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State v Salle [2015] PGNC 230; N6143 (18 May 2015)

N6143

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR (FC). 310 of 2013

THE STATE

-v-

IVAN SALLE

Wewak: Geita J
2015: 22, 23 April
11, 18 May

CRIMINAL LAW – VERDICT – Trial - Charges of stealing K61,902.30 from employer Nationwide Micro Bank Wewak Branch –Weak Petty Cash Maintenance system – Weak cash-in transit mechanism from BSP Bank – Likely areas for cash pilfering and seepages - Only logical and reasonable inference from accepted primary facts support inferences of stealing by the accused from these two weak points – Verdict of guilty.

CRIMINAL LAW –Offence committed by a highly educated and experienced banker – Consequences of the crime known full well by the accused – Deliberate acts of stealing. Section 372 (7) (a) Criminal Code Act - Verdict of guilty.

Cases cited:
The State v Kindi Lawi [1987] PNGLR 183
The State v Koivi Ipai (No 2) (2010) N3972
The State v Laumadava [1994] PNGLR 291
The State v Paulus Pawa [1981] PNGLR 498
The State v Tom Morris [1981] PNGLR 493

Counsel:

Ms. Sabine Dusava & Paul Tusais, for the State
Mr. Johnson Malambaul, for the Accused

JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

18th May, 2015

1. GEITA J: Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty to stealing cash monies totalling K61,902.30, the property of Nationwide Microbank Ltd, contrary to section 372 (7) (a) of the Criminal Code.

Terms of the Indictment

2. Between 1st April 2012 and 12th June 2012, the accused whilst being employed as Officer in Charge of Nation Wide Microbank Limited branch in Wewak stole the alleged monies which came into his possession as an employed servant.

Prosecution Evidence

3. The State evidence consisted of four oral testimonies and documentary evidence tendered into court by consent. By consent they were grouped in this manner:

Exhibit "A" –Record of Interview 12/11/2012,

Exhibit "B" – Draft Audit Report dated 4/5/2011 pp 36 – 43;

Exhibit "C" – Audit Report dated 25/6/2012 pp 44 – 56;

Exhibit "D" - Ivan Sale's Statement 12/6/2012;

Exhibit "E" – Ivan Sales Response 14/6/2012 pp.58-60.

Oral Testimonies

4. Charles Mobutuna is employed as Audit Manager-Bank Operations based in Port Moresby with 27 years of banking experience in the country. He testified of conducting a surprise audit of the books and cash in Wewak Branch in June 2012 and compiled an audit report referenced Exhibit "C", now in evidence. He was accompanied by the OIC into the vault and upon visual inspection noted that something was wrong. In compliance with audit formalities he carried out a physical count of cash in the vault which totalled K21, 554.95 toea, a difference of K61, 902.30 was detected out of a total of K83, 400.00 recorded in the cash in vault register.

His findings were immediately reported to their head office in Port Moresby after notifying the accused of the shortfall who admitted that the shortfall was noted since April 2012. He reprimanded the accused for failing to take corrective measures including failing to report the shortfall to head office in Port Moresby. His findings revealed gross negligence on the part of the OIC and his tellers and failures by all of them of failing to observe good banking management protocols at all levels. He however was unable to point out any wrong doing of stealing by any one of them and only recommended their stern reprimand with the OIC to be terminated immediately.

5. In examination in chief the witness said as OIC of the branch, his role was to ensure the smooth running of the branch including balancing of cash on a daily basis with regular reporting to head office on regular basis. The branch operated a dual control check and balance system with the OIC and one other senior member as co-partner at any one time.

6. In cross examination the witness said every time the vault was visited, both officers who are assigned dual control responsibilities must be present. All daily takings by tellers are countered, cross checked by the Teller Supervisor and handed over to the OIC for safe keeping in the vault. When questioned about his past experiences of loss of this magnitude, if any, the witness said shortfalls in the cash in vault due to incorrect inputs were rare and he knew of no experiences.

7. In re-examination the witness said he did not suspect anybody with the shortfall in cash as the branch operated a dual control system. The OIC was the last person to verify the accuracy of cash each day.

8. When asked by court if the OIC carried out a surprise count of cash the witness said no evidence was found.

9. Melinda Aluminji is a Senior Teller with Wewak Branch from 2007 and elevated to Teller Supervisor in February 2010 with Francis Asi who was the OIC of the branch at the time. From 2011 to 2012 Ivan Sale was her supervisor and OIC of the Branch. He took over from Asi. The witness outlined the role of Teller Supervisor in detail including balancing of the days takings. The day's takings were then taken to the OIC who cross checks the day's takings in the vault room. The money handed over to him and he keys in the combination to the vault and places the cash in vault on a daily basis. The witness said the process is completed by the Cash In Vault Register being updated, verified and signed with copies of daily entries transmitted to head office on a daily basis. She said access to the vault room was via a wooden door and a grill door with both keys held separately by herself and the OIC. The safe keys are solely kept by the OIC who is responsible for taking out cash in the vault.

10. The witness went on leave on 11 February 2012 and handed over her keys to Kochy Poniou. When she returned from leave in March her keys were returned to her. From then on no physical cash counts were carried out with repeated requests to the OIC for one to be carried out without success, she said. All cash movements in any one banking day were blocked into time slots as an added cash security control measure along the way: (BOD) or Beginning of day cash; (MOD) or Middle of day cash, Cash deposit to BSP Bank and cash replenishment including (EOD) or end of day cash. In 2010 and 2011 Audit, another cash security control measure was implemented through the Certificate of Compliance system, with reporting conditions every 5th day of each month to the head office. The process was employed in 2011 to alleviate any irregularities in the General Ledger, The Cash In Vault and physical cash in the vault. All attempts by Melinda to get the OIC to conduct a physical cash count in the vault remained futile. Instead falsified COC or CIV were sent to their head office on a regular basis. Unbeknown to the witness as to how much cash was actually held in the vault she countersigned the certificate of its correctness.

11. In her written statement given to police the witness deposed of observing instances of the OIC taking extra cash out from the vault, ranging between K200 to K400 as petty cash and for purchase of stationeries and other small items.

12. In examination in chief the witness said at any one time the maximum cash kept in the vault was maintained at K50, 000.00 with access cash deposited into BSP Bank and posted to headquarters and posted into the General Ledger. With instances of the branch running short of cash requests were made to the head office for replenishments and cash monies picked up by the OIC from BSP Bank. From 8th June 2012 the General Ledger balance totalled K83, 000.00, money held as access cash in the vault however no cash counting was done on that day to verify its correctness.

13. The witness said she only signed the CIV, countersigned by the OIC but did not know the actual cash in the vault and didn't know how much money was missing at the time until the missing money was revealed in the audit report of June 2012. The witness testified of instances where the OIC requested her to surrender her keys to him however she refused and walked out of his office on a Wednesday prior to the arrival of the Auditor. She also gave testimony of the OIC confiding in her that someone was trying to steal his keys from him on Thursday. The OIC dropped his bunch of keys in her drawer without her knowledge and returned in the afternoon during close of business to lock up the days takings. When the witness suggested to the OIC that the incident someone trying to steal his keys be reported to the Police he refused the suggestion. Furthermore the witness said when she refused outright to surrender her keys to the OIC upon demand she became scared and shared her encounter with the rest of the staff in the office. At the point the OIC told her that she was not going to be part of these.

14. In cross examination the witness said between 2011 and 2012 there were four tellers and any two would act in senior position roles. Cash replenishments from BSP were brought into the branch with police assistance. When questioned if she acted as branch head during March when the OIC attended a branch heads meeting in Port Moresby the witness said she needed to confirm whether it was in March or January. She said in March there was no physical cash count. The witness denied suggestions of stealing some money in between transfers from Tellers to her and onto to the OIC. The witness maintained that the OIC asked her for key cuts to which she refused.

15. In re examination the witness said at the end of each day's transaction tellers tally up, lock their tin boxes until vault visit and produce their keys to her and the OIC. She said there was no opportunity for tellers to steal.

16. Killien Inawa started work as a teller in 2009 and moved up to Lending and Recovery position. He outlines the roles of tellers and his role as loans officer. The witness said in 2011 Ivan Sale was the OIC of Wewak Branch. He was not a privy to the safe keys and does not have access to cash. In 2011 up to June 2012 he was absent on sick leave.

17. Kochy Poniou commenced as a Teller since March 2011. She described in detail the roles of a teller: after work and before closing to balance their books and hand over cash to Teller Supervisor. She has on occasions acted as duel controller in the absence of the Teller Supervisor. She said only the OIC and Teller Supervisor held keys to the safe.

18. At the end of the State's evidence your Lawyer made a no case submission based on the second limb of the no case principles: Basically arguing that although there was some evidence in court, such evidence was insufficient for court to make a finding of guilt and urged for the trial to be discontinued. The State argued that there was sufficient evidence for court to rule prima facie and allow the case to full trial. They argued that any determination of guilt is best left until all evidence is collected. Having heard both submissions I ruled against the no case application.

Defence evidence –Ivan Sale

19. The accused commenced work with National Micro Bank Ltd in Lae in 2007 and rose to be the OIC Wewak Branch in June 2011 until this allegation in 2012. He denied outright stealing the missing monies from the bank. He testified of attending a Branch Managers workshop in Port Moresby at the end of March 2012 which lasted for 10 days. He said the meeting started on Wednesday and on Sunday he returned to Wewak. Upon his return to work in April he assumed full responsibility of the bank's operations after a hand over take over ceremony. From then onwards he realised a shortfall in cash in the vault by visually observing that cash stacked in bank note denomination wasn't healthy. He said he was shocked and refrained from conducting physical checks of cash in the vault, saying he was under stress and a lot of pressure. The witness said because of the pending audit in June he refrained from counting the cash in order for the shortfall and actual loss to be confirmed by the auditor.

20. His record of interview together with his statement to police and his response to his head office formed part of his evidence. His absence on duty travel for 10 days was not reported to his superiors in Port Moresby and not contained in his response. Any suspicions of money loss during Melinda's time as acting OIC was also not reported in his statement to his head office in Port Moresby.

21. In examination in chief he described the hand over take over process in which keys were handed over as part of the process from the transferee to the transferor. He refrained from reporting the shortfall to his head office in fear of losing his job. The witness corroborated Melinda's version of events: being called into his office and informing her about the shortfall in the vault; the news of his pending transfer to Buka; requesting for the keys from her due to stress; someone trying to get his keys etc. He said he did not intend to do what he did but due to constant pressure and the fear of losing his job, he said those words... it was not his intention; He admitted that he was the sole custodian of the keys and combination to the vault. He remained adamant the due to the dual combination control system in place it was highly unlikely for huge sums of cash to be removed from the Bank, referring to the K61, 902.30 deficits.

22. In cross examination the witness remained adamant that due to the dual control system in place it was not possible for him to steal the K61, 902.30 during April and June 2012. He however admitted that as OIC of the branch he was responsible for the movement of cash in and out of the vault as he held the keys and combination to the vault. He admitted that for 2 ½ months no physical cash count was carried out and so he had no idea how much the shortfall was. He also admitted to falsifying the Cash in Vault register to cover up and maintained that he was waiting for the shortfall to be confirmed by the audit report.

23. When questioned by the court if he had reported the attempted stealing to police he said he did not report. Furthermore when asked by court if his private investigations into the reconciliations, withdrawals and deposits revealed any discrepancies he answered in the negative.

Assessment of evidence

Issue – General denial, whether the accused did steal the K61, 902.30?

24. In trying to narrow down possible suspects in this stealing I first look at all bank officers who regularly come into contact with handling cash in the bank and possible areas of cash seepage?

(A) Cash handling in the bank:

1. Ivan Sale – Branch Officer in Charge from June 2011 to 2012.

He is in charge of the overall operations of the branch with daily reporting responsibilities back to head office each day. He has full custody of the safe key and safe combination. He is privy to collecting replenished cash from Port Moresby under police escort from BSP Bank to the Branch when they become available. The depositing of such cash into the Branch vault soon upon delivery remains a grey area. No evidence was led or introduced to explain this process. Obviously the cash must be put in the vault? Was the dual control process employed in this case? Or was the accused the only one who collected the cash from the bank and deposited them into the vault single handled? No evidence was forthcoming. All that is before the court is that the accused was the only one who collected cash from the bank under police escort. All cash collected in any one day ended up with the OIC who deposits them into the vault personally.

2. Melinda Aluminji- a Senior Teller with Wewak Branch from 2007 and elevated to Teller Supervisor in February 2010. From 2011 to 2012 Ivan Sale was her supervisor and OIC of the Branch. All keys to the strong room, wooden door and vault keys were handed over to her. Performed Dual control functions in conjunction with Ivan Sale. Her access to the cash in the vault and checks were limited when the accused was on duty at work. All cash taken out from the vault daily by Ivan Sale and given to her for distribution to the tellers. She had access to the vault during the 3 days the OIC was out of the province attending to their Branch heads meeting in Port Moresby which usually takes 3 days. All three tellers report to her with their reconciled daily takings kept in a tin box until opened and counted in the presence of the OIC who then deposits them into the vault.

3. Killien Inawa worked as Teller in 2009 and moved up to Lending and Recovery position. His superior was Ivan Sale as from 2011. Due to the nature of his work he was not a privy to the safe keys and does not have access to cash. Furthermore from 2011 up to June 2012 he was absent from work on sick leave.

4. Kochy Poniou worked as a Teller since March 2011. She described in detail the roles of a teller: after work and before closing to balance their books and hand over cash to Teller Supervisor. She has on occasions acted as duel controller in the absence of the Teller Supervisor. She said only the OIC and Teller Supervisor held keys. The OIC or Teller Supervisor has keys to the safe.

25. So by a process of elimination Teller Killian Inawa is safely ruled out as a possible suspect. Teller Kochy Poniou likewise is safely ruled out as a possible suspect. Her short lived role as an acting dual controller in the absence of the Teller Supervisor for a short period of time was restricted to that function only. That was all. That did not allow her direct access to the cash in the vault. Any shortfalls or access in her daily takings would obviously be detected at the end of each working day either by the Teller Supervisor and the OIC. There is no evidence pointing to irregularities in the discharge of her assigned duties.

26. The two prime suspects remaining are Ivan Sale and Melinda Aluminji. I first look at Melinda: She had limited access to the cash in transit from BSP Bank Wewak and cash in vault through Ivan Sale. She was acting OIC during Ivan Sales absence for a few days, 3 days according to her and 10 days according to Ivan Sale. I am more inclined to accept her version of 3 days. This was corroborated by Ivan Sale when he said the meeting started on Wednesday and so he returned to Wewak on a Sunday. Ivan's version of 10 days absence is highly suspicious. Be that it may there is no evidence of relief arrangements put in place to verify the duration of his extended absence. I find it highly unlikely for a branch manager to absent himself from work without putting in place proper relief arrangements. Clearly this piece of evidence is falsified and cannot be believed. She went on annual leave 31 January 2011 and returned to work on 21 February 2012 as contained in the Audit Report.

27. I ask myself these series of hypothetical questions?

1. Is it humanly possible for Melinda to steal K61, 902.30 within 3 days considering the dual control system in place? My answer is no for obvious reasons.

2. Is it possible for Melinda in concert with Kochy to steal the K61, 902.30 within 3 days? It is possible if they both conspired to steal from the branch. However that in my view is highly unlikely for the same reasons as above.

3. Is it possible for Kochy to steal the K61, 902.30 in her acting capacity as Supervisor during Melinda's annual leave? Again considering the dual control system in place that would not be possible.

Although Melinda and Kochy had some access to the vault at some point in time their access was very limited. There is no evidence directly or inferentially to suggest their dishonesty in the missing K61, 902.30. Their mistake was that they failed to employ a fool proof handover take over process to guard against stealing and or loss of cash.

28. Now returning to Ivan Sale who now stands out as the prime suspect for the moment. His actions prior to and after the revelation of the shortfall of K61, 902.30 in April 2012 remains highly suspicious. I list them hereunder:

1. Although he knew of the shortfall, he failed to report to his superiors in Port Moresby;

2. He continuously falsified the COC report to his head office,

3. He dropped his set of office keys unannounced with the Teller Supervisor and hurriedly left the office, only returning in the afternoon to lock up, highly suspicious.

4. He confided in the Teller Supervisor of someone trying to get his keys of him but failed to report the matter to police;

5. As OIC He failed to ensure that a proper hand-over take over was in place between Melinda and Kochy before Melinda went on leave.

6. As OIC he failed to put in place a workable safe practise during his absence in Port Moresby.

7. No records were kept of surprise cash counts in the vault nor were actual cash counts carried out during the three months.

29. I ask the same hypothetical question:

1. Is it possible for Ivan Sale to steal K61, 902.30 during his time as OIC of the Branch? Considering the weak dual control system in place it was quite probable for the stealing to occur. Although he maintained that it was not physically possible for such an amount to be stolen within a three months period, considering the existence of a dual control system in place. The evidence contained in the audit report detected that the shortfall occurred as early as April 2012. This findings were corroborated by what the auditor termed as a bit unusual in which a sum of K163,000.00 was received from Port Moresby to replenish the accounts in Wewak within a six months period up to June, the date of Audit. No major withdrawals were made to warrant those replenishments during the same period. Inferentially therefore the accused knew about the short fall all along and deliberately concealed this shortfall with monies received from Port Moresby. Inferentially therefore the loss of cash was within his knowledge.

2. What safety mechanisms were put in place in between cash collection/cash transit and cash return and deposit into the branch vault? If there were any, no such evidence was put before the court. Inferentially therefore if the accused was the only one allowed to collect the replenished cash from BSP Bank, the possibilities of the cash being opened and tampered with in transit remained real and high. There is no evidence before court to mitigate this high risk activity. Police escort in my view may be a deterrent however physical cash pick-up in the bank enroute the branch vault still remains the sole privy of the accused. That in my view is another window of opening or opportunity for the accused to steal systematically from that process. All in all the Audit Report reveals 3 instances of suspicious cash replenishments between April 2012 and June 2012, the date of audit: branch requests for extra cash were made contrary to existing bank guidelines; there was access cash in the vault according to General Ledger Account and Cash in Vault register as at the material time; and thirdly the branch exceeded its cash in vault limit of K50, 000.00.

30. Inferentially therefore it was open for the court to infer that cash was also siphoned or stolen systematically during replenished cash collection/transit from BSP Bank to the branch vault over the same period of time as alleged.

31. Considering for a moment that the loss was not possible due to the dual control system, what of the observations contained in Melinda's statement that monies ranging between K200 and K400 were occasionally removed by the OIC as petty cash to buy stationeries' and other small consumables? This piece of crucial evidence in my view remains undisputed and unexplained. The Audit report however makes no mention of how petty cash was maintained in the branch. Could this than mean that the theft through that medium was insignificant and not worthy of a thorough investigation by the Auditor? I don't know because no records were produced into court. Melinda's observations however find corroboration in Ivan Sale's answer to question 26 in his record of interview: He took K2000 from the vault as petty cash. This revelation to my mind is the key to the missing K61, 902.30 over a 3 months period.
32. Hypothetically therefore close to 22 working days fall in any one month, multiply that by K2000, alleged to be taken out as petty cash. You come up with a figure of K44, 000.00, a figure near enough to the alleged monies stolen by the accused. Applying the same formula for a 3 months period, you easily come up with K132, 000.00. Inferentially therefore money seepage though the weak petty cash management process also remains very high and plausible, all fingers pointing to the accused and none other. Furthermore his actions prior too, during and after the shortfall appear damming. All other tellers are distanced and appear clean.

(B) Petty Cash Maintenance?

33. The accused admitted withdrawing K2000 for use as petty cash. The State failed to produce evidence of this process. Notwithstanding that lack the onus now was on the accused to justify the use of that K2000.00. The accused likewise dismally failed to produce evidence to justify his use of the monies with credible evidence. All he said in his defence was that all records were kept in the bank. His failure to produce evidence on this crucial point in my view proved fatal in his defence.

(C) Replenished Cash in Transit from BSP Bank to Branch Vault?

34. There is evidence before court that the accused was the only one allowed to collect replenished cash from BSP Bank, usually under police escort. This evidence has not been discredited by the accused and therefore remains relevant for all intent and purposes. The accused however has not produced evidence to show that despite him being the only one allowed to collect the cash, the court has not being told of what cash receipt/transfer mechanisms were in place allowing for open speculation? For instance when cash from BSP Bank is returned to the Branch, does the "dual control" mechanism kick into place? There is no explanation forthcoming.

35. I find the accused's actions grossly negligent and he failed to carry out his duties/responsibilities as the Branch Manager with diligent due care. There were no pressures or threats abound at the time he took over as branch head. If there were any no evidence was put before this court. The only supposed pressure and apprehension reared their heads when it dawned on him that he would lose his job during the life of the missing monies. Put differently he brought those pressures upon himself and no other. Furthermore he knew the consequences of his actions but continued on doing what he knew to be wrong until he was found out and charged. I am reminded of the good book, the Bible and its warnings against greed and money: (1 Timothy 6:10 For the love of money is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves with many sorrows. KJV) Who knows? Had the accused not been caught in this dubious scheme he could have stolen huge amounts of money belonging to the small people of Wewak who access Nationwide Micro Bank services. It follows in my view that he must be held accountable for the crime committed? There is ample credible evidence, both oral and documentary that supports courts findings that the accused is very learned and intelligent hence he would have appreciated the rights and wrongs of his actions at the time. I am therefore satisfied that he knew that what he was doing was dishonest. (The State v Laumadava [1994] PNGLR 291 and Kindi Lawi v The State [1987] PNGLR 183.)

Court Observations

36. I wish to make some observations on the work of the auditor. It would appear that his primary role was to establish that the books of the Branch and its operations were healthy and no losses and or irregularities detected. He found faults and losses at all fronts of the branch operations at all levels. The Auditor however failed short of singling out who the likely suspect was in this theft. He reported that the OIC and all the tellers were negligent in the duties. What bothers me greatly was his lack of depth in his finding on possible areas of cash seepage in the branch when that information was known to him, obviously during his investigations. The two pertinent areas that come to mind are (i) Petty Cash Maintenance and (ii) Cash transfer from BSP Bank to the Branch. These are the most vulnerable and weak cash seepage areas. If indeed such processes were in place I did not see them in his report and no such evidence given to court.

Application of the Law to the Facts

37. Since the matter before me rests substantially on accepting circumstantial evidence or otherwise to make a finding of guilt I caution myself on the need to be careful in convicting persons on such evidence. The law on circumstantial evidence is that, where a case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence, the question for the court is whether the guilt of the accused is the only rational inference that in all the circumstances would enable it to draw. The case of The State -v- Tom Morris [1981] PNGLR 493 and Paulus Pawa -v- The State [1981] PNGLR 498 are primary sources of reference.

38. Now applying the test stated in the two cases above: Do the proven facts lead reasonably to only one conclusion- that the accused did all the things constituting the elements of the offence? If yes the accused is guilty. If not the accused is entitled to an acquittal. I answer in the affirmative. Therefore the only logical and rational inference that could be drawn from the proven facts lead me to only one conclusion: That over a period of three months since taking office the accused systematically stole monies from the vault under the guise of use as petty cash and from the weak cash replenishment system. When he realised that the loss was huge he panicked and engineered dubious schemes to shift blame to other tellers, more so his next in charge Melinda Aluminji.

39. Similarly applying the test in the case of The State v Koivi Ipai (No 2): What of the accused's conduct prior too, at the time and subsequent to the crime? The accused knew off the shortfall even before it snowballed, he failed to take preventative measure as detailed in the Banks policy guidelines. Instead he engineered dubious schemes to shift blame to other tellers and purposely kept quiet about it until the surprised Audit Report. His evidence of deliberately withholding the cash shortfall pending the audit in my view is falsified and concocted as audits are purposely carried out announced to prevent any losses and or profits to be concealed, and any banking irregularities covered up. The unannounced June audit took the OIC by surprise and off-guard. His evidence of waiting for the loss to be confirmed by a pending audit in May is nonsensical, a falsehood and highly suspicious in my view. His primary role was to make sure that the Branch books and operations ran smoothly on a daily basis and not wait for his wrongs to be highlighted by an auditor. Inferentially therefore it was open to court to infer that his actions throughout were also damming and no help to him. His attempts to distance himself from this crime also dismally failed. Had the surprise audit not being made further stealing would continue to manifest itself as all request for vault cash counts were delayed on end.

40. By operation of Section 372 (7) (a) (a) of The Criminal Code Act the required elements of you now singled out as the accused, whilst being a servant/employee stole from your employer Nationwide Microbank Wewak Branch (cash monies totalling K61,902.32) is made out. (Emphasis mine).

Verdict

41. I confirm a verdict of guilty on the indictment of stealing K61, 902.32 from your employer, Nationwide Microbank Ltd.

Accordingly I convict you on the charge of stealing pursuant to Section 372 (7) (a) of the Criminal Code Act as amended.

You are now a prisoner of the State and as such I order that your bail will be revoked and returned to you with you placed in the custody of the State at Boram CIS pending your sentence.

Orders accordingly.

The Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
The Public Solicitor: Lawyer for the Accused