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Life Outreach Ministries Association Inc v Gware [2025] PGNC 346; N11488 (12 September 2025)

N11488

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS(JR) NO. 3 OF 2025 [IECMS]

BETWEEN:
LIFE OUTREACH MINISTRIES ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
Plaintiff

AND:
GEORGE GWARE as Chairman of the Papua New Guinea Land Board
First Defendant

AND:
PAPUA NEW GUINEA LAND BOARD
Second Defendant

AND:
BENJAMIN SAMSON as Secretary for Department of
Lands & Physical Planning
Third Defendant

AND:
ALA ANE as Registrar of Titles for Department of
Lands & Physical Planning
Fourth Defendant

AND:
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS & PHYSICAL PLANNING
Fifth Defendant

AND:
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Sixth Defendant

AND:
TWENTY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
Seventh Defendant

WAIGANI: DINGAKE J
16 JUNE, 12 SEPTEMBER 2025

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Preliminary Competency – Misidentification of Decision-Maker – Land Act 1996, ss 57 & 65 – Land Board’s role is advisory only – Minister for Lands sole authority to grant State leases – Requirement to name and join actual decision-maker in judicial review proceedings – Jurisdictional defect where wrong party named – Defect not curable retrospectively – Application dismissed without considering substantive grounds.

Cases cited
Frank Tonges Lau v Hon James Marape & Ors. MP Prime Minister Of Papua New Guinea [2025] PGNC 62 N11183
Honk Kiap v Fredrick Kasper [2023] PGSC 95; SC2435

Counsel
Mr. Luwi Dos, for the plaintiff
Ms. Maria Narokobi, for the first – sixth defendants
Mr. Marvin Joseph, for the seventh defendant

JUDGMENT

1. DINGAKE J: INTRODUCTION: This is an application for judicial review filed on 18 February 2025. The Plaintiff, Life Outreach Ministries (LOM), seeks review of a decision dated 13 November 2024 in which a Special Purpose Lease was granted to the Seventh Defendant, Twenty Development Association Incorporated, over land described as Portion 2268, Milinch Granville, Fourmil Moresby, National Capital District (“the subject land”).
   
2. The decision subject of review is the decision of the First Defendant, sitting as the Chairman of the Papua New Guinea Land Board (Second Defendant), made on 13 November 2024, Meeting No. 2/2024, published in the National Gazette No. G947 (item 255.LF. 041 16/2268), wherein the First Defendant granted a Special Purpose Lease to Twenty Development Association Inc (Seventh Defendant) over the land described as Potion 2268, Milinch Granville, Fourmil Moresby, National Capital District.
   
3. At the hearing of the substantive judicial review, the Respondents raised a preliminary issue namely whether the First and Second Defendants were incorrectly named as the decision maker in granting the special purpose lease to the Seventh Defendant.
   
4. This judgment deals only with that preliminary issue.
   

PRELIMINARY COMPETENCY ISSUE

5. Section 57 of the Land Act 1996 provides that the Land Board is responsible for considering applications and making recommendations to the Minister for Lands, while Section 65 vests in the Minister the sole power to grant State leases. The Land Board’s role is therefore purely advisory, and it has no authority to grant leases.
   
6. It is trite law that in judicial review process, challenges must be directed at the actual decision-maker, as this is a fundamental rule of procedural fairness and jurisdiction. Courts cannot review a decision unless it was made by, or on behalf of, a properly named and joined decision-maker.
   
7. In Lau v Marape [2025] PGNC 62; N11183, my sister Purdon-Sully J correctly held that judicial review proceedings must correctly name the person or entity that actually made the decision under challenge, emphasizing that decisions brought against misidentified parties are jurisdictionally defective and can be dismissed even before considering substantive grounds.
   
8. Similarly, in Kiap v Kasper [2023] PGSC 95; SC2435, my brother Kandakasi DCJ held that failure to properly name or join the actual decision-maker renders the entire review irregular, defective, and non-binding, with the court lacking jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases—a defect that cannot be remedied retrospectively.
   
9. My brother Kandakasi DCJ expressed his opinion at paragraph 39 and 40 of the ruling, in the following terms:
   
   39. In short, the proceeding proceeded without the decision maker being properly named and heard before the final decision in the matter. This rendered the proceedings defective and most importantly the hearing and outcome was defective, improper and not binding on the decision maker. Consequently, the decision of the Appeals Tribunal remains unchallenged and undisturbed.
       
   40. The application for leave for judicial review and later the review itself was therefore defective. This in my view rendered the grant of leave for judicial review, the substantive judicial re view and the various reliefs the learned trial judge granted were highly irregular which warrant an immediate quashing and set aside.
       
10. It is common cause that the decision to grant the Special Purpose Lease was made by the Minister for Lands, based on a recommendation from the Land Board chaired by the First Defendant.
    
11. The Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and pleadings incorrectly challenge the decision of the Land Board or its Chair rather than the Minister, who alone has the statutory authority to grant the lease.
    
12. In naming the wrong party, the court is effectively being asked to review a decision not made by those named, which is not a mere technical error but goes to the core of the court’s jurisdiction. Unlike matters of discretion or equity, this is a jurisdictional defect: if the correct decision-maker is not properly named, the court lacks the authority to hear the matter or grant relief, and no discretion can be exercised over an application that is void for this reason.
    
13. In the cases of Lau v Marape and Kiap v Kasper, cited above, the courts made clear that naming the correct decision-maker is not just a procedural formality but a fundamental requirement for judicial review proceedings to be valid. Without properly identifying and joining the actual decision-maker, the proceedings are defective and cannot stand. This principle applies to the present case, where the applicant has failed to name the Minister—the real decision-maker—and thus cannot properly challenge the decision.
    

CONCLUSION ON THE PRELIMINARY ISSUE

14. In conclusion, the preliminary issue is fully meritorious and valid. The applicant has failed to name or join the proper decision-maker, namely the Minister for Lands. Consistent with the principles laid down by our Courts as indicated above, this omission is a fatal procedural error. As a result, the application is competency-defective and must be dismissed.
    

ORDERS

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed for want of competency.
   
2. The Plaintiff shall pay the defendants’ costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
   
3. All interim orders previously granted are discharged.
   

________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the applicant: Yendeken Lawyers
Lawyers for the first- sixth respondent: Solicitor General
Lawyers for the seventh respondent: Mawa Lawyers