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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS 255 OF 2005
DANNIE TAKA
-Plaintiff-
And:
DR SAMSON AMEAN in his capacity as the Provincial
Administrator of Enga Provincial Government
-First Defendant
And:
ENGA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
-Second Defendant –
And:
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
-Third Defendant
Waigani : Injia, DCJ
2006 : June 23
JUDICIAL REVIEW – Administrative action – Decision of Departmental head refusing to comply with decision of Public Services Commission - Decision of Public Service Commission became binding after 30 days – Appropriateness of Relief – Mandamus – Discretionary – Refused notwithstanding binding nature of the decision of Public Services Commission, where mandamus would cause administrative hardships or other alternative remedies were more convenient beneficial and effective – Public Services Management Act 1995, s.18 (as amended).
Cases cited in the judgment:
Allan Pingha v PSC & Ors (2005) N2850
Ombudsman commission v Peter Yama (2004) SC747.
Port Moresby City Council v The Sheriff of PNG Ex parte Port Moresby City Council [1981] PNGLR 479
Overseas Cases:
R v Commissioner Public Service Commission; Ex parte Killeen (1914) CLR 56
Counsel:
W. Thomas, for Plaintiff
O. Steven, for the First & Second Defendants
P. Kembu, for the Third Defendant
23 June, 2006
1. INJIA, DCJ: In this substantive application for judicial review made under O.16 r.5 of the National Court Rules, the plaintiff seeks the following orders:
2. The grounds relied upon as set out in the statement filed on 4 May 2005 are as follows:
3. The plaintiff relies on his affidavit sworn on 4 May 2005.
4. The defendants contest the application. They rely on the affidavit of Mr Peter Kembu, counsel for the Third Defendant, to which is annexed a copy of the First Defendant sworn on 20 May 2005.
5. All parties filed written submissions and made oral submissions.
6. The undisputed facts as I find on the uncontested affidavit evidence before me is that on 4 June 1999, the applicant was employed under a written contract of employment, as a senior officer, (category "D" in contract in the public service), for a term of 3 years, as "Advisor (Works & Transport)" (Clause 3 of Contract). The Contract expired on or about 4 June 2002.
7. On 27 March 2002, the applicant was formally charged with disciplinary offence under s.50(a)(b) and (c) of the PSM Act, with publicly commenting negatively about the Enga Provincial Administration thereby discrediting the administration of which he had inside knowledge and part of. He was suspended without pay. On 15 April 2002, he replied to the charge denying the charge, effective from 27 March 2002. Between 28 November 2002 to 15 March 2004, he enquired of the outcome of the charge with the First and Second Defendants, by writing to them, but no response was received. On 27 October 2003, the applicant lodged an application for review with the PSC under s.18 of the PSM Act. On 30 January 2004, the PSC wrote to the First Defendant advising him of its decision in the following terms:
1. RECOMMENDATION:
1.1 That you withdraw the disciplinary charged served on Mr Dannie Taka dated 27th March 2002, and lift the suspension.
1.2 That you reinstate Mr Dannie Taka to his substantive position without any loss of service and salary entitlements accruing in the period of suspension.
1.3 That a copy of this Advice be placed in Mr Dannie Taka’s Staff and/personal file.
Please take notice that pursuant to Section 18 of the Public Services (Management) Act 1995 (as amended by Public Services (Management) (Amendment) Act 2002, the decision of the Commission becomes legally binding after a period of 30 days from the date of the decisions."
8. On 15 March 2004, the applicant wrote to the First Defendant seeking his response to the PSC decision.
9. On 18 March 2004, by a handwritten note made on the applicant’s letter of 15 March 2004, the First Defendant said:
"1. My response is forth coming. You will abide by it.
10. Thereafter the First Defendant has not implemented the decision of the PSC.
11. In his affidavit, the First Defendant gives his explanation why he has not implemented the PSC decision as follows:
"1. The Plaintiff was charged on the 27th March 2002 of a Disciplinary offence under the Public Service (Management) Act 1995. He was suspended without pay effective from the date of those charges.
12. On 6 May 2005, he filed these proceedings. During the hearing, in the light of certain concessions made by the First Defendant in his affidavit, I invited both parties to settle the matter. After several unsuccessful attempts, parties requested me to determine the merits of the application, which I now do.
13. I will first deal with procedural competency issues raised by the First Defendant. I accept Mr Steven’s submissions that on judicial review, the decision of the First Defendant supersedes all previous decisions including that of the PSC. This principle was laid down by the Supreme Court in Ombudsman Commission v Peter Yama (2004) SC747. The law as it stands today is that the decision of the PSC is final and binding after 30 days: s.18 of the PSM Act, see Allan Pingha v PSC & Ors (2005) N2850. The First Defendant is therefore under a duty to comply with the PSC decision. The plaintiff is entitled to seek an order of mandamus to compel the First Defendant to implement the binding PSC decision. Any other orders he seeks against the Defendants are not open in judicial review. And so essentially, the issue for decision is whether an order in the nature of mandamus should be issued to compel the First Defendant to implement the PSC decision? Mr Thomas for the plaintiff submits the PSC decision is binding and the First Defendant must implement it. This Court should issue an order of mandamus for him to do so.
14. The prerogative Writ of Mandamus is an equitable remedy and it is very much discretionary. Mandamus may be refused if its grant would cause administrative hardships. A case on point cited by Mr Steven is R v Commissioner Public Service Commission; Ex parte Killeen (1914) CLR 56 at 590. The High Court in that case, per Griffith CJ said at p.588:
"A mandamus will in general be granted to a public officer to do an act which he is by law bound to do, and which is a necessary preliminary to the exercise or enjoyment of some right by an individual. But the writ is discretionary, and will not be granted if it would be futile. A mandamus to admit to an office will not be granted if the office is already full."
15. Mandamus may also be refused if it would require a person to act contrary to law. A case on point also cited by Mr Steven is Ex parte Bourchier (1892) 13 SR (NSW) 105.
16. In Port Moresby City Council v The Sheriff of PNG Ex parte Port Moresby City Council [1981] PNGLR 479, the Supreme Court adopted a passage from de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd Ed) at p.561 as follows:
"Mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public duty, in the performance of which the applicant has a sufficient legal interest. The applicant must show that he has demanded performance of the duty and that performance has been refused by the authority obliged to discharge it. It is pre-eminently a discretionary remedy, and the court will decline to award it if another legal remedy is equally beneficial, convenient and effective."
The Court went on to say at p.480:
"It is a well-known rule of common law that mandamus does not lie against the Crown or against Crown servants acting exclusively in that capacity, see de Smith, pp.562, 574. but where a statute has imposed a duty on an expressly-designated public official, and his duty is to be wholly discharged by him in his own official capacity, as distinct from his capacity as an adviser to or instrument of the Crown, the courts have shown a readiness to grant mandamus, de Smith, p. 576."
17. In the circumstances of the present case, it is my view that for the reasons given by the First Defendant, it is not administratively practical or convenient and perhaps legally not open to re-instate the plaintiff on his former position, notwithstanding the position taken by the PSC and DPM. The First Defendant is the man on the ground well versed with the administration of Enga Province, and he can only be compelled to perform an act that he can lawfully be permitted and insofar as administratively feasible, convenient or practicable. Besides, the plaintiff’s contract on that position expired on or about 4 June 2002. Neither this Court nor PSC nor DPM has any authority to force the First Defendant to enter into a new contract.
18. In my view, the only remedy available is one of damages. Damages should be restricted to his pay without suspension period, of which he is entitled to under s.52 of PSM Act and any unpaid entitlements on the vacant position of EMPTW 015 Road Foreman Grade 8, but with "all other entitlements including salary to be paid at Grade 15", as per the First Defendant’s instruction to the Chairman of Inter Departmental Working Committee (IDC) dated 14 March 2005. As particulars of such entitlements is unclear, I order that the plaintiff provide these particulars within 30 days. The defendant provide its view of particulars of entitlements within 14 days therefrom. Parties settle the issue of entitlements within 14 days therefrom, failing which parties have liberty to apply to this Court for assessment of damages. I further order that the plaintiff be appointed to that position forthwith, if that position is still vacant. If not, the plaintiff be appointed to another vacant position, with salary and other entitlements at Grade 15. The payment of salary and other entitlements of course should be based on the principle of salary earned based on performance on the job. There is no evidence before me to show if the plaintiff has been performing his duties as allocated by the Enga Administration which would entitle him to receive back-dated entitlements. But in any case, in the exercise of my discretion, given that he has been fighting his case in Court, I would award him these entitlements up to the date of judgment.
19. Having reached the above conclusion, I do not consider other issues raised before me by the parties to be necessary to be considered.
20. The plaintiff shall have costs of the proceedings.
21. The formal orders I make are:
_____________________________________________________________________
Warner Shand/ Gregory Manda Lawyers: Lawyer for the Plaintiff
Solicitor General: Lawyer for the Respondents
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2006/62.html