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Trident Holdings Ltd v Republic of Vanuatu [2015] VUSC 7; CC 01 of 2013 (16 February 2015)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
(CIVIL JURISDICTION)
CIVIL CASE NO. 1 OF 2013


BETWEEN:


TRIDENT HOLDINGS LIMITED
First Claimant


AND:


GUY BENARD
Second Claimant


AND:


REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
Defendant


Coram: Justice Mary Sey
Counsel: Less J. Napuati for the First Claimant
Guy Benard Second Claimant – In person
Kent Ture Tari (SLO) for the Defendant


JUDGMENT


Introduction

  1. By its Amended Claim filed on 14 February 2013, Trident Holdings Limited (THL) is claiming for payment of the principal and interests of an invoice for “Search and Rescue” services (SAR) provided to the Defendant sometime in June 2011. This was done at the request of the department of Police Maritime Wing (PMW) in charge of maritime assistance and SAR operations under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The invoice for the work done was for an amount of VT4, 999,500.

Background Facts

  1. On 24 June 2011 at 01.30 am, Guy Benard was requested by the Maritime Rescue Coordinating Centre (MRCC) in Noumea to provide SAR assistance to a French ship, Clinique Pasteur, and her skipper Doctor Serge Jandaud. They were caught in a storm at over 300 nautical miles out of Port Vila.
  2. Guy Benard contacted Superindent John Malon Taleo (Supt. Taleo) of the Mala Base and relayed the request to him but he was told that the Defendant’s Patrol Boat RVS Tukoro was under maintenance and not operational.
  3. Supt. Taleo then requested THL to organize the SAR operations with their tug Nacato. Prior to the departure of Nacato, Supt. Taleo asked THL to provide a quotation for the SAR assistance. Guy Benard obtained the quotation from THL the same day at 7.41am and addressed it to Supt. Taleo who confirmed at 8.52am that “he was on his way to the department of Finance.” Later on, at 12.32 pm, Supt. Taleo confirmed that the quotation was accepted by the department of Finance and that he needed to be provided with the invoice in order to approve it for the department of Finance to process payment.
  4. THL provided its invoice for VT4, 999,500 and it was approved by Supt. Taleo on 29 June 2011 for payment to be made from the Government Marine SAR budget. The approved invoice was delivered to the department of Finance on 30 June 2011.
  5. On 4 July 2011, Treasury Analyst John Robert Simelum sent an email to Supt. Taleo informing him that “there is no special rescue fund” but that he had “had conversations with his bosses for alternative funding sources”. Nonetheless, the payment was not processed and the invoice remains unpaid.

Claim

  1. THL claims the following reliefs:
    1. Payment of its invoice in the sum of VT4, 999,500.
    2. Payment of contractual interests at the rate of 5% per annum.
    3. Common law damages.
    4. Aggravated damages.
    5. Exemplary damages.
    6. Legal costs and expenses.
    7. Such other order as this Court may deem fit.

Defence

  1. By its Amended Defence and Counterclaim filed on 8 August 2013, the Defendant says that although the responsibility of SAR was transferred from the Vanuatu Maritime Authority to the Police, it is not the responsibility of the Police to carry out salvage operations on Clinique Pasteur.
  2. Further, the Defendant says that because RVS Tukoro was under maintenance, Supt. Taleo, without carefully considering the situation surrounding the request for salvage rescue and other options, requested THL’s tug Nacato to carry out the operation to rescue Clinique Pasteur.
  3. The Defendant further says that Supt. Taleo unlawfully agreed to the quotation supplied to him by the Claimants.
  4. Furthermore, the Defendant contends that the operation was not done successfully as anticipated by Supt. Taleo and that Guy Benard had to make a request for assistance to the Defendant’s department of Ports and Harbours for its Tug Boat M/T Roimata II to rescue THL’s vessel from high seas.
  5. The Defendant says that the department of Ports and Harbours responded that it did not have sufficient fuel for the rescue operation on tug Nakato so an undertaking was made by the Minister of Finance and the department of Ports and Harbours for the department of Finance to pay for the fuel and for Guy Benard to reimburse the Defendant for that fuel.
  6. In light of the Defendant’s Counterclaim, Guy Benard filed an application to be made a party in the proceeding. The said application was granted by the Court on the 30 August 2013 and Guy Benard in person was made a party to the proceeding as Second Claimant and as Second Defendant to the Counterclaim.

The Evidence

  1. At trial, both counsel Mr. Less Napuati and Mr. Kent Ture Tari and the Second Claimant agreed that none of the witnesses for the Claimants would be made available for cross examination and that all eleven (11) sworn statements filed by the Claimants be admitted as evidence for the Claimants. It was also agreed that the sworn statement of Kembro Manderson filed in support of the Defence and Counterclaim be withdrawn and that the sworn statements of the other two defence witnesses be admitted in evidence but that the two witnesses be made available for cross examination.

The Issues

  1. The Defendant submits that the issues before this Court are:
15.1 Whether Supt Taleo’s actions in requesting the Claimants to carry out the rescue operation for salvage and agreeing to the Claimants’ quotation are lawful;

15.2 Whether the operation carried out by the Claimants as requested by Supt Taleo was successful;

15.3 Whether THL is entitled to the sum contained in its invoice; and

15.4 Whether the Defendant is required to pay for the damages incurred to THL’s vessel as a result of its operation on the Clinique Pasteur.

Submissions

  1. The Claimants contend that, having taken into consideration the course followed by Clinique Pasteur, Guy Benard mobilized Mr. Gibson Liu of Maewo Island for the canoe’s recovery at sea. Further, that Mr. Liu was provided with the location of the canoe at latitude 15°05,6 south and longitude 168°04,7 west and he was assisted by local fishermen who secured the boat on shore and rescued her skipper Doctor Serge Jandaud. Guy Bernard says the local fishermen were paid by THL for the services rendered.
  2. The Claimants further submit that tug Nacato had to sail immediately because of the great emergency due to the deterioration of the weather. That Roimata II did not rescue tug Nacato at 300 nautic miles out of Port Vila because Roimata II did not even reach this location and that she went only to Tongariki Island where tug Nacato was already located. Further, that the crew of tug Roimata II had never cut off the towing line from the propeller of Nacato. That Roimata II had never rescued tug Nacato in any way but limited her action by sailing in concert with Nacato to Port Vila after Nacato’s Engineer and diver Allan had cleared the propeller which was then fully operational.
  3. The Claimants further submit that an invoice made by Ports and Harbours was never personally addressed to Guy Benard and that he was only copied with the SSP invoice in the name of Ports and Harbours as agreed and instructed by the then Minister of Finance.
  4. It is also the Claimants’ contention that Supt. Taleo, being the designated person responsible for SAR, had powers to approve any justified expenses to be paid from the SAR budget.
  5. Guy Benard says Supt.Taleo advised him at all times that he was doing “everything” with the department of Finance to organize the payment due to THL and that it should be sorted out very soon. He says that he reported his conversations with Supt. Taleo to THL operations officer Sean Griffin through satellite phone. Further, Guy Benard says that on 26 June 2011, he was copied with another email of Supt.Taleo who did confirm to the SAR duty officer of MRCC Noumea that tug Nacato was requisitioned for assistance and operation.
  6. In the Defendant’s closing submissions defence counsel submits as follows:
21.1 That all Government expenditures in relation to the spending of public money is vested on the Director General who is the Head of each Ministry and that the functional responsibility of the Police at that time was under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

21.2 That Parliament has never appropriated any funds under the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Police to use towards SAR as such; That public funds would be the available funds to be utilized having its procedures available for compliance under the Financial Regulations Order No. 27 of 2000 (the Regulations).

21.3 That clause 5.1 of Part 5 of the Regulations clearly states that the Director of Finance must then approve the purchase order or payment voucher in its prescribed form. Then the Director of Finance may issue further instructions that must be followed for the purchase of goods and services. The clause then makes it clear by setting out the procedures to be followed depending on the value of goods or services being purchased.

21.4 It is further submitted that, even though at the trial it was revealed that Guy Benard did have discussions with the department of Finance, those discussions did not amount to compliance with the Regulations. Counsel submits that since the Police was under the Ministry of Internal Affairs at that time, Supt. Taleo should have first consulted the Director General who is the Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. That the Regulations specifically state that it is for the Head of Ministry to submit such request for approval, be it a quotation or purchase order.

21.5 Furthermore, that it is clear that Supt. Taleo was not the Director General at that time and that he took it into his own hands to agree to the quotation and did not consult with the Director General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus the Claimants and Supt Taleo have not abided by clauses 3.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the Regulations. As such, the agreement reached by the Claimants and Supt Taleo on the Claimants’ quotation and the operation was totally outside the scope of the Regulations and must be considered unlawful for that purpose.

21.6 That of course one may argue that the nature of the request needed urgent attention but that is not a requirement under the Regulations. Furthermore, that the provisions of the Regulations are mandatory and one just cannot by-pass them. Supt Taleo should have considered other options, for example he should have conducted the authorities from New Caledonia which was nearby to carry out the salvage rescue since it is not the duty of the Police to provide assistance to salvage operation and that the Police involvement under SAR would be to carry out operations to save lives at sea.

21.7 Therefore the Defendant concludes that the engagement of the Claimants by Supt. Taleo is ultra-vires the powers vested on him for SAR and that the Defendant should not be held responsible for Supt. Taleo’s conduct

Discussion

  1. The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) was adopted at a Conference in Hamburg. It was aimed at developing an international SAR plan, so that, no matter where an accident occurs, the rescue of persons in distress at sea “will be co-ordinated by a SAR organization and, when necessary, by co-operation between neighbouring SAR organizations”.
  2. A revised Annex to the SAR Convention was adopted in May 1998 and ed into foro force in January 20t requires Partiearties, either individually or in co-operation with other States, to establish basic elements of a search and rescue service and, where necessary, search and rescue operations those of neighbouring Stat States.
  3. The Republic of Vanuatu is a signatory to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue and is also a signatory to the International Convention on Salvage of 1989.
  4. In this present case, it is common ground that Guy Benard was requested by the Maritime Rescue Coordinating Centre (MRCC) in Noumea to provide SAR assistance to a French ship, Clinique Pasteur, and her skipper Doctor Serge Jandaud.
  5. The Defendant’s position is that the engagement of the Claimants by Supt. Taleo is ultra-vires the powers vested on him for SAR and that the Defendant should not be held responsible for Supt. Taleo’s conduct.
  6. Interestingly, however, the Defendant has not outlined to the Court the powers vested on Supt. Taleo for SAR. The only evidence before the Court is that he is the officer in charge of Vanuatu Search and Rescue Center and the only person responsible for SAR but the extent of his responsibilities has not been disclosed. Undoubtedly, this would have assisted the Court in determining whether or not Supt. Taleo had acted ultra-vires his powers or whether he was empowered to act in situations requiring urgency like in this present case.
  7. It is also submitted by defence counsel that it is not the duty of the Police to provide assistance to salvage operation and that the Police involvement under SAR would be to carry out operations to save lives at sea. However, it seems clear to me that the SAR operation carried out by the Claimants from 24 – 27 June was conducted to rescue a French citizen Doctor Serge Jandaud within Vanuatu waters. This is clearly stated in Supt. Taleo’s document dated 16 September 2011 and annexed as “A” to the sworn statement of Guy Benard filed on 15 April 2013.
  8. The pivotal question is whether Supt Taleo’s actions in requesting the Claimants to carry out the rescue operation and agreeing to the Claimants’ quotation are lawful?
  9. The crux of the Defendant’s contention is that the agreement reached by the Claimants and Supt. Taleo on the Claimants’ quotation and the operation was totally outside the scope of the Regulations and must be considered unlawful for that purpose.
  10. The Defendant submits that pursuant to sub clause 3.2(1) of the Regulations, all purchases and expenditure of public funds must be approved and signed off by a person with appropriate financial authority or a financial delegation to authorize the purchase or expenditure. Sub clause 3.2(2) of the Regulations further state that all purchases of or under VT 5,000,000 must follow the regulations set out in Part 5 (Purchasing, approval and payment for goods and services). Clause 3.1 defines a Head of Ministry to mean the person appointed as the Director General of a Ministry under the Public Service Act [CAP. 246].
  11. Clause 3.2 of the Regulations provides:

3.2. Signing and approving purchases and payments


(1) All purchases and expenditure of public funds must be approved and signed off by a person with appropriate financial authority or a financial delegation to authorise the purchase or expenditure. The Head of Ministry automatically has this authority for his or her Ministry only.
  1. It is trite law that all legislative provisions must be given their fair and liberal meaning so as to give effect to the legislative intent. There can be no room for any doubt that the intent behind the Regulations is to ensure transparency in all dealings with public authorities and persons or parties who are not an agent of the State, or an arm of the State, approved by the Minister to provide the works, supplies or services.
  2. In Papua New Guinea, the Supreme Court in two cases considered the Public Finance (Management. The cases are Thee v Keboki Business Gess Group Incorporated & Morobe Provinsel Gavman [ PNGLR 369;and Visv>Visvanathan Subendranathan v The State (Unnumbeudgmentgment SCA 10CA 106 of 1998, 27 October 1999).

35. They were both on appeal from the National Court. In Kes case>case, the National Court held that aract for the provision of g of garbage and sanitary services, entered into between Keboki Business Group and the State was not bindinthe State. The National Coul Court reasoned that the contract was not personally "executed" by the designated officer. Somebody else in fact signed the contract for and on behalf of the designated officer, the chairman of the National Government Supply and Tenders Board. That followed a successful tender for the provision of garbage collection service at a price of K90,000.00 for 12 months renewable.



"I can find nothing in the Government Contracts Act, s 4, which either explicitly or by necessary implication required a personal signature from the chairman. Nor has any authority been cited for what I consider a totally unrealistic suggestion. The chairman and members of the Central Board were asked by the Morobe Board to consider the tender because it was beyond the financial limits placed on the latter. As both are boards of the National Government, both are essentially part and parcel of the same organisation but the one has a superior status and authority to the other. The Morobe Board is merely a conduit-pipe calling for tenders and in the appropriate case channeling the tenders to the Central Board for consideration, and vice versa."


  1. Woods J expressed a similar view in these terms at pages 380 - 381 of the judgment:

"We have the elements of a contract. We have an offer and acceptance and a consideration. It is not as if under the common law or any specific legislation such a contract must be in writing. Of course because the details of the contract are complicated there is in fact some documentation and further, documentation is required for government procedures. But there is no specific requirement for a separate single document signed by both parties. Instead we have a series of documents which make up the contract or agreement. And the letter of acceptance was in the terms of condition 14 of the General Conditions of Tenders and of Contract "signed on behalf of the Chairman of the Board". These General Conditions do not insist on the correct person's signature appearing at every "step" of the contract. The specific person within the Government who has the delegation for the amount involved has considered the offer and approved the acceptance of the offer so he must be held to have accepted for the State."


38. In Visvanathan Subendranathan v The State (supra), the Nal Court ourt dismissed the Appellant's claim because it found that statutory law prohibitedcontract. The statutes in question included the Audit Act and 160;PubliPublic Fina Finance Management Act, particularlyion 40 of that that Act. That provision made it mandatory for the State to call for public tenders before awarding contractthe s of goods and serd services to the State.


39. In unusly usly upholding thng the appeal and quashing the trial judge's decision, the Supreme Court at page 13 said:


"We are of the opinion that where a contract has been entered intween an individual or a cora corporate entity and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea represented by the appropriated delegated officer or institution such as the Head of State in this instance, upon advice of the National Executive Council, the State cannot purport to contend that the agreement was in breach of statutory provisions and thus invalid or illegal. The State is bound by actions represented by tlevrelevant officers or institutions."


40. It appears to me from the above authorities that where a public authority enters into a contract with a private person, the Court will strife to uphold the contract as having being made in due compliance with the relevant procedure.


41. In this present case, I find that Supt. Taleo is the duly appointed officer in charge of SAR and he was empowered to act in situations involving the rescue of persons in distress at sea. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence that the situation he was faced with was one requiring urgency in the middle of the night when due compliance with the relevant Regulations was absolutely impossible.


42. I am unable to accept the Defendant's submissions that the actions of Supt. Taleo are unlawful and ultra vires. In my view, these submissions rest on incorrect premises and are flawed as contended by the Claimants. I am satisfied from the affidavit evidence adduced before me that Supt Taleo's actions in requesting the Claimants to carry out the rescue operation and agreeing to the Claimants' quotation are lawful. I consider the position as analogous to the doctrine of estoppel, which would operate to prevent a public authority to raise a defence of lack of authority.


43. In the final analysis, I find that the engagement of the Claimants by Supt. Taleo is not ultra-vires the powers vested on him for SAR and that the Defendant is bound by Supt. Taleo's actions. Iher therefore satisfied that THL is entitled to the sum of VT4, 999,500 contained in its invoice.


Counterclaim

45. I also accept Guy Benard's evidence that when he called the Minister of Finance he agreed to provide the fuel for Roimata II because it was an urgent rescue operation. In his oral testimony, Mr. Luke Beandi confirmed that the Minister agreed to provide the fuel and that the Minister said that he would instruct the fuel company to deliver the fuel to Roimata II directly. Under cross examination by Guy Benard, the witness was shown the letter attached to his sworn statement as "LB2" and when he was asked whether the name of Guy Benard was on the document he said that the invoice was made out to Ports and Marine department. During re-examination by Mr. Kent Tari, the witness said that the Minister did not say that Guy Benard would pay for the fuel.


45. I reject the Defendant's submission that an undertaking was made by the Minister of Finance and the department of Ports and Harbours for the department of Finance to pay for the fuel and for Guy Benard to reimburse the Defendant for that fuel. That piece of evidence is not before the Court.


46. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Defendant has proved its Counterclaim on the balance of probabilities and it is hereby dismissed with costs.


Damages
43. The final issue is whether the Defendant is required to pay for the damages incurred to THL's vessel as a result of its operation on the Clinique Pasteur.


44. In his closing submissions, Guy Benard submits that the agreed amount for the SAR operation was in the sum of VT4,999,500 to be paid at departure on the 24/06/2011 and that the agreed interest to be paid if the invoice was not settled at the agreed time was 5% per annum.


45. Guy Benard further submits that the outstanding quantum of damages is as follows:


A- Principal and interests of the debt

VT4,999,500


  1. From 25/06/20111 to 25/06/2012

1 year: 4,999,500 x 5% = 249,975vt

New principal on 25/06/2012

4,999,500 + 249,975= 5,249,475vt


  1. From 25/06/2012 to 25/06/2013

1 year: 5,249,475 x 5% = 262,474vt

New principal on 25/06/2013

5,249,475 + 262,474 = 5,511,949vt


  1. From 25/06/2013 to 25/06/2014

5,511,949 x 5%= 275,597vt

New principal on 25/06/2014

5,511,949 + 275,597 = 5,787,546vt


3 years interests:

249,975vt + 262,975vt + 275,597vt = VT 788,091


TOTAL.... VT5,787,591


B- Damages

Expenses and interests for the recovery of VT2,081,250

And 5% interests for 14 months VT 112,000


Expenses for debt collector VT 160,000


TOTAL.... VT 272,000


C- General damages

Expenses for the towage and dry docking of the barge

to Honiara

- Fuel (Port Vila/Honiara) VT 3,775,289

- Crew salaries VT 745,000

- Catering VT 490,000

- Purchase of anodes VT 408,000

- Emolument of S. Griffin VT 1,000,000

- Fuel (Honiara/Port Vila) VT3,800,000


TOTAL.... VT10,218,289


D- Special damages

Past loss of revenues

VT2,000,000 x 18 months (principal) VT36,000,000


GRAND TOTAL...... VT52,277,880


46. In support of its submissions on the issue of damages, THL refers to paragraphs 13 to 20 of its Amended Claim and to the sworn statements of Candice Benard sworn on 18th April 2013, 28th April 2014 and 7th May 2014 respectively and that of Sean Griffin dated 7th April 2013.


47. For its part, the Defendant denies any causal connection between the unpaid invoice and the alleged damages suffered by the Claimants.


48. Having considered the evidence of all the deponents in their sworn statements relating to the issue of damages, I am inclined to agree with the Defendant's submission that there is no causal connection between the unpaid invoice and the alleged damages suffered by the Claimants. There are times where the Court will not award the expectancy damages that the Claimants claim on the basis that it is too remote and/or unforeseeable. Suffice it to say that this is one such instance.


49. I will therefore not award the damages that the Claimants claim as detailed above. However, I will allow the claim for interest on the unpaid invoice at the rate of 5% per annum from 25th June 2012 to judgment.


50. I therefore enter judgment in favour of the Claimants as follows:


  1. Payment of THL's invoice in the sum of VT4, 999,500.
  2. Interest on the unpaid invoice at the rate of 5% per annum from 25th June 2012 to judgment.
  1. Costs of and incidental to the action on the standard basis as agreed or taxed.

DATED at Port Vila, this 16th day of February, 2015.


BY THE COURT


M.M.SEY
Judge


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