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Supreme Court of Vanuatu |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
(CIVIL JURISDICTION)
CIVIL CASE NO. 1 OF 2013
BETWEEN:
TRIDENT HOLDINGS LIMITED
First Claimant
AND:
GUY BENARD
Second Claimant
AND:
REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
Defendant
Coram: Justice Mary Sey
Counsel: Less J. Napuati for the First Claimant
Guy Benard Second Claimant – In person
Kent Ture Tari (SLO) for the Defendant
JUDGMENT
Introduction
Background Facts
Claim
Defence
The Evidence
The Issues
15.1 Whether Supt Taleo’s actions in requesting the Claimants to carry out the rescue operation for salvage and agreeing to the Claimants’ quotation are lawful;
15.2 Whether the operation carried out by the Claimants as requested by Supt Taleo was successful;
15.3 Whether THL is entitled to the sum contained in its invoice; and
15.4 Whether the Defendant is required to pay for the damages incurred to THL’s vessel as a result of its operation on the Clinique Pasteur.
Submissions
21.1 That all Government expenditures in relation to the spending of public money is vested on the Director General who is the Head of each Ministry and that the functional responsibility of the Police at that time was under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
21.2 That Parliament has never appropriated any funds under the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Police to use towards SAR as such; That public funds would be the available funds to be utilized having its procedures available for compliance under the Financial Regulations Order No. 27 of 2000 (the Regulations).
21.3 That clause 5.1 of Part 5 of the Regulations clearly states that the Director of Finance must then approve the purchase order or payment voucher in its prescribed form. Then the Director of Finance may issue further instructions that must be followed for the purchase of goods and services. The clause then makes it clear by setting out the procedures to be followed depending on the value of goods or services being purchased.
21.4 It is further submitted that, even though at the trial it was revealed that Guy Benard did have discussions with the department of Finance, those discussions did not amount to compliance with the Regulations. Counsel submits that since the Police was under the Ministry of Internal Affairs at that time, Supt. Taleo should have first consulted the Director General who is the Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. That the Regulations specifically state that it is for the Head of Ministry to submit such request for approval, be it a quotation or purchase order.
21.5 Furthermore, that it is clear that Supt. Taleo was not the Director General at that time and that he took it into his own hands to agree to the quotation and did not consult with the Director General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus the Claimants and Supt Taleo have not abided by clauses 3.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the Regulations. As such, the agreement reached by the Claimants and Supt Taleo on the Claimants’ quotation and the operation was totally outside the scope of the Regulations and must be considered unlawful for that purpose.
21.6 That of course one may argue that the nature of the request needed urgent attention but that is not a requirement under the Regulations. Furthermore, that the provisions of the Regulations are mandatory and one just cannot by-pass them. Supt Taleo should have considered other options, for example he should have conducted the authorities from New Caledonia which was nearby to carry out the salvage rescue since it is not the duty of the Police to provide assistance to salvage operation and that the Police involvement under SAR would be to carry out operations to save lives at sea.
21.7 Therefore the Defendant concludes that the engagement of the Claimants by Supt. Taleo is ultra-vires the powers vested on him for SAR and that the Defendant should not be held responsible for Supt. Taleo’s conduct
Discussion
3.2. Signing and approving purchases and payments
(1) All purchases and expenditure of public funds must be approved and signed off by a person with appropriate financial authority or a financial delegation to authorise the purchase or expenditure. The Head of Ministry automatically has this authority for his or her Ministry only.
35. They were both on appeal from the National Court. In Kes case>case, the National Court held that aract for the provision of g of garbage and sanitary services, entered into between Keboki Business Group and the State was not bindinthe State. The National Coul Court reasoned that the contract was not personally "executed" by the designated officer. Somebody else in fact signed the contract for and on behalf of the designated officer, the chairman of the National Government Supply and Tenders Board. That followed a successful tender for the provision of garbage collection service at a price of K90,000.00 for 12 months renewable.
"I can find nothing in the Government Contracts Act, s 4, which either explicitly or by necessary implication required a personal signature from the chairman. Nor has any authority been cited for what I consider a totally unrealistic suggestion. The chairman and members of the Central Board were asked by the Morobe Board to consider the tender because it was beyond the financial limits placed on the latter. As both are boards of the National Government, both are essentially part and parcel of the same organisation but the one has a superior status and authority to the other. The Morobe Board is merely a conduit-pipe calling for tenders and in the appropriate case channeling the tenders to the Central Board for consideration, and vice versa."
"We have the elements of a contract. We have an offer and acceptance and a consideration. It is not as if under the common law or any specific legislation such a contract must be in writing. Of course because the details of the contract are complicated there is in fact some documentation and further, documentation is required for government procedures. But there is no specific requirement for a separate single document signed by both parties. Instead we have a series of documents which make up the contract or agreement. And the letter of acceptance was in the terms of condition 14 of the General Conditions of Tenders and of Contract "signed on behalf of the Chairman of the Board". These General Conditions do not insist on the correct person's signature appearing at every "step" of the contract. The specific person within the Government who has the delegation for the amount involved has considered the offer and approved the acceptance of the offer so he must be held to have accepted for the State."
38. In Visvanathan Subendranathan v The State (supra), the Nal Court ourt dismissed the Appellant's claim because it found that statutory law prohibitedcontract. The statutes in question included the Audit Act and 160;PubliPublic Fina Finance Management Act, particularlyion 40 of that that Act. That provision made it mandatory for the State to call for public tenders before awarding contractthe s of goods and serd services to the State.
39. In unusly usly upholding thng the appeal and quashing the trial judge's decision, the Supreme Court at page 13 said:
"We are of the opinion that where a contract has been entered intween an individual or a cora corporate entity and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea represented by the appropriated delegated officer or institution such as the Head of State in this instance, upon advice of the National Executive Council, the State cannot purport to contend that the agreement was in breach of statutory provisions and thus invalid or illegal. The State is bound by actions represented by tlevrelevant officers or institutions."
40. It appears to me from the above authorities that where a public authority enters into a contract with a private person, the Court will strife to uphold the contract as having being made in due compliance with the relevant procedure.
41. In this present case, I find that Supt. Taleo is the duly appointed officer in charge of SAR and he was empowered to act in situations involving the rescue of persons in distress at sea. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence that the situation he was faced with was one requiring urgency in the middle of the night when due compliance with the relevant Regulations was absolutely impossible.
42. I am unable to accept the Defendant's submissions that the actions of Supt. Taleo are unlawful and ultra vires. In my view, these submissions rest on incorrect premises and are flawed as contended by the Claimants. I am satisfied from the affidavit evidence adduced before me that Supt Taleo's actions in requesting the Claimants to carry out the rescue operation and agreeing to the Claimants' quotation are lawful. I consider the position as analogous to the doctrine of estoppel, which would operate to prevent a public authority to raise a defence of lack of authority.
43. In the final analysis, I find that the engagement of the Claimants by Supt. Taleo is not ultra-vires the powers vested on him for SAR and that the Defendant is bound by Supt. Taleo's actions. Iher therefore satisfied that THL is entitled to the sum of VT4, 999,500 contained in its invoice.
Counterclaim
45. I also accept Guy Benard's evidence that when he called the Minister of Finance he agreed to provide the fuel for Roimata II because it was an urgent rescue operation. In his oral testimony, Mr. Luke Beandi confirmed that the Minister agreed to provide the fuel and that the Minister said that he would instruct the fuel company to deliver the fuel to Roimata II directly. Under cross examination by Guy Benard, the witness was shown the letter attached to his sworn statement as "LB2" and when he was asked whether the name of Guy Benard was on the document he said that the invoice was made out to Ports and Marine department. During re-examination by Mr. Kent Tari, the witness said that the Minister did not say that Guy Benard would pay for the fuel.
45. I reject the Defendant's submission that an undertaking was made by the Minister of Finance and the department of Ports and Harbours for the department of Finance to pay for the fuel and for Guy Benard to reimburse the Defendant for that fuel. That piece of evidence is not before the Court.
46. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Defendant has proved its Counterclaim on the balance of probabilities and it is hereby dismissed with costs.
Damages
43. The final issue is whether the Defendant is required to pay for the damages incurred to THL's vessel as a result of its operation
on the Clinique Pasteur.
44. In his closing submissions, Guy Benard submits that the agreed amount for the SAR operation was in the sum of VT4,999,500 to be paid at departure on the 24/06/2011 and that the agreed interest to be paid if the invoice was not settled at the agreed time was 5% per annum.
45. Guy Benard further submits that the outstanding quantum of damages is as follows:
A- Principal and interests of the debt
VT4,999,500
1 year: 4,999,500 x 5% = 249,975vt
New principal on 25/06/2012
4,999,500 + 249,975= 5,249,475vt
1 year: 5,249,475 x 5% = 262,474vt
New principal on 25/06/2013
5,249,475 + 262,474 = 5,511,949vt
5,511,949 x 5%= 275,597vt
New principal on 25/06/2014
5,511,949 + 275,597 = 5,787,546vt
3 years interests:
249,975vt + 262,975vt + 275,597vt = VT 788,091
TOTAL.... VT5,787,591
B- Damages
Expenses and interests for the recovery of VT2,081,250
And 5% interests for 14 months VT 112,000
Expenses for debt collector VT 160,000
TOTAL.... VT 272,000
C- General damages
Expenses for the towage and dry docking of the barge
to Honiara
- Fuel (Port Vila/Honiara) VT 3,775,289
- Crew salaries VT 745,000
- Catering VT 490,000
- Purchase of anodes VT 408,000
- Emolument of S. Griffin VT 1,000,000
- Fuel (Honiara/Port Vila) VT3,800,000
TOTAL.... VT10,218,289
D- Special damages
Past loss of revenues
VT2,000,000 x 18 months (principal) VT36,000,000
GRAND TOTAL...... VT52,277,880
46. In support of its submissions on the issue of damages, THL refers to paragraphs 13 to 20 of its Amended Claim and to the sworn statements of Candice Benard sworn on 18th April 2013, 28th April 2014 and 7th May 2014 respectively and that of Sean Griffin dated 7th April 2013.
47. For its part, the Defendant denies any causal connection between the unpaid invoice and the alleged damages suffered by the Claimants.
48. Having considered the evidence of all the deponents in their sworn statements relating to the issue of damages, I am inclined to agree with the Defendant's submission that there is no causal connection between the unpaid invoice and the alleged damages suffered by the Claimants. There are times where the Court will not award the expectancy damages that the Claimants claim on the basis that it is too remote and/or unforeseeable. Suffice it to say that this is one such instance.
49. I will therefore not award the damages that the Claimants claim as detailed above. However, I will allow the claim for interest on the unpaid invoice at the rate of 5% per annum from 25th June 2012 to judgment.
50. I therefore enter judgment in favour of the Claimants as follows:
DATED at Port Vila, this 16th day of February, 2015.
BY THE COURT
M.M.SEY
Judge
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