Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR NO. 359 OF 2015
THE STATE
V
PAUL SORA
Accused
Kokopo: Higgins, J
2015: 6 July
2017: 11 April, 20 & 22 November
2018: 21 March
CRIMINAL LAW – charges of rape and incest – burden of proof – proof beyond reasonable doubt - Accused guilty
VOIR DIRE – voluntariness of admission to police not proved – record of interview rejected
RECENT COMPLAINT – reasonable explanation for lack of recent complaint found - not adverse to credit of complainant
DELAY – Longman warning – forensic disadvantage to accused – need for careful scrutiny of evidence for the State
Cases Cited:
Papua New Guinea Cases
State v Ragi [2017] PGNC 213
Overseas cases
Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606
HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16
Longman v The Queen (1989) HCA 60; 168 CLR 79
M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; 181 CLR 487
Robinson v The Queen (1999) HCA 42; 197 CLR 162
RPS v R [2000] HCA 3; 199 CLR 620
Suresh v R (1998) HCA 23
Tully v The Queen [2006] HCA 56
Counsel:
Mr L. Rangan, for the State
Ms J. Ainui, for the Accused
21st March, 2018
“PAPUA NEW GUINEA
IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE Cr. # 359 of 2015
The State
- against -
Paul Sora of Yar village,
Angoram, ESP
HELD AT Kokopo
1st Count: Paul Sora of Yar village, Angoram, ESP stands charged that, he in November, 2012, at Vunapope Compound, Kokopo Town, in Papua New Guinea, sexually penetrated Eunice Paul without her consent by introducing his penis into her vagina
AND immediately before the commission of the offence, he threatened to kill her with a kitchen-knife which he was holding, confined or restrained her and in committing the offence, he abused a position of trust, authority or dependency, as Eunice Paul was his biological-daughter.
2nd Count: Paul Sora of Yar village, Angoram, ESP stands charged that he, on a second occasion, in November, 2012, at Vunapope Compound, in Papua New Guinea, sexually penetrated Eunice Paul without her consent by introducing his penis into her vagina
AND immediately before the commission of the offence, he threatened to kill her with a kitchen-knife which he was holding, confined or restrained her and in committing the offence, he abused a position of trust, authority or dependency, as Eunice Paul was his biological-daughter.
3rd Count: Paul Sora of Yar village, stands charged that he, in 2013, at Vunapope Compound, in Papua New Guinea, sexually penetrated Eunice Paul without her consent by introducing his penis into her vagina
AND at the time of the commission of the offence, he threatened to kill her, should she reported what he did to her, confined or restrained her and in committing the offence, he abused a position of trust authority or dependency, as Eunice Paul was his biological-daughter.
4th Count: Paul Sora of Yar village, stands charged that he, in 2013 at Vunapope Compound, in Papua New Guinea, sexually penetrated Eunice Paul without her consent by introducing his penis into her vagina
AND at the time of the commission of the offence, he threatened to kill her, should she reported (sic) what he did to her and in committing the offence, he abused a position of trust, authority or dependency, as Eunice Paul was his biological-daughter.
or alternatively:
Paul Sora of Yar village, Angoram, ESP, stands charged that he, between October, 2012 and January, 2014, at Vunapope Compound, Kokopo Town, in Papua New Guinea, on more than two (2) occasions, engaged in a conduct in relation to Eunice Paul, a female-child who was between 14 and 15 years old, which constituted an offence against children under the age of 16 years, pursuant to Division 2A-Sexual offences against children of the Criminal Code (Sexual Offences and Crimes Against Children) Act of 2002, in that he;
and
Dated at Kokopo this 7th day of August 2017.
......(Signed)........
(for) PONDROS KALUWIN
Public Prosecutor
To: Paul of Angoram (sic)
TAKE NOTICE that you will tried on the charge of which this is a copy at the Ordinary Criminal Sessions of the National Court to be held at Kokopo, East New Britain Province at 9.30 o’clock in the fore noon of Tuesday the 8th day of August, 2017 or as soon thereafter as circumstances permit.”
“You are not like a father to us. You turn around and do bad things to us.”
44. On 8 March 2018, the matter resumed with counsel making submissions.
45. Ms. Ainui, for the accused, submitted that the Court should accept the accused’s denials of wrongdoing. She highlighted the fact that no complaint was made by the victim to any person in authority until 14 March 2015, though the abuse had been going on for 3 years.
46. She further highlighted the accused’s assertion that her Aunt Helen and her uncle Willie Silas had made up these allegations to harm the accused out of resentment concerning non-payment of bride price.
47. Mr. Rangan, for the State, submitted that the evidence for the State was “overwhelming” and should be accepted.
48. Certainly, delay in the making of an allegation is relevant. However, there are often good reasons why a complainant in a case such as this may delay reporting abuse. Fear of violence is one such reason though there may be others, such as shame and reluctance to break up the family. In the present case, the acts and threats of violence by the accused are reasonable explanations for the lack of timely complaint.
49. It is true that an accused bears no onus of establishing why, if it be so, a witness is giving false testimony, whether deliberately or through error, however, if the accused offers a factual explanation which is plainly false may be taken into account in assessing his credibility. (see RPS v R [2000] HCA 3; 199 CLR 620; Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606; State v Ragi [2017] PGNC 213.
50. Care must be taken in relying on lies told by an accused as evidence of a consciousness of guilt.
51. First, the Court must be satisfied that the falsehood was a deliberate lie.
52. Second, there must be no other rational explanation than the consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused.
53. In this case, there is evidence of other uncharged acts. That is, the assault on Lorish and the other assaults on the complainant.
54. Such evidence is not usually admissible. To be admissible it must be relevant, if accepted, not merely to prove bad character but to bear upon and support the likelihood that the accused is guilty of the acts charged against him or her by virtue of a permissible rather than impermissible line of reasoning. The most recent exposition of this doctrine by the High Court of Australia is in HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16. It may place the charged acts in context, rendering them explicable rather than implausible. It may reveal an inappropriate sexual desire. However, such evidence may also have a disproportionate prejudicial effect. It should be admitted only if there is no rational view of that evidence consistent with the innocence of the accused. Merely to show that the accused has a propensity towards committing the kind of crime charged is impermissible.
55. It is a permissible line of reasoning to conclude that if the accused has shown sexual interest in, as here, a daughter and step-daughter, the allegations of sexual abuse against the daughter become the easier to accept.
56. Where it appears that there has been considerable delay in complaining of the offending behaviour of an accused, it is proper to recognize that the accused is thereby placed at a forensic disadvantage. Some avenues for testing the veracity of the allegations may be lost. It increases the danger of apparently honest and convincing but erroneous evidence being presented (see Longman v The Queen (1989) HCA 60; 168 CLR 79).
57. The warning to be heeded by the tribunal of fact is to acknowledge the disadvantages and risks occasioned by a long delayed complaint and to warn itself, or be warned, of the risks of accepting such evidence without careful scrutiny. (see also Robinson v The Queen (1999) HCA 42; 197 CLR 162; Tully v The Queen [2006] HCA 56.
58. As against that, there are, of course, very often, as I have noted, good reasons for the delay, including violent behaviour by the accused person and threats of violence if the abuse is revealed (cf. M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; 181 CLR 487).
59. It should also be noted that a non-recent complaint is not admissible against the accused. It will usually be relied upon by the defence to show inconsistency (see Suresh v R (1998) HCA 23.
60. It is in that context that the Court should remind itself that there may be understandable reasons for such inconsistency.
61. In this case, having heard all the witnesses and heeding the need for caution, there is nothing which causes me to doubt the truth of the allegations made by the complainant.
62. In addition to the above matters, the complainant’s evidence is supported by the medical examination in 2014 which found evidence that she had been subjected to sexual penetration. There has been no suggestion that the complainant had been associating with male companions. Whilst not proof of the accused’s guilt it is not inconsistent with it. The explanation offered by the accused for the making of complaint against him was, to my mind, plainly fanciful and, to my mind, betrayed a consciousness of guilt.
63. I therefore find the accused guilty as charged save that the allegation in Counts 1 & 2 that the accused was holding a knife at the time of the threats is not proved. It is immaterial to the offence charged and may be disregarded accordingly. I accept there was a threat of the use of a knife but I am not satisfied that the accused actually brandished a knife at the time of the threat.
64. It is unnecessary to record a verdict on the alternative charge.
____________________________________________________________
Public Prosecutor: Lawyers for the State
Public Solicitor: Lawyers for the Accused
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2018/106.html