Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback National Court of Papua New Guinea

Tigavu v Koito [2016] PGNC 9; N6170 (22 January 2016)

N6170

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CIA NO 84 OF 2013

MATHEW DENGUO TIGAVU FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF THE TIGAVU FAMILY OF NOKOMBOI CLAN, UPPER RAMU
Appellant

V

GAMO KOITO FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE KOITO FAMILY OF NOKOMBOI CLAN, UPPER RAMU
First Respondent

JOSEPH GABUT, BENEDICT BATATA & KUTT PAONGA, COMPRISING THE RAMU NICKEL/COBALT SPECIAL LAND TITLES COMMISSION
Second Respondents

RAMU NICKEL/COBALT SPECIAL LAND TITLES COMMISSION
Third Respondent

THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Fourth Respondent

Madang: Cannings J
2015:17th June
2016: 22nd January

APPEALS – appeal against decision of Special Land Titles Commission regarding ownership of customary land – Land Titles Commission Act 1962, Section 38 (right of appeal) – whether Commission has power to determine distribution of benefits arising from mining project on disputed land – whether proper consideration given to question of who had actual possession of land – whether hearings conducted contrary to natural justice.

The appellant appealed to the National Court against the decision of a Special Land Titles Commission declaring that an area of customary land was exclusively owned by the first respondent's family. The appeal was made under Section 38 of the Land Titles Commission Act, on four grounds: (a) the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by determining, in percentage terms, how benefits derived from the mining project undertaken on the land would be distributed to the various disputing parties; (b) the decision was against the weight of the evidence as the appellant's family was clearly the owner according to the principles of adverse possession; (c) the hearings of the Commission were conducted in a manner contrary to natural justice; (d) the Commission was wrong in law as it failed to apply the principle of adverse possession arising from Section 67 of the Land Disputes Settlement Act.

Held:

(1) The Commission has, under Section 15(1) of the Land Titles Commission Act, "jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes concerning and claims to the ownership by custom of ... land". A dispute as to distribution of benefits is a dispute concerning ownership of customary land as it is a dispute incidental to a dispute as to ownership. Further, a determination as to distribution of benefits flows so naturally from a determination of rights of ownership, possession and use of the land as to be properly regarded as forming part of such a determination, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Ground (a) was dismissed.

(2) Determination of ownership of customary land depends not only on which disputing party has the earliest claim to the land, by reason of genealogical or ancestral evidence, but also which disputing party has actually possessed the land (without opposition) in recent years (Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR 309 applied). The Commission failed to apply that principle. The Commission's decision was against the weight of the evidence. Ground (b) was upheld.

(3) The minimum requirement of natural justice is, under Section 59(2) of the Constitution, the duty to act fairly and, in principle, to be seen to act fairly. The Commission met that requirement and cannot reasonably be said to have conducted its hearings in a manner contrary to natural justice. Ground (c) was dismissed.

(4) Section 67 of the Land Disputes Settlement Act should have been applied by the Commission: if a person occupies customary land for 12 years or more, even without permission, agreement or approval of the original owners of the land, a presumption arises that the occupier is the owner of the land (Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR 309 applied). The Commission was wrong in law by failing to apply it. Ground (d) was upheld.

(5) As two grounds of appeal were upheld, the appeal would be upheld. As the Court was apprised of the relevant facts and law, it was unnecessary to remit the case for further hearing before the Commission. The justice of the case required that the Court substitute its decision for the decision of the Commission.

(6) Decision: the parts of the Commission's decision as to ownership and possession of the land and distribution of benefits were substituted by a decision that: (a) the land is jointly owned on a 50/50 basis by the appellant's clan and the first respondent's family or clan; (b) benefits derived from the land shall be distributed as follows: (i) first respondent, 35%, (ii) appellant, 35%, (iii) other parties, as decided by the Commission, 30%.

Cases cited

The following cases are cited in the judgment:

Application of Ambra Nii on behalf of Toisap Clan [1991] PNGLR 357
First Assistant Secretary, Department of Prime Minister v Michael James
Gima Raka v Philip Maimu (2013) N5200
John Anis v Nabura Morissa (2011) N4307
Leahy and Highlands Products Pty Ltd (1981) N311 (L)
Lelete Plantation Ltd v Paul Rame (2007) N5020
Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR
Re Wangaramut (No 2) [1969-70] PNGLR 410
Stabie Gason v Mangu Clan & Special Land Titles Commission (2016) N6163
Tawindi Clan v Kaimari Clan (1998) N1775

APPEAL

This was an appeal by a person aggrieved by a decision of a Special Land Titles Commission as to ownership of customary land.

Counsel

G Pipike, for the Appellant
S Maliaki, for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents

22nd January, 2016

1. CANNINGS J: Mathew Denguo Tigavu, for himself and on behalf of the Tigavu family of Nokomboi Clan of Upper Ramu, appeals against the decision of the Ramu Nickel-Cobalt Special Land Titles Commission concerning customary ownership of an area of land at Kurumbukari, Usino-Bundi District in Madang Province. The land is the site of the mine for the Ramu Nickel-Cobalt Project. It is formally described as "'Nokomboi', Blocks 3 & 4, ME [Mining Easement] 77, LMP [Lease for Mining Purposes] 44 and Block 79".
   

DECISION UNDER APPEAL

The Commission decided on 12 August 2013 that:

• the family members of the first respondent, Gamo Koito, are the traditional owners of the land and have exclusive ownership rights to it;
  
• the appellant's family has long term land use rights over parts of the land;
  
• benefits from the project relating to the land should be shared as follows: first respondent's family, 50%, appellant's family, 20%, Tugo family, 20%, Tigina Kwuiava sub-clan, 5%, Binatarari clan, 5%.
  

2. The full text of the decision, which was supported by a 36-page statement of reasons, is:
   

The Ramu Nickel/Cobalt Project Special Land titles Commission:

1. Declares and orders that the Koito family are the traditional landowners of Nokomboi land who have exclusive land ownership rights to the Nokomboi clan land, the description of which land is as follows:
   

¾ The boundary starts at the point where the small Ibindungu Creek meets the Ainagiri Creek and follows Ainagiri Creek upstream and comes up to Warinabunda village where Oro Creek and Ainagiri Creek meet at their head waters, this being the boundary between Nokomboi Clan and Tsringami clan;

¾ The Nokomboi boundary then follows the Oro creek downstream until it meets Gagaio River – this being the boundary between Nokomboi and the Tigina Kwuiava sub-clan;

¾ The Nokomboi boundary then follows the Gagaio river downstream and goes up to Andemi Hill and goes further up to Narekemi Hill – this being the boundary between Nokomboi and Pagaizi;

¾ The Nokomboi boundaries with Immuruba and Maure start at Miai (old village);

¾ The Nokomboi boundary then follows the small Miai creek down to "daun wara" (swamp) and follows the small Ibindungu Creek until it meets the Ainagiri Creek – this being the boundary with Maure clan and where the small Ibindungu Creek meets the Ainagiri Creek is also where the Nokomboi boundary starts and ends there.

2. Declares that Nokomboi Mavi did not sell Kinimati land to Mangoa Tugo.
   
3. Declares that Binatarari clan did not buy any land from the Nokomboi clan but Binatarari clan has gaited [sic] land use rights in Nokomboi land.
   
4. Declares that the Tugo family has long-term land use rights over the Kinimati land (Block 4 of SML 8).
   
5. Declares that Nokomboi clan has no sub clans.
   
6. Declares that the Tigavu family has long-term land use rights over the Warinabunda village and other land areas in Nokomboi.
   
7. Directs that a Ramu Nickel/Cobalt Project Benefits Sharing Agreement be signed between all parties to disputes over the Nokomboi land before the date of payment of land use money by MCC (The Project Company); and failing that the sharing of benefits will be as follows:
   
   1. Koito family – 50%
   2. Tigavu family – 20%
   3. Tugo family – 20%
   4. Tigina Kwuiava sub-clan – 5%
   5. Binatarari clan – 5%
      

APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCE

3. The appellant is aggrieved by the decision. He argues that the Commission should have decided that his family was the exclusive owner of the land. The appeal is made under Section 38 of the Land Titles Commission Act, which allows a "person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission" to appeal to the National Court within 90 days after the decision.
   

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

4. Four grounds of appeal are set out in an amended notice of appeal, filed 2 October 2013:
   

(a) the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by determining, in percentage terms, how benefits derived from the mining project undertaken on the land would be distributed to the various disputing parties;

(b) the decision was against the weight of the evidence as the appellant's family was clearly the owner according to the principles of adverse possession;

(c) the hearings of the Commission were conducted in a manner contrary to natural justice;

(d) the Commission was wrong in law as it failed to apply the principle of adverse possession arising from Section 67 of the Land Disputes Settlement Act.

REPRESENTATION

5. Mr Pipike of GP Lawyers represented the appellant. Gamo Koito was named as first respondent but did not appear at the hearing of the appeal. The three Commissioners, the Commission itself and the State were named as second, third and fourth respondents. They were represented by Ms Maliaki of the Office of Solicitor-General who has raised a preliminary point, which, if upheld, could result in summary dismissal of the appeal.
   

PRELIMINARY POINT

6. Ms Maliaki submits that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal as the land disputes that led to the Commission being established must be resolved through the procedures of the Land Disputes Settlement Act, which makes no provision for appeals to the National Court.
   
7. I reject this submission. The Ramu Nickel-Cobalt Special Land Titles Commission was established by way of a declaration and order of the Governor-General, on the advice of the National Executive Council, made under Section 4 (exception of certain disputes) of the Land Disputes Settlement Act, which relevantly states:
   

(1) Where the Head of State, acting on advice, is of the opinion that special circumstances exist that require a dispute to be settled by means other than those provided by this Act, the Head of State, acting on advice, may, by notice in the National Gazette, declare that this Act does not apply to the dispute.

...

(3) The Head of State, acting on advice, may, by regulation, determination or order, make provision for the settlement of a dispute to which Subsection (1) applies.

8. The declaration and order were published by notice in National Gazette No G169 of 27 December 2001. It was declared that the Land Disputes Settlement Act does not apply to the land dispute concerning Nokomboi land. It was ordered amongst other things that a Commissioner (later changed to Commissioners, after the death of the inaugural Commissioner, Mr Patrick Nasa) be appointed to determine ownership of the land and that the provisions of Part V (appeals etc) of the Land Titles Commission Act will apply to all determinations made under the order.
   
9. I am satisfied that the Commission has been lawfully established and that appeals against its decisions lie under Part V of the Land Titles Commission Act, which includes Section 38 (right of appeal), which relevantly states:
   

(1) A person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission ... may appeal to the National Court within 90 days after the decision or the review of the decision. ...

(2) An appeal under Subsection (1) may be made only on the ground that—

(a) the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction;

(aa) the decision was against the weight of the evidence;

(b) the hearings of the Commission were conducted in a manner contrary to natural justice; or

(c) the Commission was wrong in law.

10. A notice of appeal was filed on 7 September 2013 and an amended notice of appeal (which states that the appeal is brought pursuant to Section 38) was filed on 2 October 2013, both within the 90-day period. The grounds of appeal are compliant with Section 38(2) of the Act. I am satisfied that the National Court has jurisdiction and that I am obliged to determine the appeal. I will now address the four grounds of appeal.
    

GROUND (a): EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

11. This ground states:
    

The Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction under the Land Titles Commission Act when distributing percentage of benefits for each of the disputing families.

12. Mr Pipike submitted that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction when it set out the percentage of benefits each of the disputing parties would receive from the land. He submitted that the Commission's function was to determine the question of ownership of the land and who had the right to use it, but it was not required, and it had no power, to decide on how benefits generated by the land should be distributed.
    
13. This is a useful argument as the power to decide on how benefits would be distributed is not a power expressly conferred on the Commission. Its jurisdiction is primarily set out in Section 15(1) (determination of disputes) of the Land Titles Commission Act, which states:
    

The Commission has, subject to this Act, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes concerning and claims to the ownership by custom of, or the right by custom to use, any land, water or reef, including a dispute as to whether any land is or is not customary land and may make all such preliminary inquiries and investigations as it deems necessary for the purpose of hearing and determining the disputes and claims.

14. However, though the Commission is given no express power to determine the question of distribution of benefits, I consider that its "jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes concerning and claims to the ownership by custom of ... land" is broad enough to encompass determination of the question of distribution of benefits. A dispute as to distribution of benefits is a dispute concerning ownership of customary land as it is a dispute incidental to, and part-and-parcel of, the dispute as to ownership. A determination as to distribution of benefits flows so naturally from a determination of rights of ownership, possession and use of the land as to be properly regarded as forming part of such a determination, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Commission. I dismiss ground (a).
    

GROUND (b): DECISION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

15. This ground states:
    

The decision was against the weight of the evidence in that the appellants were clearly the owners of the land by virtue of the principle of adverse possession and other relevant principles enunciated in the case of Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR and subsequent National Court decisions.

16. The principle of adverse possession is the notion that, if a person who does not actually own a piece of land occupies or takes possession of it for a long time without objection from the real owner, the person in possession can be regarded, with the passage of time, to be the owner (Gima Raka v Philip Maimu (2013) N5200). It is a principle that has been adapted in PNG for the purposes of determining ownership of customary land.
    
17. Its importance was emphasised in the landmark decision of Amet J, as he then was, sitting in the Land Titles Commission in Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR 309. It is a principle that applies whenever an authorised authority such as a Local Land Court or the Land Titles Commission – or as in this case, a Special Land titles Commission – is determining ownership of customary land. (However, it does not apply to Government land: First Assistant Secretary, Department of Prime Minister v Michael James Leahy and Highlands Products Pty Ltd (1981) N311 (L), Lelete Plantation Ltd v Paul Rame (2007) N5020).
    
18. The principle of adverse possession means that ownership of customary land depends not only on the question of which disputing party had the earliest claim to the land, by reason of genealogical or ancestral evidence, but also which disputing party has actually possessed the land (without opposition) in recent years. The National Court has in a number of cases endorsed and applied the principle, also commonly known as 'the Hides Gas principle', in the course of determining judicial reviews of decisions of a Provincial Land Court. See, for example, Application of Ambra Nii on behalf of Toisap Clan [1991] PNGLR 357, Tawindi Clan v Kaimari Clan (1998) N1775 and John Anis v Nabura Morissa (2011) N4307.
    
19. I agree with Mr Pipike that the Commission was obliged to apply the Hides Gas principle' in the course of determining ownership of the Nokomboi land. It did not do that. It was preoccupied with the question of which clan was the 'historical' or 'true' owner of the land and which persons were the living descendants of that owner. Leading up to its final decision, quoted earlier, the Commission made 11 key findings, including those numbered 8 and 9:
    

That the Tigavu families have lived on the Nokomboi land for some time, has long-term land use rights over Nokomboi land. [Finding 8]

That the Koito family members (Gamo Koito and Kama Koito) are the only Nokomboi clan members alive and the traditional landowners of the Nokomboi land. [Finding 9]

20. There was clear and uncontradicted evidence before the Commission that the appellant's family and his ancestors had, without opposition from the first respondent's family or ancestors, lived on the land for multiple generations, for more than 100 years. The Commission accepted that evidence and took it into account in deciding that the appellant's family "has long term land use rights over the Warinabunda village and other land areas in Nokomboi" and is entitled to 20% of the benefits from the Ramu Nickel-Cobalt Project. However the Commission did not take that evidence into account in determining the question of ownership of the land. This was an error.
    
21. Does this mean that the Commission made a decision that was against the weight of the evidence (that being the argument at the centre of ground (b))? To answer this question it is, as I recently pointed out in Stabie Gason v Mangu Clan & Special Land Titles Commission (2016) N6163, necessary to apply the principles from the leading case on the requirements for proving that a decision is against the weight of the evidence. In Re Wangaramut (No 2) [1969-70] PNGLR 410 the pre-Independence Supreme Court held that if an appellant wishes to argue that a decision of the Land Titles Commission was against the weight of the evidence, the appellant is obliged to:
    
    • put before the National Court the evidence that was before the Commission,
      
    • show how the Commission misconstrued the probative value of the evidence or drew unjustified inferences or failed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence; and
      
    • show why the decision appealed against is wrong and cannot be supported by the evidence or by any proper inferences to be drawn therefrom or from the relevant law.
      
22. The appellant has met those requirements. He has:
    
    • put before the National Court the evidence, including transcripts of hearings, which was before the Commission;
      
    • shown how the Commission misconstrued the probative value of the evidence about the appellant's family having possession of the land for multiple generations and failed to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence, by showing how the Commission disregarded that evidence for the purpose of its decision as to ownership, as distinct from rights of possession and use, of the land;
      
    • shown why the Commission's decision that the first respondent's family has exclusive land ownership rights is wrong and cannot be supported by the evidence.
      
23. I am therefore satisfied that, with respect, the Commission made a decision that was against the weight of the evidence. Ground (b) is upheld.
    

GROUND (c): HEARINGS CONDUCTED CONTRARY TO NATURAL JUSTICE

24. This ground states:
    

The hearings of the Commission were conducted in a manner contrary to natural justice in that the Commission failed to consider and give relevant attention to the submissions made by the appellants and did not state reasons for refusing the submissions made by the appellants when making its decision.

25. Mr Pipike submitted that the appellant put the argument before the Commission, about his family being the occupants of the land for multiple generations, but the Commission ignored the argument and did not say in its final decision why it had rejected the argument. It therefore acted unfairly contrary to the principles of natural justice.
    
26. I reject this submission for two reasons. First, I am not convinced that the appellant's argument about the Hides Gas principle was put to the Commission clearly and coherently, in the same way that Mr Pipike has put it to the Court. Secondly, I am not convinced that the failure of the Commission to give proper weight to the argument can be regarded as a failure to hear the appellant or a manifestation of any bias against the appellant.
    
27. The minimum requirement of natural justice is, under Section 59(2) of the Constitution, the duty to act fairly and, in principle, to be seen to act fairly. I am satisfied that the manner in which the Commission conducted its many public hearings, in particular the hearings it conducted regarding Nokomboi land, met that requirement. It cannot reasonably be said to have conducted its hearings in a manner contrary to natural justice. Ground (c) is dismissed.
    

GROUND (d): DECISION WRONG IN LAW

28. This ground states:
    

The Commission was wrong in law in that it failed to apply and follow the precedent case of Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR 309 and give consideration to Section 67 of the Land Disputes Settlement Act where adverse possession over a long period of time gives presumption of ownership rights to the appellants.

29. This ground of appeal is an extension of ground (b), which raised the issue of whether the Commission's decision was against the weight of the evidence due to the failure to apply the principle of adverse possession, also known as the Hides Gas principle. I resolved that issue in favour of the appellant. This ground introduces the argument that the Commission erred in law in a similar way by failing to consider Section 67 of the Land Disputes Settlement Act, and that if the Commission had applied Section 67 it would have made a different decision.
    
30. Section 67 (presumption as to vesting of interests) of the Land Disputes Settlement Act states:
    

(1) Notwithstanding any other law, proof that a party to a dispute has exercised an interest over the land the subject of the dispute for not less than 12 years without the permission, agreement or approval of any other person sets up a presumption that that interest is vested in the first-mentioned party.

(2) Where a presumption is set up under Subsection (1), it may be rebutted only by evidence leading to clear proof that the interest is vested in some other person.

31. This section is not drafted in a straightforward way so I will try to translate it into plain language: if you exercise an interest over land, eg by occupying it and giving the impression that you are the owner, for 12 years or more, without permission, agreement or approval – and nobody challenges you – you are presumed to be the owner. And, if after 12 years, someone does challenge your claim to the land, they need clear proof that they are the rightful owner or occupier. If there is no clear proof, you are the true owner and/or occupier.
    
32. Put another way: if a person occupies customary land for 12 years or more, even without permission, agreement or approval of the original owners of the land, a presumption arises that the occupier is the owner of the land.
    
33. There are surprisingly few cases in which the Court has grappled with Section 67. In Tawindi Clan v Kaimari Clan (1998) N1775, Injia J, interpreted the provision in a way that gave it a more automatic application than the way I have understood it. His Honour stated:
    

The principle of adverse possession under s 67 confers customary ownership right or title over the land by operation of law: Re Hides Gas Project Land [1993] PNGLR 309 at 316-317. It is not merely an "evidentiary aid" to the determination of title over land ... The use of the land over a period of more than 12 years without opposition confers that right of title by operation of law. Upon the expiration of 12 years, the person is the absolute owner of the land which includes all improvements on the land which they have erected. This process of acquisition of title by operation of law extinguishes any existing supposed propriety rights of any other party.

34. With respect, I am unable to agree completely with that interpretation. However, I am certainly in agreement with his Honour that Section 67 is a clear statutory reinforcement of the Hides Gas principle. Whether it is called a principle of adverse possession, or given some other description, it is a principle of law that must be applied by any authority when it is deciding on ownership of customary land. Special consideration must be given to evidence of recent possession of the land of 12 years or more.
    
35. I uphold the argument that the Commission failed to give that principle special consideration and, in that respect, its decision was wrong in law. Ground (d) is upheld.
    

CONCLUSION

36. As two grounds of appeal have been upheld, the appeal will be upheld. This raises the question of what order the Court should now make. This is a matter of discretion, to be exercised under Section 38A (2) (powers of National Court on appeal) of the Land Titles Commission Act, which states:
    

Upon the hearing of the appeal, the National Court shall inquire into the matter and may—

(a) adjourn the hearing from time to time;

(aa) receive fresh evidence if in the opinion of the Court that evidence is relevant and the party seeking to rely on it was not negligent in failing to adduce it before the Commission;

. . .

(c) if the justice of the case so requires, substitute for the decision any decision that might have been given by the Commission; or

(d) remit the case in whole or in part for hearing or for further hearing before the Commission.

37. It is unnecessary to remit the case to the Commission. The Court is apprised of the relevant facts and law. The justice of the case requires, for the purposes of Section 38A (2)(c), that the Court substitute its decision for the decision of the Commission.
    
38. I will not make the order sought by the appellant, which would declare that the appellant's family is the owner of the land to the exclusion of all other parties including the first respondent. I am not convinced that I am obliged to make such an order.
    
39. The best and fairest thing to do is to make an order that takes into account and respects both (a) the appellant's family's claim to ownership deriving from their occupation of the land by multiple generations for over 100 years, and (b) the clear 'chain of title' going back to time immemorial enjoyed by the first respondent's family. I will declare and order that the appellant's family and the first respondent's family are the joint traditional owners of the land on a 50/50 basis and that they have joint rights to occupy the land, subject to other rights of possession as determined by the Commission.
    
40. I will vary the distribution of benefits to reflect the changes in ownership, so that benefits derived from the land will be distributed as follows: (i) first respondent, 35%, (ii) appellant, 35%, (iii) other parties, as decided by the Commission, 30%.
    
41. I will order the parties to bear their own costs as the first respondent was not represented at the hearing of the appeal; also, there has been no clear winner of the appeal. All interim orders staying the Commission's decision will be quashed.
    

ORDER

42. It is ordered that:
    
    • (1) The appeal is upheld.
      
    • (2) As the justice of the case so requires, there is substituted for the decision under appeal, under Section 38A(2)(c) of the Land Titles Commission Act, the following decision, the underlined portions of which show the primary respects in which the decision under appeal has been altered. Accordingly the National Court of Justice:
      
      1. Declares and orders that the Tigavu family and the Koito family are the joint traditional landowners of Nokomboi land on a 50/50 basis, who have land ownership rights to the Nokomboi clan land, the description of which land is as follows:
         

¾ The boundary starts at the point where the small Ibindungu Creek meets the Ainagiri Creek and follows Ainagiri Creek upstream and comes up to Warinabunda village where Oro Creek and Ainagiri Creek meet at their head waters, this being the boundary between Nokomboi Clan and Tsringami clan;

¾ The Nokomboi boundary then follows the Oro Creek downstream until it meets Gagaio river – this being the boundary between Nokomboi and the Tigina Kwuiava sub-clan;

¾ The Nokomboi boundary then follows the Gagaio River downstream and goes up to Andemi Hill and goes further up to Narekemi Hill – this being the boundary between Nokomboi and Pagaizi;

¾ The Nokomboi boundaries with Immuruba and Maure start at Miai (old village);

¾ The Nokomboi boundary then follows the small Miai Creek down to "daun wara" (swamp) and follows the small Ibindungu creek until it meets the Ainagiri Creek – this being the boundary with Maure clan and where the small Ibindungu Creek meets the Ainagiri Creek is also where the Nokomboi boundary starts and ends there;

2. Declares that Nokomboi Mavi did not sell Kinimati land to Mangoa Tugo.
   
3. Declares that Binatarari clan did not buy any land from the Nokomboi clan but Binatarari clan has gaited land use rights in Nokomboi land.
   
4. Declares that the Tugo family has long-term land use rights over the Kinimati land (Block 4 of SML 8).
   
5. Declares that Nokomboi clan has no sub-clans.
   
6. Declares that the Tigavu family has long-term land use rights over the Warinabunda village and other land areas in Nokomboi.
   
7. Directs that the sharing of benefits in relation to the Ramu Nickel-Cobalt Project will be as follows:
   
   6. Koito family – 35%
   7. Tigavu family – 35%
   8. Tugo family – 20%
   9. Tigina Kwuiava sub-clan – 5%
   10. Binatarari clan – 5%
       

(3) The interim order of 23 October 2013 staying the Commission's decision and any other similar interim orders are dissolved.

(4) The parties will bear their own costs.

(5) The file is closed.

Judgment accordingly.

_____________________________________________________________
GP Lawyers : Lawyers for the Appellant
Solicitor-General : Lawyer for the Second, Third & Fourth Respondents