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State v Ngotngot [2016] PGNC 123; N6306 (30 May 2016)

N6306

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]


CR NO. 644 OF 2014 and CR NO. 1540 OF 2015


THE STATE


V


JOE NGOTNGOT


AND:


EREMAS MUTIUL


Kokopo: Anis AJ
2016: 11, 14 15, 16 and 17 March and 30 May


CRIMINAL LAW – section 315(a)(d) of the Criminal Code Act - grievous bodily harm with intent - elements of the offence discussed - element of intent absent - alternative charge - section 319 - grievous bodily harm - elements of charge and grievous bodily harm discussed - charge sustained - accused convicted of alternative charge of grievous bodily harm

CRIMINAL LAW - identification - principles discussed - assault occurred at broad daylight - complainant and other witness alleged to be intoxicated at the time of the assault - no credible evidence to support claim


CRIMINAL LAW - one co-accused exercised his right to remain silent - his record of interview was tendered without objection - it contained partial admission of assault - accused remained silent and did not explain his partial admission - partial admission used as good evidence against both accused


PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - court considered evidence in totality - methods of considering totality of evidence discussed - second method applied - evidence of prosecution and defence considered together to determine the material facts and issue


Facts


The State charged two co-accused each with grievous bodily harm with intent, on one complainant Miriam Papakat. Both accused are policemen. The offence was allegedly committed on the complainant during police investigation into a disturbance that occurred at Kabakada village in Rabaul. Both accused pleaded not guilty.


Held:


  1. The Court considered the evidence in totality following the second method that is considering together the evidence of the prosecution and the defence, to finding the truth or nearer to the truth of what really happened (case law followed: State v. Miriam Kakun (1997) N1673).
  2. A record of interview that is tendered without objection or by following due process, is good evidence and is open to the Court to assess and give appropriate weight to, even if the accused person or its author exercises his or her right to remain silent at the trial (case law followed: State v. John Yeon Bekeram (2011) N4298).
  3. The two accused claimed the complainant was 'drunk' and mistakenly identified them as responsible for assaulting her but the assault on the complainant occurred at broad daylight and the complainant and witnesses there had more than 1 to 2 hours to view, recognise or identify the two accused.
  4. The charge of grievous bodily harm with intent under section 315(a)(d) of the Criminal Code Act Chapter No. 262 against the two accused was not sustained because the prosecution failed to establish the element of intent.
  5. The alternative charge of grievous bodily harm under section 319 of the Criminal Code Act Chapter No. 262 against the two accused was sustained.

Cases Cited:


Ilai Bate v. The State SC1216 (2012)
John Beng v. The State [1977] PNGLR 115
Keko Aparo and Ors v. The State (1983) SC249
State v. Miriam Kakun (1997) N1673
State v. John Yeon Bekeram (2011) N4298


Counsel:


Ms Aihi, for the State
Mr Kaluwin, for the two Accused


RULING ON VERDICT


30th May, 2016


1. ANIS AJ: The State (prosecution) presented a single indictment dated 10 March 2016, on 11 March 2016, against you two. The indictment reads in part:


JOE NGOTNGOT of TAVU NO. 3, RABAUL and EREMAS MATIUL of RABURUA, KOKOPO, EAST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCE both stand charged that they the said JOE NGOTNGOT and EREMAS MATIUL on the 14th day of December 2013, at Kabakada Village, Rabaul in Papua New Guinea with intent to do grievous bodily harm did grievous bodily harm to one MIRIAM PAPAKAT.


ALTERNATIVELY

JOE NGOTNGOT of TAVUI NO. 3, RABAUL and EREMAS MATIUL of RABURUA, KOKOPO, EAST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCE both stand charged that they the said JOE NGOTNGOT and EREMAS MATIUL on the 14th day of December 2013, at Kabakada Village, Rabaul in Papua New Guinea unlawfully did grievous bodily harm to one MIRIAM PAPAKAT.


CHARGE


2. You two are charged under section 315(a) (d) and alternatively under section 319, of the Criminal Code Act Chapter 262 (Criminal Code). The prosecution also invokes section 7 of the Criminal Code.


3. Let me set out these provisions herein:


315. Acts intended to cause grievous bodily harm or prevent apprehension.


A person who, with intent—


(a) to maim, disfigure, or disable any person; or


...,


does any of the following things is guilty of a crime:—


(d) unlawfully wounding or doing a grievous bodily harm to a person; or

...

Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life.


319. Grievous bodily harm.


A person who unlawfully does grievous bodily harm to another person is guilty of a crime.


Penalty: Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.


7. Principal offenders.


(1) When an offence is committed, each of the following persons shall be deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it:—

(a) every person who actually does the act or makes the omission that constitutes the offence; and

(b) every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence; and

(c) every person who aids another person in committing the offence; and

(d) any person who counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence.


(2) In Subsection (1) (d), the person may be charged with—

(a) committing the offence; or

(b) counselling or procuring its commission.


(3) A conviction of counselling or procuring the commission of an offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a conviction of committing the offence.


(4) Any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of such a nature that, if he had himself done the act or made the omission, it would have constituted an offence on his part, is—

(a) guilty of an offence of the same kind; and

(b) liable to the same punishment,

as if he had done the act or made the omission, and may be charged with himself doing the act or making the omission.


BRIEF FACTS


4. The prosecution, in presenting the indictment, relies on the following brief facts against you two. I will summarise that herein:


5. On 14 December 2013 at around 10am - 10:30am, you two with other policemen namely Michael Keleve, Bani Masat and Louis Ling went to Kabakada village. You all went there to attend to a complaint laid by another villager from the same village Ekonia Levi Pidikier (Ekonia) and his wife. The couple alleged that the complainant Miriam Papakat (Miriam) and some youths damaged their house the previous night. At Kabakada village, you Eremas Matiul held a softball bat and used it to hit the arms and legs of Miriam. You Eremas Matiul then dragged Miriam to the other policemen who also assaulted her and another suspect Jimmy Raflin (Jimmy). You Joe Ngotngot used a rubber fan belt to assault Miriam and you swore at her. You two continued to assault Miriam and Jimmy, that is, you Eremas Matiul used the softball bat and you Joe Ngotngot used the fan belt. You two and other policemen then took Miriam and Jimmy to the main road to wait for the police vehicle to arrive. There, you two continued to assault Miriam some more that is, you Eremas Matiul used the softball bat and you Joe Ngotngot used the fan belt. Miriam cried out in pain and begged you two to stop but you two did not listen to her. You two broke Miriam's right leg at that point in time. When the police vehicle arrived, you two plus the other policemen took Miriam and Jimmy to the police station. Despite Miriam's severe injuries, police detained her in the cell from 14 December 2013 to 16 December 2013. Miriam was later released on bail and she sought medical attention at the Nonga Base Hospital.


PLEA


6. You two deny the charges of grievous bodily harm with intent. You two do not deny being at the crime scene with other policemen. But you two deny assaulting Miriam, that is, as for you Joe Ngotngot, you deny that you used a fan belt to assault Miriam, and for you Eremas Matiul, you deny that you used a softball bat to assault Miriam.


7. Your trial on verdict commenced on 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17 March 2016. The Court reserved its decision on verdict on 17 March 2016.


8. This is my ruling.


MAIN ISSUE


9. The main issue as agreed by the parties is identification.


10. I note that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt the charges of grievous bodily harm with intend against you two. This also goes for the alternative charge of grievous bodily harm. If the prosecution fails to discharge this burden of proof on both charges, and the Court is also unable to enter a convict on lesser charges under assault, I will dismiss the charges and acquit you two.


EXHIBITS


11. The parties, by consent, tendered the court deposition. I accepted each of the exhibits tendered from the court deposition. I set them out herein in two tables starting from the exhibits tendered by the prosecution:


Exhibit
Description
Date
P1
Statement of Reserve Constable Loius Ling
Undated
P2
Statement of Mitat Sebulon, hand written in English
Undated
P3
Statement of Senior Sergeant Saint Luke Maibougu. Attachments: 2 sketch maps of various locations at Kabakada village and several scanned coloured photographs of the crime scene
The statement is dated 19/04/14
P4
Statement of Kualum Tande, in English
23/04/14
P5
Statement of Sergeant Stanley Japele, information officer, in English
23/04/14
P6
Statement of First Constable John Isouve, in English
10/11/2014
P7
Statement of Inspector Charles Winuan, in English
22/04/14
P8
Record of interview of Joe Ngnotngot, in Pidgin; also attached is a softball bat
16/04/14
P9
Record of interview of Eremas Matiul, both in English and Pidgin
09/11/15
P10
3 coloured photographs of Miriam Papakat
Undated
P11
Copy of police request for medical examination form
18/12/13
P12
Copy of Miriam's clinic book
Undated
P13
Copy of receipt of payment of medical report
18/12/13
P14
Copy of receipt of payment for x-ray
19/12/13
P15
Copy of Nonga General Hospital request for x-ray examination form
19/12/13
P16
Copy of remittance advice of the victim's bail refund of K100
21/02/14

Exhibits
Description
Date
D1
Paragraph 6 to Miriam Papakat's complaint statement
15/04/14
D2
Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Benjamin Papakat's statement
15/04/14

LAW - IDENTIFICATION


12. Case law has made it mandatory for a Court and in particular a National Court judge to caution himself or herself when dealing with a case where conviction is dependent upon identification.


13. I must caution myself on the dangers of accepting evidence of witnesses who have testified that they actually saw you two with a group of policemen who allegedly committed the offence. I note that even an honest witness can make mistake for various reasons including normal human error. I note that for me to seriously consider and accept a witness's evidence on point, the witness must prove himself or herself to be honest, accurate and reliable. This can of course be difficult and a judge in my view needs to consider all factors including legal, factual and also common sense or the practical aspect of the story, for example, whether the evidence make logical sense. Consideration of corroborative evidence is essential although not mandatory. Essential factors I must take into account with these include the time of the day or the lightings and the length of time each witness has had, to say or claim that he or she saw the two of you assault Miriam.


14. The case law on point is the case of John Beng v. The State [1977] PNGLR 115. The principles held therein I thought were well summarised by the Supreme Court in the case of Ilai Bate v. The State SC1216 (2012). The Supreme Court held these:


10. It is settled law as explained by the Supreme Court in John Beng v The State [1977] PNGLR 115, Biwa Geta v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 153 and Jimmy Ono v The State (2002) SC698 that there is an inherent danger in convicting an accused on the basis of identification. The trial judge should by his or her reasons for decision demonstrate that that danger is recognised and heeded. This is done by administering a ‘self caution’. It is the sort of caution that a judge would give to a jury in jurisdictions that have trial by jury. In PNG we have no juries. The judge is the tribunal of fact as well as of law. So the judge is expected to caution himself or herself as a matter of self-discipline and as a means of demonstrating through his or her judgment that the principles on identification evidence have been applied.


11. The trial judge should indicate that the court is mindful of the risks involved but that if the quality of the identification evidence is good the matter should proceed to verdict; and if the quality of the evidence is poor an acquittal should be entered unless there is other evidence that goes to support the correctness of the identification. The judge’s reasons should show an awareness of the possibility that an honest witness can be mistaken and still be convincing. The court must be satisfied that the witness is both honest and accurate. In assessing the quality of the identification evidence relevant considerations include: whether the witness is purporting to identify a person who was a stranger or someone he recognised; the length of time that the witness observed the accused (eg a prolonged period or a fleeting glance); the emotional state of the witness at the time of the incident; the prevailing conditions (eg was it broad daylight or at dusk or dawn or inside or outside?); the line of sight (eg did the witness have a clear front-on view or was the line of sight interrupted or did the witness just see the accused from the side?). If there are discrepancies in the identification evidence the court should consider them and assess whether they are explicable in terms other than dishonesty or unreliability.


15. The principles held above are binding herein. I also adopt and apply them to this case in my consideration in addition to what I have already stated above in my judgment.


PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES


16. The prosecution called in three (3) witnesses. They are Ekonia, Miriam and Benjamin Papakat (Benjamin). Let me summarise their evidence:


DEFENCE'S WITNESSES


17. The defence called two (2) witnesses. They are you Eremas Matiul and Oris Levi. I will summarise their evidence herein:


ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE


18. How will I approach the evidence?


19. I will assess the evidence in totality following the second method as highlighted by the late Justice Akuram in the case of State v. Miriam Kakun (1997) N1673. I read the relevant part where his Honour held herein:


I therefore had to look carefully at her story and that of the State witnesses. There are two ways of assessing the totality of the evidence. First, I can look at the State witnesses' evidence together but separately from that of the accused to see which version is the correct one. Secondly, I can look at all the evidence of both State and defence's together and in doing so, to find the truth or nearer the truth of what really happened. I prefer the second method for two reasons. First reason is that the first method or approach would create a distorted picture of the total evidence available. Some evidence from either side may not be truthful and I may put too much weight to it where it is not due. Second reason is that the issue before the Court is that of accused "intending to cause grievous bodily harm to deceased when she stabbed her". To find intention, I must infer from all the facts of both State and Defence witnesses to see whether there was such an intention present.

(Underlining is mine)


20. I will consider the evidence of both the prosecution and the defence together. This is because I find, as I will discuss in my judgment, evidence adduced from both sides relevant in ascertaining the material facts and issues in the matter. I will start-off with the least credible evidence and finish off with credible evidence as we go down herein.


21. I refer to the sworn evidence of you Eremas Matiul. Unfortunately, I must say that I find you Eeremas Matiul to be the least credible witness I have observed at this trial. Let me summarise what I have to say:


Q34. Do you have any knowledge of this incident where you and other policemen went to Kabakada village and picked up a woman and a man and bashed them and took them to Rabaul police station on Saturday 14th December 2013?


ANS: No idea at all.
(Underlining mine)


I note that an accused person can choose if he or she wishes to answer a question or not, in a record of interview. If the accused chooses not to answer, he may use phrases for example like "I exercise my right to remain silent" or "I have nothing to say" or "pass" or "I refuse to answer" or "I reserve my right until I talk to my lawyer."


However, in this case, you said you had no idea at all about the incident that occurred on 14 December 2013. That was taken down as your answer at that time and is now evidence before this Court.


Q35. All these you have told me and I have typed it down on paper. Are you telling me the truth that you have no knowledge of this incident where you and other policemen went and broke a woman's leg at Kabakada village?


ANS: Yes I am telling you the truth.
(Underlining mine)


22. I now turn to the evidence of Oris. She is Ekonia's wife. Oris was at her house in the evening of 13 December 2013. She travelled early the next day on 14 December 2013 to lodge complaint with the police and she remained at the police station throughout that day.


23. I find Oris's evidence to be vague and at times confusing. I think she tried once to give false evidence which I will discuss herein. I rank her evidence credibility and reliability as low. Let me discuss her sworn evidence herein:


24. I turn to you Joe Ngotngot. You have chosen to remain silent and not to give sworn evidence at the trial. You have exercised your right under the Constitution and I take note of that.


25. I will instead look at what you have stated in your record of interview that is Exhibit P8, which is in evidence before the Court. I note that the prosecution tendered your record of interview without objection. You voluntarily signed it and I am satisfied that all the pre-conditions for administering a record of interview were complied with in your case. I am satisfied that the evidence is properly before the Court for consideration despite the fact that you have exercised your right to remain silent at the trial [see the case: State v. John Yeon Bekeram (2011) N4298].


26. I find your story in the record of interview to be partially correct because some of what you have stated were corroborated by evidence given by you Eremas Matiul and from the prosecution's evidence. The material facts you deny therein is that you did not use a fan belt to assault Miriam either at Ekonia's house or on the main road at Kabakada village. To assess the credibility of your evidence, let me discuss what you have stated in the record of interview:


"Mipela bihainim rot igo na ol complainant itok olsem sampela ol mangi wok long drink JJ Yawa (Home brew beer) istap aninit long lain cocoa so mipela banisim em ol igo daon. Mipela bihainim dispela grup igo antap long maunten. Mi lukluk igo daon em mitupela lukim Eremas Matiul holim wanpela bilong ol dispela spak man na ol narapela ronawei. Mitupla ron ikam daon na displa spak man struggle wantaim Eremas Matiul na em lusim han long em na dispela man ronawei. Mi na Michael Keleve raunim sait blong maunten igo na kamap long haus bilong meri ya Miriam Papakat. Taim mitupela kamap long haus em nogat manmeri istap. Olgeta ronim dispela spak man igo daon long maunten. Mitupela Michael Keleve ibihainim ol igo daon na kamap long wanpela haus ol burukim long em na complaint ikamap. Long hap em mitupela lukim olsem ol ples lain holim dispela spakman na meri ya pinis na wok lon paitim em istap."


The translated version: We followed the road up and the complainants said some youths were drinking homebrew beer - JJ Yawa (Homebrew beer) under the cocoa trees so we went and surrounded the area. The youths saw us and they all ran away. We followed a group that ran up the mountain. I was with Michael Keleve and we climbed the mountain to the top and when we looked down we saw Eremas Matiul apprehended one of these drunkards. Both of us ran down the mountain and this drunkard struggled with Eremas Matiul and ran away. Michael Keleve and I went around the mountain and went to Miriam Papakat's house. When we arrived at the house there was nobody there. All of them chased this drunkard down the mountain. Michael Keleve and I followed them down and came to a house where it was damaged and the complainants went and complained. From there we saw that the villagers already apprehended this drunkard and the woman and were assaulting both of them.


Q49. Pasin yupela mekim long paitim dispela meri long ples yet na taim yupela wokabaut long liklik rot igo long main rot em yupela paitim em yet igo kamap long main rot. Na long main rot em yupela continue long paitim en inap yupela burukim right leg bun bilong em. Dispela em isoim olsem yupela igat intention long bagarapim dispela meri na yupela mekim olsem, Bai yu tok wanem long dispela?


Ans: Em rong bilong ol dispela members husait paitim em long rot. Mi Kam bihain bikos mi wok long assessim ol damages long haus ibagarap.


Translated version: The manner you assaulted that woman at the village, on track leading out to the main road, at the main road and continued till you broke her right leg. This shows that you have the intention to injure that woman. What have you got to say to this?


Ans: The members were wrong to assault her on the main road. I went later because I was assessing the damages done to the house.
(Underlining is mine)


27. I find your last statement to the interviewer damning. You clearly said therein that members of your team assaulted Miriam on the main road. Your team members, according to your answer to Question 20 in the record of interview, were the two of you, Michael Keleve, Bani Masat and Luis Ling. You said Luis was the driver and there were two more others whom you could not recall their names. Because you Joe Ngotngot chose not to give sworn evidence, this evidence is good evidence and it contradicts what you Eremas Matiul has stated on point. And as far as all the evidence is concerned regarding whether Miriam was assaulted on the road side, you Joe Ngotngot supports the prosecution's case on point whereas you Eremas Matiul is the only person who claims that there was no second assault on Miriam on the roadside. Given the lack of credibility in the evidence of you Eremas Matiul, there seems to be strong evidence now also confirming the assault on Miriam on the main road by policemen.


28. I refer to Miriam's sworn evidence. I find her evidence credible, reliable and corroborated in relation to the material facts and the main issue.


29. Let me discuss her sworn evidence herein:


30. I wish to discuss the allegation that Miriam had been drinking or was drunk. The allegation was firstly made by Oris. I have already found Oris's evidence to have very little credibility. Even then, I note that Oris never actually saw Miriam drinking with the youths but only made an assumption based on what she said she heard that night. Oris's evidence on point is therefore baseless given Miriam's direct evidence denying that she was drunk that night or consumed alcohol with the youths. The next person who gave evidence to say that Miriam was drunk was Ekonia. He made that claim after he apprehended Miriam and assaulted her with other men. He did not give any other evidence to support his allegation or claim that Miriam was drunk. If he was counting on the evidence of his wife Oris, I have already ruled that out. There does not seem to be any solid link or connection between youths drinking the previous night to Miriam or to Miriam being drunk the next day at around 12noon. I am convinced that the allegations that Miriam was drunk seem have been made up or are false. I am of the view that Ekonia has made this story up, that is, of Miriam being drunk, to justify why he and others assaulted her. For Oris, well, Miriam swore at her the previous day so her evidence could be tainted on that basis as well. Or she may want to protect her husband in relation to her husband's assault on Miriam and therefore told a lie. This Court has already found Oris giving contradictory evidence above. The other person who has alleged that Miriam was drunk is you Eremas Matiul. I have already ruled your evidence as not credible. I also find that you are telling a lie to protect yourself and you Joe Ngotngot.


31. One important factor is the distance between Miriam's house, Ekonia's house and Miriam's mother's house. In cross-examination, Miriam said her house was about a hundred meters away. It was clarified that Miriam's mother's house and Ekonia's house shared the same boundary. I ask myself, if the assault was alleged to have come from Miriam's mother's house, why didn't Ekonia and Oris lay the complaint against Miriam's mother because that was where the youths were alleged to have been drinking and disturbing them or that noises were coming from that direction.


32. I turn to the sworn evidence of Benjamin. He gave evidence for the prosecution. I find this witness's evidence credible on the material facts alleged by the prosecution. I discuss it herein:


33. I turn to the sworn evidence of Ekonia. He is an independent witness for the prosecution. Regardless of that, I find Ekonia to be a credible and reliable witness. In my opinion, he gave an honest account of what he saw, did, or thought, and I do not think he invented anything new or tried to, for example, bend his recollection to suit himself or anyone. Let me discuss his evidence herein:


FINDINGS - FACTS


34. I will now focus my findings on the material facts in relation to the issue of identification.


35. Let me summarise my findings herein:


(1) At 6am on 14 December 2013, Ekonia and his wife Oris left their house at Kabakada village. They travelled to Rabaul to lay a complaint at the police station concerning a disturbance that had occurred the previous night on their premises at Kabakada. They registered their complaint with the police at about 10:30am. From there, the police told Oris to wait at the police station. You two, together with others namely Michael Keleve, Bani Masat, Luis Ling and Ekonia travelled to Kabakada to investigate the incident. The six (6) of you arrived at Kabakada at about 11:30am. Luis Ling dropped you two and the others at Kabakada and drove off.


(2) From there, you Eremas Matiul and Ekonia went to check Miriam's house. You Eremas Matiul and Ekonia apprehended Jimmy who was sleeping inside Miriam's house. There was no one else there at Miriam's house at that time apart from Jimmy. Jimmy tried to escape but you Eremas Matiul and Ekonia recaptured him. You Eremas Matiul and Ekonia brought Jimmy down to Elouka's house. At Elouka's house, Ekonia left you Eremas Matiul with Jimmy and he went to apprehend Miriam. Ekonia brought Miriam back to his house. When Ekonia arrived with Miriam at his house, you Eremas Matiul had already brought Jimmy over from Elouka's house, and the rest of the policemen were already there at Ekonia's house including you Joe Ngotngot. Ekonia handed Miriam over to you two and the other policemen at his house.


(3) At Ekonia's house, three (3) witnesses saw the assault on Miriam. Miriam herself identified you Joe Ngotngot of using a fan belt to assault her. Miriam herself identified you Eremas Matiul of using a softball bat to assault her. The said softball bat was exhibited and identified as the one usually kept in the police vehicle that you two and the others had used at that time. The prosecution's witnesses have identified the softball bat in Court as the same bat you Eremas Matiul used to assault Miriam with on 14 December 2013. Benjamin, Miriam's husband stood 6 meters away and witnessed the assault and he identified you two and said the same thing in relation to how Miriam was assaulted. Ekonia was also present and said he only saw you Eremas assaulting Miriam with the softball bat. Ekonia saw another policeman also assaulting Miriam at the same time but he did not see who he was because he was talking to some people.


(4) From Ekonia's house, you two and the other policemen together with Miriam and Jimmy walked over to the main road to wait for the vehicle to arrive. At the side of the road you Joe Ngotngot used the same fan belt to assault Miriam and you Eremas Matiul used the same softball bat to assault Miriam. The whole incident and waiting time took more than one (1) hour.


(5) All these happened at broad-daylight from 11:30am to about 1pm or 2pm in the afternoon. You two including Miriam travelled together in the same vehicle to the police station. Miriam had all these opportunities to recognise and identify you two as the assailants. Benjamin also had all the time and opportunity to identify you two as the assailants during the time of the assaults on Miriam and Jimmy at Kabakada village. Ekonia travelled with you two, to and from the police station. He teamed up with you two and other policemen at Kabakada to look for suspects there so there is no doubt in my mind that his evidence identifying the you two is accurate.


(6) Miriam and Benjamin were not drunk at the material time. I find no credible evidence to show that Miriam and Benjamin were drunk or were with the youths that drank that night and made noise and stoned Ekonia's house. Both Miriam and Benjamin denied that. Oris's evidence of Miriam being drunk and Ekonia's evidence on point are speculative and baseless. The sworn evidence given by you Eremas Matiul lacks credibility. In your record of interview, you said it was true that you could not recall a single event of the incident. I note that you Eremas Matiul were in Court listening all along whilst the prosecution witnesses all gave their evidence. This could explain why you suddenly was able to recall the incident and decided to give sworn evidence. I find that you Eremas Matiul gave false evidence when you said Miriam was drunk. On this point, let me ask myself this: Assuming Miriam and Bejamin consumed alcohol themselves or were with the youths at 7pm the previous night as alleged by Oris, where is the credible evidence that the couple drank continuously or non-stop from 7pm on 13 December 2013 till about 11:30am on 14 December 2013 the next day? That would be about 16 hours of drinking if I am to accept the claim by the defence on this point. This is obviously an incredible allegation by the defence. And also very important is the fact that the assault happened for more than one (1) hour. It did not take like 1 minute or 5 minutes or 10 minutes. Miriam and the policemen waited at the road side for a very long time probably another hour before the vehicle arrived. Then Miriam and you two all jumped into the same vehicle and went to the police station. Miriam had at best more than 2 hours or so to see and recognise you two as the assailants. Ekonia corroborated Miriam's evidence that you Eremas Matiul used a softball bat to assault her at Ekonia's house. I ask myself this second question: If Miriam was drunk, how come Ekonia who is an independent witness gave sworn evidence which corroborated what she has stated? And you Joe Ngotngot admitted in your record of interview that policemen assaulted Miriam on the side of the road whilst waiting for the police car to arrive. Again, if Miriam was drunk, how is it that you Joe Ngotngot corroborated her sworn evidence that she was assaulted on the side of the main road at Kabakada? With the strong corroborative evidence, it then becomes immaterial whether Miriam was sober or not at that time, that is, despite my findings that Miriam was not 'drunk'. Miriam's evidence is solid.


(7) I find that Miriam suffered serious injuries to all parts of her body. You two assaulted her on her arms, her back, on her legs and on her calf muscles with the use of the fan belt and the softball bat. Medical report tendered showed she suffered swellings from her head down to her toes. I note no evidence of any detailed medical examination conducted on Miriam so this Court does not know for sure that Miriam suffered serious internal injuries. There is probability for such injuries but this cannot be confirmed and I will not speculate. But I am satisfied firstly that she suffered severe external injuries or bruisers to her body. She suffered swellings all over her body, which is linked to the weapons that were used by you two on her. Secondly, medical examination confirmed she suffered swelling on her right ankle. This report, together with the photograph of Miriam's right leg in plaster of Paris, indicates that her right ankle could have been broken or dislocated. I do not find in fact that her right leg was broken. Miriam's own medical report tendered in Court did not state anywhere therein that her right leg was broken. To conclude that Miriam's right leg was broken without proper evidence would, in my view do injustice to this case. But the description in the medical report fits and I will accept for this purpose that her right ankle was twisted, dislocated or badly damaged. And I reach such a conclusion because Miriam had to wear a plaster of Paris and medical report showed serious swelling to her right ankle, which in my view meant that the injury to her right ankle was serious to warrant such attention or treatment.


FINDING - IDENTIFICATION


36. I am satisfied that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that you two assaulted Miriam at broad daylight at Kabakada village in Rabaul on 14 December 2013.


ELEMENTS OF GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM WITH INTENT


37. Let me begin by reading section 315(a) (d) herein:


315. Acts intended to cause grievous bodily harm or prevent apprehension.


A person who, with intent


(a) to maim, disfigure, or disable any person; or


...,


does any of the following things is guilty of a crime:—


(d) unlawfully wounding or doing a grievous bodily harm to a person; or


(Underlining is mine)


38. I have identified five (5) elements herein in relation to offences committed under section 315(a) (d). They are:


(i) wounding that person(4); or

(ii) doing grievous bodily harm to that person(5).


(Numbering is mine)


39. I note that elements (4) and (5) are optional.


ABSENCE OF INTENT


40. I am not satisfied that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the element of intent for the charge of grievous bodily harm with intent under section 315(a)(d) of the Criminal Code.


41. Evidence showed that the reason why you two assaulted Miriam was to get Miriam to reveal the names of the youths whom you two had alleged Miriam knew. Evidence showed that when she denied knowledge of the youths, she was assaulted not just by you two but also by Ekonia and others. I also note that the investigating officer at the police station also asked Miriam concerning the youths. Evidence showed that you two have decided at that time it seems that the best way to extract information from Miriam was to inflict pain on her.


42. With the absence of the element of 'intent' which is mandatory for an offence under section 315(a)(d), it is sufficient for me and I rule now that I am not satisfied that the prosecution has established the charge of grievous bodily harm with intent.


ALTERNATIVE CHARGE - GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM


43. The alternative charge that is laid against you two by the prosecution is grievous bodily harm under section 319 of the Criminal Code.


44. The term grievous bodily harm is defined under section 1 of the Criminal Code. It reads:


"grievous bodily harm" means any bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger or be likely to endanger life, or to cause or be likely to cause permanent injury to health;


(Underlining is mine)


45. It is not difficult to see the elements of grievous bodily harm from reading section 1 of the Criminal Code. I set them out herein:


(Numbering is mine)


46. The second and third elements are optional meaning the prosecution can choose either one of them or both. But the first element that is 'bodily injury' is mandatory.


47. In relation to the present case, I find that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the first element, that is, I find that Miriam suffered bodily injuries from the assault by you two on her at Kabakada village on 14 December 2013. I do not find evidence of the second element existing in the present case, that is, I do not consider the assault on Miriam life threatening. However, I do find that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the third element, which is that the bodily injuries Miriam sustained are likely to cause permanent injuries to her health. Let me explain: There is no real contest to the actual injuries including injuries to Miriam's right ankle. I refer firstly to Exhibit P11. Exhibit P11 is a standard Police Request for Medical Examination dated 18 December 2013, which the police issued soon after the incident to the Nonga Base Hospital to examine Miriam. Under section REASON FOR EXAMINATION it states and I read "Sustained Serious Injuries". I find that Exhibits P10, P12, P13, P14 and P15 also corroborate Miriam's injuries. These exhibits have all been tendered by consent. I note that I have ruled out that Miriam suffered a broken leg because of insufficient evidence. But I have also found medical evidence which showed severe swelling on Miriam's right ankle. That may very well indicate that she suffered a broken right ankle but the prosecution fell short of proving that the ankle was broken. However, the medical evidence plus photographic evidence of Miriam wearing a plaster of Paris fixed to her right leg confirms that the injury to her right ankle was severe or serious. There were black markings all over her back which indicates that she suffered both external and possible internal injuries. Medical report also states that both her calf muscles showed soft tissues, which I take to mean that she also suffered serious internal injuries to her calf muscles. All these therefore go to show that Miriam's bodily injury has caused or is likely to cause permanent injury to her health.


48. Because I have now established that the prosecution has proven elements 1 and 3, I find that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that Miriam suffered grievous bodily harm to her body.


49. That being the case, I will now go back and look at the charge of grievous bodily harm. Section 319 reads:


A person who unlawfully does grievous bodily harm to another person is guilty of a crime.
(Underlining is mine)


50. The elements for the charge of grievous bodily harm under section 319 of the Criminal Code are:


(Numbering is mine)


51. The prosecution must prove all four (4) elements beyond reasonable doubt for this Court to sustain the charge of grievous bodily harm.


52. In the present case, I have already identified you two as persons responsible so the prosecution has proven the first element. You two did not raise any defence in law to justify your actions. I find nothing lawful about your actions on the complainant Miriam. This Court therefore finds both of your actions unlawful. In regard to the third element, I have already identified the elements of grievous bodily harm above in my judgment and ruled that Miriam's injuries qualified therein. In regard to the fourth element, Miriam is the person who suffered grievous bodily harm at the hands of you two.


SECTION 7


53. The prosecution invokes section 7 of the Criminal Code.


54. I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you two also aided and abided each other in the commission of the alternative offence of grievous bodily harm on Miriam.


SUMMARY


55. Firstly, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that you two were the persons who seriously assaulted and caused grievous bodily harm to Miriam Papakat on 14 December 2013, at Kabakada village in Rabaul. But because I found absence of intention in your actions, according to law, the charge of grievous bodily harm with intent under section 315(a) (d) of the Criminal Code cannot be sustained.


56. However, I am satisfied and find that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the charge of grievous bodily harm against you two, pursuant to section 319 of the Criminal Code. The alternative charge against you two is sustained.


ORDER OF THE COURT


Verdict: Guilty of the alternative charge of grievous bodily harm.


______________________________________________________


Office of the Public Prosecutor: Lawyers for the State
Office of the Public Solicitor: Lawyers for the two accused


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