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Papua New Guinea District Court |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JUSTICE]
V/CT 8/2010
JOSEPHINE LAW
Appellant
V
ANDREW PASI
Respondent
MADANG: J KAUMI
2010: 21st April
2010: 19th, 26th, May
2010: 7th, 11th, 25th June
2010: 2nd July
APPEAL
VILLAGE COURT ACT- Appeal to District Court against a Preventive Order issued by a Village Court- Constitutional rights are guaranteed and must be accorded–Protection of the Law--Principle of substantial miscarriage of justice discussed-Sections 37 (1) and 59's mandates must be adhered to.
PRACTISE AND PROCEDURE-Strict application of the rules of evidence and of the acceptance of documents into evidence not applicable when a decision of Village Court under appeal or review.
A woman appealed against a "Preventive Order" issued against her by a Village Court pursuant to a complaint made against her by her husband.
Held:
(1). The strict application of the rules of evidence and of the acceptance of documents into evidence are relaxed when a decision of
a V.Ct is under appeal or review by the District Court and this mandated by the operation of Sections 89 (5) and 59 (1) of the V.Ct
Act.
(2). Division 5 of the Village Courts Act provides for the Preventive Jurisdiction of a Village Court and the provisions of s.51 under this Division in particular provides the mechanism for the issuance of such orders.
(3). The mechanism provided by s.51 (1) is a simplified process akin to the District Court process where interlocutory applications can only be filed on the basis of a pending substantive matter. It is a process simplified by design to suit the situation in a Village Court.
(4). The original purpose of Section 51 (1) was to prevent tribal fighting but the wording of this provision makes it clear that it can be used for individual as well as group trouble.
(5). There are various aids to construction that can be employed in the interpretation of statutory provisions. The issue of statutory interpretation has been discussed by the Supreme and National Courts in many cases in this country and some of them are:-
(a) In Anna Wemay v Kepas Tumdual the National Court held that the statute must be construed according to its express intention. If the words are precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound them in their ordinary and natural sense-without recourse to outside aids to interpretation.
(b) In PLAR No.1 of 1980 the Supreme Court held that statutes should be given their 'fair and liberal meaning'-the "purposive" rule of construction as contrasted with the 'literal' or 'narrow or restricted' interpretation.
(6).Village Courts must not forget that they are creatures of statute and as a consequence bound to perform within the parameters of the enabling legislature, the Village Court Act and should not issue 'Preventive Orders' as a matter of cause just because they have the power to do so.
(7).The Constitution of Papua New Guinea does not specifically provide against domestic violence however there are several sections which make it clear that domestic violence, and in particular wife-beating are against the Constitution.
(8).I find that the provisions of s.37 (1) of the Constitution allowed the Appellant full protection of the Law. What this means is that she had every right to go to the Police for assistance as the Police are constitutionally mandated to preserve peace and good order in the country. There was no better Institution to help a battered wife.
(9).The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary are a key stakeholder in the Law and Justice Sector's vision of providing a safer community and have a central role to play in combating domestic violence in all forms and firm policing of domestic violence provides the foundation for an effective response to the problem.
(10).It becomes imperative therefore to consider whether circumstantially there has been a miscarriage of justice in the immediate matter.
(11).This entails applying the test in this matter whether by reason of the course taken by the Yanimba Village Court in the issuance of the 'Preventive Orders' in excess of its jurisdiction, the Appellant was not accorded his rights as provided for by Section 37(1) of the Constitution. If this is the result on the appellant of the Yanimba Village Court's decision then there is a substantial miscarriage of justice because what the law provided for, the appellant was not accorded and that is not justice according to law.
(12).The decision of the Yanimba Village Court to issue the 'Preventive Order' against the Appellant is quashed.
(13). Yanimba Village Court must ensure that:-
(a).firstly, it is within their jurisdiction to issue a 'Preventive Order; and
(b). secondly, upon being satisfied that it is within their jurisdiction to issue such an order, issue the order and further require the disputants to appear later before it for the problem to be dealt with by the normal way as provided for under the Village Courts Act.
Cases cited:
The following cases are cited in the judgment:
Kisi v Nash [1974] PNGLR 4
Kumo v Killian [1976] PNGLR 149
In Anna Wemay v Kepas Tumdual [1978] PNGLR 173
PLAR No.1 of 1980 [1980] PNGLR 326 (10/10/80)
Wali vs Wali [2006] N3051 (20th /04/06),
Binafe v Goro [2006] CIA 419 OF 2005 (15/09/06)
Overseas Cases cited
Mraz v. The Queen [1955] HCA 59; (1955) 93 C. L. R 493,
Legislations
Constitution of PNG
Village Court Act 1989
Abbreviations:
The following abbreviations appear in the judgment:
APPL Appellant
CID Criminal Investigation Division
CLR Commonwealth Law Report
J Justice
N National Court judgment
No number
PNG Papua New Guinea
PNGLR Papua New Guinea Law Reports
RESP Respondent
S Section
VS Versus
V.CT ACT Village court Act
V.CT Village Court
APPEAL
This was an appeal against a preventive order of a Village Court.
Representation:
Appellant in person
Respondent, in person
INTRODUCTION
1. Kaumi. J This is a judgment on an appeal against a Preventive Order issued by Andrew Pasi, a Village Court magistrate of the Yanimba Village Court here in Madang.
2. At the outset I adopt as a matter of practice parts of the outline only of a judgment by Cannings J in Wali vs. Wali [1] This is for a want of a suitable precedent in our jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
3. The appellant, Josephine Law is the wife of Ronney Law, the person in whose favour the 'Preventive Order' was issued. The matter giving rise to the issue at hand as far as I can ascertain from the documents filed by the Appellant is about an assault on her by her husband, Ronney Law.
VILLAGE COURT PROCEEDINGS
4. On 31st March 2010, the Yanimba Village Court issued a "Preventive Order" against the Appellant in the following manner:-
(a). Displa oda I stopim yu long no ken go long ol opis bilong Polis na toktok long problem bilong yu na man bilong yu. Toktok bilong yutupela istap nau long opis bilong Police CID long investigation.
(b).Yu bai stap aninit long dispel oda inap long CID investigation report I pinis.Sapos yu no bihainim or sakim dispel oda yu bai kalabus (6)pela mun or baim kot long K200.00.
APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT
5. On 13 November 2009 the appellant filed a notice of appeal, stating the following grounds:
Court contravened an Act applied to in; (Order unconstitutional and breached her rights).
Court exceeded its jurisdiction; (Lack of Jurisdiction).
There was substantial miscarriage of justice.
SUBMISSIONS
6. The strict application of the rules of evidence and of the acceptance of documents into evidence are relaxed when a decision of a V.Ct is under appeal or review by the District Court and this mandated by the operation of Sections 89 (5) and 59 (1) of the V.Ct Act. This court can therefore admit and consider documents which would otherwise be not admissible and I make these comments at this juncture as the documents submitted by both appl and resp are of such a nature.
APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS
7. The appl's submission was contained in two documents, a handwritten document filed on 16/04/10, and a document titled affidavit
of appeal sworn on 13/05/10 with an attachment, a Police witness statement signed but undated.
8. Firstly, the document titled affidavit of appeal deposed to the following matters:-.
(a). That the Appellant was the initial complainant since 15/03/10 and that she is the complainant of the following matters, firstly, Assaults and Threats and secondly, Adultery and Enticements;
(b). On 22/03/10, her husband's parents falsely accused her of attempted murder and reported her to the CID to investigate a foreign substance found in both their cups. That the matter had no evidence or proof to pursue the case.
(c). That the Yanimba Village Court failed to mediate any of the above complaints.
(d). On 31/03/10, the Yanimba Village Court Magistrate, Andrew Pali issued a preventive order No. 95847, denying the Appellant's rights to proceed with her above complaints.
(e). Upon this preventive order the Appellant was harassed and insulted with the words "Kaikai kan" at Modilon General Hospital by her husband, Ronney, and family members.
(f). That the Appellant felt and appealed against the issuance of the preventive order on the grounds that firstly, the said Village Court lacked jurisdiction when it issued the said order, and secondly, that the prevention order was unconstitutional and breached her rights.
9. Secondly, the Police Witness statement deposed to an assault on the Appellant by her husband on 15/03/10 at around 10:00pm in which she says she was badly assault by her husband, Ronney with the use of fists and a kwila stick on her face, back of her head and both her knees. This assault caused her to take her children and escape later to her sister's house for safety.
10. Thirdly, a handwritten note was filed containing names of people allegedly involved in an incident on 31/03/10 at Modilon General.
RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSION
11. The resp's submission was contained in a document titled " Affidavit of Appeal -Preventive OrderNo.95847" sworn on 20/05/10 and filed on 26/05/10 and it's depositions were that the Yanimba Village Court did not receive any complaints from the Appellant as she went to other authorities with her complaints and so it did not mediate on any of her complaints, and on 31/03/10 the Appellant's husband Ronney complained to Mr. Pali that a criminal case between him and his wife (Appellant) was still with CID investigators and requested a preventive order to stop the Appellant going from office to office or other authorities laying other complaints, that preventive order No.95847 was issued under (Sections 49, 50 and 51 of the Village Courts Court to the Appellant as she may cause a breach of peace between herself and her husband. Further that the Village Court has power to stop trouble in the village, community and individuals by issuing preventive orders and that the Appellant's rights were not breached due to continuing by CID police criminal case investigations in Madang.
ISSUES
12. The issues are as follows:-
ISSUE ONE (1)
• Did the Yanimba Village Court act in contravention of any Constitutional Law, Act or subordinate enactment applying to it by issuing the 'Preventive Orders'?
ISSUE TWO (2)
• Has there been a substantial miscarriage of justice? (This is a prerequisite to allowing the appeal under Section 92(1) of the Village Courts Act.)
ISSUE THREE (3)
Did the Village Court exceed its jurisdiction?
ISSUE FOUR (4)
What remedies, if any, should be granted by the District Court? (The District Court's remedial powers are prescribed by Section 92(1) of the Village Courts Act.)
RELEVANT LAW
13. There are certain provisions of legislations that are relevant to the issues at hand and they are as follows:-
CONSTITUTION
Section.36. FREEDOM FROM INHUMAN TREATMENT.
(1) No person shall be submitted to torture (whether physical or mental), or to treatment or punishment that is cruel or otherwise inhuman, or is inconsistent with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
Section.37. PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
(1) Every person has the right to the full protection of the law, and the succeeding provisions of this section are intended to ensure that that right is fully available, especially to persons in custody or charged with offences.
Section.197. FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE FORCE.
(1) The primary functions of the Police Force are, in accordance with the Constitutional Laws and Acts of the Parliament–
(a) to preserve peace and good order in the country; and
(b) to maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and objective manner.
VILLGE COURTS ACT
Section.51. PREVENTIVE ORDERS.
(1) Where it appears to a Village Magistrate or a Village Court that a dispute may cause a breach of the peace, the Village Magistrate or the Village Court may–
(a) order the parties to appear before the Village Court with a view to having the dispute dealt with under this Act; and
(b) for the meantime, order the parties or any other person not to–
(i) enter into a further dispute or counsel another person to enter into a dispute; or
(ii) fight, prepare to fight or counsel another person to fight; or
(iii) spread rumors or fears about the existence or imminence of a dispute; or
(iv) make offensive weapons or carry offensive weapons in certain places; or
(v) do any other act or thing, whether or not specified in the order, that might aggravate the dispute or cause a breach of the peace.
(2) Where an order is made under Subsection (1) (b), the Court shall cause the order to be issued in writing and served on each party to the dispute or on any other person.
Section.59 EVIDENCE ETC.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), in any proceedings before it a Village Court shall not apply technical rules of evidence but shall admit and consider such information as is available.
(2) The powers and procedures of a Village Court shall be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice
DELIBERATION OF ISSUES
14. I will deal with the third issue first as this matter arose out of a preventive order and it is pertinent to firstly consider the provisions of s.51 (1) of the V.Ct Act which provides for the issuance of such orders. The result of my deliberations on this issue will also impact on the other issues.
THIRD ISSUE: Did the Yanimba Village Court exceed its jurisdiction when it issued the 'Preventive Order'?
15. In resolving this issue it necessary to firstly understand what the provisions of s.51 (1) mean.
16. The original purpose of this provision was to prevent tribal fighting but the wording of this provision makes it clear that it can be used for individual as well as group trouble. Domestic violence is unfortunately the norm rather than the exception in contemporary Papua New Guinea society today and so it may be said to disturb the peace as it frequently leads to bigger problems when relatives become involved.
17. Division 5 of the Village Courts Act provides for the Preventive Jurisdiction of a Village Court and the provisions of s.51 under this Division in particular provide the mechanism for the issuance of such orders.
Section 51 provides as follows:-
(1) Where it appears to a Village Magistrate or a Village Court that a dispute may cause a breach of the peace, the Village Magistrate or the Village Court may–
(a). order the parties to appear before the Village Court with a view to having the dispute dealt with under this Act; and
(b) for the meantime, order the parties or any other person not to–
(i) enter into a further dispute or counsel another person to enter into a dispute; or
(ii) fight, prepare to fight or counsel another person to fight; or
(iii) spread rumours or fears about the existence or imminence of a dispute; or
(iv) make offensive weapons or carry offensive weapons in certain places; or
(v) do any other act or thing, whether or not specified in the order, that might aggravate the dispute or cause a breach of the peace.
(2) Where an order is made under Subsection (1)(b), the Court shall cause the order to be issued in writing and served on each party to the dispute or on any other person.
18. There are various aids to construction that can be employed in the interpretation of statutory provisions. The issue of statutory interpretation has been discussed by in many cases in this country and some of them are:-
(a) In Anna Wemay v Kepas Tumdual [2] the Court held that the statute must be construed according to its express intention. If the words are precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound them in their ordinary and natural sense-without recourse to outside aids to interpretation.
(b) In PLAR No.1 of 1980 [3] the Supreme Court held that statutes should be given their 'fair and liberal meaning'-the "purposive" rule of construction as contrasted with the 'literal' or 'narrow or restricted' interpretation.
The wording of s.51 (1) I find are in plain English, 'precise and unambiguous' and when given their 'fair and liberal' meaning, it is clear that Village Courts either on their own motion or by application have the power to make Preventive Orders either if they believe that "a dispute may cause a breach of the peace", and further require the disputants to come to court at a later time to have the problem dealt with. In other words this mechanism provided by s.51 (1) is a simplified process akin to the District Court process where interlocutory applications can only be filed on the basis of a pending substantive matter. It is a process simplified by design to suit the situation in a Village Court.
19. There is nothing in evidence before this Court by both the Appellant or Respondent stating or even remotely suggesting that the Appellant and her husband were ordered by the Yanimba Village Court to appear later before it for the problem to be dealt with.
20. Indeed the Yanimba Village Court's document "Affidavit of Appeal" stated at paragraph that the Appellant did not file any complaints with them against her husband. Instead there was a complaint registered with Madang CID by the Appellant and was being investigated by that Office.
21. The husband of the Appellant, Ronny Law complained to Yanimba Village Court and sought a Preventive Order against her and was granted what he sought. Yanimba V.Ct however it did not issue any further orders for the disputants to appear before it later to deal with the problem when it was clearly mandated by s.51 (1) to do so.
22.Even if Yanimba V.Ct had fulfilled all the requirements of s.51 (1) upon my consideration of the provisions of s.51 (1) (b) and the situation the Appellant found herself in I fail to see how the Appellant's going to the CID office would qualify under one of the grounds provided for therein, specifically, I cannot see how her going to the CID office was going to;-
(i). enter or counsel another to dispute; or
(ii).fight, enter into a fight or counsel another to fight; or
(iii). Spread rumors or fears about the existence or imminence of a dispute; or
(iv).make offensive weapons or carry offensive weapons; or
(v).do any other act or thing, whether or not specified in the order, that might aggravate the dispute or cause a breach of the peace.
23. Indeed this order would be laughable if it wasn't as serious as it is, given the implications of its issuance.
24.The Royal Papua New Guinea Police Constabulary's Constitutional function is to maintain peace and good order and I can't understand how a person going to a CID office for help with her problems is going to cause a breach of peace. Indeed nobody can dictate to Police how they perform their Constitutional functions. On the same token nobody can prevent anyone both citizens and non citizens alike from seeking help from a member of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
25. I find that Mr. Pasi's orders were made in excess of the jurisdiction given to him under the Village Court Act and border on an attempt to pervert the course of justice. His orders were an infringement of the Appellant's Constitutional rights as provided by s.37 (1) to 'Protection of the Law'.
26. Mr. Pasi had no business or right deciding whether or not right the Appellant could go a Constitutional Office for help, in this instance the CID. He overstepped the mark.
27. Village Courts must not forget that they are creatures of statute and as a consequence bound to perform within the parameters of the enabling legislature, the Village Court Act and must not go shooting off or issuing' Preventive Orders' as a matter of course just because they have the power to do so.
28. I answer Issue Three in the affirmative (Yes) for the above reasons.
29. Village Courts need to ensure that:-
firstly, it is within their jurisdiction to issue a 'Preventive Order; and
secondly, upon being satisfied that it is within their jurisdiction to issue such an order, issue the order and further require the disputants to appear before it for the problem to be dealt with.
FIRST ISSUE: • Did the Village Court act in contravention of any Constitutional Law, Act or subordinate enactment applying to it by issuing the 'Preventive Order' against the Appellant?
30. At the outset of my deliberation of this issue I am guided by these provisions of Sections 89 (5) and 59 (1) and can therefore admit and consider documents which would otherwise be not admissible and I make these comments at this juncture as the documents submitted by both appl and resp are of such a nature.
S.59 EVIDENCE, ETC.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), in any proceedings before it a Village Court shall not apply technical rules of evidence but shall admit and consider such information as is available.
31. The initial matter giving rise to the issuance of the Prevention Order and eventually to this appeal was an assault on the Appellant by her husband, Ronny Law.
32. The Constitution of Papua New Guinea does not specifically provide against domestic violence however there are several sections which make it clear that domestic violence, and in particular wife-beating are against the Constitution.
33. I consider certain provisions of the Constitution which are pertinent to the deliberations of this issue.
34. Section 37 (1) of the Constitution mandates that every person, citizen and non citizen alike has the right to the full protection of the law.
35. I find that the provisions of s.37 (1) of the Constitution allowed the Appellant full protection of the Law. What this means is that she had every right to go to the Police for assistance after all the Police are constitutionally mandated to preserve peace and good order in the country. There was no better Institution to help a battered wife.
36. Wife beating or abuse of wives in whatever form is cruel and inhuman and Section 36 (1) provides that no person shall be submitted to treatment or punishment (whether physical or mentally) that is cruel or otherwise inhuman, or is inconsistent with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. As a matter of fact all types of violence for that matter are against the laws of Papua New Guinea (except in very limited circumstances). Corollary to this there is no special law which allows husbands to hit their wives or vice versa.
37. I fail to see the logic in Mr. Pasi's Preventive Order, that "Displa oda I stopim yu long no ken go long ol opis bilong Polis na toktok long problem bilong yu na man bilong yu. Toktok bilong yutupela istap nau long opis bilong Police CID long investigation"
38. It was upon the Appellant's complaint laid with the Madang CID that a lawful investigation was being carried out. Mr Pasi had absolutely no lawful right to order her not to go to the CID for help when it was her complaint that they were already investigating. If anything her husband could have gone with her to the CID if he felt he had something to offer which would assist them in their investigations
39. His 'Preventive Order was a breach of the Appellant's constitutional rights and absurd to say the least because she was the initial victim and her position did not change but remained the same even on the date of the issuance of the order, 31/03/10 when she sworn at by her husband and his relatives with the use of the infamous 'Triple K'.
40. His orders were not only in breach of her constitutional rights but also ultra vires his powers. He has attempted to water down what is a prevalent problem in our society today.
41. If this Court is to overlook the root cause of this matter and accept Mr. Pasi's reasons per se for the issuance of the said order that would be tantamount to condoning violence against women in general and allowing to permeate a wrong perception by the public that the magistracy is failing in its duty as a bulwark against injustice in society, in particular wife-beating.
42. Mr. Pasi has not provided any plausible reasons for the issuance of his order.
43. Section 1 of the Preamble declares that the first goal of the National Goals and Directive Principles shall be for every person to be dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or herself from every form of domination or oppression so that each man or woman will have the opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationship with others and clearly wife-beating is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.
44. Certainly Mr. Pasi's Preventive Orders do not reflect this part of our Constitution.
45. Section 197 (1) of the Constitution provide that the primary functions of the Police Force are, in accordance with the Constitution Laws and Acts of the Parliament, to preserve peace and good order in the country and to maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and objective manner.
46. Indeed Cannings.J in Kerry v State [4] confirmed this.
47. The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary are a key stakeholder in the Law and Justice Sector's vision of providing a safer community and have a central role to play in combating domestic violence in all forms and firm policing of domestic violence provides the foundation for an effective response to the problem.
48. The Village Court would do well to consider this part of the Constitution as well in its deliberations.
49. I answer Issue One in the affirmative (Yes) for the above reasons.
ISSUE TWO Has there been a substantial miscarriage of justice? (This is a prerequisite to allowing the appeal under Section 92(1) of the Village Courts Act.)
50. This issue is properly addressed by having regarded firstly to s.92.2 of the the V.Ct Act which states:
S.92. DECISION ON APPEAL OR REVIEW.
(2) The decision shall be confirmed unless the Magistrate is satisfied that–
(a) the Village Court acted in contravention of any Constitutional Law, Act or subordinate enactment applying to it; or
(b) the Court was not properly constituted; or
(c) except as provided for by this Act, a party was not present; or
(d) a party was not given a reasonable opportunity to present his case personally or by a representative; or
(e) the Court exceeded its jurisdiction or its powers; or
(f) the Village Magistrates constituting the Court included a Village Magistrate who had a substantial interest in the subject matter of the proceedings such as to disqualify him from adjudicating on the matter, and there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice.
51. The courts in this country have discussed over the years the issue of what amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
52. Kelly. J in Kisi v Nash [5] stated that the meaning of "substantial miscarriage of justice" has generally been considered from the point of view of the accused person (see e.g. Mraz v. The Queen [6] and the authorities there referred to) and in relation to a provision cast in the form that the appellate court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred (cf. Supreme Court (full Court) Ordinance 1968, s.28 (2) which, however, refers only to" miscarriage of justice"). The test to be applied in the present instance is whether the magistrate properly directing himself on the law would have come to the same conclusion as to which he did come. In this case it could not be said that this would have been so, so that there has been a miscarriage of justice and in the circumstances I consider that it could be regarded as a substantial miscarriage of justice within the meaning of s.236 (2) in that here has been premature dismissal of information.
53. In Kumo v Killian [7] O'Leary AJ held that in applying those principles in relation whether there has been a miscarriage of justice, the court should consider all the circumstances of the case.
54. In the matter of Binafe v Goro [8] Cannings.J. held inter alia that the District Court has a duty to accord natural justice to parties and to conduct its proceedings fairly in accordance with Section 37 (11), 37(12) and 59 of the Constitution.
55. It becomes imperative therefore to consider whether circumstantially there has been a miscarriage of justice in the immediate matter.
56. This entails applying the test in this matter whether by reason of the course taken by the Yanimba Village Court in the issuance of the 'Preventive Orders' in excess of its jurisdiction, the Appellant was not accorded his rights as provided for by Section 37(1) of the Constitution. If this is the result on the appellant of the Yanimba Village Court's decision then there is a substantial miscarriage of justice because what the law provided for, the appellant was not accorded and that is not justice according to law.
57. In view of the above and the answers given to Issue One and Three I answer Issue Two (2) in the Affirmative (Yes).
ISSUE FOUR (4). What remedies, if any, should be granted by the District Court? (The District Court's remedial powers are prescribed by Section 92(1) of the Village Courts Act.)
Section 92 DECISIONS ON APPEAL OR REVIEW
A Magistrate hearing an appeal against, or making a review of, a decision of a Village Court may-
(a). confirm the decision; or
(b). quash the decision; or
(c). Order that the matter be dealt with again by the Village Court and, if he thinks fit, give with the order a direction as to how any defect in the earlier proceedings may be overcome.
58. In consideration of all the circumstances of this matter that have been deliberated on I consider that the issuance of the said 'Preventive Order' to be a void and I quash that decision.
DETERMINATION
59. The decision of the Court on the Appeal:-
(i). The decision of the Yanimba Village Court to issue the 'Preventive Order' against the Appellant is quashed.
(ii). Yanimba Village Court must ensure that:-
(a).firstly, it is within their jurisdiction to issue a 'Preventive Order; and
(b). secondly, upon being satisfied that it is within their jurisdiction to issue such an order, issue the order and further require the disputants to appear before it for the problem to be dealt with by the normal way as provided for under the Village Courts Act.
Appellant in person
Respondent in person
[1] [2006] N 3051 (20th /04/06)
[2] [1978] PNGLR
[3] [1980] PNGLR 326 (10/10/80)
[6] [1955] HCA 59; (1955) 93 C.L.R 493
[8] [2006] CIA 419 OF 2005 (15/09/06)
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