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Buto v Guadalcanal Plains Resources Development Association [2026] SBHC 9; HCSI-CC 562 of 2023 (30 January 2026)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 562 of 2023

BETWEEN:

DANIEL BUTO
(Representing himself and members of Lunga Mamata of the Ghaobata line of Guadalcanal Province who are the tribal owners of the Perpetual Estate
in Parcel Number 192-003-8)
Claimant

AND:

GUADALCANAL PLAINS RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (GPRDA)
First Defendant

AND:

JOHN ROSIVAENA
(President of GPRDA)
Second Defendant

AND:

JOHNSON VOGITHIA
Third Defendant

Date of Hearing: 23 October 2025
Date of Judgment: 30 January 2026

Ms Y Samuel for the Claimant
Mr J Apaniai for the First and Second Defendant
Mr B Zama for the Third Defendant

JUDGMENT

AULANGA; PJ:

1. Following the grant of an interim court order, the Claimant filed a Category A claim on 22 January 2024. The claim was subsequently amended on 14 February 2024. In the amended claim, the Claimant seeks the following relief:
   • (1) An order of restraint against the First and Second Defendants, together with their agents, servants, associates, or any persons acting under their instructions, prohibiting them from releasing or distributing any further benefits including royalties, rentals, and dividends arising from the perpetual estate in parcel number 192-003-8, pending the final determination of High Court Civil Case No. 207 of 2022.
   • (2) An order that the First and Second Defendants breached clause 15.4 of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 28 October 2004 by continuing to release benefits (royalties, rentals, and dividends) in respect of the said perpetual estate despite the existence of High Court Civil Case No. 207 of 2022.
   • (3) A consequential order directing the First and Second Defendants to refund and account for all benefits (royalties, rentals, and dividends) paid out in respect of parcel number 192-003-8 between June 2022 and 20 November 2023.
   • (4) An order against the Third Defendant for breach of fiduciary duty in his capacity as one of the surviving trustees of the perpetual estate in parcel number 192-003-8.
   • (5) Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem just, equitable, and appropriate in the circumstances.
   • (6) Costs of the proceeding.

Background of the case

2. The Claimant is a member and the current chairman of Lunga Mamata subtribe, which forms part of the Ghaobata tribe of North Guadalcanal Province. He has instituted this proceeding both in his personal capacity and in a representative capacity on behalf of the Lunga Mamata subtribe.
3. The Claimant’s Lunga Mamata subtribe is the customary owner and the beneficiary of a parcel of land situated in North Guadalcanal, registered under perpetual title as parcel number 192-003-8 (“PN 192-003-8”). This subtribe is also a member of the Guadalcanal Plains Resource Development Association (“GPRDA”). PN 192-003-8, together with other lands within the Guadalcanal Plains, has been leased to Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Ltd (“GPPOL”) for the purpose of oil palm cultivation and production. In consideration of the lease, GPPOL is required to pay the benefits comprising of dividends, rents, and royalties to GPRDA (“the First Defendant”). The First Defendant, in turn, would distribute these benefits to the various tribes or subtribes through their trustees, who are obliged to further distribute the benefits to the members of their respective tribes or subtribes.
4. On 9 January 1975, PN 192-003-8 was duly registered under the perpetual title in the names of five individuals, namely Stephen Matagu, Mathew Tuanivali, Joseph Tiva, Eliza Thudu, and Benjamin Kuvia. Before the registration, these individuals executed a statutory declaration affirming that they would hold the said parcel of land jointly, as co-owners, upon statutory trusts. The purpose of the trust was to ensure that the land was to be administered for the collective benefit of the members of the Lunga Koghamotha landholding group, which forms part of the Ghaobata tribe. By virtue of this declaration, the registered proprietors assumed fiduciary obligations to safeguard the interests of the group, thereby recognizing the customary ownership rights of the Lunga Koghamotha people, embedding those rights in all dealings with the property.
5. In October 2004, the First Defendant entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with New Britain Palm Oil Ltd for the establishment of the GPPOL. Under the terms of the MOU, it was expressly stipulated that all parcels of land leased, or to be leased, to GPPOL must be duly registered in the names of their respective trustees. These trustees were to hold the legal title in trust for and on behalf of the members of their respective tribes or subtribes, thereby ensuring that the customary landowners retained beneficial ownership and that the benefits derived from the lease would be distributed in accordance with their customary entitlements. This requirement served both to formalize the trustees’ fiduciary obligations and to safeguard the interests of their indigenous landholding groups.
6. In 2005, PN 192-003-8 was registered in the names of Eliza Thudu, Benjamin Kuvia, John Ilei, Philip Sopage, and Johnson Vogithia of the Lunga Mamata subtribe. Following this registration, three of the trustees, namely Eliza Thudu, Benjamin Kuvia, and John Ilei, have since passed away, leaving Philip Sopage and Johnson Vogithia (“the Third Defendant”) as the surviving registered trustees. Despite their deaths, the land register continues to record the names of the deceased trustees, reflecting an outdated entry inconsistent with the present trusteeship. As the surviving trustees, the First Defendant is obliged to pay the benefits from the lease of the land to them for distribution to their Lunga Mamata subtribe.
7. It is not in dispute that disagreements arose concerning the distribution of the lease benefits by the remaining registered trustees. As a consequence, the Claimant together with members of his subtribe resolved to replace Philip Sopage and the Third Defendant as trustees. By correspondence dated 4 July 2022, the Claimant formally notified the First Defendant of this decision and requested that the payment of lease benefits to Sopage and the Third Defendant be suspended. The correspondence further advised the First Defendant that a legal proceeding, namely HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022, had already been instituted in the High Court against Sopage and the Third Defendant in relation to the dispute.
8. Clause 15.4 of the MOU provides that, in circumstances where a dispute arises concerning the landownership or trusteeship of the land, the lease benefits are to be held in trust and withheld from any distribution until the dispute is resolved. Notwithstanding the Claimant’s letter of 4 July 2022 and the pendency of the legal proceeding, the First Defendant continued to disburse the lease benefits to Sopage and the Third Defendant. The Claimant considers this as contrary to the requirements of the MOU.
9. In December 2023, the First Defendant ceased all payments of the lease benefits pursuant to an interim restraining order issued by the Court on 20 November 2023 in respect to this proceeding. By complying with the terms of the order, the First Defendant has suspended all further disbursements of the benefits to Philip Sopage and the Third Defendant. The cessation of the payments reflects the First and Second Defendants’ adherence to the Court’s directive and ensures that no benefits are released to the disputed trustees pending the final determination of the matter in HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022.
10. On 16 May 2025, the High Court dismissed the claim in HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022. Following the dismissal, the Court issued further orders directing the Defendants to lodge with the Registrar of Titles copies of the statutory declarations registered in respect of PN 192-003-8 by 6 June 2025. The order further provided that, in default of compliance, the trustees of PN 192-003-8 were to be determined by the Guadalcanal Local Court. Subsequently, on 2 December 2025, the High Court made an additional order requiring the Guadalcanal Local Court to determine the trustees of PN 192-003-8 within three months of the date of that order. The High Court also directed that the progress of this determination be monitored by the Court in March 2026.

Non-filing of written submissions by Claimant’s counsel

11. In the present matter, notwithstanding that the Court had issued two directions requiring the Claimant to file written submissions following the trial, first by 25 August 2025 and subsequently by 30 October 2025, regrettably, the Claimant’s counsel has failed to comply with either direction. Such non-compliance demonstrates a total disregard for the procedural orders of the Court. As a result, the Court has not been assisted by any submissions from the Claimant, and is constrained to rely solely upon the written submissions filed by counsel for all the Defendants.

Issues for Court’s determination

12. In the present matter, the parties have agreed upon the issues for determination by the Court. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is of the view that the issues may be appropriately narrowed to three principal questions. The first issue is whether the First and Second Defendants breached clause 15.4 of the MOU by releasing the lease payments notwithstanding the notice of the dispute. The second issue is whether, in light of the dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022, the Claimant remains entitled to the remedies sought in this proceeding. The third issue is whether the Defendants, either individually or collectively, bear liability to refund the lease benefits paid in respect of PN 192-003-8 during the period between June 2022 and 20 November 2023.

Whether the First and Second Defendants breached clause 15.4 of the MOU by releasing the lease payments notwithstanding the notice of the dispute

13. In relation to the first issue, clause 15.4 of the MOU states:
    • “15.4. Where there is any dispute, whether in custom or otherwise, as to who should-
    • (a) be recognised by the Association as a Landowner in custom in respect of a particular land parcel;
    • (b) for any reason replace a Landowner or Trustee in custom in respect of a particular land parcel,
    • Then any benefits (whether dividends, rents or royalties) payable under this Memorandum in respect of the disputed ownership interest shall be held by the Association in a separate trust account and shall not be paid out by the Association until the dispute has been resolved (whether by the courts or otherwise).”
14. The effect of this clause is clear. That is, whenever there is uncertainty or disagreement regarding the rightful landowner of a parcel of land subject to the lease, the Association (the First Defendant herein) must refrain from distributing the benefits connected to that land. Instead, the Association is obliged to deposit such benefits, whether dividends, rents, or royalties, into a separate trust account. Those funds must remain untouched until the dispute is conclusively resolved, either by judicial determination or by another recognized mechanism. The clause therefore serves a protective function, ensuring that the benefits are not wrongfully or prematurely distributed, thereby safeguarding both the Association and the disputing parties from potential liability or inequity in the event of a dispute.
15. The Claimant’s claim runs on the basis that the First and Second Defendants have breached clause 15.4 of the MOU by continuing to release the lease payments to the Third Defendant despite having received the correspondence from the Claimant’s solicitor, Mr. Nelson Laurere, dated 4 July 2022. Unfortunately, the Court rejects this contention. Clause 15.4 of the MOU does not specify whether a solicitor’s letter alone is sufficient to trigger the suspension of the payments, nor does it prescribe the precise form of the notice required. It merely states that the benefits must be withheld until the dispute is resolved “whether by the courts or otherwise.” The language is deliberately open-ended, but it does not elevate a private correspondence, as relied upon by the Claimant, to the status of a binding authority to suspend the payments of the lease to the registered trustees.
16. In practice, the solicitor’s letter relied upon by the Claimant herein amounted to nothing more than a notice of dispute. It merely informed the First Defendant that the Claimant was contesting the trusteeship over the PN 192-003-8 and had filed a proceeding in the High Court. However, such a letter carries no binding legal effect. If the First Defendant were to suspend the payments solely on the basis of this private correspondence, it would risk acting prematurely, particularly if the claim were later dismissed or found to be without merit. By contrast, a formal court order in fact provides an authoritative direction, legal certainty, and enforceability. It protects the First Defendant from any liability, and guarantees that funds are preserved until the dispute is properly adjudicated.
17. In resolving this first issue, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between a unilateral notice issued by a solicitor and a binding order of the Court. In the absence of express wording in clause 15.4 that elevate a private notice to a sufficient trigger, the appropriate and reliable mechanism for suspending the payments must be a formal court order. A broader reading of clause 15.4 denotes that judicial intervention is the preferred safeguard as it provides the Association with a clear legal basis for withholding the payments, prevents accusations of bias or wrongful withholding of the payments, and ensures that the trust mechanism is activated only when the dispute has been formally recognized by an adjudicative authority. While the clause contemplates resolution “by the courts or otherwise,” the Court finds that a court order is the safest and most defensible way to suspend the payments.
18. At the time the Claimant issued his solicitor’s letter in July 2022, Sopage and the Third Defendant remained the registered trustees of PN 192-003-8. The land register had not been amended, nor had any court order restrained the First and Second Defendants from making the payments. In those circumstances, the First and Second Defendants were legally obliged to continue disbursing the benefits to the registered trustees.
19. The Claimant’s letter containing the notice of dispute and reference to the pending litigation in HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022 did not, by themselves, alter the legal status of the trustees or impose a binding obligation on the First and Second Defendants to suspend the lease payments. Only a court order could have that effect. Such an order was eventually issued in November 2023, when the Court granted an interim restraining order. From that point onward, the First and Second Defendants complied fully and ceased all the payments to the Third Defendant. Prior to the issuance of that order, their conduct was consistent with both the MOU and the registered trustees. Accordingly, the Claimant’s letter and the mere existence of the pending litigation were insufficient to halt the payments. The First and Second Defendants cannot be said to have breached clause 15.4 of the MOU by continuing to release the benefits until restrained by the Court.
20. Based on the foregoing analysis, it is the Court’s view that the First and Second Defendants cannot be held liable to reimburse the payments made prior to the issuance of the interim restraining order in November 2023. The Third Defendant cannot be held liable as well for receiving the payments. Any payments of the benefits made prior to the service of the court order to the person restrained, as rightly held in Alu Timber Company Ltd v Famoa Development Association Ltd [2002] SBHC 96, are not payments made in breach of the court order. A court order only binds the parties once they have notice of it, and until service of the order occurs, payments made in good faith remain lawful. Until that order was issued and served, the Third Defendant remained the trustee of record under the land register, and the First and Second Defendants were legally obliged to continue disbursing the benefits accordingly. The payments made and received during that period were consistent with the MOU. Consequently, no breach of clause 15.4 can be attributed to all the Defendants in respect of the payments released before the intervention of the Court.

Whether, in light of the dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022, the Claimant remains entitled to the remedies sought in this proceeding

21. The second issue requires this Court to consider the impact of the dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022 on the Claimant’s entitlement to the remedies sought in this proceeding. It is evident that the remedies pursued by the Claimant are entirely contingent upon the continued existence, or at least, the final determination of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022. That earlier case forms the very foundation of this proceeding, as it is the basis upon which the Claimant seeks to compel the First and Second Defendants to suspend the payments under clause 15.4 of the MOU. Without the existence of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022, the legal footing for the Claimant’s claim in this matter is substantially undermined, raising the question of whether any relief can properly be granted in its absence.
22. This Court takes judicial notice that HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022 was dismissed on 16 July 2025. In dismissing that matter, the High Court also directed the Guadalcanal Local Court to determine the trusteeship of PN 192-003-8 in accordance with custom. The dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022 is therefore decisive. Since the High Court has dismissed that case, the dispute upon which the Claimant relied on in this proceeding now ceased to exist in law. The combined effect of the dismissal and the order referring the trusteeship issue to the Guadalcanal Local Court was to extinguish any basis for asserting that the trusteeship of PN 192-003-8 remained unsettled, or that the Defendants were under a continuing obligation to suspend the lease payments under clause 15.4 of the MOU. In substance, the dismissal confirmed the legal position that Sopage and the Third Defendant continue to be the lawful trustees of PN 192-003-8. Consequently, the First Defendant is entitled to resume and continue to disburse the benefits to them without any interruption. Having reached that decision, the Claimant’s reliance on clause 15.4 is therefore misplaced, as that clause only operates in the presence of a live dispute. With the dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022, no such dispute remains, and the legal foundation for the Claimant’s claim has been conclusively removed.
23. Put another way, the remedies sought by the Claimant in this proceeding, namely the restraint orders, declarations of breach, and for the refund of the benefits, are all contingent upon the existence of a valid and ongoing dispute. That dispute was embodied in HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022. With the dismissal of that case, there is no longer any subsisting dispute capable of invoking clause 15.4 of the MOU. The foundation upon which the Claimant’s claim rests has therefore fallen away. To grant the remedies sought in these circumstances would serve no practical purpose and would amount to nothing more than an academic exercise, as counsel for the First and Second Defendants correctly observed. The Court must avoid issuing any order that lacks utility or enforceability, and in the absence of a live dispute, the relief claimed, in the Court’s view, cannot be sustained.
24. The Court therefore finds that the dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022 now effectively nullifies the Claimant’s entitlement to the remedies sought in this case. The Claimant cannot rely on a dispute that has been judicially dismissed to ground the remedies sought in the current proceeding. The First and Second Defendants, having acted in accordance with the land register and the Court’s interim restraining order, cannot be faulted for the continuing payments until the dispute was formally resolved. Accordingly, for this issue, this Court holds that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the remedies sought.

Whether the Defendants, either individually or collectively, bear liability to refund the lease benefits paid in respect of PN 192-003-8 during the period between June 2022 and 20 November 2023

25. The third issue concerns whether the Defendants, either individually or collectively, must refund the lease benefits disbursed during the period between June 2022 and 20 November 2023. The Claimant argues that such payments were without legal basis and should be reimbursed.
26. The Court has already determined that the First and Second Defendants did not breach clause 15.4 of the MOU by continuing to release the payments until restrained by the interim court order of November 2023. At all material times prior to that order, Sopage and the Third Defendant remained the registered trustees of PN 192-003-8. The First Defendant was therefore legally obliged to continue disbursing the benefits to them in accordance with the MOU.
27. The Claimant’s solicitor’s letter of July 2022 and the pendency of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022 did not, by themselves, alter the legal status of the trustees or impose a binding obligation on the First and Second Defendants to suspend the payments. Only a formal court order could have that effect. Such an order was eventually issued in November 2023, and from that point onward, the First and Second Defendants complied fully and ceased all the payments.
28. In light of the dismissal of HCSI CC No. 207 of 2022, it is the Court’s view that there is no legal basis upon which the Claimant can demand the reimbursement of the benefits from either of the Defendants paid prior to the restraining order. To impose any liability on the First and Second Defendants for the payments made in accordance with the MOU and without any binding court order would be unjust and without any legal basis.
29. This Court therefore finds that all the Defendants, whether individually or collectively, do not bear any liability to refund the lease benefits paid between June 2022 and 20 November 2023. Those payments were made lawfully, consistently with the MOU, and in accordance with the trusteeship recorded in the land register.
30. Accordingly, the Claimant’s claim for the reimbursement must fail. All the Defendants’ conduct during the relevant period was proper, and no liability arises to account for or refund the benefits disbursed prior to the Court’s restraining order.

Alleged fiduciary liability

31. The Claimant, in the amended claim, further alleged a breach of fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. In determining whether the Third Defendant, as one of the surviving trustees of PN 192-003-8, has breached such duty, the Court must first consider the evidentiary burden.
32. It is undisputed that the Third Defendant is a registered trustee of PN 192-003-8, holding the property for the benefit of the members of the Lunga Mamata subtribe. As stated in Perogolo v Laugana [2011] SBHC 103, at paragraph 2, the Third Defendant as the trustee bears “a binding obligation to always do what is right and proper for others (the beneficiaries) and to act in utmost good faith towards them.” Fiduciary liability is a grave allegation, requiring cogent proof of misconduct such as dishonesty, misappropriation, or wilful neglect of duty. In the present case, the Claimant has failed to adduce material or sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegation. Mere suspicion or dissatisfaction cannot ground the allegation of fiduciary liability; clear and convincing proof is required. This principle is well established. In Speight v Gaunt (1883) 9 App Cas 1 (HL), the House of Lords held that trustees must exercise the care of an ordinary prudent person managing their own affairs, but they are not guarantors of outcomes. Unless negligence or misconduct is shown, liability cannot be imposed. In this present case, the Third Defendant’s receipt of the lease benefits was in accordance with the land register and the MOU. Without any material evidence of negligence or dishonesty, his conduct falls squarely within the standard articulated in Speight v Gaunt cited above.
33. Likewise, in Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241, Millett LJ emphasized that the irreducible core of trusteeship is honesty and fidelity to the trust. Trustees are not liable merely because the beneficiaries are dissatisfied; liability arises only in cases of fraud or wilful default. In the present case, the Claimant has produced no evidence of fraud or wilful default on the part of the Third Defendant. His receipt of benefits was lawful, consistent with his position as a registered trustee, and supported by the First Defendant’s obligation to disburse payments to trustees of record.
34. The reasoning in Re Londonderry’s Settlement [1965] Ch 918 further supports this conclusion. The Court of Appeal held that trustees must act in accordance with the trust instrument and the law while possessing a degree of confidentiality in their decision making. However, they are not bound by unilateral notices or private correspondence from the beneficiaries. In the present case, the solicitor’s letter of July 2022 amounted to no more than a unilateral notice of dispute, devoid of any binding legal effect. In the absence of a court order, the Third Defendant remained a trustee of record, and his receipt of the benefits was lawful. The Claimant has not produced any material evidence that the Third Defendant acted outside the scope of his authority or contrary to the trust instrument.
35. Taken together, these authorities establish that fiduciary liability cannot be imposed without proof of dishonesty, negligence, or breach of trust. The Claimant’s failure to provide such material evidence is fatal to the claim. The Third Defendant acted consistently with the land register, the MOU, and the lawful payments made by the First Defendant. His conduct was neither fraudulent nor negligent, and no breach of fiduciary duty can be sustained. Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegation of breach of the Third Defendant’s fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries must fail, both for want of evidence and on the basis of the cited authorities.

Claimant’s locus standi to commence the proceeding

36. In addition to the substantive findings of this matter, the Court must also consider the argument advanced by the Third Defendant that the Claimant lacks locus standi to maintain this proceeding. Rule 3.42 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 (“the Civil Procedure Rules 2007”) requires that any person purporting to act in a representative capacity must demonstrate sufficient authority and produce evidence of such representation.
37. The Claimant has instituted this proceeding both in his personal and in a representative capacity on behalf of the Lunga Mamata subtribe. However, the Claimant has provided no evidence whatsoever in any of his sworn statements filed in this matter to substantiate his authority to represent the subtribe. No resolution of the subtribe, no statutory declaration, nor any other documentary proof has been placed before the Court to establish that he has been duly authorized to act on behalf of the group.
38. The Court of Appeal in Peako v Bako [2002] SBCA 17 has made it clear that representative actions must be supported by cogent evidence of authority. A mere assertion of representation is insufficient. The principle articulated in that case is directly applicable here, that is, without any proof of authorization, the Claimant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to seek remedies on behalf of others.
39. The Claimant may argue that the question of locus standi should have been raised before the trial, so that the Court could decide it as a preliminary matter. While it is true that challenges to standing are often dealt with at an early stage as mentioned in Rule 3.42 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2007, the Court is not precluded from considering that issue at the trial.
40. It is the Court’s view that locus standi goes to the very foundation of a party’s right to bring a proceeding. It is a jurisdictional question, meaning, if a party lacks standing, the Court cannot properly grant the relief sought, regardless of the stage of the proceeding. For that reason, the Court retains the discretion to consider the issue of standing or locus standi at any point, including during or after the trial.
41. This principle is consistent with Peako v Bako (supra), which emphasized that representative actions must be supported by clear evidence of authority. The absence of such evidence is not a mere procedural irregularity but a substantive defect that undermines the legitimacy of the claim.
42. In the present case, the Claimant has provided no evidence such as any resolution of the Lunga Mamata subtribe or any statutory declaration, or any other documentary proof to demonstrate his authority to represent the Lunga Mamata subtribe as required under Rule 3.42 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2007. That failure is fatal to his representative claim. Even though the matter was not raised before trial, the Court is entitled, and indeed, obliged to consider it when determining whether the remedies sought in this proceeding can be granted.
43. In light of the above, the Court finds that the Claimant has failed to discharge the evidentiary burden required under Rule 3.42 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2007. His claim in a representative capacity is therefore fatally defective. This failure further reinforces the Court’s earlier findings that the remedies sought in this proceeding cannot be granted.
44. Accordingly, the Court accepts the Third Defendant’s submission. The Claimant’s lack of locus standi operates as an additional and independent ground upon which the claim must fail. This Court therefore finds that the claim cannot succeed, both on the substantive issues already determined and on the fundamental defect of standing.

Orders of the Court

1. The Claimant’s amended claim is dismissed in its entirety.
2. Costs of this proceeding are to be paid by the Claimant to all the Defendants, if not agreed, to be taxed.

THE COURT
Hon. Justice Augustine S. Aulanga
PUISNE JUDGE