|
|
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
National Court of Papua New Guinea |
N2104
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS NO: 617 of 1998
BETWEEN:
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AUTHORITY
Prosecutor
AND:
NIUGINI SCRAP CORPORATION PTY LTD
Defendant
OS NO: 620 of 1998
BETWEEN:
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AUTHORITY
Prosecutor
AND:
JAMES SINTON SPENCE
Defendant
WAIGANI: KANDAKASI J
FOREIGN INVESTMENT – Need for certification as a foreign enterprise under the Investment Promotion Authority Act 1992 (IPA Act) – Carrying on business without first obtaining certificate under the IPA Act – Contravention of s. 41(1)(a) of the IPA Act – Guilty plea to charge – Conviction on guilty plea.
Foreign enterprise conducting business in an activity reserved for citizens only – Contravention of s. 41(1)(b) of the IPA Act – Guilty plea to charge – Conviction on guilty plea.
SENTENCE - On guilty plea to charge under s. 41(1)(a) and (b) of the IPA Act – Factors for consideration before penalty – Intent of Parliament – Purpose of prohibition and penalty – Penalty to be severe, punitive and deterrent in nature – Other purposes of sentencing inapplicable – Guilty plea effect of – Guilty plea and no prior conviction factors for consideration in offenders mitigation – Level of gain during period of illegal operations relevant – Onus on offender to mitigate penalty – Failure to mitigate may justify imposition of maximum prescribed penalty – IPA Act s. 41(1)(a) and (b) and s. 41(3)
Cases Cited:
Arthur Ageva v. Bobby Gaigo [1987] PNGLR 12
R v. Davey [1980] FCA 134; [1980] 2 A Crim R 254
The State v. Abel Airi N2007
Inakambi Singorom v. John Kalaut [1985] PNGLR 238 at 241, per Kidu CJ.
PLAR No. 1 of 1980 [1980] PNGLR 326.
Norah Mairi v. Alkan Tololo & Ors [1976] PNGLR 125 at 136.
SCR No. 1 of 1978: Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public Prosecutor [1978] PNGLR 345 at page 389, per Pritchard J.
Counsel:
Mr. S. Nutely for the Prosecutor
Mr. W. Frizzell for the Defendants
JUDGEMENT ON SENTENCE
KANDAKASI J: By consent of the parties, these matters were dealt with together on 12th April 2001, after a number of adjournments. The hearing was by affidavits, again with consent of the parties. After the hearing, I adjourned for submissions of the parties and thereafter a decision.
The defendants pleaded guilty to one charge each respectively under Section 41(1)(a) and 41(1)(a) and (b) of the Investment Promotion Act 1992 (the IPA Act) for carrying on business without certification as a foreign enterprise and in an activity reserved only for citizens. The information charging them were presented with leave of the Court granted on 14th June 1999. On the available material I was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty pleas. I therefore accepted the guilty pleas and proceeded to convict the defendants of the charges against them. As these were the first ever cases to be dealt with under the IPA Act, I asked counsel to assist me with relevant local (if any) and oversees authorities in the determination of an appropriate sentence for the defendants.
The parties’ submissions have now been received. Unfortunately, they offer no real assistance. They make submissions on the facts and the provisions of section 41 (1)(a) and (b) without any suggestion has to how I should determine what penalty is appropriate. They do not even suggest the principals or factors I should take into account before arriving at a decision. The only exception there is that, they both submit that I should take into account the fact that the defendants have plead guilty and that operates in their mitigation. I am proceeding to this judgement therefore, without much assistance from counsel.
The relevant facts can be ascertained from the various affidavits, that were admitted into evidence with the consent of the parties. The facts are therefore not in issue. Niugini Scrap Corporation Pty Limited (the company) was incorporated under the Companies Act (Chapter 146) on 28 May 1996. Its shareholders were Ronald M. Wanless (Australian) with 51 shares and John Lari (Papua New Guinean) with the remaining 49 shares. The officers of the company were Ronald M. Wanless (Director) and John Lari (Director). James Sinton Spence was the company’s secretary and his office was the registered office of the company. It was situated at 2nd Floor, Brian Bell Plaza, Turumu Street, Boroko, National Capital District.
On 21st May 1996, a complaint was made to the Registrar of Companies that the company was a foreign company carrying on business with a foreign director and its majority shareholder was also a foreigner. The Registrar of Companies conducted a search of its records and found that the complaint was true.
By an undated letter, received by the Registrar of Companies on 21st May 1996, from LNJ Consultants Pty Ltd, notice was given that an application would be made to the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) for certification of the company has a foreign enterprise. Simultaneously, the IPA received an application by the shareholders for a certification of the company, as a foreign enterprise.
On 8th August 1996, the IPA rejected the application for certification as a foreign enterprise and communicated that to the company and its officers by letter of the same date. The rejection was on the basis that the activities for which the company sought certification were reserved activities for citizen companies and individuals. The company and its officer’s appealed against that rejection by letter dated 6th September 1996. However, the appeal was out of time and without the payment of the required appeal fees. So by letter dated 25th September, the IPA informed the company that the appeal could not be considered. At the same time, the IPA expressed concern that the company was still carrying on reserved activities and without proper certification and asked the company and its officers to rectify the situation within two weeks.
The company responded through its lawyers, Joseph S. Aaoae who wrote on 3rd of October 1997, to the IPA informing that, the shares held by the foreigners would be transferred to a citizen to comply with the requirements of the IPA Act. On the same day, the IPA wrote to the company’s lawyers requiring the indicated restructuring of the company to be completed by or before 9th of October 1997. The IPA reminded the company that the activities it was involved in were reserved for citizens and warned that, if the company did not restructure as indicated and still carries on the activities, prosecution would follow.
On 9th October 1997, the company’s lawyers wrote to the IPA and informed that the shares held by the foreigners would be transferred to a Papua New Guinean. The IPA responded by a letter dated 10th October 1997 requesting the company to provide evidence of the shares being transferred and informed that foreigners should not control the business. The company failed to reply to that letter and that attracted a further letter from the IPA to the company on 1st December 1997 warning of prosecutions under the Act unless a reply was received within 14 days. A response from the company’s lawyers was then communicated by letter dated 17th of December 1997. In that response, the company claimed that it had been in contact with three officers of the IPA and that there was a misunderstanding which resulted in the application for certification being made under the wrong provisions and that an application under the correct provisions was being lodged.
Then on 11th of November 1997, the company lodged its second application, which was the one mentioned in its lawyers’ letter of 17th December 1997. This time the application was for manufacturing of basic iron and steel. That application was rejected on 17th June 1998, after asking for and receiving technical inputs to determine whether the companies proposed activity was different from recycling scrap metal, which is a reserved activity for citizens. In the same rejection letter, the IPA informed the company of its right of objection to the rejection. Prior to that, the only national partner in the business, Mr. John Lari, wrote to the IPA on 9th of June 1998 stating that the company was still carrying on business but he did not receive what he was entitled to receive from the business. The company continuing to operate was confirmed by a listing of the company in the 1998 yellow pages of Papua New Guinea Telephone directory. By 27th July 1998, the company was still carrying on the reserved business without certification.
The company through a Brendan McMullen admits carrying on business without certification as a foreign enterprise and despite directions from the IPA. This was because about 300 customers continued to go to the company to sell scrap metal to it as it was offering better price than its competitors. He also says, the letter dated 17th June 1998, was not seen by the company officials until a month later.
As for Mr. John Lari’s complaint, Mr. McMullen says Mr. Lari transferred to Madang and went out of communication with the company and was running his own business.
The prosecution argues that, the defendants continued to carry on business despite being a foreign enterprise and without meeting the requirements for certification. Not only that, it was carrying on a business activity that was reserved for citizens. It was also in defiance of concerns raised by the IPA over the non-compliance of the relevant requirements of the IPA Act and not observing the prohibition of the activities they were carrying on.
The defendants argue that, the IPA did not ask them to stop the activities they were engaged in so they continued to carry on business until after the receipt of the letter of 17th of June 1998 and they immediately took steps to ceased from those activities. The defendant, James Sinton Spence argues that, he was only the company’s secretary. Consequently, he did not have any power to direct the affairs of the company but the directors were.
The section under which the defendants have been charged and convicted of reads in relevant parts as follows:
"41. Offences.
(1) A foreign enterprise and an officer or owner (however described) of a foreign enterprise which or who—
(a) carries on business without a certificate under Part IV or Part IVA; or
(b) carries on business in an activity that is reserved for a citizen: ...
(c) ...
(d) ...
(e) ...
is guilty of an offence.
Penalty: A fine not exceeding K100,000.00.
Default penalty: A fine not exceeding K10,000.00.
(1A) ...
(2) ...
(3) In a prosecution of an offence under this Section, the burden of proof that a foreign enterprise or a national enterprise—
(a) was not carrying on business; or
(b) was lawfully carrying on business under Section 27(5) and (6); or
(c) was carrying on business only for the purpose of winding-up its affairs,
is on the foreign enterprise or national enterprise.
(4) ..."
There is no local case to assist me in determining an appropriate sentence or penalty in these case. I asked counsel to assist me with any authority outside the country but they have not been able to do that. Also, I am not able to find any case law either within or outside Papua New Guinea, though I am aware that there was an earlier case in the country. That case appears not to have been reported or gone into the unreported but numbered judgement system.
It is an established practice in our jurisdiction that where there is no relevant practice or procedure, the practice or procedure in a similar setting should be adopted and applied. That is what was done in Arthur Ageva v. Bobby Gaigo [1987] PNGLR 12, which was approved by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, for the case before me, I will adopt the practice and principals that govern the sentencing power of the Court in criminal cases generally, noting however that there is no provision in the IPA Act that is similar to s. 19 of the Criminal Code. I also need to bear in mind the particular wording of the relevant sections in the IPA Act.
The purposes and or aims of punishment or sentence in criminal cases are well settled. Muirhead J., delivering the leading judgement in R v. Davey [1980] FCA 134; [1980] 2 A Crim R 254, in the Australian Federal Court in relation to an appeal by the Crown, against a sentence of 3 years for manslaughter which had been suspended on various conditions, at pages 260 – 263 stated some of those principles in these terms:
"One finds in the cases referred to, references to ‘moral sense of the community’, to ‘condign punishment’ and references which appear to draw a contrast between ‘rehabilitation’ of an offender and ‘deterrence’. There are references derived from R v. Radich [1954] NZLR 86 to sentences which are ‘weakly merciful’. There has, of course, been much debate academic and judicial as to the purposes of punishment, the effectiveness or otherwise of deterrence, the necessity for punishment, the concept of retribution. One would again glean from some sources that there are two conflicting responsibilities vested in a sentencing judge – one owed to the prisoner, to rehabilitate him, to treat him gently as it were – the other owed to society, to punish, to levy retribution, to deter. And the cases I have referred to suggest that error was demonstrated because of the emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment or deterrence. It is important that the law does not become confused in its objective. The purpose of the criminal law is to bring wrongdoers to justice for the protection of the community. First and foremost, it is the protection of the community a sentencing judge must bear in mind (R v Cuthbert (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) NSW 272, per Herron CJ at 274).
...
In R v Kear (1978) 2 Crim LJ 40, Wells J, a judge of considerable experience in criminal matters, dealt in detail with the principles of sentencing and his remarks were then obviously addressed to an anxious public. But he referred in so doing to the remarks of Napier CJ in Webb v O’Sullivan [1952] SASR 65 at 66, which he stated, represented the true position in law:
‘The courts should endeavour to make the punishment fit the crime, and the circumstances of the offender, as nearly as may be. Our first concern is the protection of the public, but, subject to that, the court should lean towards mercy. We ought not to award the maximum which the offence will warrant, but rather the minimum which is consistent with a due regard for the public interest.’"
These principles have been referred to with approval and applied in a large number of cases in Papua New Guinea. A recent example of that is my own judgement in The State v. Abel Airi N2007 (delivered on the 28th of November 2000).
What is clear from cases like these, is that a sentencing judge or Court has the difficult task of weighing two equally important interests. The first is that of the community to appropriately punish, to levy retribution and to deter would be offenders for its protection. The second and opposing interest is to rehabilitate an offender. The particular circumstances of each case help determine the kind of punishment that must be imposed.
In the case of a successful prosecution and conviction in a case like the present, I am of the view that, these principals should not apply whole scale. Instead, they should be modified to meet the legislative intent behind the Act or legislation under which the prosecution and conviction had taken place. This in turn would conform with the well accepted principal of, all legislative provisions must be interpreted in such a way to give effect and meaning to the legislative intent: see Inakambi Singorom v. John Kalaut [1985] PNGLR 238 at 241, per Kidu CJ; PLAR No. 1 of 1980 [1980] PNGLR 326; Norah Mairi v. Alkan Tololo & Ors [1976] PNGLR 125 at 136; and SCR No. 1 of 1978: Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public Prosecutor [1978] PNGLR 345 at page 389, per Pritchard J.
So what is the legislative intent behind section 41(1)(a) and (b) and 41(3) of the IPA Act? The intent of Parliament in coming up with these provisions is quite obvious, in my view. Parliament intended, as is the case in other countries that, all foreigners wishing to carry on business in Papua New Guinea must first apply for and obtain a certificated under the IPA Act from the IPA. At the same time, Parliament considered it appropriate that a number of specified business activities in the country should only be available for citizens. This was to ensure that foreigners did not come at will and carried on whatever business they wished and thereby take away business activities from the citizens of the country or run in direct competition with the citizens. It was also to ensure that people or business entities that meet the requirements of the country through the various legislation and policies and government guidelines for the country are complied with to conduct business in Papua New Guinea. In a few words, the requirements were enacted to control the entry of foreigners into the country to conduct business.
In my view, Parliament considered the restrictions were very important. It therefore, enacted the provisions under consideration to punish those who were not prepared to respect and observe the clear legislative intent. It follows therefore that, in enacting the provisions in question, Parliament intended that offenders should be seriously penalised with a large amount of money up to a maximum of K100, 000.00 with a default penalty of K10, 000.00 unless they proved their innocence by virtue of s.41 (3) of IPA Act or mitigated their penalties. This was in my view, to deter would be offenders from breaching the requirements of the IPA Act. In other words, these provisions put all foreigners and their Papua New Guinean partners or agents on notice that, if they fail to met the requirements of the IPA Act before undertaking any business in the country and or engage in businesses reserved only for citizens, they will be met with heavy penalties. Parliament’s intention in my view therefore was to achieve zero business prior to certification or involvement by foreigners in business activities reserved for citizens.
Based on the above, I am of the view that, the only relevant purpose and or consideration for sentencing or determining penalty under the IPA Act is one of retribution and deterrence only. I do not consider that rehabilitation and the other purposes of sentencing applying in normal criminal cases have any application in specific legislative prosecutions as is the case here under the IPA Act. I have come to that view because these are offences specifically created to prevent the very kind of conducts covered for the protection of Papua New Guinean businesses and to encourage Papua New Guineans to go into businesses Parliament considered they are capable of without competition from foreigners. It is a case of either complying with the requirements of the IPA Act by people wishing to go into business or not. If foreigners wish to carry on any business in Papua New Guinea they have to first apply for and obtain a certificate under the IPA Act for a business activity not reserved for Papua New Guineans. That is the only way in which foreigners can be permitted to conduct business in the country. If foreigners choose not to meet those requirements and conduct business illegally and in defiance of those requirements they must be dealt with severely to demonstrate the importance of the requirements and to deter would be offenders.
It is good business practice to seek and ensure that all requirements of the law are first met before actually going into any proposed business. This is part of what is usually known has the conduct of "due diligence". That is to say, all care and precaution should be exercised before going into a business so as to inter alia meet the requirements of the relevant and applying laws. This covers aspects of incorporation, shareholding and corporate structuring prior to commencement and conduct of business. Of course, accountants play a major role in this process. In some cases, as in this case, accounts become corporate secretaries. They make it their business to know the requirements of the relevant law including any specific and applying Act of Parliament such as the Companies Act 1997 and the IPA Act.
The defendants in this case do not disclose what kind of steps they took to ensure compliance of the IPA Act and other relevant and applying Acts of Parliament. Instead the evidence and the allegations against them shows a clear breach and disregard of the relevant provisions of the IPA Act. The company went into a reserved business when it was not entitled to and in any case before, applying for and obtaining an approval as a foreign enterprise permitted to conduct business in Papua New Guinea. The IPA repeatedly expressed concern over that and the defendants did nothing to correct it although they said they would. They claim that because the IPA did not tell them to stop carrying on the reserved business they continued to carry it on until after 17th of June 1998. This is unacceptable because the IPA has no obligation under the Act to do that. In any case, the legislative prohibition is already there for them to observe and follow without waiting for the IPA to tell them to so.
Mr. Spence is an experience and chartered account and has had a number of years’ experience in Papua New Guinea. He therefore had every reason to know of the requirements of the IPA Act including the need to apply for certification before commencing business as well as the list of businesses reserved for citizens. Yet he has done nothing to ensure that the company complied with the requirements for certification and to ensure that the company’s business did not come within the reserved list. He claims he was only the secretary of the company and as such he could not cause and or direct the company to meet the requirements of the IPA Act. He says, that duty or right was with the board of directors. I do not accept his claims because, given his experience and his position, he was in a position to draw to the attention of the board of directors to the need to meet the requirements of the IPA Act, including the prohibition and penalties under s.41 of the IPA Act. Indeed I note, that one of the responsibilities of a company secretary is to ensure compliance of all statutory and other legal requirements in so far as they apply to his company.
These factors operate against the defendants and they call for a sentence that accord well with the legislative intent as I have stated above and the facts of this case. However, before determining the appropriate sentence or penalty, I consider any factor in mitigation of the defendants should be taken into account. But in saying that, I do not consider that the principles considered under and in the context of s. 19 of the Criminal Code (the Code) apply. This is because that section applies to offences under the Code only (see s. 19(1)). If Parliament intended that the considerations under s. 19 of the Code should apply in the determination of penalty under s. 41(1) of the IPA Act, Parliament could have provided for it. Since Parliament did not do that, I am at no liberty to consider and apply those provisions and the principals built around that section to this case. It is settled law that, if something is not provided for in legislation by the legislature, it is not for the courts to add, in the disguise of interpreting and applying the law: see The State v. Paul Pokolou N404. Nevertheless, I am of the view that Parliament intended to vest a court hearing a charge under s. 41(1) with a discretion to either impose a penalty up to the maximum prescribe or a lesser amount, by prescribing a penalty in the way it is stated. If the Parliament intended otherwise, it could have said "penalty K100, 000.00" and in "default K10, 000.00"
By section 41(3) Parliament in effect reversed the burden of proof in relation to the prohibitions. Using the words of that provision Parliament provided that "[i]n a prosecution of an offence under this Section, the burden of proof that a foreign enterprise or a national enterprise (a) was not carrying on business; or (b) was lawfully carrying on business under Section 27(5) and (6); or (c) was carrying on business only for the purpose of winding-up its affairs, is on the foreign enterprise or national enterprise."
It follows therefore that, all that the IPA can do is allege and show that a named person, either a natural person or an enterprise did not meet the requirements for certification or observed the prohibitions under s.41 (1)(a) and (b). The burden is then on the person accused to prove his innocence. If on the evidence the Court finds the accused person guilty, by necessary implication, in my view he would also have the burden to show to the satisfaction of the court, why the maximum penalty should not be imposed against him or her. I note this is the case already even for a prosecution under our normal criminal justice system. A prisoner has the duty to put up a case for a lenient sentence against him once he has been found guilty. In other words, a prisoner has the duty to put to the court any factors in his mitigation before sentence is passed. That duty applies to a prosecution under s.41(1) of the IPA Act in the absence of anything to the contrary.
In the present case, the defendants admitted the charges against them. As noted earlier, the evidence produced against them by the prosecution supported their guilty pleas. I would have in any case found the defendants guilty on the basis of the evidence produced against them, if they denied the charges and produced no evidence in rebuttal. Nevertheless, their guilty pleas saved the Court the time it would have taken to hear evidence, assess it and come up with a finding. But unlike in a normal prosecution, they did not save the prosecution any hardship save the time and costs it would have taken the prosecution on account of the defendant’s going into evidence to discharge the burden they have under s. 41(3) of the IPA Act. Notwithstanding that, I will take into account their guilty pleas as a factor in their favour. I will also take into account the fact that the defendants have not been previously charged and convicted of a similar or any other breach of the requirements of the IPA Act or any other criminal offence.
I consider it also appropriate that the amount of money the defendants made in breach of the provisions in question need to be taken into account. There is no real evidence on the actual amount made by the defendants during the period the company was conducting the unauthorised business. On the evidence produced by the IPA, the company’s total assets stood at K215, 000.00 per the business plan dated April 1992 which is annexed to Mr. Pus’ affidavit. Then by December 31st 1996, according to the company’s balance sheet, which is also annexed to Mr. Pus’ affidavit the company’s total assets and liabilities stood at K179, 010.14. Other evidence coming also from Mr. Pus’ affidavit shows levels of income from over K300, 000.00 to K500, 000.00. From the Affidavit of Mr. Spence sworn on the 11th of April 2001, the foreign and majority shareholders of the company loaned to the company a total of about K342, 256. 27. Further, according to the affidavit of Mr. William Marum sworn on the 27th of July 1998, representatives of the company indicated to the IPA that the company had over K1 million to invest and wanted IPA clearance.
Coupled with this evidence and the fact that the company was carrying on business for a number of years continuously, it is reasonable to infer that the business was a going concern. As to how much was actually generated by the business is a matter within the peculiar knowledge of the defendants. They had the burden both under s.41 (3) of the IPA Act and the normal practice and procedure in criminal law to show that the business was not a going concern. In the absence of such evidence I take it that the level of income was substantial. That is why the company and those behind it continued to carry on business and kept a good number of employees despite repeated concerns and warnings shown and issued by the IPA.
In determining whether or not to impose the maximum prescribed penalty, I consider that the level of business and gain to an offender should be taken into account. If the income or gain to the offender is nil or negligible a lesser amount of penalty may be appropriate. If however, the level of gain is substantial the maximum prescribed may be imposed. Between those two extremes, the penalty can bend either toward the higher end or the lower end depending on the level of the gain. The onus is on the offender to make a case for a lesser penalty than the one prescribed, given the intent of Parliament.
For the present case, I find on the available material that, the company was carrying on a business that was successful but for the failure to meet the requirements of the law. The only local shareholder complained to the IPA of not receiving his share of the income from the company’s business. The defendants did not rebut this evidence in any way. I therefore, find that the illegal operations of the company’s business resulted in gains to the foreign shareholders at the expense of the local shareholder, which it is not prepared to disclose. This is the very kind of conduct the legislature intended to prevent by enacting the requirements for certification and coming up with the reserved list of business for citizens and requiring the offenders to prove the opposite of a charge against them.
Based on these findings, I consider a sentence short of the maximum prescribed penalty is appropriated to reflect the fact that the defendants have no prior convictions and that they pleaded guilty to the informations presented against them. The informations were presented against the defendants following the company conducting business without certification under the IPA Act and for carrying on a business reserved for citizens. I consider an appropriate penalty is K70, 000.00 against the company, Niugini Scrap Corporation Pty Ltd.
I consider Mr. Spence is equally liable and should bear a penalty of K70, 000.00 as well for a number of reasons. First, there is no distinction between a company and its officers in s. 41(1)(a) and (b) of the IPA Act. Instead, they are covered in the same footing. In much the same way, there is no distinction between shareholders, directors and or other officers of a company and or separation on the kind of penalty that can be imposed. Secondly, he was the corporate secretary. He has been in the country for a number of years. His professional business involved the provision of his services to companies and individuals. His lawyer submits he has a reputation and is of some standing in society. Yet he pleads ignorance of the law. This defies the well know principal of law that, ignorance of the law is no excuse. He further claims that he was in no position to influence the company to comply. I do not accept that argument because he could have at least asked the company to ensure that it complied with all the requirements of the law before the company commenced its business. Thirdly, if the legislature intended that officers like this defendant should have a defence based on the level of their association and influence on an offender, provisions could have been made for that but there is no such provision. I warn myself that, my duty is to only interpret and apply the law and ensure not to either add or diminish the effect and intent of Parliament. If I accept this defendant’s arguments I would in effect be re-enacting the provisions of the IPA Act to allow for a defence to be sustained on the basis of less or no meaningful association, with an offender.
The defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff’s costs pursuant to s.44A (3) Investment Promotion Act. In line with that, I would order the defendants to pay the IPA’s costs.
For these reasons I make the following orders:
_____________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for Prosector: Gadens Lawyers
Lawyers for the Defendants: Warner Shand Lawyers
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2001/114.html