|
|
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS (JR) No. 18 OF 2019
BETWEEN
Hon. GINSON SAONU – In his capacity as Governor of Morobe Province
First Plaintiff
AND:
MOROBE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
Second Plaintiff
AND:
Hon. JOHNSON TUKE – In his capacity as the National Minister of Mining
First Defendant
AND:
DANIEL ROLPAGAREA – In his capacity as the State Solicitor
Second Defendant
AND:
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Third Defendant
AND:
WAFI MINING LIMITED
Fourth Defendant
AND:
NEWCREST PNG 2 LIMITED
Fifth Defendant
Lae: Numapo, AJ
2019: 19th March & 07th May
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Leave Application for Judicial Review (Order 16 Rule 3 of the National Court Rules) – Grounds relied on are minimum requirements for granting leave – Requirements of sufficient interest is not restrictive - Prima facie arguable case - Objection to Competency – Authority of Lawyers to act – Leave granted.
Cases Cited:
Papua New Guinea Cases
Asakusa v Kumbakor, Minister for Housing [2008] PGNC 39; N3303.
Dawidi v Jacob [2001] PGNC 130; N2083.
Geno v The State [1993] PNGLR 22.
Independent State of Papua New Guinea v Philip Kapal [1987] PNGLR 417.
Ken Mondiai & Ors v Wawoi Guavi Timber Company Ltd (2007) SC886
Leto Darius v Commissioner of Police [2001] 147, N2046;
Kombati v Singin [2004] PGNC 85; N2691; and
Louis Medaing & Ors v Lima Mulung & Ors [2010] N4001.
NTN Limited v The Board of the Post and Telecommunication Corporation and Others [1987] PNGLR 70
OS No. 668 of 2016 (CC2) – Ezra Kwako v Thomas Nen
Steamships Trading Company Ltd v Minister for Lands and Physical Planning [2000] PGNC 11; N1959
Pora v Leadership Tribunal [1997] PNGLR 1.
Sapu v Commissioner of Police [2003] PGNC 80; N2426
Valu v Ngagan [2018] PGSC 62; SC1723
Overseas Cases
Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1982] AC 617
Counsel:
Mr. R. Saulep, for the First Plaintiff
Mr. P.Mawa, for the First, Second and the Third Defendants
Mr. A. Mana, for the Fourth and Fifth Defendants (In Court)
DECISION
7th May, 2019
1. NUMAPO AJ: This is an application for leave for judicial review pursuant to Order 16 Rule 1 & 3 (O 16 r 1 & 3) of the National Court Rules (NCR). The requirement of r 3 sub-rule (3) have been duly complied with by giving notice of the application to the Attorney-General, by service on him sealed copies of the Originating Summons, Notice of Motion, and Statement in Support pursuant to O 16 r 3 (2) (a) and the verifying Affidavit in accordance with r 3 (2) (b). The defendants were represented by counsel on the application, though such application are usually made ex parte – r 3 (2) NCR.
2. The Plaintiff applied for leave for judicial review of a decision contained in a “Letter of Clearance” dated the 10th December 2018 from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant purportedly “clearing” the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) for signing and execution between the State and the Developers - Wafi Mining Limited and Newcrest PNG 2 Limited regarding the Wafi-Golpu Mining Project. Acting on the advice of the Second Defendant the First Defendant on behalf of the Third Defendant signed the MOU with the Fourth and Fifth Defendants on the next day, 11th December 2018. The Plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision hence this application. The nature of the decisions and the agreements for which review is sought are adequately set out in the originating summons and the statement in support.
3. In his affidavit the Plaintiff stated that on the 04th December 2018 in Sydney, Australia the Mining Minister Hon Johnson Tuke (First Defendant) and the Plaintiff Hon. Ginson Saonu were in Sydney for the Annual Mining Conference when both were summoned to a meeting at the Intercontinental hotel by the Prime Minister Hon. Peter O’Neill and were presented with an MOU and requested both leaders to sign in front of the other delegates comprising representatives of the Developer of Wafi-Golpu Joint Venture (“WGJV”), the Vice Minister for Mining, Member for Bulolo and the Governor of Central Province. Neither of the leader was aware of the MOU and refused to sign. As a result the signing was further deferred to Port Moresby and a week later on the 11th December 2018, the MOU was signed following the clearance given to the First Defendant by the Second Defendant. The decision to sign the MOU is now the subject of this application for review.
4. The Plaintiff took issue with the Clearance Letter issued by the Second Defendant clearing the MOU to be signed without proper consultation and/or input from him as the elected representative and Governor of the province or that of the Morobe Provincial Government given the fact that the Wafi-Golpu Mining Project is located in the Morobe Province. The decisions of which he is seeking review are set out in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of the Originating Summons (JR) as follows:
1. (a) The letter constituting the “Legal Clearance” issued by the Second Defendant on the 10th December 2018 for the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between the First, Fourth and Fifth Defendants regarding the Wafi- Golpu Mine development; and
(b) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the First, Fourth and Fifth Defendants on the 11th December 2018 pertaining to the 30% State Equity Option in Wafi-Golpu Mine in the Morobe Province.
5. According to the Plaintiff the significance of the MOU hence this application is that it deals with the State Equity Option which is a source of revenue for which the province has already expressed an interest in acquiring a share in the equity option. The Prime Minister has been made aware that the Morobe Provincial Government is interested in acquiring up to 15 per cent stake in the Wafi-Golpu mining project and intends to raise the required finances to acquire it.
6. Mr Mawa for the First, Second and Third Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff’s application is premature, misconceived and defective and is not supported by any cogent and tangible evidence to make out a prima facie case for a judicial review and asked the Court to refuse leave. He argued that the alleged decisions in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) alluded to above are not decisions which are capable of judicial review. He further submitted that the Applicants have not established a prima facie case for a judicial review in respect to the purported decision set out in the originating summons.
7. Mr Mawa further argued that the letter containing the Legal Clearance purportedly issued by the Second Defendant on the 10th of December 2018 for the execution of the MOU regarding the Wafi-Golpu Mining Project is not a ‘decision’ per se of a public body or authority and therefore, cannot be reviewed. He submitted that the application for leave should be refused.
8. An objection to competency was also raised by the Defendants alleging that the Plaintiffs have not obtained the necessary approval from the Attorney-General by way of a brief-out pursuant to section 10 of the Public Money Management Regularization Act 2017 (“PMMR Act”) and section 7 of the Attorney General Act 1989 (“AG Act”) and therefore, questioned the authority of Saulep Lawyers to institute these proceedings on behalf of the Plaintiff. Mr Mawa submitted that brief-outs to represent public body or a statutory body or other entities of government which also includes the provincial government must come from the Attorney-General in accordance with section 7 of the AG Act before proceedings are instituted. In this instance, Saulep Lawyers have not received any such brief-outs or instructions from the Attorney General and therefore, cannot represent the Plaintiffs hence the whole proceeding is incompetent and should be dismissed. He referred the Court to the recent Supreme Court decision of Valu v Ngagan [2018] PGSC 62; SC1723.
9. In response, Mr Saulep agreed that no such approval was given by the Attorney-General to represent the Second Plaintiff – The Morobe Provincial Government despite the Plaintiff’s numerous correspondences to the Office of the Attorney-General seeking to obtain the same and so to cure this defect he filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act on the 8th of February 2019 on behalf of the Second Plaintiff being the public body. He also pointed out that there is an obvious inconsistencies regarding the definition of a “public body”. Section 2 of the Interpretation section of the PMMR Act does not include the Provincial Government as a public body whereas section 10 (4) of the same Act included the Provincial Government as a public body.
10. Mr Saulep submitted that the First Plaintiff instituted the proceedings in his personal capacity as the elected representative and the Provincial Member of the Morobe Province and in that regard he does not require any approval from the Attorney-General.
11. My reading of the provision is that for purposes of legal representation the provincial government is regarded as a public body under section 10 (4) of the PMMR Act and therefore, cannot engage legal representation without the expressed approval of the Attorney-General. I am satisfied therefore, that the filing of the Notice of Ceasing to Act has settled the requirements of section 10. Consequently, the Second Plaintiff is no longer represented in this proceedings. It is also my understanding that the definition of a “public body” or a “statutory body” under section 10 does not include an individual holding a public office such as for instance an elected leader or representative and for this reason the objection on competency must fail.
12. Furthermore, there is, manifested on the evidentiary record, an apparent abuse of the discretionary power by the State to withhold approval to prevent a challenge of its own Department’s advice to the State by the Second Defendant. I consider that as a deliberate act on the part of the State to frustrate the efforts of the Second Plaintiff to exercise its rights to seek appropriate remedies that it might be entitled to under the law. In addition, such an act is in clear breach of the spirit of the Organic Law on Provincial & Local Level Governments found in the Preamble that calls for “promoting opportunity and popular participation in government at all levels” based on the second goal (Equality and Participation) of the National Goal and Directive Principles.
13. Mr Saulep further submitted that section 10 (1) of the PMMR Act is offensive to section 41 of the Constitution (Proscribed Acts) and is harsh and oppressive and therefore, unlawful and applied to the Court to strike it out as being unconstitutional and oppressive. In such matters only the Supreme Court is vested with the original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of other Courts, to deal with matters relating to the interpretation or application of any provision of a Constitutional Law pursuant to section 18 of the Constitution, hence I am unable to give a ruling on this aspect of his submission.
14. The principles of law governing the grant of leave for judicial review is well settled in this jurisdiction. Applicant seeking leave for judicial review pursuant to O16, r 3 of the NCR must satisfy the Court:
(i) that he has the locus standi in that he has sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates;
(ii) that the decision sought to be reviewed is that of a public body or authority;
(iii) that there is an arguable case on its merits;
(iv) that all administrative or other remedies have been fully exhausted; and
(v) that there has been no undue delay in bringing the application.
The above five (5) grounds is the checklist of the minimum requirements (emphasis mine) the Court must be satisfied with before it exercises its discretion whether or not to grant leave for a judicial review. Kandakasi J (as he then was) summarized well these requirements in Leto Darius v Commissioner of Police [2001] N2046. See also Kombati v Singin [2004] PGNC 85; N2691; and Louis Medaing & Ors v Lima Mulung & Ors [2010] N4001.
15. The powers of the National Court to grant reliefs sought in judicial review is found in section 155 of the Constitution. The reliefs available are commonly known as prerogative writs in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto.
A.GROUNDS SEEKING LEAVE
16. I now turn to the grounds seeking leave:
17. The Plaintiff/Applicant submitted that as a duly elected Provincial Member for Morobe Province and as Governor he has sufficient interest in the subject matter and therefore, has standing (locus standi) to bring this proceedings. One of his responsibilities is to ensure that the province generates and raises sufficient internal revenue from various sources within the province to maintain government services and one such revenue source is from mining activities carried out in the province such as the Wafi-Golpu mine.
18. Since assuming office as Governor he has made it his business to attend to all the consultative meetings and conferences regarding the Wafi-Golpu Mining Project. The National Government invoked the consultative process referred to as the ‘development forum’ under section 3 of the Mining Act to consult with the landowners and other relevant stakeholders including the Morobe Provincial Government. However, it was interrupted by a Court Injunction taken out by a landowner group in the proceedings OS No. 668 of 2016 (CC2) – Ezra Kwako v Thomas Nen. The Injunctive Orders were varied by consent to allow the development forum to resume on the 12th October 2018 but nothing has happened to date.
19. The Plaintiff through the Morobe Provincial Government has also commissioned a “Position Paper” relating to the Wafi/Golpu mining project. All these are evidence of his interest in the project and also that of the Provincial Government. Despite all his efforts the MOU on the Wafi-Golpu Project was signed on the 11th of December 2018 following the advice of the Second Defendant without his knowledge and/or input or that of the Provincial Government hence he is aggrieved by that decision.
20. So does the Plaintiff’s involvement in all these meetings and engagements regarding the Wafi/Golpu project indicates his sufficient interest in the matter? I would answer that in the affirmative.
21. The question relating to sufficient interest and locus standi varies from case to case and is often answered by examining the nature of the decision and the context in which it was made. In Steamships Trading Company Ltd v Minister for Lands and Physical Planning [2000] PGNC 11; N1959, his Honour Sheehan J held that; “.....it is essentially a mixed question of fact and law, a matter of fact and the degree of relationship between the plaintiff and the subject matter of his or her complaint....” See also: See Dawidi v Jacob [2001] PGNC 130; N2083.
22. The requirements of sufficient interest is broad in its application and not restrictive. So long as the Applicant is able to show that he has some relationship with the subject matter and that his relationship or interest in the subject matter is so affected by a decision of a public body that is sufficient ground to seek review. In Ken Mondiai & Ors v Wawoi Guavi Timber Company Ltd (2007) SC886 the Supreme Court held that:
“On application for leave the Court must be satisfied that the applicants has sufficient interests in the subject matter of the application...Sufficient interest might be demonstrated by interests of property, legal or financial nature but can include community, environmental, cultural interest and areas of special expertise.”
23. In the present case it is clear to me that the Plaintiff has an interest in the subject matter – the Wafi/Golpu mine. Firstly, the mine is situated in the Morobe Province of which he is the Governor and he would no doubt, have some interests in this multi million Kina project. Secondly the mine has a huge potential to change the economic outlook of the province and the country when it becomes fully operational and therefore, he wants to make sure that the province is well positioned to benefit from the project through revenue generation, employment opportunities and other spin-off activities and benefits for his people. Thirdly, he is also mindful of the environmental impact and other social issues that may arise as a direct result of this mining project and want to ensure that these concerns are properly addressed. And this is where his interests lies. I am satisfied therefore, that a prima facie case on sufficient interest has been made out in favour of granting leave pursuant to O 16 rr 2, 3 and 5 NCR.
24. For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has sufficient interest in the matter and therefore, has the locus standi to bring these proceedings pursuant to O 16 r 3(1) and (5).
25. One of the requirements to be granted leave is that the Applicant must satisfy the Court that the decision sought to be reviewed is that of a public body. There are two aspects to this, in my view; firstly, it relates to the decision per se, that whether or not it has the usual characteristics of a “decision” to be deemed a decision made by a public body and therefore, capable of being reviewed. And secondly, that the decision is that of a public body.
26. Firstly, with respect to the decision per se, Mr Mawa for the Defendants argued that the “Legal Clearance” contained in the letter to the First Defendant dated 10th December 2018 for execution of the MOU is not a decision per se but are mere documentations and therefore, not reviewable. On the closer look at the letter it became obvious to me that this was a legal advice from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant to expedite the signing of the MOU. The letter carries certain specific instructions regarding the MOU and clauses that needed to be inserted prior to the signing in accordance with the PNG laws and regulatory processes. The First Defendant is expected to adhere to these instructions before signing the MOU. Under those circumstances, I cannot see how this kind of instruction and advice cannot be deemed a decision. The Second Defendant is the Chief Legal Advisor to the State and his views and advice no doubt, forms the basis of a decision. He provides advice that translates into decisions based on law. Based on the advice the First Defendant proceeded to execute the MOU. I am satisfied therefore, that the advice given by the Second Defendant contained in the Letter of Clearance of the 10th December 2018 constituted a decision and therefore, reviewable.
27. Secondly, with respect to “public body”, the First Defendant – the Minister for Mining holds a public office and performs a public function as a Minister of the State. He is the Minister responsible for the Department of Mineral Policy & Geohazards Management, a public body. He is a member of the Cabinet in the National Executive Council (NEC) which forms the executive government established by the Constitution, a public authority. He acted in his official capacity as Minister responsible and had signed the MOU on behalf of the State. See: Asakusa v Kumbakor, Minister for Housing [2008] PGNC 39; N3303.
28. The Second Defendant is an employee of the State and therefore, a public servant and holds a public office as the State Solicitor within the Department of Justice and Attorney General (DJAG) established under the Attorney-General Act 1989. One of the statutory functions he performs is to provide legal advice to government departments, bodies, entities and agencies. His advice and decisions in most cases are quasi-judicial in nature and are issued for and on behalf of the State. The advice he gave regarding the MOU is made in his official capacity hence a decision of a public body and therefore, is reviewable.
29. I am satisfied that both the First and the Second Defendants are holders of public office and acted in their respective capacities and the decisions they made in the clearing of the MOU and its subsequent signing are done in the discharge of their respective statutory duties and therefore, is reviewable.
30. With respect to arguable case the onus is on the Applicant to demonstrate to the Court that he has an arguable case on merits to be given leave. The Court must be satisfied that the Applicant has an arguable case in that there are serious, substantive and fundamental issues of law to be tried. These must be shown in the grounds for review contained in the statement in support that must be properly and sufficiently pleaded to raise arguable issues of law. See: Asakusa v Kumbakor, Minister for Housing (supra). See also: NTN Limited v The Board of the Post and Telecommunication Corporation and Others [1987] PNGLR 70; and Geno v The State [1993] PNGLR 22. See also: Pora v Leadership Tribunal [1997] PNGLR 1.
31. The leading authority on arguable case is found in Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1982] AC 617; Lord Diplock sets out the principles on arguable case and said at p.644 that:
“If on a quick perusal of the material then available, the Court (at the leave application stage) thinks that it discloses what might on further consideration turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed, it ought, in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to give leave to apply for the relief. The discretion that the Court is exercising at this stage is not the same as that which it is called upon to exercise when all evidence is in and the matter has been fully argued at the hearing of the application.”
32. In the present case the two pertinent issues raised in this application are in my view, prima facie arguable case as they contain substantive issues of law to be tried. The first issue relates to the requirements of Section 3 (3) of the Mining Act which requires the Third Defendant - The State to consult with all relevant stakeholders before the grant of a mining lease. Furthermore, the need for proper and meaningful consultation is made mandatory by section 255 of the Constitution which states that; “In principle, where a law provides for the consultation between persons or bodies the consultation must be meaningful (emphasis mine) and allow for a genuine interchange and consideration of views.”
33. It is obvious from the evidence before the Court that neither the Plaintiff nor the Provincial Government were consulted before the MOU was signed. Furthermore, the consultation process has not taken place but if it did it was not properly concluded due to an injunction taken out in Thomas Nen (supra)
34. The relevant provisions of the Mining Act and Constitution made it both mandatory and obligatory on the part of the State to not just consult but “meaningfully” consult and allow for genuine interchange and consideration of views with persons or bodies that it ought to consult with prior to signing of any Agreement irrespective of whether it is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or a Mining Development Contract (MDC). Meaningful consultation through forums such as the development forum (s.3 Mining Act) is a pre requisite and made compulsory by law and therefore, the issuing of the Clearance Letter by the Second Defendant to the First Defendant clearing the MOU to be signed when the consultation process has not been fully exhausted was not only premature but also a clear breach of the Mining Act and the Constitution. The Plaintiff has an arguable case on merits in that the action(s) of the First and Second Defendants gave rise to serious substantive issues of law to be tried.
35. The second issue relates to the terms of the MOU itself in which the State has a right (State Option) to elect at any time before the commencement of the mining to make a single purchase of up to 30% equitable interest in any mineral discovery arising under the Exploration License (‘EL’). The State opted instead to acquire only 20% equitable interest in the Wafi-Golpu Joint Venture Project (‘WGJV’) as reflected in Clauses 2.4 (e) and 3.1 (a) of the MOU. Plaintiff argued that the Morobe Provincial Government had made its intentions known to the National Government that it is interested in acquiring up to 15% equity in WGJV however, this was not accommodated in the MOU. The Plaintiff is concerned that the Second Defendant has not taken into account his concerns regarding the 30% State Equity. Although the Morobe Provincial Government may not have same legal rights in a similar way as the State in equity participation in such projects under the current laws it may have some equitable interest in the WGJV under the doctrine of equity being; just, fair and reasonable. The Morobe Provincial Government and the landowners cannot be totally left out of the equation in terms of fair distribution of any wealth and benefits generated from this project. The fourth goal of the National Goals and Directive Principles enshrined in the Constitution calls for the “collective benefit and equal distribution” of natural resources and environment for all citizens.
36. All in all, I am satisfied that the materials placed before me discloses an arguable case on merits in favour of granting leave to the Plaintiff/Applicant.
37. It is obvious from the Plaintiff’s affidavits that he has on numerous occasions wrote to the First Defendant, Second Defendant and Third Defendant requesting proper consultation between the relevant stakeholders before any Agreement or MOU is signed as required under section 3 (3) of the Mining Act. However, no response was forthcoming from any of them. The Plaintiff also wrote to the Fourth and Fifth Defendants, the Developers of the Wafi/Golpu Project expressing concern about the lack of consultation in the signing of the MOU and suggested that the Developers withdraw from it but this was also rejected. The First Defendant also issued a ‘Ministerial Statement’ rejecting outright the Plaintiff’s request to withdraw the MOU signed on the 11th December 2018 and re-negotiate new terms with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders including the Plaintiff. Copies of all correspondences, letters and even text messages were presented to the Court as evidence.
38. One of the fundamental rule in judicial review application is that the Applicant for judicial review must exhaust all other remedies available to him. See: Sapu v Commissioner of Police [2003] PGNC 80; N2426 and Independent State of Papua New Guinea v Philip Kapal [1987] PNGLR 417.
39. The various correspondences, letters and text messages to the Defendants and their lack of response is prima facie evidence that the Plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative avenues to resolve this issue but to no avail. I am therefore, satisfied that the Plaintiff has exhausted all other remedies available or provided to him by law and therefore, is entitled to leave.
40. A period of four (4) months is prescribed as a proximate period within which an application for judicial review must be filed - O 16 r 4 (2) NCR.
41. In the present case, the Letter of Clearance was issued on the 10th December 2018 and the MOU was signed on the 11th December 2018 and the proceedings were instituted on the 17th January, 2019, a period of five (5) weeks from the date the decisions complained of were made. It is well within the statutory time limits prescribed by the NCR. Defendants have not raised any substantial defence pertaining to delay and I do not think it is necessary for me to labour further on this ground.
42. On the whole, I am satisfied that there is no undue delay in bringing this proceedings and that it was brought within time.
RULING
43. All in all, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the Court on each of the five grounds to be granted leave pursuant to O 16 r 3 NCR and accordingly, I grant leave to the Plaintiff/Applicant.
ORDER
44. Having granted the Plaintiff/Applicant leave for judicial review pursuant to O 16 r 3, the Plaintiff is now directed to do the following forthwith:
(i) File a Notice of Motion for Substantive Review pursuant to O 16 r 5 sub-rule (2);
(ii) File Supporting Evidence;
(iii) File Affidavits verifying the facts to be relied on; and
(iv) File any Disputed Facts.
DIRECTIONS HEARING
45. The date for directions hearing is hereby fixed for the 24th May 2019 at 0900 which is about 14 days from today. The Notice of Directions Hearing will be issued by the Registrar with the returnable
date fixed for the same date set above pursuant to O 16 r 13.5 (5) of the Judicial Review (Amendment) Rules.
After directions hearing, parties will return to Court for a Pre-Hearing Conference to be held on the 06th June 2019 at 0900.
At the pre-hearing conference a date for full hearing of the matter will be fixed. This conforms with the requirement under O 16 r
5 (4) NCR.
I note from the Applicant’s statement in support pursuant to O 16 r 3 sub-rule (2) that the remedy sought is in the nature of
certiorari quashing the letter of the Second Defendant dated 10th December 2018, constituting the decision clearing the MOU for execution. Alternatively, an Order that the decision to clear the MOU
for execution is quashed.
The remedy sought will be fully determined after hearing arguments from both parties at the substantive judicial review hearing. The
grant of leave will operate as stay until the full determination of this application pursuant to O 16 r 3 sub-rule (8) (a).
I note from Clause 2.2 of the MOU that parties have agreed to some milestones within a certain timeframe with respect to the progress
and development of Wafi/Golpu mining project. This grant of leave operates as a general stay and as such no activities or work is
to be conducted or carried out until the matter is fully determined. This also applies to any representation made by either the Applicant
and/or the Defendants regarding the project which includes any meetings or consultations on the same. The stay, for all intended
purposes, is to maintain the status quo until the substantive determination is finalized. Failure to comply with this stay order
will result in serious consequences.
Costs of these proceedings and related incidentals to be paid by the Defendants.
Orders accordingly,
Saulep Lawyers: Lawyer for the Applicant
Mawa Lawyers: Lawyer for the First, Second & Third Respondents
Corrs Chambers Westgarth Lawyers: Lawyers for the Fourth and Fifth Defendants (In Court)
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2019/146.html