IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TONGA	AC 26 of 2024	
LAND JURISDICTION	[LA 29 of 2015]	
NUKU’ALOFA REGISTRY		
___________________________________________________________________________

BETWEEN	       LORD LUANI
	                  Judgment Creditor

AND 		        DIANNE WARNER
		        Receiver/Appellant

AND 			LORD NUKU
		         Judgment Debtor

AND 			MINISTER OF LANDS
		          Respondent

Hearing:		9 May 2025

Court:			Randerson, Harrison and Morrison JJ

Counsel:		Sione Fonua for the Appellant
			Sione Sisifa SC, Solicitor-General for the Respondent

Judgment:		16 May 2025

___________________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
___________________________________________________________________________
Background
[1]	This appeal concerns an application by a Receiver for directions to aid in enforcing a judgment debt owed to the Judgment Creditor Lord Luani. The Supreme Court has already issued a charging order over certain assets owned by the Judgment Debtor Lord Nuku. The Receiver sought an order granting a lease to Lord Luani over a tax allotment registered to Lord Nuku and an order for the transfer of two leases to Lord Luani.
[2]	Tupou J held in the court below that the application before her was for substantive relief rather than merely directions, and that as the Judgment Debtor had not been joined in the proceedings, relief should be refused.
Brief facts
[3]	On 7 September 2017, the Court of Appeal gave judgment in favour of Lord Luani in the sum of $3,380335.00, against Lord Nuku.
[4]	On 17 July 2020, the Judgment Creditor secured a charging order over various assets of Lord Nuku. They included the tax allotment in the name of Lord Nuku and two leases, 9436 and 9473, registered in the name of Faka’osifono Finefeuiaki Valevale, and situated at Veitongo.
[5]	To enforce the charging orders, Lord Luani applied for the appointment of a Receiver. On 18 February 2021, the appellant was appointed as Receiver. 
[6]	The Receiver, relying on the prescribed powers of a Receiver under the Receivership Act, applied for a lease over Lord Nuku’s tax allotment, and to transfer the remainder of leases   9436 and 9473 in favour of the Judgment creditor. The Minister of Lands advised that he considered he had no power under the Land Act to grant or transfer without the consent of Lord Nuku.
[7]	The Receiver applied for directions pursuant to section 5(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1903, and Order 33 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules.
[8]	In effect the Receiver sought substantive relief, in the form of orders to give effect to recovery of the Judgment debt, namely:
(a)	that the Judgment Debtor grant a lease over his tax allotment; and
(b)	 that the Judgment Debtor transfer leases 9436 and 9473.

Grounds of appeal
[9]	The grounds of appeal are that the learned primary judge erred, in that her Honour:
(a)	 failed to address the issues, namely whether the refusals by the Minister to grant the lease and transfer the land were justified;
(b)	failed to consider that the former Lord Chief justice Whitten KC on 18 July 2023 directed to include Lord Luani (Judgment creditor) and Lord Nuku (Judgment debtor) as parties to the application;
(c)	the Judgment debtor’s case was argued in the Land Court by way of written submissions dated 5 June 2020 by Counsel for Lord Nuku, which were put before the Land Court;
(d)	the Judge accepted that the Land Court has inherent jurisdiction under sections 4 and 5 of the Supreme Court Act and Order 33 of the Supreme Court Rules. Still, she refused to exercise such power;
(e)	the Appellant as Receiver has legal capacity to apply for a lease over the charged tax allotment and the transfer of the reminder terms of the leases;
(f)	the Minister has the power to execute the granting of the lease and transfer the leases; and
(g)	there was ample time to complete the tasks before the expiration date of the receivership and any delays were not the fault of the Receiver.
The appellant’s contentions on appeal
[10]	The appellant seeks to have substantive questions resolved, including:
(a)	a finding that the lease of the tax allotment can be transferred to the Judgment creditor;
(b)	that the Judgment debtor was party to the proceedings below by virtue of the order made by Whitten LCJ;
(c)	the consent of the Minister and Lord Nuku are not required for the grant of the lease over the tax allotment, and the receiver can sign on their behalf; and
(d)	the three leases can be transferred to the Judgment Creditor (Lord Luani).
The reasons below
[11]	The learned primary judge noted that the relief being sought on the hearing before her was for:
(a)	determination of the issue whether the Minister can grant a lease over the Judgment debtor’s land without his consent; 
(b)	determination of the issue whether the Minister can transfer the Judgment Debtor’s interest as lessor over leases 9436 and 9473 to a third party;
(c)	an order compelling the Minister to grant a lease over the Judgment debtor’s tax allotment to the Receiver; and
(d)	an order compelling the Judgment debtor to transfer leases 9436 and 9473 to the Receiver.	
[12]	 Her Honour referred to authority as to the limited powers of a Receiver in relation to selling land, and the need to guard against abuse of the charging order process. 
[13]	Her Honour then found:
“24.	Respectfully, I am not convinced that the request before me is a genuine request for directions as such; rather it is principally an application for Court orders to be issued against the Respondent to grant a lease over the Judgment Debtor’s registered tax allotment and to transfer leases 9436 and 9473 to the Judgment Creditor. To exclude the holders of the relevant lands from this proceeding is unfair.
25. 	That being the case, I agree with the position of the Court in Safety at Sea (Australasia) Ltd that a specific application is required for the orders sought herein, in line with the laws currently in force. In order for all relevant issues to be resolved, all of the persons whose interests are likely to be affected should be joined.”
Consideration
[14]	There are a number of points that are relevant to the resolution of this appeal.
[15]	First, contrary to the appellant’s submission, the order by Whitten LCJ on 18 July 2023 did not direct that the documents be served on the Judgment Debtor. All that was ordered was that a copy of the directions made that day be served on the Judgment Debtor. As it happens the Judgment debtor was served with the Application notice, memorandum supporting the application, draft order, affidavit of Ms Warner and the directions. Therefore, from 11 August 2023 there can be no doubt that he was aware of the proceedings. True it is, that he has shown no interest in participating in the proceedings, however, nothing in the directions made the Judgment Debtor a party to the proceedings such that Lord Nuku would be bound by the outcome. 
[16]	Secondly, nothing was done, in that order or otherwise, to make the lessees of the two leases, 9436 and 9473, party to the proceedings.
[17]	As a result, neither the Judgment Debtor (Lord Nuku) nor the lessee of the leases was a party on the hearing before the learned primary judge. There can be no doubt that their interests will be affected if the relief sought by the Receiver is granted. Indeed, under the Receivership Act 2015, s 17(3)(b) would require the Receiver to act with reasonable regard to their interests:
“17 General duties of receivers
(1)	A receiver shall exercise his powers in good faith and for a proper purpose. 
(2)	…
(3)	In addition to subsections (1) and (2), a receiver shall exercise his powers with reasonable regard to the interests of – 
(a) … 
(b) persons claiming, through the grantor, interests in the property in receivership; ….”
[18]	The learned primary judge was, in our respectful view, correct to find that they were not parties, and that their absence created unfairness should relief be granted.
[19]	Thirdly, contrary to appeal ground No. 2, nothing in the directions made by Whitten LCJ had the effect of making Lord Luani a party to the proceedings. That ultimately may be of little moment as nothing was said in the written submissions to support this aspect.
[20]	Fourthly, the application before the learned primary judge sought substantive relief: 
“This application requests the court to exercise its statutory powers to direct the Respondent to grant a lease and transfer leases to give effect to the Judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal on 17 September 2017.”
[21]	  The submissions below confirmed the relief sought. In those circumstances, it was not an error on the part of the learned primary judge to find that such relief should not be granted in the absence of all interested persons. 
[22]	Fifthly, the material indicates that the Appellant’s appointment as Receiver expired on 18 February 2024. Whitten LCJ made an order in February 2023 extending the term for one year, and the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal asserts the expiry date as fact. That was confirmed before this Court. 
[23]	The application was filed in June 2023 and came before Whitten LCJ on 18 July 2023 for directions to take it to a full hearing. The directions made by Whitten LCJ were designed to have all points elucidated by the time of the hearing, which was set as half a day on 15 September 2023. 
[24]	Plainly, Whitten LCJ intended that the substantive relief would be argued at that hearing. The parties took the steps directed, the last being on 8 September 2023. To that time the receiver’s appointment was still current.
[25]	The learned primary judge’s ruling was made on 8 November 2024.
[26]	Given the Receiver’s appointment expired prior to the hearing, a potential issue arose as to the Appellant’s competence to seek the relief before the learned primary judge. It seems it was not addressed. However that maybe, an issue arises now as to the competence of the Receiver to bring the appeal. 
[27]	The Notice of Appeal addresses the fact that the Receivership ended on 18 February 2024, but says nothing as to competence:
“7. The Appellant’s appointment expired on 18 February 2024. There was ample time to complete the tasks before the expiration date, but there have been delays, which were not the Appellant’s fault.”
[28]	However, the Notice of Appeal seeks, as part of the relief, an order extending the Receiver’s appointment to 18 February 2026. The Appellant’s written submissions add nothing on the issue. In his oral address Mr Fonua said that an extension was not sought pending the outcome of this appeal. Mr Sisifa made the formal submission that the appeal was incompetent because of the expiry of the receiver’s appointment, though no such point was addressed in his written submissions. It seems no such point was raised before the learned primary judge.
[29]	The Receiver is no longer the Receiver, her appointment having expired on 18 February 2024. Whether there is some sort of accrued right as Receiver to bring or continue the present proceedings is not a matter explored below or before this Court. However, this Court has been asked to make the order extending the appointment to 18 February 2026. There was no opposition to that course and we consider that order should be made regardless of the outcome otherwise.
[30]	The central reason why the primary judge refused the application was the absence of all interested parties, specifically, the Judgment Debtor, over whose land a lease was sought, and the lessee under leases 9436 and 9473. 
Powers of the Receiver
[31]	Given the substantive issues raised both below and on appeal, it seems appropriate to make some observations.
[32]	The Receivership Act 2015 was passed by Parliament in 2015 and the Royal Assent was given on 25 May 2017.  The Act was the subject of an Extraordinary Gazette published on 20 June 2017. The Gazette notified that the Act:
“… is passed at the 2015 Session of the Legislative Assembly and are (sic) issued with this Session Gazette”.
[33]	The respondent contends that the Receivership Act is not yet in force. This is because s 1(2) of the Receivership Act provides:
“(2)	This Act shall come into force on a day to be appointed by the Minister responsible for Commerce by Notice in the Gazette and different provisions may be brought into force on different dates.”
[34]	In our view, the respondent’s contention that the Receivership Act is not yet in force is correct.
[35]	As the Gazette notified, the Act “… is passed at the 2015 Session of the Legislative Assembly and are (sic) issued with this Session Gazette”. The Gazette was published on 20 June 2017, two years after the Act was passed. The Royal Assent was given to the Act before the Gazette, on 25 May 2017.
[36]	The appellant relied on s 56 of the Constitution as signifying that an Act becomes law when it is published after getting Royal Assent. Section provides:
“56 Power of Legislative Assembly 
The King and the Legislative Assembly shall have power to enact laws, and the representatives of the nobles and the representatives of the people shall sit as one House. When the Legislative Assembly shall have agreed upon any Bill which has been read and voted for by a majority three times it shall be presented to the King for his sanction and after receiving his sanction and signature it shall become law upon publication ….”
[37]	Mr Sisifa SG contended that s 1(2) of the Receivership Act did not contradict the Constitution as it was a clear expression of the will of the Legislative Assembly. We need not determine that issue as the Interpretation Act provides when an Act comes into force:
“3 When Acts come into force 
(1)	An Act to which His Majesty's Assent has been given shall come into operation on the day of publication in the Gazette, unless the contrary intention appears.  Provided that Acts pursuant to clause 79 of the Act of Constitution of Tonga (Cap. 2), shall come into operation on the day it is signed by His Majesty.  
(2)	Where an Act comes into operation in accordance with subsection (1), or part of that Act, is expressed to come into operation on a particular day, that Act or that part, as the case may be, comes into operation immediately on the expiration of the last preceding day.”
[38]	Section 1(2) of the Receivership Act is a clear expression of a contrary intention, and displaces the day of publication in the Gazette as the day it comes into force.   The relevant Minister has not announced the day of commencement. The Act is not yet in force.
[39]	For the reasons which follow below, that conclusion does not impact on the outcome of this case.
[40]	We note that the learned primary judge referred to the decision of this Court in Namoa v Moehau, as containing a finding that the Receivership Act was not yet in force.  That is a misunderstanding of Namoa. There the order appointing a receiver had included powers granted under the Receivership Act. This Court said:
“[2] …	On behalf of Ms Namoa, Mr Edwards submitted that the receivership order ought not to have been made or that it was too vague in its terms. We were told that the Receivership Act 2015, on which it appears that Langi J relied, at least in part, has not yet been brought into force by notice in the Gazette.”
[3] 	Ms Kafoa, for Mr Siosaia Moehau (Siosaia) acknowledged that the orders made in the Supreme Court may not have been made (at least in the same terms) if the Judge had been aware that the Receivership Act was not in force.
…
[11]	As previously stated, the Receivership Act was not in force at the time the application was made.
…
[21]	Plainly, the fact that the Receivership Act had not been brought into force prevented the Judge from making any order pursuant to its terms.”
[41]	It is plain that in Namoa this Court did not have to consider whether the Act was actually in force, having been told by both sides that it was not. 
Receivership Act
[42]	We will review some of the provisions of the Receivership Act which, if and when it comes into force, will be relevant to what we say below in paragraphs [56] to [62].
[43]	The Receivership Act provides for the appointment of a receiver under a deed or agreement: ss 7-8, but as noted below also includes a receiver appointed under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. 
[44]	For the purposes of the Act the definition of “receiver” is wide:
“receiver” means a receiver, or a manager or a receiver and manager in respect of any property appointed – 
(a)	by or under any deed or agreement;  
(b)	by the court in the exercise of a power conferred on the court or in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction; 
whether or not the person appointed is empowered to sell any of the property in receivership, but does not include – 
(c)	a mortgagee who, whether personally or through an agent, exercises a power to – 
(i) enter into possession of mortgaged property; or 
(ii) sell or otherwise alienate mortgaged property; or 
(d)	an agent of any such mortgagee;
[45]	The Act provides in s 13:
“13 Execution of documents
(1)	A receiver may execute in the name and on behalf of the grantor all documents necessary or incidental to the exercise of the receiver’s powers.”
[46]	Then section 14 relevantly provides for the powers of a receiver:
             “14 Powers of receivers	
(1)	A receiver has the powers and authorities expressly or impliedly conferred by the deed or agreement, or the order of the court, by or under which the appointment was made. 
(2)	In addition to subsection (1) but subject to any contrary provision in the deed or agreement, or the order of the court, by or under which the appointment was made, a receiver may do any of the following – 
(a)  demand and recover, by action or otherwise, income of the property in receivership; ...”
[47]	Section 17 prescribes the general duties of Receivers:
“17 General duties of receivers 
(1) 	A receiver shall exercise his powers in good faith and for a proper purpose. 
(2) 	A receiver shall exercise his powers in a manner that he believes on reasonable grounds to be in the best interests of the person in whose interests he was appointed. 
(3) 	In addition to subsections (1) and (2), a receiver shall exercise his powers with reasonable regard to the interests of – 
(a)	the grantor; 
(b) 	persons claiming, through the grantor, interests in the property in receivership;
(c) 	unsecured creditors of the grantor; and
(d) 	sureties who may be called upon to fulfill obligations of the grantor. 
(4) 	Subsection (3) does not limit or affect section 18.”
[48]	Court supervision of receivers, and the power to make directions, is governed by s 35(1)(a) and (4) of the Act:
“35 Court supervision of receivers 
(1)	The court may, on the application of a receiver – 
(a)	give directions in relation to any matter arising in connection with the performance of the functions of the receiver; …
…
(4)	The powers given by subsections (1) and (2) – 
(a) 	are in addition to any other powers the court may exercise under this Act, any other Act, or in its inherent jurisdiction; and 
(b) 	may be exercised in relation to a matter occurring either before or after the commencement of this Act and whether or not the receiver has ceased to act as receiver when the application is made.”
[49]	The Act does not contain a provision to apply to the court except in s 35. That is the power to apply for “directions in relation to any matter arising in connection with the performance of the functions of the receiver”. 
[50]	In this case, the appointment of the Receiver was by the court, the order stating that that it was pursuant to s 5(2)(c)(c) of the Supreme Court Act and Order 33 of the Supreme Court Rules. The appointment was “by way of equitable execution in respect of property of the Judgment debtor … for the enforcement of the Judgment debt …”. The Order then provided that the Receiver shall:
“exercise all the functions, powers and duties conferred by, and in accordance with, sections 14, 17, 18, 20 and 21 of the Act and Order 33 rule 6 of the Rules”.
The Supreme Court Act and Rules
[51]	Section 5(2)(a) and (c) of the Supreme Court Act relevantly provides:
“5 Powers
The powers of the Supreme Court referred to in this section include, subject to any other applicable law to the contrary, all powers that the court considers necessary or desirable to enable it to give effect to and enforce the judgments and orders of the court … and, without derogating from the generality of the foregoing, includes power to – 
(a)	make charging orders against property, in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court;
…
(c) 	make orders to appoint receivers in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court; …”
[52]	Order 33 rule 6 authorizes a Receiver to apply to the Court for directions:
“A receiver may at any time request the Court for directions by written request stating the matter upon which directions are required.”
[53]	Order 34 provides that: 
“A charging order shall provide a judgment creditor with security, in whole or in part, over the property and assets of the judgment debtor described in the order.”
General comments as to principles – appointment of receivers
[54]	As this Court did in Namoa, we make some general comments about the principles applicable to making an order for the appointment of a receiver and the jurisdiction of the Court to give “directions”.
[55]	We adopt the statements in Namoa at paragraphs [5] and [18]-[28] as to the Court’s appointment and control of receivers. In particular, we note that in paragraph [21] of Namoa, the Court directed its comments to the situation which would obtain once the Receivership Act came into force.
General comments as to principles – directions
[56]	In Mirabela Nickel Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq); Ex Parte Madden, Vaughan J examined the principles surrounding a receiver’s application for directions. There the directions were under s 424 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), but the principles are equally applicable to the appointment of a receiver under the Receivership Act. 
[57]	Section 424 relevantly provided:
“424 Controller may apply to Court
(1)	A controller of property of a corporation may apply to the Court for directions in relation to any matter arising in connection with the performance or exercise of any of the controller’s functions and powers as controller.”
[58]	As can be seen s 424 is a close analogue of 35(1)(a) of the Receivership Act.
[59]	In Mirabela, Vaughan J relied upon the Federal Court decision in Re Sandalwood Properties Ltd; Ex parte Preston and said:
“86.	Section 424's power to make directions is intended to facilitate the work of a controller; it should be interpreted liberally.
…. 
89.	The following principles emerge from Re Sandalwood Properties Ltd; Ex parte Preston as to the nature and scope of available directions under s 424:
(1)	The directions that may be provided are a form of personal guidance or advice; they articulate the approach the controller is justified in taking having regard to the known circumstances and relevant legal principles.
(2)       The power is to give 'directions' in relation to the matters identified in s 424(1).  The relevant matters are described in broad and general terms, especially given the words 'in connection with'.  So too the words 'in relation to' are of 'the widest import'.  Thus the permissible subject matter of a direction will include the actions of the controller but is not confined to such actions.  It will include where:
…the controller has to consider the appropriate action to take in undertaking functions or exercising powers and a third party is claiming that a right, interest or entitlement of the third party must be acknowledged or respected in exercising those functions or powers …
(3) 	The circumstance that the controller is a privately appointed receiver and manager is not relevant to the question whether to make directions. That said, receivers should not be unduly nervous and come to court where advice is not needed.
(4) 	There must be an issue calling for the exercise of legal judgment, ie a legal issue of substance or procedure or an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness.  It must be more than a business or commercial decision.  However, the fact that a legal question may have significant commercial consequences does not make the giving of directions inappropriate.  The court does not give advice as to how the controller should act but rather whether there is legal justification to so act. 
(5)   	Once the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied the court has a discretion whether to provide advice of the kind contemplated by the statutory provision.
(6)  	The making of directions is not an adjudication.  It will not be determinative of parties’ rights.  The court is not determining the rights of persons and has no power to provide directions that would have that consequence.
(7)   	The fact that directions are sought in the context of an adversarial dispute does not mean that it is inappropriate to provide directions.  There is a need to consider the nature of any underlying dispute.  Nevertheless, the existence of such a dispute, and the circumstance that the subject matter for advice is an issue in adversarial proceedings, may be relevant to whether the court is willing to give directions and in what terms.
(8)   	A direction is given in the context of the circumstances presented to the court at the time it is made; it will not extend to materially different circumstances that arise in the future.  The form in which a direction is expressed should be consistent with it being provided by way of judicial advice. 
90.	A direction under s 424 does not bind third parties in relation to substantive issues.  That is even the case where the third party is joined as a defendant (remembering, however, that MSI was merely given leave to appear and was never joined as a defendant). The non-binding nature of a direction under s 424 is consistent with the accepted position that the making of the direction is not an adjudication and is not determinative of rights.”
[60]	Subject to what follows, we respectfully adopt those principles as applicable to receivers’ applications for directions in the Kingdom of Tonga.
[61]	For reasons which we will develop, the statement in paragraph 89(6) of Mirabela is inapplicable in the current case.
[62]	We observe that, in practice, directions given after substantive argument are generally accepted by the parties and provide a convenient mechanism to resolve issues of importance arising in a receivership. They also provide comfort to receivers if the directions are followed.
[63]	However, the approach in Mirabela should not be understood as reflecting the position when, as here, the appointment of the Receiver was by way of equitable execution, that is, the Court taking steps to ensure its orders are effectual. In our view, that circumstance brings a different set of considerations into account.
General comments as to principles – receivers by way of equitable execution
[64]	As set out in paragraphs [4] and [5] above, the Court made a charging order first, and then appointed the Receiver to enforce that order. The charging order provided that Judgment Debtor’s land (Nuku Island) and the leases (9436 and 9473) were charged with the repayment of the Judgment Debtor’s debt.
[65]	The order appointing the Receiver noted that the Judgment Debtor did not oppose the making of the order, and relevantly provided that she was:
(a)	appointed pursuant to s 5(2) of the Supreme Court Act;
(b)	appointed by way of equitable execution in respect of the Judgment Debtor’s property, namely the same property as nominated under the charging order, for the enforcement of the judgment debt; and 
(c)	the Receiver shall exercise all the powers given under ss 14, 17, 18, 20 and 21 of the Receivership Act.
[66]	Where, as here, a receiver is appointed by way of equitable execution over assets, a number of principles are applicable, including:
(a)	a receiver by way of equitable execution is an officer of the Court, not the agent of the judgment creditor;
(b)	the appointment of a receiver is a highly flexible discretionary remedy, capable of incremental development based on established principles;
(c)	a receiver should be appointed if there is a reasonable prospect that the appointment will assist enforcement of the judgment and there is a real prospect the appointment will serve a useful purpose; 
(d)	a receiver may be appointed over any asset of the judgment debtor, including assets in which the debtor has a beneficial interest;
(e)	the Court may make any mandatory ancillary orders it considers necessary to support the work of the receiver;
(f)	there is no rule of law that a receiver by way of equitable execution can only be appointed over assets that are amenable to execution at common law; in fact:
(i)	a receiver can be appointed to collect both current and future debts; and
(ii)	a receiver can be appointed to collect future receipts from a defined asset.
[67]	The general effect of such a receiver is that the order does not usually transfer the specified property to the judgment creditor or indeed the receiver, but it does prevent the judgment debtor from dealing with the property. The receiver’s role is then to collect the specified property.  When it has been collected the receiver must make an application to the Court for liberty to pay the judgment creditor the property realised less a deduction of the costs of the receivership.
[68]	As a court-appointed receiver, equitable remedies are available to assist in the task assigned by the order. Those remedies are, of course, discretionary, but flexible as the task they serve is to make the court’s orders effectual. Authority supports the conclusion that the wide sweeps of a court’s orders are available when the particular case warrants it, with no artificial limits.
[69]	The breadth of available remedies was noted by Gaudron J in Jago v District Court of New South Wales:
“5.	Subject to any limitation or restriction to be found in statute, a court necessarily has power (whether that power is identified as inherent power or a power necessarily to be implied from relevant statutory provisions) to control its own process and proceedings.
…
7. 	The power of a court to control its own process and proceedings is such that its exercise is not restricted to defined and closed categories, but may be exercised as and when the administration of justice demands.”
[70]	We pause to observe that in this case, there are no such limitations or restrictions in a statute.
[71]	Examples of the breadth of the power are many. For instance, in Maricante v Batiste, the case involved receivers and a plaintiff seeking that the court make directions with respect to the sale of a property. This was said:
“[75]	[I]n my opinion the Court’s power to make an interlocutory order for the appointment of a receiver under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) must carry with it the implied power to give directions with respect to the discharge of the functions for which the appointment is made – at any rate, where (as here) such directions are necessary in a practical sense to enable the receiver to carry out those functions without exposing himself to a real risk of litigation.”
[72]	Other examples of the broad powers are:
(a)	authorising the pooling and redistribution of assets;
(b)	 how property is to be administered; and
(c)	the propriety or reasonableness of the sale of property.
[73]	In Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Limited, the UK High Court made orders appointing a receiver where recovery of the debt by other processes of execution was not practicable, at least in any reasonable timescale. The Court confirmed its commitment to promoting the ready enforcement of arbitration awards and its willingness to develop its jurisdiction incrementally if necessary, “unconstrained by rigid expressions of principle and responsive to the demands of justice in the contemporary context”.
[74]	In many cases a receiver appointed by way of equitable execution will be appointed because conventional methods of enforcement are inappropriate or thwarted. In such cases the courts are willing to facilitate an appointment accompanied with a wide scope of powers.
[75]	It follows, in our view, that once the receiver is appointed, the full suite of orders available to a court to make its orders efficacious are available, depending, of course, on establishing that they are needed to fulfil the object of the appointment, i.e. enforcement of the judgment debt. The powers granted under such orders are not constrained by the Land Act. Rather, they stem from the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to make enforcement of its own orders effective. 
[76]	To elaborate, the Land Act recognises that mortgages may be granted over allotments and leases granted under the Act with the approval of the Minister. Transactions of this kind are agreed between the registered holder of the allotment or lease and third parties. The Act does include enforcement powers in the event of default but there is no provision under the Act for charging orders which are issued by the Court to enforce an order over assets that may or may not include land. The source of authority to issue and enforce charging orders is entirely independent of the Land Act and does not require the consent of anyone including the Minister or the holder of the allotment or lease at issue, or the lessee. 
[77]	Support for the proposition that the Land Act does not constrain the grant or enforcement of a charging order over land is found in the decision of this Court in Intracor Trading Co (NZ) Ltd v Finau. This Court explained the distinction between the nature  and source of  authority of a charging order made by the Court and a mortgage over land granted under the Land Act. This Court also confirmed that it would be a matter for the Court to decide what remedies should be granted if a charging order over (in that case) a lease was to be enforced. This might include limiting the remedy to possession for the remainder of the lease or it could be an order for a sub-lease for the remainder of the lease, or it might include an order for the sale of the lease.  
[78]	Finally, we note that Mr Sisifa conceded that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, it being outside the framework of the Land Act.
Conclusion
[79]	Though the central reason for dismissing the application was that necessary parties had not been joined, her Honour also found that it should be dismissed because the relief sought was substantive. In our view, her Honour fell into error in both respects. The application was by a court-appointed receiver, seeking the Court’s assistance to enforce a judgment debt, secured by a charging order. Those issues had been the subject of directions to bring them on for a hearing, and they are within the scope of what a receiver might seek in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The appropriate course would have been to give directions for the missing parties to be joined and steps to bring the matter back on with all parties represented. 
[80]	Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, with costs.
[81]	As referred to in paragraph [30] above, an order should be made extending the appointment of the receiver until 18 February 2026. 
[82]	The Receiver’s application is to be remitted to the Supreme Court where it will be necessary to make orders formally joining Lord Nuku and the lessee of both leases as parties and directing service of the application and supporting documents on them,
Result
1.	The appeal is allowed.
2.	The matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for further hearing in light of this judgment.
3.	The appellant’s appointment as Receiver is extended to 18 February 2026. 
4.	The respondent must pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be fixed by the Registrar if not agreed.

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Randerson J

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Harrison J

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Morrison J