr. Justin Wohuinangu, for the respondents

JUDGMENT

1. DINGAKE: INTRODUCTION: This is an application by the Defendants to set aside Directional Orders made by this Court on 14 April 2025 (“the April Orders”). The April Orders were made ex parte on the application of the Plaintiff, who holds a judgment debt of K6 million against the Hela Provincial Government, an agency of the State, for services rendered.
   
2. The core of the dispute lies at the intersection of a successful litigant’s right to enjoy the fruits of its judgment and the specific, restrictive regime established by the Claims By and Against the State Act (“the Claims Act”) for enforcing judgments against the State.
   

BACKGROUND

3. The Plaintiff obtained judgment against the First Defendant. The Second Defendant, the State, is liable for this debt by virtue of Section 1 of the Claims Act.
   
4. The judgment has remained unsatisfied for several years. The Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 14(1) of the Claims Act, endorsed a certificate of judgment. Despite this, the Departmental Head responsible has failed to satisfy the judgment debt.
   
5. Frustrated by this inaction, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion seeking, inter alia, orders pursuant to Order 13, Rule 13 of the National Court Rules (“NCR”) for:
   
   1. The oral examination of the Hela Provincial Government Administrator and Finance Manager to determine whether there are monies legally available to satisfy the debt; and
      
   2. The production of documents to establish the availability of such funds.
      
6. Critically, the Plaintiff did not seek an order for Mandamus. It explicitly sought liberty to move for Mandamus after the oral examination was completed.
   
7. On 14 April 2025, the Court granted the April Orders, which included the aforementioned orders for examination and production, and also granted leave to the Plaintiff to amend its directional orders.
   
8. The Defendants now seek to set aside the April Orders.
   

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

9. The following issues fall for determination:
   
   1. Should the Directional Orders granted on the 14th of April 2025 be set aside for offending the Claims By and Against the State Act?
      
   2. What are the requirements to set aside an order of court, and have they been met?
      
   3. Was the Plaintiff entitled to invoke Order 13 Rule 13 of the National Court Rules to enforce the judgment debt?
      
   4. Did the granting of the Directional Orders offend the Supreme Court authority of Atlas Corporation Ltd v Ngangan (1995] PNGLR 1?
      

ANALYSIS AND REASONING

ISSUE 2: THE REQUIREMENTS TO SET ASIDE AN ORDER AND WHETHER THEY ARE MET

10. The Defendants’ application is brought under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to review and set aside its own orders, particularly those made ex parte. The principles are well-established:
    
    1. The applicant must show that the order was made irregularly or in error; and/or
       
    2. That there are serious questions to be tried regarding the validity of the order; and/or
       
    100. That it is in the interests of justice to set the order aside.
         
11. The threshold is not particularly high. The primary concern is whether the order should have been made in the first instance. If the Court finds that the April Orders were granted on an incorrect legal basis, that is a sufficient reason to set them aside. I will therefore consider this issue in conjunction with the substantive legal arguments under Issues 1, 3, and 4.
    

ISSUE 1 & 3: THE CLAIMS ACT, ORDER 13 RULE 13, AND THE ABSENCE OF MANDAMUS

12. The Defendants’ central argument is that the Claims Act provides a complete code for enforcing judgments against the State and that the April Orders, by seeking to circumvent the specific procedures of the Act (particularly the prohibition on Mandamus in s.14(5)), are illegal and invalid.
    
13. I find this argument to be fundamentally misconceived, and it fails for the following reasons:
    
    1. The Nature of the Orders Sought: The Plaintiff did not seek Mandamus. It sought preliminary orders for examination and discovery. Section 14(5) of the Claims Act expressly prohibits actions for Mandamus or contempt other than for failure to observe the requirements of Section 14(2), (3), and (4). The Plaintiff’s application is not caught by this prohibition. It is a preliminary step, a fact-finding mission, not an attempt to compel payment directly.
       
    2. The Role of Order 13 Rule 13: Order 13 Rule 13 of the NCR is a tool of general application for a judgment creditor to investigate the financial means of a judgment debtor. It states: “Where a person is entitled to enforce a judgment... the Court may order the judgment debtor... to attend before the Court and be orally examined... and to produce any documents...” The State, once a judgment has been entered against it, is a "judgment debtor" like any other. While the method of ultimate enforcement is different (no writ of execution), the right to investigate the debtor’s ability to pay is a logical and necessary precursor to choosing the correct enforcement method.
       
    100. The Solicitor General’s Certificate is Key: Section 14 of the Claims Act is triggered by the service of a certificate of judgment upon the Solicitor General. The Defendants concede that this was done. The endorsement of the certificate by the Solicitor General is the State’s acknowledgment of its legal liability. At this point, the debt is no longer a contested claim but a crystallized debt owed by the State. The Plaintiff is therefore a judgment creditor entitled to use all available and appropriate tools to discover how that debt may be paid, short of tools expressly forbidden by statute (like attachment).
         
14. Therefore, the Plaintiff was entirely entitled to invoke Order 13 Rule 13 of the NCR. The April Orders did not offend the Claims Act; they operated alongside it to facilitate its purpose – the satisfaction of valid judgment debts against the State.
    

ISSUE 4: THE AUTHORITY OF ATLAS CORPORATION LTD V NGANGAN

15. The Defendants’ reliance on Atlas is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Atlas was dealing with an application for Mandamus itself. The comments of Logan J, which are authoritative, were directed at the prerequisites for granting that specific mandatory order.
    
16. Logan J held that Mandamus should not issue until it is ascertained that there are funds legally available. He suggested that one way to ascertain this is by oral examination. His Honour was not prohibiting oral examination; he was endorsing it as a necessary prerequisite for the more drastic step of Mandamus.
    
17. The Plaintiff’s strategy in this case is a textbook application of the logic in Atlas:
    

Step 1: Obtain judgment and the Solicitor General’s certificate (done).

Step 2: Use Order 13 Rule 13 to examine the debtor and ascertain if funds are available (the subject of the April Orders).

Step 3: Only then, and only if the examination reveals available funds, consider applying for Mandamus to compel the Departmental Head to apply those specific funds to the debt.

18. The April Orders are therefore not in offence of Atlas; they are in perfect harmony with it. They are the very mechanism suggested by the Supreme Court to ensure that any future application for Mandamus is properly founded.
    

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

19. For the foregoing reasons, I find that:
    
    1. The Plaintiff was entitled to invoke Order 13 Rule 13 of the National Court Rules.
       
    2. The Directional Orders granted on 14 April 2025 were properly made and do not offend the Claims By and Against the State Act.
       
    100. The said Orders are consistent with, and give effect to, the principles outlined in Atlas Corporation Ltd v Ngangan.
         
    4. Consequently, the Defendants have not established a basis for this Court to set aside the April Orders.
       
20. The Defendants’ Application to set aside the Directional Orders of 14 April 2025 is hereby dismissed.
    
21. The time for compliance with the Directional Orders of 14 April 2025 is extended to 30 days from the date of this judgment.
    
22. The Defendants shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs of this application on a party-party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the applicant: Toll Lawyers
Lawyers for the respondents: Gileng & Co. Lawyers