PacLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

National Court of Papua New Guinea

You are here:  PacLII >> Databases >> National Court of Papua New Guinea >> 1997 >> [1997] PGNC 4

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Decisions | Noteup | LawCite | Download | Help

Aro Investments Pty Ltd v Fly River Provincial Government [1997] PGNC 4; N1519 (6 February 1997)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N1519

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS 35 “B” OF 1997
BETWEEN
ARO INVESTMENTS PTY LTD - PLAINTIFF
AND
FLY RIVER PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT - 1ST DEFENDANT
AND
ANDREW I TEMU - 2ND DEFENDANT

Waigani

Sevua J
5-6 February 1997

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Injunction - Application to set aside - Not available when the act to be restrained has already occurred.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - District Court Order - Application to set aside - S.25 District Court’s Act - District Court may set aside - Appeal against District Court order is appropriate relief.

Held

1. As the plaintiff&#8 17;sraontract to supply and deliver to the first defendant, the services known as Daru Town Garbage & Sanitation Contract had already been terminated, an injunction isavail

&<&#160 Sect Section 25 of the Dittrict Court’s Act gives the plaintiff the right to have an ex-parte oset ain thtrictt.

3. ; T60 plaentifintiffRfRf’s 17;s propeproper course of action would be by way of an appeal to the National Court pursuant to s.219 of the District Court’s Act.

4. & T60;plae tiffn#8217;s apps application is dismissed.

Cases Cited

Leytrac Pty Ltd v The State [1982] PNGLR 148

Counsel

R p forntiff

6 February 1ary 1997

S>SEVUA EVUA J: The plaintiff has made this application seeking two orders. Firstly, it seeks to restrain the first and second defendants their servants and agents from interfering with the right of the plaintiff to supply and deliver to the first defendant the services provided in the contract between the plaintiff and the first defendant known as the Daru Town Garbage and Sanitation Contract. And secondly, it seeks anrorder that the Daru District Court orders made on 3rd February, 1997, be set aside on the basis that the District Court had no jurisdiction.

The brief fare as follows. The plaintiff ae first deft defendantndant entered into a contract on 4th March, 1986, whereby the plaintiff would provide removal services for refuse and night soil in the town of Daru and such services would be paid for by the first defendant. Pursuant to Clause 6, thtrcontract was for three years but was renegotiated on 4th March, 1987, for a further three years, commencing that date.

At the expiration of the contract, it was not renewed, however, the plaintiff continued to provide the services and the first defendant continued to pay for such services. There is evidence the cont contract had lapsed on 31st September, 1994, following a six months extension from 1st April, 1994. I cannot follow how came tame to be, but that e evidence before me.

On 2nd April, 1996, the secondecond defendant wrote to the plaintiff and amongst other things, informed laintiff that, “in the meantime alternative arrangemengements for the provision of Garbage and Sanitation Services are being investigated, including the calling of new tenders”.

On 2nd November, 1996, a tender was called by the Western Province Supply and Tenders Board. On 14th January 1997, the second defendant formally advised the plaintiff that its bid for this tender was unsuccessful. On January 1997, the seconsecond defendant, in his capacity as Chairman of Western Province Suand Tenders Board formally ally advised the plaintiff, amongst other things, that a new contract was being executed with the new contractor, and the new contractor shall commence these services on 1st February 1997 whilst the plaintiff’s interim contract would lapse on close of business, 31st January, 1997. Since thater, correspondenondence have been exchanged between the plaintiff and its lawyers and the defendants, subsequently leading to these proceedings.

On 3rd February 1997, the Daru Districtt ordered firstly, that thet the plaintiff was to relinquish the sanitation pans to the new contractor, Regs Services forthwith, and secondly, that the Police Station Commander is to assist Regs Services to enter the plaintiff’s premises to physically remove the sanitation pans and deliver them to the premises of Regs Services. Apparently, thentiff had rhad refused to deliver pans and other equipment to the first defendant following the latter’s request on 16th January, 1997, hence the Districtt proceedings.

Counsel for the plaintiff has made twde two submissions. Firstly, he subm that the the plaintiff was entitled to a notice of termination of the contract and since the defendants had not given proper notice to terminate the contract,plaintiff is entitled to continue with the contract. 160; His s submission is t is that, the Daru District Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this matter because, he submitted, the contract was worth more than K100,000.00, therefore that Court did not jurisdiction. This Chis Court that, in , in the substantive proceedings which are on foot, the plaintiff is seeking various declarations and injunctions including the restraining order it is seeking in paragraph 1 of its notice of motion now before me.

With respect to counsel, I consider that the whole application is misconceived and should be refused.

Firstly, the contract which the plaintiff seeks to rely on had already expired in September 1994. There wasenewal so the sere services including the payment for such services were being rendered on an ad hoc and interim basis. The plaf knew that a tendetender wing proposed and it knew this because the second defendant dant had advised in its letter of 2nd April 1996. There is no provisn theracntract governing the giving of notice of terminationation, but in my view, the plaintiff had been aware as early as April 199at the defendants were reviewing the contract including the calling of a new tender.

Even if the Court finds that proper notice was not given to the plaintiff, and I am not determining this issue now, I consider that its remedy is in damages in lieu of notice or for breach of contract not an injunction. Thintiff, in my view, cann cannot come to this Court and seek what is tantamount to specific performance in the manner it has done in this action. Here the defen have awardewarded a contra a new contractor followingowing a public tender which effectively severed the plaintiff’s services. The new contract wasave ccmmenced on 1st February 1997, but it could not becausecause, sanitation pans and other equipment are currently being withheld b plaintiff. So, as far as the dants arts are concerned, the plaintiff, as at 31st Jant January 1997, was no longer, the contractor.

The so called ‘plaintiff’s right’ to supply and deliver to the first defendant the services known as Daru Town Garbage and Sanitation Contract has been terminated and to seek an order to restrain an act which has already occurred is inappropriate and contrary to the legal principle which is well established. I refer to ac Pty Ltd v Th v The State [1982] PNGLR 148 in which the Court held:

“where an act intended to be restrained has already occurred an injunction torain is not available: an alternative remedy by way of decl declaration may be available.”

In my judgment therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief it now seeks.

Secondly, the plaintiff seeks to have the Daru District Court order of 3rd February, 1997 set aside. I am not aware if that waer was granted following an exparte application. If it was ts.25 of the Dise District Courts Act gives the plaintiff the right to have it set aside by way of an application to the Dis Cour60; If the order rder was granted after a full hearing, then I consider that the plaintiff&tiff’s relief is not what it is now seeking from this Court.

In my view, the plaintiff’s proper course of action would be an appeal to the National Court pursuant to s.219 of the District Courts Act. That is autory right of thof the plaintiff, as it is obvious that the plaintiff is aggrieved by the order of the said District Court. I der that the plaintiff&#iff’s application before me, far as it relates to the sthe second relief it is seeking, is tantamount to an abuse of the process of the Court and this Court has to prevent its process beis being abused. Since the plaintiff viousliously aggrieved by the decision of the District Court, it should have appealed against that decision, to this Court. Theedure employed by the pthe plaintiff is inappropriate, miscus and contrary to the prov provisions of the District Court’s Act.

For these reasons, I refuse the plaintiff’s aption and order that this apis application be dismissed.

Lawyer for Plaintiff: Pato Lawyers



PacLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/1997/4.html