HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Case name: 	Premier of Guadalcanal Province v Sino Capital (SI) Limited	
		
Citation:		
		
Date of decision: 	25 February 2026	
		
Parties: 	Premier of Guadalcanal Province, Moses Bau, Eric Kuta, Vota Kou, Joash Salini And David Rosalio V Sino Capital (SI) Limited, New Ocean (Si) Company Limited, Attorney General, John Stewart 	
		
Date of hearing: 	30 March 2021	
		
Court file number(s): 	693 of 2020	
		
Jurisdiction: 	Civil 	
		
Place of delivery: 		
		
Judge(s): 	Lawry; PJ	
		
On appeal from:		
		
Order:		
		
Representation: 	Ms. N Tongarutu for the Applicants 
Mr. W Rano for the First and Second Respondent 
Mr. H Lapo for the Third Respondent 
No Appearance for the Fourth Defendant 	
		
Catchwords: 		
		
Words and phrases:		
		
Legislation cited:	Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rule 2007, r 15.3.9, r 7.11, r 11.12, r 2.2, r1.4, r 1.14, r 1.17, r 15.3.8, r 2.2, r 1.3, 	
		
Cases cited:	Sina v Matupiko [2001] SBHC 78, Van Vlymen v Levers Solomon Ltd [2021] SBCA 2, 	

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 693 of 2020

BETWEEN:

PREMIER OF GUADALCANAL PROVINCE
[Representing Guadalcanal Provincial Executive]
First Applicant

AND:

MOSES BAU
Second Applicant

AND:

ERIC KUTA
Third Applicant

AND:

VOTA KOU
Fourth Applicant

AND:

JOASH SALINI AND DAVID ROSALIO
Fifth Applicants

AND:

SINO CAPITAL (SI) LTD
[Licencee under Felling Licence No. A10762 (A & A10762(B)]
First Respondent

AND:
NEW OCEAN (SI) COMPANY LIMITED
[Contractor]
Second Respondent

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL
[Representing the Commissioner of Forests]
Third Respondent

AND:

JOHN STEWART 
[Former Deputy Provincial Secretary of Guadalcanal Provincial Govt.]
Fourth Respondent

Date of Hearing: 30 March 2021 
Date of Ruling: 25 February 2026

Counsel:
Ms. N Tongarutu for the Applicants 
Mr. W Rano for the First and Second Respondent 
Mr. H Lapo for the Third Respondent 
No Appearance for the Fourth Defendant 

Lawry; PJ
RULING 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. 	This matter first came before the Court in late December 2020 by way of an urgent ex-parte application filed in the name of the Premier of Guadalcanal Province. The application was accompanied by a certificate of urgency dated 27 December 2020, which sought interim injunctive relief restraining logging activities under certain felling licences pending further proceedings.
2. 	The orders sought in that application fell into two broad categories. First, the application sought an order under rule 15.3.9 extending time within which judicial review proceedings might be commenced. Secondly, it sought interlocutory and protective relief, including suspension of the relevant felling licences, restraint of logging operations within the Paripao Ward, and orders for an accounting of logs sold or being sold.
3. 	The materials filed in support of that application were directed to the grant of urgent interim relief only. They were framed on the basis that the orders sought were necessary to preserve the status quo while substantive proceedings were commenced.
4. 	During 2021 additional documents were placed on the file, including sworn statements responding to the interlocutory application. For example, the sworn statement of Francis Belande Sade filed on 12 May 2021 expressly addressed allegations raised in the urgent application and the circumstances said to justify interim orders.
5. 	Those documents were directed to the interlocutory dispute. They did not purport to commence substantive proceedings, nor did they set out any originating claim identifying a cause of action, relief sought, or issues for trial.
6. 	No claim for judicial review or other originating process has ever been filed in this matter. The file therefore consists solely of interlocutory materials and responses to them, unaccompanied by any substantive proceeding capable of determination.
BRIEF FACTS
7. 	The materials before the Court disclose a dispute concerning the validity of timber rights processes said to have been undertaken in or about 2007 and the legality of logging activities subsequently carried out under felling licences issued pursuant to those processes.
8. 	The Applicant contends that the timber rights process was irregular or unlawful and seeks, by interlocutory application, to restrain logging activities and obtain related relief pending the determination of the dispute.
9. 	Those assertions are directed to the merits of the underlying controversy. At this stage, however, the Court is not concerned with the substantive merits of the dispute but with the procedural status of the matter and whether there is any properly constituted proceeding before the Court capable of determination.
APPLICABLE LAW
10. 	The relief sought in the present matter engages two distinct procedural frameworks under the Civil Procedure Rules. The first concerns the proposed commencement of judicial review proceedings, including the application for an extension of time within which such proceedings might be brought. The second concerns the interlocutory and protective orders sought in relation to logging activities. The Court must therefore consider the Rules governing both the commencement of proceedings and the grant of interlocutory relief.
11. 	The first category of relief sought concerns the proposed commencement of judicial review proceedings. Judicial review invokes the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over public decision-making and is governed by Part 15.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
12. 	Rule 15.3.8 provides that a claim for a quashing order must be made within six months of the decision impugned. Rule 15.3.9 confers a discretion on the Court to extend that period where it is satisfied that substantial justice requires it. The discretion is not exercised lightly. As explained in Sina v Matupiko [2001] SBHC 78, prerogative relief is discretionary and not claimed as of right; the applicant bears the burden of accounting for delay and demonstrating that, in all the circumstances, justice is better served by permitting the late challenge to proceed than by maintaining finality. Questions of standing and timeliness therefore arise as threshold matters which must be resolved before judicial review proceedings may properly be brought.
13. 	Where extension of time is sought prior to the filing of a claim, the Court’s task is to determine whether the applicant has a sufficient interest to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction and whether the circumstances justify departure from the ordinary six-month limit. Only if those gateway requirements are satisfied can judicial review proceedings properly be commenced.
14. 	The Court now turns to the procedural framework governing the second category of relief, namely the interlocutory and protective orders sought independently of any judicial review claim. Those matters fall to be considered within the general structure of the Rules governing the commencement of proceedings. Proceedings in the High Court are ordinarily commenced by the filing of a claim. Rule 2.2 provides that, unless otherwise provided, “a proceeding is started by filing a claim.”
15. 	The filing of a claim performs a substantive procedural function. It identifies the parties, the relief sought, and the factual and legal basis for that relief. It thereby defines the controversy to be adjudicated and frames the issues for determination by the Court. Without such a document, there is ordinarily no proceeding in the sense contemplated by the Rules, but only an unformulated dispute.
16. 	The Rules nevertheless recognise that in appropriate cases relief may be sought prior to the filing of a claim. Rule 7.11 permits a person to apply for an interlocutory order before a proceeding is started, and rule 7.12 confers discretion on the Court, where such an order is made, to specify a time within which proceedings must be commenced by filing a claim.
17. 	Those provisions reflect a procedural accommodation allowing the Court to grant urgent protective relief where justice so requires, without insisting upon immediate compliance with the ordinary commencement requirements. They do not, however, alter the structural role of a claim as the instrument by which a dispute is converted into a proceeding capable of determination.
18. 	The Rules do not contemplate that interlocutory applications may indefinitely substitute for the commencement of proceedings. Temporary protective relief derives its procedural legitimacy from its relationship to substantive proceedings, whether existing or intended.
19. 	Rule 1.3 provides that the overriding objective of the Rules is to enable the Court to deal with cases justly. Rule 1.4 explains that dealing with a case justly includes ensuring proportionality, expedition, and the fair resolution of the real issues between the parties, and rule 1.5 requires the Court to give effect to that objective when exercising any power under the Rules.
20. 	The Court of Appeal has emphasised that the Rules must be interpreted purposively so as to give effect to that objective: Van Vlymen v Levers Solomon Ltd [2021] SBCA 2. The Rules are therefore not ends in themselves but instruments through which the Court administers justice.
21. 	The jurisprudence also recognises that non-compliance with the Rules is not invariably fatal. Rules 1.14 and 1.17 empower the Court to dispense with compliance, declare steps effectual or ineffectual, or otherwise manage proceedings where justice requires.
22. 	Those provisions, however, presuppose the existence, or at least the realistic prospect, of a proceeding capable of determination. They do not authorise the Court to treat interlocutory materials as a substitute for substantive proceedings indefinitely.
ANALYSIS
23. 	The Court turns to the relief sought in the urgent application. The application raises, first, the question whether judicial review proceedings may properly be commenced, in light of the request for an extension of time. That question does not of itself determine the outcome of the matter, but it bears upon the procedural footing of the remaining relief. It is therefore appropriate to address the extension of time issue first. The Court must therefore consider whether the applicant has standing, at least for the limited purpose of seeking that gateway relief.
24. 	Standing in judicial review requires that the applicant demonstrate a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the decision sought to be challenged. The requirement is applied flexibly in public law matters, but the Court must nevertheless be satisfied that the applicant is properly placed to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction.
25. 	The application is brought in the name of the Premier of Guadalcanal Province, said to be acting on behalf of the Province in relation to timber rights processes affecting land within the Province. The materials before the Court indicate that the Provincial Executive participated in, or was aware of, the relevant timber rights process at the time it occurred.
26. 	In those circumstances, the Court is prepared to assume, for the limited purpose of considering whether time should be extended, that the applicant possesses a sufficient institutional interest in the subject matter to seek that gateway relief. That assumption does not determine standing for any substantive judicial review claim.
27. 	Rule 15.3.8 requires that a claim for a quashing order be made within six months of the decision impugned. Rule 15.3.9 permits the Court to extend that period only where it is satisfied that substantial justice requires it.
28. 	The decisions now sought to be challenged arise from a timber rights process conducted in or about 2007 and the licensing decisions made thereafter. The delay in seeking judicial review is therefore measured in many years.
29. 	The materials before the Court do not establish that the relevant decisions were concealed or only recently discovered. On the contrary, they indicate that the Provincial Executive was involved in the process at the time and that the determinations formed part of the administrative record governing logging activities within the Province.
30. 	No satisfactory explanation has been provided for the lengthy delay in bringing proceedings. Nor has the Court been shown circumstances which would justify reopening decisions taken many years ago and acted upon in the interim.
31. 	In those circumstances, the Court is not satisfied that substantial justice requires the extension of time sought under rule 15.3.9. The gateway relief necessary to permit the commencement of judicial review proceedings would therefore be refused.
32. 	The refusal of an extension of time is determinative of the judicial review aspect of the application. Without such extension, no claim for judicial review can be brought and the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is not engaged.
33. 	The Court now turns to the second category of relief sought in the urgent application. Unlike the gateway matters associated with the proposed judicial review, this category consists of the interlocutory and substantive orders directed to the suspension of logging activities and related measures.
34. 	Those orders were framed as interim or ancillary relief pending the commencement and determination of judicial review proceedings. Their procedural footing therefore depends upon the existence of substantive proceedings capable of determination.
35. 	No claim has ever been filed commencing substantive proceedings in this Court.
36. 	The file reveals that what was initially lodged was an urgent interlocutory application accompanied by a certificate of urgency dated 27 December 2020 seeking ex parte injunctive relief pending “further proceedings”. Subsequent material consists of sworn statements and responses addressing that interlocutory application. None purport to commence substantive proceedings or define a cause of action or issues for trial.
37. 	None of those materials, however, purport to commence substantive proceedings. They respond to, or support, interlocutory relief. They do not set out a cause of action, define the legal basis for relief, or identify the issues to be determined at trial.
38. 	In the absence of a claim:
•	
a.	no cause of action has been pleaded;
b.	no relief has been formally sought from the Court by way of originating process;
c.	no statement of facts has been advanced as requiring proof at trial; and
d.	no issues have been framed for determination.
•	
2.	What remains before the Court therefore consists solely of interlocutory materials: a certificate of urgency, sworn statements and supporting documents. Those materials were plainly intended to support temporary protective relief pending the commencement of proceedings, but they do not themselves constitute a proceeding capable of adjudication.
•	
3.	While rule 7.11 of the Civil Procedure Rules permits the Court to entertain an interlocutory application prior to the commencement of proceedings, that provision cannot be read as displacing rule 2.2 or the pleading structure of the Rules as a whole. Rule 2.2 identifies the filing of a claim as the step by which a dispute is converted into a proceeding capable of determination. Without an originating claim, the Court does not lack jurisdiction in the abstract. Rather, it lacks a justiciable controversy framed for determination within its civil jurisdiction.
•	
4.	The documents on the file confirm that the interlocutory application was framed as a precursor to proceedings rather than as a substitute for them. The certificate of urgency itself refers to the need to preserve the status quo pending “further proceedings”, thereby recognising that substantive proceedings were intended but never commenced. 
•	
5.	To permit such an application to remain indefinitely on foot without the commencement of proceedings would allow disputes to be litigated in the absence of any defined cause of action, relief, or issues. It would effectively transform temporary interlocutory machinery into a free-standing proceeding.
•	
6.	Such an outcome would undermine the structure of the Rules and be inconsistent with the overriding objective in rule 1.3. It would neither promote the just determination of disputes nor ensure that proceedings are conducted efficiently, proportionately, or with proper identification of the real issues between the parties.
•	
7.	The Court is therefore satisfied that, notwithstanding the permissive character of rule 7.11, the absence of any claim in the present matter means that there is no proceeding capable of adjudication. The continued existence of the file serves no legitimate forensic purpose. The present conclusion does not rest on delay alone. It rests on the absence of any originating proceeding by which the dispute could be defined or determined.
•	
8.	The materials filed in this matter raise a number of substantive questions, including issues of locus standi, entitlement to seek relief on behalf of others and the legality of the administrative decisions impugned. Those are matters that ordinarily fall for determination only within properly constituted proceedings in which the cause of action, the parties, and the relief sought are clearly defined.
•	
9.	In the absence of a claim, the Court has no pleaded case against which such questions can be tested. Issues of standing, jurisdiction and entitlement to relief are not abstract questions capable of determination in isolation; they arise only in relation to a defined claim and pleaded grounds.
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10.	To attempt to resolve those matters in the present procedural posture would require the Court to determine substantive issues without any properly formulated proceeding before it. That would be inconsistent with the structure of the Civil Procedure Rules and with the Court’s duty under rule 1.3 to ensure that cases are dealt with justly and on their real issues.
•	
11.	Accordingly, any issues raised in the interlocutory materials as to standing, entitlement, or the merits of the dispute are premature. They cannot properly be resolved unless and until proceedings are commenced by the filing of a claim.
•	
12.	Nothing in this ruling determines the merits of the underlying dispute or the rights of any party in relation to the timber rights process or the licences in question. The Court determines only that no proceeding capable of adjudication has been commenced.
•	
13.	It remains open to any person with standing to commence proceedings in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules should they seek substantive relief. This order is therefore procedural in nature and does not determine any substantive right.

Conclusion
14.	For the reasons set out above, the Court has refused the application for an extension of time under rule 15.3.9. In the absence of such extension, no judicial review claim can properly be commenced.
•	
•	
15.	Further, no originating claim has in fact been filed as required by rule 2.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules commencing substantive proceedings in this Court. In consequence, there is no proceeding capable of determination within the meaning of the Rules.
•	
16.	What remains before the Court therefore consists only of interlocutory materials which, in the absence of any viable originating proceeding, do not define a cause of action, identify the relief sought, or frame issues for adjudication. The file discloses not a justiciable proceeding but an unformulated dispute.
•	
17.	In those circumstances, and having regard to the structure of the Rules, the overriding objective in rule 1.3, and the Court’s powers under rules 1.17 and 9.75 to deal with ineffective or abusive proceedings, the Court is satisfied that the matter in its present form cannot properly be determined.
•	
18.	The appropriate course is therefore to strike out the proceeding.
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ORDERS
1.	The proceeding is struck out.
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2.	The Applicant is to pay the defendants costs of the proceedings.  
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By the Court

………………………………………………..
Hon. Justice Howard Lawry
Puisne Judge