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Kevi v Teaching Service Commission Disciplinary Committee [1997] PGNC 187; [1997] PNGLR 659 (24 July 1997)

[1997] PNGLR 659

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

GRAHAM KEVI

V

THE TEACHING SERVICE COMMISSION DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE

MOUNT HAGEN: LENALIA AJ
11, 24 April 1997

Facts

The plaintiff was a lecturer at the Mount Hagen Technical College in the Western Highlands Province. He was dismissed by the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee on alleged disciplinary grounds. On appeal against that decision by the plaintiff, the defendant confirmed the discussion of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee. The plaintiff is now seeking judicial review of the decision of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee, which was subsequently confirmed by the Defendant on the grounds, inter alia, that he was denied natural justice.

Held

1. As a matter of statutory construction of the Teaching Service and Teaching Service Act Regulations (Ch. No. 71), the Disciplinary Committee constituted as an appellate Board is required by law to give reasons for dismissal and an opportunity to be heard before the member was dismissed. Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; [1963] 2 All ER 66 and Okuk and Another v Fallscheer [1980] PNGLR 274 applied.
   
2. Where the Teaching Service Commission Disciplinary Committee acts on recommendation by the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee resulting in a finding of guilt, the Disciplinary Committee must give reasons at the time the member is informed of the decision.
   
3. Although there may not be any specific requirement under the Teaching Service Act and Teaching Service Regulations for the Disciplinary Committee to give reasons, it is a requirement of the principles of natural justice to give reasons.
   
4. The defendant erred in law by failing to give reasons for finding the plaintiff guilty of a serious disciplinary charge.
   
5. The defendant erred in law when it adopted the decision to dismiss the plaintiff when the charge was not supported by any evidence.
   
6. The purpose of judicial review is not concerned with the decision but the decision making process and whether procedural fairness was ever afforded to the aggrieved person seeking review.
   

Papua New Guinea cases cited

Fallscheer v Okuk and Another [1980] PNGLR 101.

Niggints v Tokam [1993] PNGLR 66.

Kekedo v Burns Philip (PNG) Ltd and Others [1988-89] PNGLR 122.

Okuk and Another v Fallscheer [1980] PNGLR 274.

Other cases cited

Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175.

Mallock v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 All ER 1278.
R. v Secretary of State for the Home Affairs Department ex-parte Hosenball [1977] 3 All ER 452.

Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; [1963] 2 All ER 66.

Counsel

D O’Connor, for the plaintiff.

24 April 1996

LENALIA AJ. The plaintiff was granted leave to apply for judicial review on 28th of June, 1996. The matter has since been adjourned from time to time until it came up before me on 11th of April for hearing.

The plaintiff applies for judicial review pursuant to Order 16 of the National Court Rules (Ch. No. 38), asking the court to remove to it and quash a determination of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee made on 18th of August 1995 which decision was subsequently confirmed by the defendant, dismissing the plaintiff from his teaching career as a lecturer at the Mount Hagen Technical College in the Western Highlands Province. Disciplinary Committees are constituted under Part VII - Division 1 of the Teaching Service Act and Part II Divisions 1 and 2 of the Teaching Service Regulations (Ch. No. 71). The plaintiff was charged with a serious charge pursuant to Section 83 (1) of the Act and s 19 of the Regulations on 18 August 1995 and the charge was served on the plaintiff on 1 September 1995. This was a serious disciplinary charge. The nature of the charge were that the plaintiff on 22 June 1995 did turn up for work heavily intoxicated with alcoholic liquor and further was unable to teach and thereby neglected his duties. There was a further allegation contained in the charge that the plaintiff had committed similar behaviour on two (2) previous occasions for which the plaintiff was highly reprimanded in 1994.

On receipt of the notice of the charge, the plaintiff immediately reacted by sending two written replies to the First Assistant Secretary Special Services, Technical Division - Education Department, in Port Moresby. In both replies, the plaintiff pleaded his innocence and admitted that, although he had consumed liquor the previous evening, he denied consuming liquor on the date stated in the charge. The plaintiff also alleged that on the date stated in the charge, he was on the campus until 9.45 am when he left the campus. He was not engaged in teaching that day and seeing he had no classes on 22 June, he applied for a leave of absence for that day. This is evidenced by an application for leave attached to his affidavit.

By 16 October 1995, the plaintiff was served with a copy of the decision made by the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee on 5 October the same month which committee acted on recommendations by the National Education Board recommending that the plaintiff should be dismissed from the Teaching Service (see s 85 (4) of the Act and s 19 (4) of the Regulations).

Following service of the notice of dismissal, the plaintiff immediately appealed to the Chairman of the Teaching Service Commission Disciplinary Appeal Committee detailing his reasons for his innocence and an allegation that, the findings by the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee to suspend and dismiss him was ill-conceived and unsubstantiated by evidence. The plaintiff, on both occasions, had the right under s 80 (10) of the Teaching Service Act to appeal to those respective committees to which he had appealed.

The defendant board determined the plaintiff’s appeal on 21 December 1995 pursuant to s 80 (11), of the Act and decided to confirm the decision of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee to dismiss the plaintiff from the Teaching Service. It is from that decision that the plaintiff has sought leave and the relief he seeks is that an order of certiorari be made against the defendant to remove into this court and quash the decisions of the Teaching Service Commission Disciplinary Appeal Committee which confirmed the decision of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee to dismiss him from the Teaching Service. The plaintiff’s assertions are supported by two detailed reports. The first one by the principal of the Mount Hagen Technical College dated 8th of August 1995. The second one by an Inspector’s report compiled and dated 28 and 29 August the same year which were both very comprehensive and made in favour of the plaintiff’s attitude toward his work, his performances both in class and outside and his general behaviour toward other staff and his students.

The plaintiff relies on a number of grounds on this review. They are:

(i) There was no evidence to substantiate the charge laid against the plaintiff;

(ii) The penalty applied was excessive; and

(iii) The decision of the Teaching Service Disciplinary Committee was contrary to natural justice in that it failed to consider that the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee failed to:

(a) provide any evidence substantiating the charge;

(b) provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses providing evidence for the charge;

(c) provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to address the National Education Board Disciplinary on penalty; and

(d) provide any reasons for its decision.

It is the result of the above allegations that the plaintiff claims that the defendant has failed to exercise its powers according to the requirement of the Teaching Service Act and the common law rules of natural justice and further claims that he was not afforded a hearing, let alone a fair hearing.

The plaintiff has properly claimed the protection of law entitled to under s 37 (4) and s 59 of the Constitution. This Court is vested with powers of review pursuant to s 155 (4) and (5) of the Constitution and Order 16 of the National Court Rules of 1983 (Ch. No. 38). The purposes of judicial review were succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Rose Kekedo v Burns Philip (PNG) Ltd and Others [1988-89] PNGLR 122. The Court said there that the purpose of judicial review is not to examine the sub-ordinate authority’s decision with the view to substituting its own opinion. Judicial review is rather concerned with the decision making process. It has also been established that, the Court’s powers of judicial review is only available to consider the validity of a decision of a tribunal and to interfere with that decision only if it can be shown that such a decision made was unlawful, or was unfair or made contrary to the principles of natural justice: Tandali v The State [1990] PNGLR 170. By these principles, it is thought that where a tribunal or authority exceeds its powers or where there is error on the face of the records or where there is breach of the rules of natural justice, it is said that it amounts to substantial miscarriage of justice.

The first ground relied upon on this review is that there was insufficient evidence put before the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee against the plaintiff. On perusal of documents, the defendant’s lawyers filed a Notice of Intention to Defend and despite several adjournments, and despite a notice of fax from the Solicitor General’s Office advising the plaintiff’s lawyers that a lawyer from the Solicitor General’s office would appear to cross examine witness on the morning of 11 April, no defence lawyer turned up. There is evidence by the plaintiff that upon receipt of the notice of the charge, he provided both the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee and the defendant with detailed denials of allegations contained in the charge. There was no corresponding evidence put by the defendant Board to rebut what the plaintiff said.

Proceeding before any committees constituted under the ss 74, 75 and 76 of the Teaching Service Act are all governed by s 82 of the Teaching Service Act. This section says:

"82. Proceedings before Committees.

(1) The Chairman of a Disciplinary Committee shall fix a date and place for the hearing of any matter, and shall notify the member of the Teaching Service concerned, personally or by post.

(2) The Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee and the charging authority shall, where practicable, give to the member a copy of all documents intended to be used at the hearing at least seven days before the date fixed under Subsection (1).

(3) The member shall inform the Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee of the names and addresses of any witnesses whom he wishes to attend the hearing and shall, where practicable, make arrangements for their attendance.

(4) The member and the charging authority are entitled to appear, and to examine witnesses and address the Disciplinary Committee, personally or by a lawyer or agent.

(5) The Disciplinary Committee shall make a thorough investigation without regard to legal forms or solemnities or the rules of evidence, and may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks proper.

(6) The Disciplinary Committee shall determine whether the hearing shall be in public or in private.

(7) Where the Teaching Service Commission Disciplinary Committee upholds an appeal, it may recommend that the amount of all or any specified part of the reasonable expenses incurred by a member of the Teaching Service in prosecuting the appeal be paid, and if approved by the Commission the amount may be paid to the member".

Documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff shows that none of the alternative procedures defined in ss 82 nor in s 83 were complied with. I find that in absence of evidence pointing me to the contrary, the claim by the plaintiff that there was no evidence to substantiate the charge must be sustained.

The allegation by the plaintiff that the defendant adopted the recommendation of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee was excessive must fail for the following reasons. Earlier on in this judgement, I said that the purpose of judicial review is not concerned with the decision but the decision making process and whether procedural fairness was ever afforded to the plaintiff. Procedural requirements under the Act in dealing with both less serious and serious disciplinary offences are laid out quite explicitly in the terms of ss. 78 and 80 of the Act. The law only requires this court to look at the manner and procedures adopted and ask whether the Teaching Service Commission Disciplinary Committee complied with the law and the principles of the rules of natural justice. Therefore I am not required to decide whether the decision reached by the Disciplinary Committee was excessive or not: Rose Kekedo v Burns Philip [PNG] Ltd and Others (supra).

The last assertion made by the plaintiff relates to a breach of natural justice. The plaintiff claims that defendant failed to consider failure by the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee to provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to cross-examine any witness who provided evidence in support of the charge and the fact that the plaintiff was not given the right to present his case fairly before the Committee. One of the rules of natural justice is that a man has a right to be heard before a decision adversely affecting him is taken. In applying the concept of fairness, it is said that there is always a duty to be fair, though what fairness requires will differ from case to case. The question is whether in the particular circumstances of the case the procedure taken by a tribunal was fair: (see David Foulkes, Administrative Law (Fifth edition) page 226).

The constitutional provisions of a fair hearing is enshrined in s 59 of the Constitution and the common law principles of natural justice as stated in the case of Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; [1963] 2 All ER 66. It is also the requirement of s 82 of the Teaching Service Act that a member is entitled to be heard when he is tried. The procedures to be followed by a committee dealing with serious offences are fully detailed by s 82 of the Act. Section 82 envisages a hearing in the presence of an affected member. In the instant case, the plaintiff, appealed against two consecutive decisions. It may not have been taken seriously by the various Disciplinary Committees. Lord Denning once said:

"The right of a man to be heard in his defence is the most elementary protection of all and where a statutory form of protection would be less effective if it did not carry with it a right to be heard. I would not find it difficult to imply this right": Mallock v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 All ER 1278.

The plaintiff’s case is concerned with well-defined procedural rules under the Teaching Service Act. There is no doubt that the rules of natural justice have been applied in this jurisdiction. There is no doubt that such rules are enshrined in the Constitution (see ss 37 (4) and 59). The provision on protection of the law provided for in s 37 (4) could not have meant otherwise than the protection of the whole body of law defined in s 9 of the Constitution. What is required under Part III, Divisions 4 and 5 of the Teaching Service Act is that a member be given a fair hearing. If it was not specifically stated there, at least it is the requirement of the principles of natural justice.

The plaintiff also claims that there was failure on the part of the defendant in not providing him reasons for its decision. It is a requirement that a tribunal or a Board should give reasons for its decision. The reasons are obvious. The principle contains elements of fairness and if the defendant was to be fair to the plaintiff, reasons should be given to the fullest practicable extent and set out in writing. Secondly, a "reasoned" decision is essential in order that, where there is a right of appeal, the applicant can assess whether he has good grounds to appeal and he can be able to prepare well to meet the case. In my view, it is an obligation to state the reasons for a decision together with a right of appeal against the decision that the tribunal is more likely to concentrate its mind carefully on the decision. The giving of reasons would be an assurance that the decision made by the board or tribunal is free from arbitrariness. There may be instances where reasons might not be required for a decision. For instance, in matters concerning national security in which national security might be jeopardised: R. v Secretary of State for the Home Affairs Department ex-parte Hosenball [1977] 3 All ER 452; see also David Faukes, Administrative Law (5th ed.) Ch. 9.

The Teaching Service Act and the Teaching Service Regulations specifically require the disciplinary committees to give reasons. It has been held in this jurisdiction that an officer cannot be dismissed (or even demoted) without first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing his defence and explanation and reasons being given for the decision: Falscheer v Iambaki Okuk and Another [1980] PNGLR 101. The principles there were subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in Okuk and Another v Fallscheer [1980] PNGLR 274.

The duty to give reasons on the part of departmental heads was enunciated by Amet J (as he then was) in Niggints v Tokam [1993] PNGLR 66 and which principles are quite pertinent to the facts of the case before me. In that case, His Honour said at pp. 71-72:

"The statement of principle I now enunciate is that the departmental head who decides in his discretion, on proper consideration of the Public Services Commission’s recommendation, not to accept it should state the reasons for not so accepting the recommendation. It is not sufficient to dismiss the recommendation in the way the first respondent did:

"Recommendations from the Public Services Commission are only recommendations. I do not accept the Public Services commission recommendations and therefore, you remain dismissed".

"If no reasons are stated other than this kind of statement, it leaves the court no option than to conclude that there were no good reasons at all. Public officials discharging public duties are required for public accountability to provide reasons for their actions and decisions. If their decisions affect substantial interests and welfare of other officers and their families, good management and common sense principles of fairness require that reasons be given.

"Powers such as the power to dismiss and power to accept nor not accept recommendation are not absolute and unfettered. They are not intended to be exercised arbitrarily and without good reasons".

It has been said "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration" per Lord Denning in Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175."

For these reasons, I find that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice, which warrants interference with the decision made by the defendant confirming the decision of the National Education Board Disciplinary Committee. I therefore order that the decision made by the defendant be quashed. That the applicant be reinstated to the Teaching Service with appropriate entitlements from the date of his dismissal. The defendant shall meet the cost. Costs to be taxed, if not agreed.

Lawyer for the plaintiff: D.L O’Connor Lawyers