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State v Veravekapi [2022] PGNC 334; N9812 (28 July 2022)

N9812


PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]


CR (FC) 218 OF 2021


STATE


V


PUANA PUANA VERAVEKAPI


Waigani: Wawun-Kuvi, AJ
2022:11th, 23rd May, 27th July


CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-Misappropriation, section 383A(1)(a) (2)(d) Criminal Code- Stealing, section 372(1)(5)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code-Whether the application of the property was dishonest? Whether the accused fraudulently converted cash monies to his own use? Whether the cash monies were located in a dwelling house?


The accused was charged with two counts of misappropriation under section 383A(1)(a)(2)(d) of the Criminal Code and one count of stealing under section 372(1)(5)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.


The accused incorporated a company known as Project Development Services (PDS) on 20 July 2016.
He subsequently gained employment with Carmon Construction Limited (Carmon) as a civil engineer.


On 24 June 2017, Carmon signed a contract with the State for the construction and sealing of the Kerema Town Roads. Pariva Road was not included in the contract. The accused was appointed as the project manager.
On 5 March 2018, the Gulf Provincial Government awarded a contract to PDS for the construction of Pariva Road. The accused used plant and equipment belonging to Carmon for the construction of the road.


Between 1 December 2018 and 31 December 2018, Santos Construction Services Limited (Santos) was engaged for the Kerema Aerodrome rehabilitation. It is alleged that the accused used plant and equipment belonging to Carmon for the project.


Between 1 December 2018 and 31 December 2018, the accused was given K15, 000.00 cash monies to give to the owner of Carmon for the use of the machinery. The accused stole the monies.


The accused does not dispute that he used Carmon machinery to construct the Pariva Road. He states that it was his intention to pay Carmon for the machinery, but he was terminated.


As for the Kerema Aerodrome Project, he says that that was an arrangement between Carmon and Santos. He was paid K15, 000 by Santos for the consultancy service he provided. It was his money.


Held:
As to Count 1:


  1. The accused was not authorized to use Carmon Construction Limited’s machinery on Pariva Road.
  2. The charge of misappropriation under s. 383A does not require the fraudulent taking or fraudulent conversion of the property unlike stealing as defined under s. 365 of the Code: see John Kasaipwalova v The State [1977] PNGLR 257.
  3. The accused did not deprive Carmon Construction Limited of the machinery. He used it for an unauthorised purpose for his own gain.
  4. In a charge of misappropriation, the State must prove that the application was a deflection from the purposes of the owner of the property. It need not prove that the property was consumed, expended or dissipated: see R v Easton [1993] QCA 255; [1994] 1 Qd R 531.
  5. The use of the machinery by the accused was a deflection from the purposes of the owner, namely Carmon Constructions Limited.
  6. The test of dishonesty is subjective but the standard of dishonesty to be applied is objective. The State must prove that the conduct of the accused was dishonest according to the standards of honest and reasonable members of the community and that subjectively he knew that his conduct was dishonest according to those standards: see Havila Kavo v The State (2015) SC1450 and Wartoto v The State (2019) SC1834.
  7. It was dishonest according to the objective standard of honest and reasonable members of the community for the accused to apply to the use of Project Development Services, Carmon’s machinery, under the circumstances they were obtained and used. I am also satisfied, that considering the accused level of education and background, he must have known that his conduct was dishonest according to those standards.
  8. The accused is found guilty and convicted of the charge of Misappropriation under section 383A(1)(a)(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.

As to Count 2:


1. The accused was not authorized to use Carmon Construction Limited’s machinery on the Kerema Aerodrome.


2. The accused colluded with George Ivaroa Toto of Santos Construction to use Carmon’s machinery on the Kerema Aerodrome project.


3. It was dishonest according to the objective standard of honest and reasonable members of the community for the accused to apply to the use of Santos, Carmon’s machinery, under the circumstances they were obtained and used. I am also satisfied, that the accused must have known that his conduct was dishonest according to those standards.


4. The accused is found guilty and convicted of the charge of Misappropriation under section 383A(1)(a)(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.


As to Count 3:


1.The monies were given before discovery of the unauthorized use of the machinery.


2. George Toto Ivaro did not give the sum of K15, 000.00 with instructions that it be given to Dickson Panau of Carmon Construction Limited.


3. Whilst money was paid, there are other possible inferences as to the purpose of the payment that cannot be excluded. That, the money was for consultancy service provided or for payment to the accused for the use of the machines or just part of his payment for both securing the contract, providing technical support, and providing the machines. All of which do not involve Carmon being the recipient.
4. The evidence does not permit to make a finding that the money was intended for Carmon Construction Limited.


5. The State has not proven that the money belonged to Carmon Construction Limited. Additionally, the State has not proven that the accused took the property with a fraudulent intent. Rather, the evidence as I have found, shows that the accused was given the money.


6. There is also no evidence that the money was taken from a dwelling house.


7. The accused is found not guilty and discharged of the charge of stealing under section 372(1)(5)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.


Cases Cited:


Papua New Guinean Cases
Wartoto v The State (2019) SC1834
Havila Kavo v The State (2015) SC1450
John Kasaipwalova v The State [1977] PNGLR 257


Overseas Cases Cited
R v Easton [1993] QCA 255; [1994] 1 Qd R 531


Reference
Criminal Code (Ch 262)


Counsel


Ms Theresa Aihi, for the State
Mr. John Goava, for the Defence


VERDICT


28th July, 2022


  1. WAWUN-KUVI, AJ: Puana Puana Veravekapi (the accused) is a 60-year-old male from Maopa Village, Abau in the Central Province. He is a civil engineer by profession graduating with a Bachelor of Engineering.
  2. He incorporated a business known as Project Development Services (PDS) on 20 July 2016.
  3. Between 2017 and 2018, he was employed by Carmon Constructions Limited (Carmon). He was the civil engineer and the project manager.
  4. In 2017, Gulf Provincial Government awarded a contract for the construction of Kerema Town roads to Carmon. The accused as Project Manager oversaw the project.
  5. The State now charges the accused for the unauthorised use of Carmon’s plant and equipment to other projects in Kerema.
  6. I will first deal with count 1 on the indictment and then counts 2 and 3.


BURDEN OF PROOF


  1. The onus is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and to negate any defences properly raised on the evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

COUNT 1: PARIVA ROAD

The Charge


  1. The accused is charges as follows:

Count 1: PUANA PUANA VERAVEKAPI of MAOPA VILLAGE, ABAU, CENTRAL PROVINCE stands charged that he between the 1st day of March 2018 and the 31st day of December 2018 at Kerema town, Gulf Province in Papua New Guinea, dishonestly applied to the use of Projects Development Services plant and equipment property belonging to Carmon Constructions Limited.


The Allegations


  1. On 24 June 2017, Carmon signed a contract with the State for the construction and sealing of the Kerema Town Roads. The specific roads were, the Hospital Road, Karita Road or KayBay Road, Hevoro 1 Road and Hevoro 2 Road. The accused was the project manager.
  2. On 25 March 2018, Gulf Provincial Government awarded PDS the contract to repair the Pariva Road. This was a road that was within Kerema Town but was not included in the contract awarded to Carmon.
  3. Carmon states that PDS through the accused used plant and equipment, specifically two Hino 700 Tipper Trucks, a Caterpillar Grader and a JCB Excavator (machinery) to construct the Pariva Road. The accused did not inform Carmon of this arrangement and no payment was received for the use of the machinery.
  4. The accused does not deny that he used Carmon’s machinery to construct the Pariva Road. He says that it was a technical decision and that he had intended to pay Carmon for the use of the machinery and equipment but was terminated before he could do so.

The Elements


  1. The State is required to prove that the accused[1]:
  2. The Application
  3. To own use or the use of another
  4. Property
  5. Belonging to another
  6. Dishonesty

Issues

  1. Whether Carmon authorized the use of the machinery?
  2. And if so, whether there was dishonest application?

Finds of Fact


  1. I state at the outset that there is no principle in law that requires me to accept or reject the whole of a witness evidence. Rather, I may accept part of the evidence and attach the appropriate weight and reject other parts.
  2. The accused admits that he used Carmon’s machinery for his company’s project on Pariva Road. He says that he informed Dickson Panau of Carmon Constructions.
  3. Dickson Panau states that he did not give authorization for the use of the machinery on Pariva Road.
  4. The issue for resolution is whether Carmon Construction authorized the use of its machinery?
  5. Determination of this issue is dependent upon when Carmon became aware of the use of its machinery.
  6. Dickson Panau says that he was only informed by Ravu Kila following the discovery of the photographs in the accused computer. He requested an explanation from the accused. The accused response was not sufficient, and a police complaint was laid.
  7. Ravu Kila stated that when he found the photographs in the accused computer, he realized that the accused was using Carmon’s machinery for an unauthorized project. He then contacted Dickson Panau who told him to investigate. He conducted investigations and confirmed that Carmon’s machinery, employees, and materials were used on the Pariva Road project.
  8. The accused answers throughout his evidence confirms that Dickson Panau only became aware of the use of the machinery after they were used. He stated that he was told by Dickson Panau to forget about what had happened and concentrate on completing the big project. He was surprised that they had pursed criminal charges because he was of the view that it was an administrative matter.
  9. Much of the accused evidence is consistent with the evidence of Dickson Panau and Ravu Kila of Carmon that discussions about the use of the machinery occurred following the discovery of the photographs and subsequent internal investigations.
  10. This leads me to conclusion that:
  11. I am therefore satisfied that Dickson Panau of Carmon Constructions did not authorize the use of the machinery on Pariva Road.

Application


  1. The dishonest application as charged by the State is the unauthorised use of Carmon machinery.
  2. The machinery always remained the property of Carmon. The accused as project manager was the custodian of the machinery.
  3. PDS through the accused used the machinery and was paid for the construction of the Pariva Road. Carmon was never paid.
  4. Determination of whether the unauthorized use amounts to dishonest application is subject to the definition of “applies to use” and the circumstances surrounding the application.
  5. The charge of misappropriation under s. 383A does not require the fraudulent taking or fraudulent conversion of the property unlike stealing as defined under s. 365 of the Code: see John Kasaipwalova v The State [1977] PNGLR 257.
  6. Here, the accused did not deprive Carmon of the machinery. He used it for an unauthorised purpose for his own gain.
  7. In determining the meaning of “applies to own use”, I adopt the principles in the Queensland Court of Appeal case of R v Easton [1993] QCA 255; [1994] 1 Qd R 531. Section s.408C of the Queensland Criminal Code, which was under considerations is similar to section S.383A of the Code. Macrossan CJ stated[2]:

It can be accepted that the section envisages some interaction between the person and the thing and this will not be met merely by the formation of an intention to act or the devising of a plan in respect of the thing. The section nevertheless stops short of requiring that there should be some consumption, expenditure or dissipation of the thing, alteration of its form or utilisation of it to secure some collateral material benefit, although these may be involved. I consider that the requirement of this part of the section is met when there has been a utilisation by the person involved for his own purposes. While the ways in which this may occur are legion, one example may illustrate the very minimal level of activity which I think would be sufficient. If a person takes a picture or work of art belonging to another and puts it in a place for the purposes of his own private enjoyment of it he will have applied it to his own use. He does not, for example, have to sell the picture before it can be said that this has occurred. Perhaps his plan may be more complicated than this. He may intend to sell the item after a time and in the meantime take pleasure from his private possession of it. On the other hand, he may simply intend to return it after a time. When he first takes the item in an unauthorised way from the person to whom it belongs and carries it towards his house to implement his plan, I consider that he will have already applied it to his own use,.....

.........

.......before an item of property will be “applied”, there has to be a mental element, an intention held in relation to the thing, and also there has to be some implementation of that intention, i.e. some act or acts which constitute some dealing with the thing: in simple terms something has to be done to or with the thing. Usually there will be, I think, some influence exerted upon the thing affecting its form, location or its attributes. The “application” will involve some deflection from the purposes of the person to whom the property belongs. In addition, the section stipulates that the application be dishonest.”


  1. The issue is not whether Carmon was deprived of ownership of the machinery or that it did not receive any money for the use of its machinery. In a charge of misappropriation, the State must prove that that the application was a deflection from the purposes of the owner of the property. It need not prove that the property was consumed, expended, or dissipated.
  2. There is no dispute that the machinery was in Kerema because of the Kerema Roads project. Having found that Carmon did not authorize the use on Pariva Road, I am satisfied that the use of the machinery by the accused was a deflection from the purposes of the owner, namely Carmon Constructions Limited.

Was the application dishonest?


  1. The test of dishonesty is subjective but the standard of dishonestly to be applied is objective. The State must prove that the conduct of the accused was dishonest according to the standards of honest and reasonable members of the community and that subjectively he knew that his conduct was dishonest according to those standards: see Havila Kavo v The State (2015) SC1450 and Wartoto v The State (2019) SC1834.
  2. Whilst the accused had the technical knowledge, PDS never had the materials, labor, and machinery to undertake the project. These were matters that were within the accused knowledge when he applied for and was subsequently awarded the Pariva Road project.
  3. What was available which he knew as the project manager of Carmon was Carmon’s materials and machinery. Materials and machinery in which he decided to use without informing Carmon, prior to, during and after the use.
  4. He was not being honest because he did not inform Carmon of his intention to use the materials and machinery. He was not honest because the only time Carmon was aware of the use of the machinery was when they were already used.
  5. There was no genuine intention to pay for the use of the machines or materials. The accused since receiving payment in March of 2018 never made any attempts to pay for the use of the machinery.
  6. If this was a technical decision in the best interest of Carmon, then the logical and honest thing to do would have been to inform Dickson Panau and the contract would have been awarded to Carmon, who had the resources.
  7. I am satisfied, that it was dishonest according to the objective standard of honest and reasonable members of the community for the accused to apply to the use of PDS, Carmon’s machinery, under the circumstances they were obtained and used. I am also satisfied, that considering the accused level of education and background, he must have known that his conduct was dishonest according to those standards.

Conclusion


  1. I am satisfied that the State has proven the elements of the charge of misappropriation beyond a reasonable doubt.

COUNT 2: KEREMA AERODROME

The Charges


  1. The accused is charged as follows:

Count 2: PUANA PUANA VERAVEKAPI of MAOPA VILLAGE, ABAU, CENTRAL PROVINCE stands charged that he between the 1st day of March 2018 and the 31st day of December 2018 at Kerema town, Gulf Province in Papua New Guinea, dishonestly applied to the use of Santo Construction Services Limited plant and equipment property belonging to Carmon Constructions Limited.


The Allegations


  1. In 2018, the Gulf Provincial Government awarded a contract to Santos Construction Service (Santos) for the rehabilitation of the Kerema Aerodrome.
  2. Carmon states that its machinery was used during this project. The accused did not inform Carmon of this arrangement.
  3. The accused does not deny that machinery was used. He says that Carmon was informed, and any payment arrangements was between Carmon and Santos.

Elements of Misappropriation


  1. The elements of the offence of misappropriation have been stated at paragraph 11.

The Evidence


  1. The State called Dickson Panau, Ravu Kila ad George Toto Ivaroa. The accused gave evidence in his defence and called John Haiava.
  2. Dickson Panau whilst the Managing Director appeared to have very little knowledge of what was happening in Kerema. What is clear from his evidence is that he did not authorize the use of the machinery for the Kerema Aerodrome. As far as he was concerned, he had sent the machinery to Kerema to construct the four town roads.
  3. Ravu Kila is the contracts officer. He found pictures and other documents relating to the Pariva Road and Kerema Aerodrome in the accused computer. He informed Dickson Panau and conducted an internal investigation.
  4. George Toto Ivaro is the Managing Director of Santos. He states that Carmon’s machinery was used for the Aerodrome Project. That Carmon had sent an invoice for K27, 880.00. That he gave K15, 000.00 cash as part payment. The money was given to the accused with instructions to pay the Managing Director of Carmon.
  5. The Accused says Carmon was aware of the use of the machinery. That K15, 000.00 was paid for services he had provided to Santos.
  6. John Haiava was employed as the Road Supervisor with Santos. He states that the K15, 000.00 was payment to the accused for consultancy service.

Issue(s)


  1. Whether Carmon authorized the use of its machines?
  2. And if so, whether there was dishonest application?

Findings of Fact


  1. I am again reminded that there is no principle in law that requires me to accept or reject the whole of a witness evidence. Rather, I may accept part of the evidence and attach the appropriate weight and reject other parts.
  2. It is accepted by all parties that Carmon’s machinery was used by Santos for the Kerema Aerodrome Project. It is also not disputed that the machines were in Kerema for the construction of the Kerema town roads.
  3. The issue is whether Carmon authorized the use of the machinery?
  4. Dickson Panau says that he did not give approval for the use of the machinery. The accused says approval was given.
  5. John Haiava’s evidence supports the State’s case that Carmon did not authorize the use of the machines. It provides insight as to the real arrangement.
  6. John Haiava says that the accused was a consultant to Santos between 2018 and 2019. That he had prepared and submitted the bid for the Kerema Aerodrome project. The contract was awarded late 2018 and early 2019. The project was not completed because Santos was given a deadline. They could not meet the deadline because they did not have the machinery. The contract was terminated.
  7. George Toto Ivaroa had stated that the machinery was in Kerema and that was the reason they were used. This is consistent with the evidence of the accused, that the only machinery in Kerema was that of Carmon.
  8. It is reasonably concluded that Santos did not complete the project because by then Carmon had put a stop to the use of its machinery.
  9. I do not accept the George Toto’s Ivaroa evidence that Dickson Panau referred him to the accused.
  10. Firstly, he was very evasive in his answers. When asked about the reason for the termination of the contract he merely stated that they did not meet the deadline. When considering the evidence of John Haiava, it is apparent that George Toto Ivaroa was evasive because he is the managing director of a company that neither had the technical background and resources to carry out the project. He had received money from the State for a project that he could not perform. He may face police charges for any answers that demonstrate that he had colluded with the accused. His answers were therefore calculated.
  11. Secondly, Carmon’s project was worth K3 million and had deadlines. The accused as project manager for all intent and purposes oversaw Carmon’s operations in Kerema. It is inconsistent with common sense and logic that Carmon would release its machinery and project manager for another job.
  12. Thirdly and finally, according to George Toto Ivaroa, John Haiava and the accused, the accused was working as an engineer for both Carmon and Santos during the relevant period. The accused states that according to NAC requirements, Santos was required to engage a qualified engineer to supervisor the project at the Kerema airport. He was engaged by George Toto to provide project supervision and technical support to Santos. This demonstrates that there was already an established relationship and one that did not require a referral from Dickson Panau.
  13. The evidence from John Haiava, George Toto Ivaro and the accused demonstrates that George Toto Ivaro and the accused were known to each other already. That they had devised the plan to obtain the Kerema Aerodrome Project and that they would use Carmon’s machinery. When Carmon discovered that its machinery was used, the project came to a standstill and was subsequently terminated.
  14. The evidence of Dickson Panau and Ravu Kila is clear. There was no authorization and that was the basis for the investigation which led to the eventual arrest of the accused.
  15. I find that there was no authorization for the use of the machinery.

Was the application dishonest?


  1. I adopt again adopt the principles in R v Easton [1994] 1 Qd R 531[3]. The issue is not whether Carmon was deprived of ownership of the machinery or that it did not receive any money for the use of its machinery. The issue is whether the application of the machinery was to a purpose other than what it was intended for?
  2. The machinery was in Kerema for the construction of the Kerema town roads. Carmon did not give authorization for the use of its machinery. The accused was responsible for the decisions relating to the machinery and he made the decision to use them on the Kerema Aerodrome. He did so because he was also engaged by Santos.
  3. I am satisfied that at the time when the accused used the machinery, he applied them to a use other than its intended purpose.
  4. Was the application dishonest?
  5. The test as it relates to dishonesty has already been discussed at paragraph 26 of this judgement.
  6. The accused was in Kerema because he was the project manager and engineer for Carmon. He then became engaged as an engineer for Santos. He applied for the Aerodrome contract on behalf of Santos. When he applied, he knew that Santos did not have the machinery and the technical expertise to complete the project.
  7. He used Carmon’s machinery and his expertise to carry out the project. He did not inform the owner of Carmon one Dickson Panau, prior to, during and after the use of the machinery. Carmon only found out when its Contracts Officer Kila Ravu conducted investigations and informed Dickson Panau of his findings.
  8. I am satisfied, that it was dishonest according to the objective standard of honest and reasonable members of the community for the accused to apply to the use of Santos, Carmon’s machinery, under the circumstances they were obtained and used. I am also satisfied, that the accused must have known that his conduct was dishonest according to those standards.

Conclusion


  1. I am satisfied that the State has proven the elements of the charge of misappropriation beyond a reasonable doubt.

COUNT 3: K15, 000 PAYMENT

The Charge


  1. The accused is charged as follows:

Count 3: PUANA PUANA VERAVEKAPI of MAOPA VILLAGE, ABAU, CENTRAL PROVINCE stands charged that he between the 1st day of December 2018 and the 31st day of December 2018 at Kerema town, Gulf Province in Papua New Guinea, stole cash sum of Fifteen Thousand Kina, the property of Carmon Constructions Limited.


The Allegations


  1. When Carmon discovered that its machines were used by Santos on the Aerodrome, it demanded payment.
  2. Santos responded to the demand and paid K15, 000 cash through the accused.
  3. Carmon did not receive the K15, 000.00 from the accused.
  4. The accused says that the K15, 000.00 was for consultancy services that he had provided to Santos.

Issue(s)


  1. What was the purpose of the money?

Findings


  1. There is no dispute that K15, 000.00 was given to the accused.
  2. When the money was given is crucial to the resolution of this issue.
  3. The evidence leads me to conclude that the monies were given before discovery of the unauthorize use of the machinery.
  4. Firstly, Dickson Panau was not aware of the use of the machinery.
  5. Secondly, John Haiava evidence which I accept is that the money was paid shortly after the contract was awarded.
  6. Thirdly and finally, common sense and logic dictate that the money would not have been given to the accused to take to Dickson Panua as he was the person who was under investigation for the unauthorised use of company properties. He would have been the last person anyone would have trusted.
  7. I do not accept the evidence of George Toto Ivaroa that he had given the money with instructions that it be given to Dickson Panau. I have accepted that the accused colluded with George Toto Ivaroa and that his motives for not being entirely truthful are because of the collusion.
  8. Whilst money was paid, there are other possible inferences as to the purpose of the payment that cannot be excluded. That, the money was for consultancy service provided or for payment to the accused for the use of the machinery or just part of his payment for both securing the contract, providing technical support, and providing the machinery. All of which do not involve Carmon being the recipient because at the relevant point in time, Carmon was not aware of the use of its machinery.
  9. The evidence does not permit to make a finding that the money was intended for Carmon.

Elements of Stealing


  1. The elements of stealing under Section 364 and 365 of the Criminal Code are:
    1. the movable property of another.[4]
    2. The accused moved the property by some physical act, i.e, asportation.[5]
    3. The accused took or converted the property to his own use or the use of another.[6]
    4. The accused took or converted the property with a fraudulent intent.[7]
  2. The State had further charged under section 372(5)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code. The section requires that the State must prove that the property was stolen from a dwelling house and its value exceeds K10.00.

Has the State proven the elements of stealing?


  1. The State has not proven that the money belonged to Carmon Construction Limited. Additionally, the State has not proven that the accused took the property with a fraudulent intent. Rather, the evidence as I have found, shows that the accused was given the money.
  2. There is also no evidence that the money was taken from a dwelling house.

Conclusion


  1. I am left with reasonable doubt as to whether the accused stole cash monies in the sum of K15, 000.00.

CONCLUSION


  1. Verdict of Guilty is returned for count 1 and 2 of the indictment for the charges of misappropriation under section 383A(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and a verdict of Not Guilty for count 3 of the indictment for the charge of stealing under section 372(1)(5)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.

ORDERS


  1. The Orders of the Court are as follows:
    1. The accused is found guilty and convicted of the charge of Misappropriation under section 383A(1)(a)(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.
    2. The accused is found guilty and convicted of the charge of Misappropriation under section 383A(1)(a)(2)(d) of the Criminal Code.
    3. The accused is found not guilty and discharged of the charge of stealing under section 372(1)(5)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.
    4. A Pre-Sentence Report is ordered and shall be made returnable on 10 August 2022 at 9.30 am.
    5. Bail is granted under section 10 of the Bail Act on the same conditions on which bail was previously granted.

________________________________________________________________
The Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
Sannel Lawyers: Lawyer for the Defence



[1] Havila Kavo v The State (2015) SC1450 and Wartoto v The State (2019) SC1834
[2] At page 534
[3] Refer to paragraph 17
[4] State v Kissip [2020] PGNC 17; N8184 and Illich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110
[5] Regina v Albert [1953] PGSC 8 (1 April 1953), State v Hanaoi [2007] N4012; State v Karakabo [2012] N4897; State v Kissip [2020] PGNC 17; N8184 and Ikalom v The State (2019) SC1888
[6] The State v Hanaoi [2007] N4012; State v Karakabo [2012] N4897; State v Kissip [2020] PGNC 17; N8184 and Ikalom v The State (2019) SC1888.
[7] The State v Hanaoi [2007] N4012; State v Karakabo [2012] N4897; State v Kissip [2020] PGNC 17; N8184 and Ikalom v The State (2019) SC1888


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