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Tiensten v Koim [2011] PGNC 127; N4420 (14 October 2011)

N4420

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

O.S. (JR) NO. 769 OF 2011

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO ORDER 16 (3) OF THE NATIONAL COURT RULES

BETWEEN:

HONOURABLE PAUL TIENSTEN, LLM, MP
Applicant/Plaintiff

AND:

SAM KOIM
First Defendant

AND:

SYLVESTER KALAUT
Second Defendant

AND:

TIMOTHY GITUA
Third Defendant

AND:

THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
Fourth Defendant

AND:

TOM KULUNGA as Commissioner of Police
Fifth Defendant

AND:

THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Sixth Defendant

Kokopo: Lenalia; J
2011: 5th & 14th October

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Application for leave to apply for judicial review – Application for leave to apply for judicial review to review the decision of the National Executive Council – Order 16 Rule 3 of the National Court Rules

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Judicial Review – An application for leave to apply for judicial review to review the decision of/ by the National Executive Council – Principles – Issue of no-justiciability – National Executive Council decision non-justiciable

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW – Jurisdiction – Applicant has not submitted himself to PNG jurisdiction – Application should be refused – Application for leave to apply for judicial review refused with costs.

Cases cited:

Papua New Guinea Cases

NTN Pty Limited-v-The Board of Post & Telecommunication Corporation and 2 Others [1987] PNGLR 70
Kekedo v Burns Philp (PNG) Ltd & Others [1988-89] PNGLR 122
Ila Geno and Others v Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1993] PNGLR 22.
Markscal Limited and Robert Needham-v-MRDC and 2 Others [1996] PNGLR 491
Paul Pora-v-Leadership Tribunal [1997] PNGLR 1
Telikom PNG limited-v-The Independent Consumer and Competition Commission and Digicel (PNG) Limited (2008) SC906

Overseas Cases cited.

American Cyanide Company-v-Ethicon Ltd (1975) 1 All E.R 495
Inland Revenue Commissioners-v-National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1981] 2 All E.R. 93 at 105
Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex Parte Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1981] 2 W.L.R 722

Counsel:

Mr. P. Yange, for the Plaintiff
Mr. M. Murray, for all Defendants

14th October, 2011

1. LENALIA, J. The Applicant/Plaintiff (plaintiff or applicant) of this case is applying for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision by the National Executive Council which is named as the Fourth Defendant decision No.NG 03/2011 to establish an "Investigation Team" into allegations of corruption at the National Planning & Monitoring Department and the other Departments and the other State Agencies. This is the brief ruling on the Member's application for leave.

2. The applicant is the current member for Pomio Electorate, East New Britain Province. He was the former Minister for the Department of National Planning and District Development in the former Government. Following the change of Government on 11th August 2011, the Fourth Defendant had a meeting during which it considered a Policy Submission No. NG 04/2011.

3. In its meeting on 12th August 2011, the National Executive Council (N.E.C.) reached a resolution to establish an investigating team to investigate into allegations of corruption in the Department of National Planning & Monitoring and which would later extend to other Departments and State agencies. (See copy of the decision annexed "A" to Member's Affidavit 3rd October 2011). The NEC then established the task force to investigate the monies appropriated through the Development Budget from 2009 to 2011 amongst others the K125 million for the Kokopo Community Projects and the K10 million which were outside the Development Budget.

Address by Plaintiff's Counsel

4. Mr. Yange from Warner Shand Lawyers appeared for the plaintiff/applicant, made his submission in relation to the nature of this application saying that, the N.E.C is a body established by the Constitution and is amenable to the judicial review processes. He argued that, the limitations set by s.153(2) & (3) of the Constitution do no apply to the facts of the present application. He said, these Subsections cannot apply to judicial review of decisions by the N.E.C and thus any decisions made are amenable to judicial review.

5. Counsel submitted that, on this type of situation on this particular case, s.155(4) of the Constitution expressly vests in this Court jurisdiction with inherent power to review and if the Court is of the view that, there are overriding considerations of public policy in a particular case it should grant leave. He said, in a case like the circumstances of the current application where the NEC Decision offended against the Constitution, it is appropriate to invoke this Court's power pursuant to s.155 (5) of the Constitution as the NEC had conducted itself in a manner that was unconstitutional.

6. On the issue of an arguable case, counsel argued that the applicant need only to show that there are reasonable grounds of a prima facie case basis exist for seeking the final relief that the applicant will seek in the final relief. On the Terms of Reference attached to the NEC decision, Mr. Yange argues that it is unconstitutional as counsel quoted the following phrase "Team" to "Prosecute the persons found to be criminally implicated under the laws of Papua New Guinea" was and is an attempt to direct or control the Public Prosecutor or the Police in their investigative functions.

7. Mr. Yange argues that the NEC decision contravenes ss.177(1), 176(3)(a), (5), 197(2) and even s.214 of the Constitution. The latter section deals with the functions of the Auditor General. He submits that, the NEC acted ultra vires its powers and the decision can not be allowed to stand saying this is the reason why the plaintiff applies for leave.

8. He ended his submission by arguing that the gist of the applicant's complaints is that the decision by the Fourth Defendant cannot be accepted as a lawful exercise of the prosecution powers given to the Office of the Public Prosecutor or the PNG Constabulary prosecution or investigative functions. He said, the balance of convenience cannot favour the process in the Terms of Reference to continue and thus leave for judicial review should be granted. He cited many case law authorities some of which I shall refer to later.

Address in reply by Counsel for all Defendants

9. Mr. Murray of counsel for the Defendants vigorously contested the application. Counsel argued that on the face of this application, the applicant has no sufficient interest on this application because, he had no locus standi since all affidavits containing the applicant's complaints were filed in Australia. Even if the applicant has sufficient interests, would such right override the public interest which was the underlying reason behind the approval of the establishment of a body which counsel referred to as "National Anti-Corruption Alliance (NACA).

10. Counsel asked the court to consider the issue of jurisdiction properly because on this application, the applicant seeks intervention to stop the progress of a public authority which was properly established to investigate matters of huge public concern which has been the subject of discussion on transparency and good governance. Counsel referred the Court to the affidavit of the First and Fifth Defendants saying those affidavits contain elaborate explanation on the empowerment of NACA by the Fourth Defendant.

11. On the issue of undue delay, counsel conceded that the defendants have no issue with this principle but Mr. Murray stressed that this application was brought under a situation which would be described as "pre-emptive strike" against the decision of the public body properly established which body was and is authorized to carry out "certain functions with the sole objective of putting back some pleasant smile on peoples faces."

12. On the issue of "arguable case", counsel argued that, the applicant does not have an arguable case citing ss.22 & 23 of the Constitution for enforcement of constitutional rights and sanctions taking into consideration the fact that if there was lack of procedural law on this type of application, this Court is empowered to consider the National Goals and Directive Principles.

13. Counsel asked a legitimate question of what authority has caused an error, legal or otherwise against the applicant which would warrant the filing of the application for leave to apply for judicial review. According to Mr. Murray, the NEC has not committed any constitutional or statutory breaches and as such the applicant must establish such errors or illegal activities to the satisfaction of this court before leave is granted.

14. He referred to the two instances where the Honourable Member was invited by the members of the "Investigation Taskforce Sweep" for interview with him and on both occasions he did not attend. Counsel referred the court to the affidavits evidence filed by the First and Fifth Defendants saying such evidence explain in detail the reasons behind the Fourth Defendant granting executive approval bring into the existence of NACA. Counsel ended his submission by saying that the applicant has not made out a case for the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave for judicial review.

Application of law

15. The application is made pursuant to O.16 r.3 Sub rule (1)(2)(3) and (4) of the National Court Rules 1983. These provisions state:

"3. Grant of leave to apply for judicial review. (UK. 53/3)

(1) An application for judicial review shall not be made unless the leave of the Court has been obtained in accordance with this Rule.

(2) An application for leave must be made by originating summons ex parte to the Court, except in vacation when it may be made to a Judge in chambers, and must be supported—

(a) by a statement, setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought; and

(b) by affidavit, to be filed before the application is made, verifying the facts relied on.

(3) The applicant must give notice of the application to the Secretary for Justice not later than two days before the application is made and must at the same time lodge with the Secretary copies of the statement and every affidavit in support.

(4) Without prejudice to its powers under Order 8 Division 4, the Court hearing an application for leave may allow the applicants statement to be amended, whether by specifying different or additional grounds for relief or otherwise, on such terms (if any) as it thinks fit."

16. It is established law that an applicant who applies for leave to apply for judicial review has to satisfy the court about the four major legal principles. They include:

1. An applicant must show that he or she has sufficient interest and standing or locus standi.
   
2. Is there an arguable case?
   
3. Has there been delay in bringing the application.
   
4. That he or she has exhausted alternative statutory or administrative remedies.
   

17. The above principles were enunciated in cases such as Kekedo-v-Burns Philp (PNG) Ltd & Others [1988-89] PNGLR 122 and Ila Geno and Others-v-Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1993] PNGLR 22 have been adopted and re-stated in many subsequent cases stating that in order for leave to be granted the applicant must satisfy the court on the above four principles.

18. The case of Diro-v-Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [1991] PNGLR 153 establishes that an application for leave to apply for judicial review is not intended to be extended or exhaustive as in a full substantive judicial review hearing. The purpose for a leave application is to establish whether an applicant has an arguable case. The Court there also said that, "there will just as likely be an arguable case in opposition". If a court is satisfied that there is a case fit for further consideration, then leave should be granted. (See NTN Pty Ltd-v-Board of Post & Telecommunication & Ors [1987] PNGLR 70, Manjin-v-PTC [1990] PNGLR 288).

19. In the common law case of Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex Parte Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1981] UKHL 2; [1981] 2 W.L.R 722 Lord Diplock said that where a court is considering an application of this nature, the threshold question for the court to consider when considering the issue of sufficient interest is, the court must direct its mind and form a prima facie view about it from the facts presented to it on the application.

20. So in the circumstances of the instant application, I am not required to look into the matter deeply as it would defeat the purpose of it in this jurisdiction as any leave application as provided for under O.16 r.3: Markscal Limited and Robert Needham-v-MRDC and 2 Others [1996] PNGLR 419, see American Cyanide Company-v-Ethicon Ltd (1975) 1 All E.R 495 for the principles of undue delay, exhaustion of available venues, arguable case and locus standi.

1. Has the applicant sufficient interest or locus standi?
   

21. The first principle enunciated in the above case is; the applicant must show that he has sufficient interest and standing on this application. In order for the applicant to establish the first requirement, he must show at this stage, that is, at the time the application for leave to apply for judicial review is made, that he has an interest on this application. I am, of the view that, this principle would tie in with the issue of jurisdiction. If the applicant has a keen interest on this application, he should submit himself to the jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea.

22. The applicant on this case filed documents from Australia. Those documents include the affidavit deposed to by the Member sworn on 30th September 2001 and filed on 3rd of this month. This document contains Annexure "A" the NEC Decision NG 03/2011 Special Meeting No.NG02/2011, the affidavit verifying facts filed 3rd October 2011 and the undertaking as to damages filed the same date.

23. It may be argued that, the applicant has locus standi, but considering the task assigned to the investigating team, can it be argued that the interest of the applicant overrides that of the general public when considering the amounts allegedly involved in the corrupt deal involving public money.

24. On the instant application, I find that, neither the Applicant nor the Fourth Defendant have committed any errors or wrongs known in law against each other so that, leave should be granted to the Honourable Member to go for a judicial review. The decision by the Fourth Defendant to set up a body and task it with investigative powers to make investigations into the allegations of corruption in this nation was an executive act or decision and in my opinion, an act of mercy to the people of this nation.

25. The Policy Submission No.4/2011 in no uncertain terms decided that the Investigating Team should be drawn from the National Anti-Corruption Alliance which body consists of key State Agencies.

26. The purpose of the investigation is to investigate into the K10 million that was paid to a private citizen company namely Travel Air Limited whose proprietor is Mr. Eremas Wartoto and the controversial K125 million which was allocated for the Kokopo District Community Projects. Paragraph 2 of the above decision reads:

"2. approved the establishment of the investigation into allegations of corruption at the Department of National Planning & Monitoring which would also extent to other Departments or State agencies in so far as the Development Budget from 2009 to 2011 was appropriated, and among others the K125 million for the Kokopo Community Projects and the K10 million which are outside of the Development Budget."

27. The National Executive Council is a government body established pursuant to s.149 of the Constitution. Note here that, the executive decision of the Fourth Defendant does not only affect the applicant. There are other people and departments which will be investigated. (See copy of letter from Mr. Sam Koim to Rakum Peni dated 8th September 2011, annexure "D" of applicant's affidavit filed 3rd October 2011).

28. I am of the view that in order for the applicant to have standing, he ought to submit himself to the jurisdiction of this country. His absence leads this court to hold that, being out in another jurisdiction where he filed documents in relation to this application, he does not have locus standi.

2. Is there undue delay in bringing this application?
   

29. On the second principle, Mr. Murray of counsel for the Defendants argued that they have no issue with the second principles as the Plaintiff filed the application on time. Counsel commented that according to the Defendants, this application has been brought under a situation that would be best described as and if I may quote the counsel's quote "pre-emptive strike" under the guise of sanctions provided by Sections 22, 23, 41 and 155(5) of the Constitution. I will refer to some of those Sections when I discuss the next principle. Sections 22 & 23 of the Constitution state:

"22. Enforcement of the Constitution.

The provisions of this Constitution that recognize rights of individuals (including corporations and associations) as well as those that confer powers or impose duties on public authorities, shall not be left without effect because of the lack of supporting, machinery or procedural laws, but the lack shall, as far as practicable, be supplied by the National Court in the light of the National Goals and Directive Principles, and by way of analogy from other laws, general principles of justice and generally-accepted doctrine.

23. Sanctions.

(1) Where any provision of a Constitutional Law prohibits or restricts an act, or imposes a duty, then unless a Constitutional Law or an Act of the Parliament provides for the enforcement of that provision the National Court may—

(a) impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding K10 000.00; or

(b) in the absence of any other equally effective remedy under the laws of Papua New Guinea, order the making of compensation by a person (including a governmental body) who is in default,

or both, for a breach of the prohibition, restriction or duty, and may make such further order in the circumstances as it thinks proper.

(2) Where a provision of a Constitutional Law prohibits or restricts an act or imposes a duty, the National Court may, if it thinks it proper to do so, make any order that it thinks proper for preventing or remedying a breach of the prohibition, restriction or duty, and Subsection (1) applies to a failure to comply with the order as if it were a breach of a provision of this Constitution.

(3) Where the National Court considers it proper to do so, it may include in an order under Subsection (2) an anticipatory order under Subsection (1)."

3. The applicant must have an arguable case.
   

30. For an applicant to have an arguable case, it involves the question of whether the application involves or raises any fundamental legal issues. The approach by the Courts in cases of application for leave to apply for judicial review, is that once some fundamental or serious issues of law such as constitutional or statutory interpretation or legal principles are raised which issues would merit judicial determination, an applicant should be granted leave: Arawe Logging Pty Ltd and Thomas Krokio and 30 Others-v-The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1988-89] PNGLR 216. In other words, there must be genuine issues of law that raise serious questions affecting an applicant: Amadio Pty Ltd-v-The State & Patterson Lowa, Isaac Moke and Mt. Kare Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] PNGLR 218.

31. On Mr. Yange's submission, he referred to sections 177(1), 176(3)(a), (5), 197(2) of and s.214 of the Constitution and s.3 of the Audit Act. Counsel argued that the decision by the Fourth Defendant which requires the investigating team to prosecute those found to be criminally implicated is an attempt to direct or control the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Papua New Guinea Constabulary. On the functions of the Public Prosecutor, s.177(1) & (2) state:

"177. Functions of the Public Prosecutor and the Public Solicitor.

(1) The functions of the Public Prosecutor are—

(a) in accordance with an Act of the Parliament and the Rules of Court of the Supreme Court and the National Court, to control the exercise and performance of the prosecution function (including appeals and the refusal to initiate and the discontinuance of prosecutions) before the Supreme Court and the National Court, and before other Courts as provided by or under Acts of the Parliament; and

(b) to bring or to decline to bring proceedings under Division III.2 (leadership code) for misconduct in office.

(2) The functions of the Public Solicitor are to provide legal aid, advice and assistance for persons in need of help by him, and in particular—

(a) to provide legal assistance to a person in need of help by him who has been charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment for more than two years; and

(b) notwithstanding the provisions of Section 176(5) (establishment of offices) he shall provide legal aid, advice and assistance to any person when directed to do so by the Supreme Court or the National Court; and

(c) in his discretion in any matter, whether of a criminal or civil nature provided that such assistance shall be—

(i) limited to advice and preparation of documents in any proceedings in respect of which an Act of the Parliament prohibits legal representation of any party to the proceedings; and

(ii) granted in accordance with an order of priorities relative to the resources of the Public Solicitor laid down by an Act of the Parliament."

32. I do not agree with Mr. Yange on that part of his submission that the Fourth Defendant is hijacking prosecutorial functions of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the investigative functions vested on the Police Force. As in all actions in law, there is always a plaintiff or as in criminal case, an informant and in serious cases the State, and there is always a defendant. Obvious as it is, someone has to be the complainant of each case. Other wise, there would not be any trouble makers.

33. The investigating team comprises of officers from different departments. They form that body referred to earlier as NACA. The Chairman of the team is Mr. Sam Koim, he is the Principal Legal Officer with the Office of the Solicitor General. The Deputy Chairman is Superintendent Sylvester Kalaut, who is the Provincial Police Commander for East New Britain Province. Another policeman is a member of the team Mr. Timothy Gitua is the Director of the National Frauds and Anti-corruption Squad.

34. There are other officers from other departments on this body. There are two policemen on the team and my view is when the investigation is done and people are found to be responsible, they may be referred for prosecution. When the NEC acted to set up the Investigating Team, it did it to the best interest of ordinary people to investigate into exorbitant sums of money that have either gone missing or misapplied. If there is no complainant, who is going to complain? The obvious result would be if there is no complainant, no investigation would have been mounted and in my opinion lead to more lawlessness.

35. In fact Offices of the Public Prosecutor, Department of Treasury, the Internal Revenue Commission, the Auditor General, the Department of Provincial and Local Level Government and the Media Unit are members of the Investigating Team. To this Court that is a well balanced representation of State agencies.

36. In my view, the decision by the Fourth Defendant was and is an executive decision or act. The NEC is established by s.149 of the Constitution and its functions are defined by Subsection (3)(a) as "to be responsible in accordance with this Constitution for the executive government of Papua New Guinea." On the validity of executive acts by the NEC pursuant to s.153 of the Constitution is non-justiciable. Again Mr. Yange tried to explain the terms of s.153(2) & (3) of the Constitution by saying these two provisions do not apply to the circumstances of the current application. The decision by the Fourth Defendant was and is an executive act and in my view non-justiciable. Section 153 of the Constitution states:

"153. Validity of executive acts

(1) Subsections (2), (3) and (4) are subject to any Constitutional Law or Act of the Parliament.

(2) The question, whether the procedures prescribed for the National Executive Council have been or are being complied with, is non-justiciable.

(3) The question, whether any, and if so what report has been given to the National Executive Council by the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy, is non-justiciable.

(4) No act of a Minister is open to challenge on the ground that he was not empowered to perform the act, if some other Minister, or any Minister, was so empowered.

(5) This section does not limit the jurisdiction or powers of the Ombudsman Commission, or of an authority or tribunal established under Division III.2 (leadership code)."

37. Mr. Yange referred this court to the case of Zachary Gelu-v-Sir Michael Somare MP (2008) N3524 where Cannings J granted leave to the applicants to apply for judicial review. With respect, in that case, the applicants sought leave of the National Court to quash the decision of the Prime Minister to appoint the Inquiry and to order that the Inquiry be prohibited from conducting any further proceedings. The Court in that case found that there were specific Constitutional breaches which warranted judicial review. I differentiate that case from the instant application. In comparison with the circumstances of the instant application, the Fourth Defendant has not committed any constitutional breach or errors. All it did was to establish the team to investigate.

38. The argument raised by Mr. Yange of counsel for the applicant about ss.22 and 23 of the Constitution, it is my respectful view that as a matter of practical politics or administrative decision, the Fourth Defendant ought not to be questioned by any court of law. The general provisions on the type of sanctions under those sections must give way to the interests of the executive decision by the NEC and the general public at large. On the issue of the validity of the executive acts of NEC, s.153 (2) of the Constitution states that, where the issue of whether the prescribed procedures are complied with is non-justiciable.

39. In fact the above issue raises the question as to what is actually wrong with the decision by the Fourth Defendant to set up the investigating team and if executed according to the terms of reference, whose interest would it serve. It would serve both the State and the general public and more particularly those people who have missed out on the much needed funds for development of infrastructure programs in their Districts. I hold the view that there is no arguable case.

Exhaustion of alternative statutory or administrative remedies

40. Has the Member exhausted statutory or administrative remedies? I would answer this question in the negative. The last legal principle considered relevant in a leave application is the exhaustion of administrative remedies. This principle is designed to ensure that the process of judicial review is or would only be applied as the last resort to resolve legal issues. (See Leave Applications for Judicial Review – Law and Practice by Michael A. Ntumy Ch.10 at 99).

41. The Applicant/Plaintiff included in his affidavit filed in the Registry office on 3rd October 2011 but which was sworn and made before the Notary Public on 30th of September this year believed to be in Cairns, Australia two copies of letters of invitation from Mr. Sam Koim dated 7th September this year in which the Applicant/Plaintiff was invited to attend an interview with the team on 12th of September 2011. Mr. Koim is the Chairman of the Investigating Team into the allegations of corruption.

42. On 13th of September, Mr. Sylvester Kalaut, the Provincial Police Commander of this Province (Deputy Chairman of the team) wrote another formal invitation to the Member to attend an organized interview at Ralum, Police Headquarters on 14th of September 2011. In both instance the Plaintiff never attended. (See Annexure "B" and "C" of the Plaintiff's affidavit referred to above).

43. In that annexure "C", the writer pointed out that police and other government enforcement agencies under the National Anti Corruption Agencies had been sanctioned by the Fourth Defendant to investigate the disbursement of K1.9 billion by the National Planning Department in the first three months of 2011 and the preceding years. By any man's standard or by any businessmen's standard, the amount of money is so exorbitant warranting an investigation in the nature of the one sanctioned by NACA, commissioned by the Fourth Defendant to conduct such investigation.

44. Since the Plaintiff was the former Minister for National Planning and Monitoring Department, his attendance of any interview would serve the purpose of finding out where the money went and the Court is sure, the Plaintiff would have assisted in the investigation if he was willing to.

45. Conducting an interview with someone suspected of committing an offence would be different from, the kind of interview the Plaintiff was invited to attend. With respect to the Member, he had not committed any offence known in law and so what was the Member afraid of? The word "investigation" is defined by the 'Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary' as "an official examination on the facts about a situation, crime, etc..."

46. Exhaustion of alternative remedies both statutory and other administrative process ought to be exhausted before seeking injunctive relief: Ila Geno, Paul Lawton & Florian Mambu-v-The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1993] PNGLR 22. That case was an appeal from the National Court decision which refused leave. Amet J (as he then was) gave elaborate reasons when he refused to grant the application for leave. The Supreme Court in that case quoted a passage from His Honour's judgment at page 26 of the above case which I think should be considered by counsels before resorting to litigation.

47. On the last leg of the principles on application for leave for judicial review, I am of the view that the Plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies and therefore, I must refuse the application for leave to apply for judicial review.

48. The Court orders the Plaintiff to pay for the costs of and incidental to this application.
______________________________________________________

Warner Shand Lawyers: Lawyer for the Plaintiff
Murray & Company Lawyers: Lawyer for all Defendants.