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Murunga v Kambori [2014] PGNC 339; N5706 (15 August 2014)

N5706

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

WS NO. 626 OF 2007

BETWEEN:
PAUL ENNY MURUNGA
Plaintiff

AND:

VALENTINE KAMBORI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PLANNING AND MONITORING
First Defendant

AND:

CLEMENT TETERATE IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PLANNING AND MONITORING
Second Defendant

AND:

INSPECTOR VINCENT POKAS IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMANDER OF THE BADILI POLICE STATION
Third Defendant

AND:

GARY BAKI, COMMISSIONER OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY
Fourth Defendant

AND:

THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Fifth Defendant

Waigani: Davani .J
2014: 10th July,
: 15th August,

PRACTISE AND PROCEDURE – entry of default judgment – malicious prosecution – false imprisonment – loss of employment

PLEADINGS – Amended Statement of Claim – pleading lacked particulars – Wrongs (Miscellaneous Proceedings) Act – not pleaded – Default Judgment entered – in a vacuum

Facts:

The plaintiff, a former contract officer with the Department of National Planning and Monitoring, was arrested on 1st May, 2006, by the third defendant and other policemen, was charged and held in the cells for about 2 hours, then released on bail. On 17th May, 2006, the charges were dismissed by the Boroko District Court, for want of prosecution.

The plaintiff also claims to have lost his employment with the Department of National Planning and Monitoring as a result of these charges and proceedings.

The matter is before the Court for assessment of damages, default judgment having been entered.

Held

1. Because the plaintiff did not plead the Jurisdictional basis on which he relies in making this claim, that when default judgment was entered, it was entered in a vacuum;
   
2. That s. 1 of the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act was not pleaded, that judgment was obtained in a vacuum and as a result, the relationship and nexus between the third defendant and the fifth defendant has not been established;
   
3. The plaintiff is under an obligation to clearly plead the legal and factual basis of his claim to then establish the proper foundation in the pleadings;
   
4. There is no proper pleading of the third defendant's relationship with the Independent State of Papua New Guinea;
   
5. Where vicarious liability is claimed, the plaintiff must name the servant or agent or alleged tort feasor as the defendant and must plead in the Statement of Claim, the nexus or connection between the principle tort feasor and the nominal defendant;
   
6. If the cause of action is not pleaded with sufficient clarity, that liability should not be regarded as proven;
   
7. A Judge must be slow to enter default judgment and must exercise great care and caution when considering whether to enter default judgment in claims for malicious prosecution;
   
8. That the whole proceedings will be dismissed.
   

Cases cited:

Catherine Popo v. Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission (2014) SC1360
Coecon Ltd Receivers'/Manager Appointed) v. National Fisheries Authority (2002) N2182
David Lambu v. Paul Paken Torato (2008) SC953
Demba Kalo v. Cornie Akaya & the State (2007) N3213
Kuk Kuli v. the State (2004) N2592
Lina Kewakali v. The State (2011) SC 1091
Madiu Andrew v. MRDC Ltd (2004) N2601
Mahera Ignote v. Abraham Hualupmomi & the State [1996] PNGLR 308
Pickthall v. MVIT [1991] PNGLR 113
Pius Nui v. Tanda, Kulunga and the State [2004] N2765
PNGBC v. Jeff Tole (2002) SC 694
Tkatchenko v. NCDC (2002) N2916
William Mel v. Coleman Pakalia & Ors (2005) SC790

Counsel:

Ms D. Mewerrimbe, for the Plaintiff
Mr J. Kerenge, for all the defendants

DECISION

15th August, 2014

1. DAVANI .J: Before the Court for hearing is Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim, as amended, filed on 27th March, 2008. ('Amended Claim')
   
2. The matter is before me for assessment of damages, default judgment having been entered against the defendants on 2nd June, 2009.
   

Background

3. The plaintiff was a contract officer with the Department of National Planning and Monitoring and held the position of Acting Assistant Secretary, Bilateral Programme Branch, ACMD position No. DNPM-AC-02 at the time the alleged incident, the subject of these proceedings, took place. In the Amended Claim, the plaintiff pleads his claim against all named defendants.
   
4. The alleged incident occurred on 1st May, 2006. At that time, the defendants held the following positions:
   

- the first defendant was the Secretary for the Department of National Planning and Monitoring ('DNPM').

- the second defendant was an employee of the DNPM and at that time, was acting as the first defendant's agent

- the third defendant was the Police Station Commander for the Badili Police Station.

5. Whilst at a senior management meeting on 1st May, 2006, at about 10:15am, the second and third defendants together with about 10 to 12 uniformed policemen, five of whom were armed with firearms, entered the plaintiff's office and confronted him together with one Mr Jacob Mera. They took them in a police vehicle Toyota Hilux double cab, white in colour Registration No. ZGC 510 to the Badili Police Station and detained them in the Police cells from 10:30am to 12:30pm. The plaintiff alleges that they were not read their constitutional rights nor were they charged.
   
6. Subsequently, the plaintiff and two other officers were all charged under section 20 of the Summary Offences Act then further detained at the Boroko Police station cells from 1pm to 3pm. They were eventually released on bail of K50 each at about 3pm that afternoon.
   
7. On 17th May, 2006, the Boroko District Court heard the charges and dismissed it for want of prosecution.
   
8. The plaintiff comes to Court seeking damages for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, loss of employment and exemplary damages.
   
9. The defendants, through Mr Kerenge of the Office of the Solicitor-General, oppose the plaintiff's claim for damages and submit that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages under any of the heads set out above and that the whole proceedings ought to be dismissed because the Statement of Claim is very deficient.
   

Evidence

10. The plaintiff relies on the following affidavits:
    

- his affidavit sworn on 7th July, 2010 and filed on 30th July, 2010, marked exhibit 'A';

- affidavit of Gilbert Belard, sworn on 25th August, 2010 and filed on 27th August, 2010, marked exhibit 'B';

- affidavit of Eluh So'on, sworn on 25th August, 2010 and filed on 27th August, 2010, marked exhibit 'C';

- affidavit of Newman Wali, sworn on 25th August, 2010 and filed on 27th August, 2010, marked exhibit 'D';

- affidavit of Dr. Melvin M. Usita, sworn on 25th October, 2011 and filed on 10th December, 2012, marked exhibit 'E';

- affidavit of Dr. Jack Amana, sworn on 6th October, 2011 and filed on 10th December, 2012, marked exhibit 'F'.

11. The defendants do not rely on any affidavits, only making submissions on affidavits relied on by the plaintiffs.
    

Analysis of Evidence and the Law

12. In his submissions in response to the claim for damages, Mr Kerenge focuses particularly on the manner in which the Amended Claim was pleaded and that it, amongst others, lacks the necessary essential particulars that would support a claim in malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment.
    

The law on assessment of damages

13. The trial Judge's role when assessing damages following the entry of default judgment has been discussed in many cases. In William Mel v. Coleman Pakalia & Ors. (2005) SC790, Supreme Court Bench of Los J, Jalina and Cannings .JJ, endorsed the principles expressed by Kandakasi .J in Coecon Ltd Receivers'/Manager Appointed) v. National Fisheries Authority (2002) N2182 and by the Supreme Court in PNGBC v. Jeff Tole (2002) SC 694, bench comprising Amet CJ, Sheehan and Kandakasi .JJ. In those cases, the Court noted and re-endorsed the principles that the trial Judge's role is:
    

- to make a cursory inquiry so as to be satisfied that the facts and the cause of action are pleaded with sufficient clarity.

- if the facts and cause of action are reasonably clear, liability should be regarded as proven, that is, the default judgment resolves all questions of liability in respect of the matters pleaded in the Statement of Claim.

- only if the facts or the cause of action pleaded do not make sense or would make an assessment of damages, a futile exercise, should the Judge inquire further and revisit the issue of liability.

- the plaintiff has the burden of producing admissible and credible evidence of the alleged damages.

- any matter that has not been pleaded but is introduced at the trial, is a matter on which the defendant can take issue, on liability.

14. In this case, defendants' counsel has not requested that the Court revisit the issue or aspect of liability. Rather, defendants' counsel, as stated above, has requested or submitted that the Court should be very focused on the issue of whether the claim is properly pleaded and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages he claims.
    
15. The principles to apply when the Court is assessing damages are those that the National and Supreme Courts have over the years re-established and re-emphasized and which I will raise and discuss below.
    

False Imprisonment

16. The plaintiff alleges false imprisonment at paragraphs 23 to 27 of the Amended Claim. The relevant pleadings in relation to false imprisonment as contained in the Amended Claim are the following;
    

"23. As a result of the foregoing facts, the plaintiff claims that he was falsely imprisoned by the policemen.

PARTICULARS OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT

(a) Refusing the plaintiff's request to drive in his own vehicle and drive to the Badili Police Station and instead forcing the plaintiff into the back of a confined and caged police vehicle.

(b) Intentionally detaining the Plaintiff against his will at the Badili Police Station cells for two (2) hours without being read his Constitutional rights nor being charged.

(c) intentionally detaining the plaintiff against his will at the Boroko Police Station cell for another two hours without offering the plaintiff the opportunity to bail himself out until 3.00pm in the afternoon.

24. On Wednesday, 3rd May, 2006, the plaintiff and the other two (2) officers appeared before the Boroko District Court for the mention of their case. Their case was adjourned to 17th May, 2006 as the prosecutors were not prepared.

25. On the same day, Wednesday, 3rd May, 2006, in a Judicial Review Proceeding instituted by Mr Kevin Mansu regarding the position of the Secretary for the Department, the National Court held at Waigani ruled that the appointment of Mr Kevin Mansu as Acting Secretary for the Department was proper and legal.

26. On 17th May, 2006, the Boroko District Court heard the plaintiff's charge of being "unlawfully on premises". The charges against the plaintiff as well as the other 2 officers were dismissed by the Court for want of prosecution.

27. As a result of the foregoing facts, the plaintiff claims that he was maliciously arrested and prosecuted by the defendants."

17. The defendant's lawyer Mr Kerenge, submits that the plaintiff has not pleaded which provisions of the Arrest Act 1997 and the Constitution were breached. He submits further that the plaintiffs have also not pleaded the grounds or the basis on which the plaintiff's constitutional rights were breached and generally, the lack of particularity in the Amended Claim. Mr Kerenge submits that the plaintiff's pleadings set out above are vague and that those pleadings do not substantiate an allegation of unlawful detention or false imprisonment.
    
18. The plaintiff's submissions are also that the State, in this case, the fourth and the fifth defendant, should be vicariously liable for the actions of the other named defendants. In this case, I assume it will be the third defendant Inspector Vincent Pokas, because the allegations as pleaded in paragraphs 23 to 27 are that the alleged false imprisonment occurred at the Badili Police Station.
    
19. Firstly, although the plaintiff submits that the State is vicariously liable because the State is responsible for the third defendant's actions, who is alleged to have committed these alleged breaches whilst performing his duties, that the plaintiff has not pleaded S. 1 (4) of the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Chapter 297 ('Wrongs Act'), only referring to it in his written submissions. I discuss the relevance of this statement later below.
    
20. Secondly, O. 8 R. 14 of the National Court Rules, although applies only to defences "or subsequent pleadings", the obvious anomaly in this case is that, the plaintiff has not pleaded the jurisdictional basis on which he relies in making this claim against the State. It means that default judgment was obtained in a vacuum where, the relationship and nexus between the third defendant and the fifth defendant, more particularly, has not been established, considering this is a claim for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, purportedly committed by the third defendant whilst in his employ with the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and whilst performing his lawful duties.
    
21. The plaintiff is under an obligation to clearly plead the legal and factual foundation of his claim to then establish the proper foundation in the pleadings. In this case, there is no proper pleading of the third defendant's relationship with the Independent State of Papua New Guinea; therefore, there is no legal basis for the claim. (see Madiu Andrew v. MRDC Ltd (2004) N2601).
    
22. Additionally, where vicarious liability is claimed, the plaintiff must name the servant or agent or alleged tortfeasor as the defendant, and must also plead in the Statement of Claim the nexus or connection between the principle tort feasor and the nominal defendant. (see Lina Kewakali v. the State (2011) SC 1091; Kuk Kuli v. the State (2004) N2592).
    
23. Also if a plaintiff's cause of action or his entitlement to sue depends on a statute, he must plead all facts necessary to bring him within that statute and to also plead that statute. (Lina Kewakali v. the State (supra); (Catherine Popo v. Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission (2014) SC1360 per Injia CJ, Davani .J, Gabi.J)
    
24. In Pickthall v. MVIT [1991] PNGLR 113, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff must specifically plead the statute, in that case, s. 54 (5) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Trust Act, the requirement to plead specifically the excess allowed by s. 54 (5) of the MVIT Act. His Honor Brown .J stated there in no uncertain terms:
    

"Such a claim must specifically plead the statute."

25. In this case, although there is a claim for wrongful arrest, the foundation of that claim has not been pleaded i.e. the provisions in the Arrest Act and the Constitution that were allegedly breached. Clearly, the claims for false imprisonment have no legal foundation and cannot support a claim for false imprisonment. Such a pleading does not demonstrate a breach of the Arrest process and the unconstitutionality of the third defendant's actions.
    

Malicious Prosecution

26. Mr Kerenge referred the Court to the celebrated case of Mahera Ignote v. Abraham Hualupmomi & the State [1996] PNGLR 308 and Demba Kalo v. Cornie Akaya & the State (2007) N3213 and submitted that the tort of malicious prosecution will be established if, as held in those cases:
    

"1. The tort of malicious prosecution is committed if arrest is procured maliciously and without probable cause.

2. Malice may be inferred where the defendant has a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice; Hernimna v. Smith [1938] AC 305 cited.

3. The decision to initiate proceedings is based on following factors;

(a) that the defendant must have been instrumental in instigating the proceeding;

(b) that the proceedings must terminate in favour of the plaintiff; and

(c) that the proceedings instigated must be done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause.

4. the decision to lay a charge by a policeman investigating the crime is an unfettered discretion without direction, interference or order from any other policeman or officer whether of the same or of a superior rank. Sections 22 and 43(b) of Police Force Regulation does not apply in the decision to lay charges by policemen of persons who break the law.

5. Malicious prosecution is counter to the policy of freedom to prosecute suspected criminals and thus the requirement that there must be an absence of reasonable and probable cause.

6. In order to succeed, the plaintiff must prove;

(a) that the defendant did not believe that the plaintiff was probably guilty of the offence, and

(b) that a person of ordinary prudence and caution would not conclude, in the light of the facts in which he honestly believed, that the plaintiff was probably guilty."

27. The plaintiff submits that the defendant should not make those submissions because default judgment has already been entered.
    
28. Ms. Mewwerrimbe for the plaintiff submits that the Court should be focused on the assessment of damages claim because liability is not in issue.
    
29. I have no qualms with that except for the fact that if the cause of action is not pleaded with sufficient clarity, as in this case, aptly demonstrated above, that, as has been decided in many cases over the years, some of which I have set out above, that liability should not be regarded as proven. It means then that the assessment of damages will be a futile exercise for the plaintiff.
    
30. In this case, it is not a matter of the Court revisiting liability, rather, it is my role as the Court of Law, to ascertain if the cause of action is probably pleaded albeit, with sufficient clarity. I concluded, above, that default judgment was entered in a vacuum because s. 1 (4) of the Wrongs Act, has not been pleaded. This provision is referred to by Ms Mewerrimbe in her written submissions where she states at page 5, paragraph no. 11 that:
    

"when considering the issue of whether the State should be vicariously liable to pay ordinary damages and exemplary damages for torts committed by officers of the State, in such as the present one, s. 1 (4) of the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act Chapter 297 is significant." (my emphasis)

31. So, clearly, the plaintiff's lawyers acknowledge that s. 1 (4) of the Wrongs Act is indeed vital to a claim of this nature. However, they have neglected or failed to plead this provision, a major procedural flaw.
    
32. It means then, that the claim for malicious prosecution will not succeed on this basis alone.
    
33. Additionally, although the plaintiff has set out in the Amended Claim, what appears to be particulars of malicious prosecution, those pleadings do not demonstrate the malicious intent that the third defendant had when he arrested the plaintiff. It is necessary that I set out in full the pleadings in relation to malicious prosecution which can be found at pgs 18 to 20 of the Amended Claim. It reads:
    

"PARTICULARS OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

(a) The plaintiff was arrested at his legitimate place of work attending senior management meeting at the Third (3rd) Floor of Vulupindi House, Waigani and brought to the Badili Police Station.

(b) The plaintiff was charged for being "unlawfully on the premises".

(c) The third defendant, had he exercised prudence and caution in the performance of his duties, would not possibly have concluded that the plaintiff was unlawfully on premises when the plaintiff was in fact at his legitimate place of work attending to his official duties.

(d) The arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff was done with malicious intention to bring disrepute and shame to the plaintiff through media publicity.

(e) As such, the police were not interested in pursuing the case and therefore, the case was dismissed for want of prosecution in favour of the plaintiff at the second mention only.

28. The events commencing from the arrest of the plaintiff and two (2) other officers up until the discharge of the charges against them were widely publicized by both in the print media and EMTV.

29. On 18th May, 2006, soon after the criminal charges against the plaintiff was dismissed by the Court, disciplinary charges pursuant to General Order 9 of the Public Services (Management) Act 1995 were laid against the plaintiff and the charges were;

(a) For being heavily involved in trying to overthrow the first defendant from office and breaching section 25 of his contract of employment in that he was negligent in the discharge of his duties, inefficient and incompetent and guilty of disgraceful and improper conduct.

(b) Breach of Section 20 of his contract of employment in that he had absconded from official work since 19th April 2006 to 18th May, 2006.

30. The plaintiff was given seven (7) days to respond to the charges and suspended from duties pending the determination of his charges.

31. The plaintiff responded to the charges against him well within the seven (7) day period and the first defendant informed the plaintiff that he had a case to answer and referred the plaintiff's case to the Department of Personnel Management, recommending termination of the plaintiff's contract and the Public Service.

32. Despite several follow ups with the Department as well as the Department of Personal Management by the plaintiff as to when his case would be dealt with there has been no positive response forthcoming.

33. Whilst the plaintiff was still under suspension, the department was restricted and all positions were reclassified to higher levels and advertised, including the plaintiff's substantive position commencing 3rd November, 2006.

34. the plaintiff applied for several of these divisional head positions but due to the fact that he was a suspended officer, none of his application was successful.

35. the plaintiff's former substantive position is now occupied by Mr Karl Sopol and the plaintiff is now an unattached officer.

36. the plaintiff is a very senior officer of the department and prior to his suspension was a contract officer. The plaintiff's history of work with the Department is as follows;

(a) obtained economics degree at the University of Papua New Guinea and a Masters Degree in Development Economics from Manchester University in the United Kingdom.

(b) Joined the then Department of Finance and Planning on 18th January, 1993 as a Programme Officer, with the then office of International Development Assistance ("OIDA").

37. Prior to his suspension, the plaintiff was employed on contract for a second term and his contract would have expired on 8th March, 2008.

38. From the plaintiff's contract of employment, he was enjoying the ' following benefits and privileges;

(a) Salary (Grade 16.3) - K31, 083.00 per annum

(b) Allowance (Gratuity & DMA) - K8, 917.00 per annum

(c) Others (travel allowance- K20, 000.00 per annum leave allowance, utilities)

(d) motor vehicle - 24 hours use office vehicle

39. As an unattached officer, the plaintiff is only entitled to his basic fortnightly salary of K31, 082.00 being the gross annual salary and K1, 058.52 being the net fortnightly salary.

40. the actions of the defendants, in the aforesaid paragraph were actions done with malicious intent and without lawful authority or lawful excuse and out of spite towards the plaintiff and with the intentions of punishing the plaintiff and to injure his proper feelings and pride and have been subjected to humiliation and suffered great mental anguish and stress.

41. As a consequence of the foregoing actions of the defendants the plaintiff's constitutional rights has been infringed.

42. As a result of the plaintiff's suspension and subsequent loss of his substantive position, the plaintiff has suffered the loss of his job including contractual entitlements and his substantive position and this has caused mental distress, frustration, anxiety and loss of reputation for the plaintiff."

34. I ask where is the malicious intent that ought to be demonstrated in that pleading. There is none. Although there is some reference to it at pars. 27 to 40 of the Amended Claim, that, in my view, is very general pleading which does not, on the verge of repeating myself, particularize the malicious intent and the actions done without lawful authority or lawful excuse and out of spite towards the plaintiff. e.g. pars. 27 (d) and 40 of the Amended Claim, (see above).
    
35. That is why, in claims for defamation and malicious prosecution, a party cannot apply for summary disposal of those claims (see O. 12 R. 37 (a) of National Court Rules). Although, the provisions on the entry of default judgment in O. 12 Rules. 25 to 36, Division 3, is not specific to claims for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, in view of the special pleading requirements in a defamation action, a Judge should exercise great care and caution when considering whether to enter default judgment and must ensure to carefully screen the Statement of Claim. (see David Lambu v. Paul Paken Torato (2008) SC953 per Gavara-Nanu, Davani and Cannings .JJ). In my view, the same standard should be applied to claims for malicious prosecution. In fact, a Judge or the National Court must be slow to enter default judgment in claims for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The entry of default judgment on a claim that has not been properly pleaded means that the claim was entered in a vacuum.
    
36. Although in his supporting affidavits, the plaintiff describes in extensive detail what allegedly occurred at the Badili Police Station and also what he believes occurred, the glaring reality is that default judgment was entered based on a deficient pleading. i.e. the lack of specific provisions of the Arrest Act and the Constitution, most importantly, the clear absence of s. 1(4) of the Wrongs Act in the Amended Claim.
    
37. As the Court said in Pius Nui v. Tanda, Kulunga and the State [2004] N2765, for a claim in malicious prosecution to succeed, the plaintiff must prove:
    
    • That the defendant had used the criminal process to institute proceedings against the plaintiff;
      
    • The defendant has acted maliciously;
      
    • The Plaintiff has suffered damage to his fame, person or property.
      
38. In my view, the awarding of damages is subject very much to a finding of malicious intent, which if not done after a trial and was done after entry of default judgment, means that the statement of claim must have been properly particularized to demonstrate intent. And yes, pleadings are not evidence but the elements of malicious prosecution must be pleaded.
    
39. Again, the Court said in Pius Nui v. Tanda & others (supra), relying on what an earlier Court said in Tkatchenko v. NCDC (2002) N2916. "... that a person arrested or detained will be greatly injured in their credit, character and reputation. They may suffer considerable inconvenience, anxiety and expense, but even if the plaintiff is taken to Court and the charge is dismissed, it does not necessary follow that the persons responsible for laying of the charge are guilty of malicious prosecution..." (my emphasis)
    
40. Again, the Court said further in Tkachenko v. NCDC (supra) that:
    

"it is the Constitutional function of the Police Force to preserve peace and good order in the country and to maintain and enforce the law in an impartial and objective manner (s. 197 of the Constitution). It is also a police function to lay, prosecute or withdraw charges in respect of offence. Therefore, any person or body who wishes to charge another person for any offence must lay their complaint with the Police and the Police would lay the appropriate charge or charges against that person."

41. Which is why, as I said above, in claims for Malicious Prosecution, false imprisonment and of course defamation, these very principles enshrined in our Constitution and succinctly stated by the Court in Tkatchenko, must be balanced out with the rules of proper and good pleading before judgment is entered on an interlocutory application, in this case, default judgment.
    

Loss of Employment

42. The plaintiff alleges that the third defendant's action, more particularly, the fact that he was arrested by the third defendant, developed and led to a turn of events which eventually resulted in him losing his job. These claims and the allegations that the claim for malicious prosecution could lead to the loss of employment is unrealistic and very far-fetched. The Amended Claim does not plead the nexus between these two very different claims. I would have expected to see a pleading in causation or even submissions from plaintiff's counsel (and defendant) in relation to causation and remoteness of damages. But I did not hear from counsel on this.
    
43. Counsel must be slow to making all manner of claims without first ascertaining that the pleading captures their client's case.
    
44. Even then, based on the present pleading, the plaintiff's allegations as we have seen is that the alleged loss of employment occurred as a result of the alleged malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, I have already found against the plaintiff on this. Which means that there is no foundation on which the claim for loss of employment can stand.
    

Conclusion

45. Without the proper pleadings and the fact that default judgment was entered in a vacuum, means that the assessment of damages is indeed a futile exercise. This Court finds that there is no basis on which to proceed to assessment of damages.
    
46. This claim must be dismissed.
    

Formal Orders;

47. These are the formal orders of the Court;
    

1. This claim is dismissed in its entirety;

2. the plaintiff will pay the fifth defendant's costs of the proceedings, to be taxed if not agreed.

____________________________---______________
Mawa Lawyers: Lawyers for the Plaintiff
Office of the Solicitor-General: Lawyers for the Fifth Defendant
No lawyers on record for the First to the Fourth Defendants