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Uma v Tuasulia [2026] SBHC 12; HCSI-CC 475 of 2025 (3 March 2026)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil case No. 475 of 2025

BETWEEN:

JACKIM UMA
First Claimant

AND:

JUK SECURITY SERVICES
Second Claimant

AND:

ALFRED TUASULIA
Defendant

Date of Hearing: 3 March 2026
Date of Ruling: 3 March 2026

Counsel

Mr J Iniga for the First and Second Claimants
Mr J To’ofilu for the Defendant

Nott; PJ

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT

Introduction

1. This is the Defendant’s application under Rule 9.75 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeking to strike out the Claim filed by the Claimants in these proceedings. The Defendant contends that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious and constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court.
2. The application is supported by the sworn statement of the Defendant together with documentary exhibits and is opposed by sworn material filed on behalf of the Claimants. The Court has also had regard to the pleadings and written submissions filed.
3. The application therefore falls to be determined on the basis of the pleadings and sworn evidence presently before the Court.

The Claim as Pleaded

4. The Statement of Claim alleges that the First Claimant conducted a security services business which was later incorporated as JUK Security Services Ltd. It is pleaded that the Defendant was engaged in the business and subsequently promoted himself as a shareholder and manager of the company.
5. The Claim further alleges that, beginning in or about 2013, the Defendant diverted payments and business opportunities away from the company into another entity, Focus Security Services Ltd, and continued to draw upon company funds without consultation.
6. The relief sought includes declarations that the First Claimant owns majority shares in the Second Claimant; declarations of breach of contractual obligations; orders that the Defendant account for contract monies said to have been payable to the Second Claimant; damages for loss of business; interest; and costs.
7. Central to the Defendant’s application is the legal status of the Second Claimant. The Defendant’s sworn statement exhibits a company extract confirming that JUK Security Services Limited was deregistered on 1 June 2014.
8. The same sworn material also exhibits a business name certificate showing that the business name “JUK Security Services” was removed from the register on 3 May 2019. No evidence has been placed before the Court suggesting that the company has been restored to the register or otherwise revived.
9. The present proceedings have been commenced many years after that deregistration.

Submissions
Summary of the Applicants Submissions

10. The Defendant applies under Rule 9.75 to strike out the Claim on several grounds. While a number of matters are raised, the Defendant’s principal and determinative contention is that the present proceeding constitutes an impermissible revival of Civil Case No. 365 of 2020, which was discontinued, contrary to Rule 9.70(a).
11. It is submitted that the current claim arises out of the same factual matrix, involves the same parties, and seeks materially the same relief as the discontinued proceeding. The Defendant argues that Rule 9.70 prohibits revival of a discontinued claim without leave of the Court, and that the Claimants have attempted to circumvent that requirement by commencing fresh proceedings under a new file number. On that basis, the Defendant contends that the present claim amounts to an abuse of process and should be struck out.
12. In addition to that primary ground, the Defendant submits that the Second Claimant, JUK Security Services Ltd, was deregistered and therefore lacks legal personality to sue, rendering the claim untenable insofar as it is brought in the company’s name.
13. The Defendant further contends that aspects of the relief sought are framed in favour of a non-existent entity and that the Statement of Claim lacks adequate particularisation of alleged diversion of contracts and monies.
14. However, the Defendant’s central submission remains that the proceeding is procedurally barred by Rule 9.70 and should be struck out on that basis alone.

Summary of respondent’s submissions

15. The Claimants oppose the application and submit that the threshold for strike-out under Rule 9.75 is a high one. They contend that the Court must assume the pleaded facts to be true and should only strike out a claim in clear and obvious cases. Reliance is placed on authorities including Fera v Ologa [2004] SBHC 24, Ben v Karena Ltd [2019] SBHC 73, and Iputu v Lasi [2014] SBHC 7, which emphasise that proceedings should not be summarily terminated where triable issues arise or where any defect is capable of cure by amendment.
16. The Claimants submit that the Statement of Claim discloses recognisable causes of action. It pleads the relationship between the First Claimant and the Defendant, their involvement in the security services business, alleged diversion of business opportunities and monies and entitlement to relief arising from those matters. These matters, it is said, raise substantive factual disputes suitable for determination at trial and cannot be characterised as frivolous or vexatious.
17. In relation to the deregistration of the Second Claimant, the Claimants submit that this does not justify striking out the entire proceeding. At most, it raises a pleading defect or issue of misdescription and the First Claimant’s personal cause of action remains intact. Any such defect, it is argued, is curable by amendment.
18. As to alleged deficiencies in particulars, the Claimants contend that issues concerning the identification of contracts or monies are matters for further and better particulars or case management directions. They emphasise that factual disputes cannot be resolved at the strike-out stage and that the Court must not prefer the Defendant’s sworn version of events over the pleaded case.
19. Finally, in relation to the earlier discontinued proceedings (Civil Case No. 365 of 2020), the Claimants submit that the discontinuance occurred without the First Claimant’s knowledge or instruction, that it does not operate as res judicata, and that the present proceedings were commenced in good faith. They deny any abuse of process and submit that the issues raised, including breach of fiduciary duty, fraud or misrepresentation, unlawful allotment of shares, unfair prejudice and passing off, are matters fit for determination at trial.

Applicable Legal Principles

20. Rule 9.75 of the Civil Procedure Rules confers a discretionary power on the Court to strike out a claim where it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise constitutes an abuse of process.
21. The jurisdiction is a summary one and must be exercised with caution. A claim will only be struck out where it is plain and obvious that it cannot succeed. The Court does not conduct a trial of disputed facts at this stage.
22. For the purposes of a strike-out application, the pleaded facts are assumed to be capable of proof unless they are inherently implausible or legally incapable of sustaining the cause of action asserted.
23. A claim will not be struck out merely because it appears weak, lacks detailed particulars, or may ultimately fail at trial. The question is whether, assuming the pleaded facts to be true, the claim discloses a legally recognisable cause of action.

Discontinuance and Abuse of Process

24. Rule 9.70(a) provides that where a claimant discontinues, the claimant may not revive the claim without leave of the Court. The Rule regulates revival of the discontinued proceeding.
25. Although discontinuance does not constitute a determination on the merits and does not give rise to res judicata, the Court must guard against procedural abuse. A claimant cannot evade procedural discipline by discontinuing proceedings and then commencing a substantially identical claim for an improper purpose.
26. Abuse of process requires more than duplication. It requires circumstances demonstrating oppression, harassment, or misuse of the Court’s procedures.

Application
Effect of Discontinuance and Rule 9.70

27. It is not disputed that Civil Case No. 365 of 2020 was commenced by the same Claimants against the same Defendant and was subsequently discontinued.
28. Rule 9.70(a) provides that where a claimant discontinues, “the claimant may not revive the claim without the leave of the court.” The Rule imposes a procedural bar against unilateral resurrection of discontinued proceedings.
29. The present proceeding, Civil Case No. 475 of 2025, is framed as a fresh claim. However, the Court is concerned with substance rather than form. A careful comparison of the Statement of Claim filed in Civil Case No. 365 of 2020 and the Statement of Claim filed in Civil Case No. 475 of 2025 demonstrates that the two proceedings arise out of the same factual matrix and advance substantially the same controversy.
30. First, the parties are materially identical. In both proceedings the First Claimant is Mr Uma (described in slightly varied spelling), the Second Claimant is JUK Security Services (or JUK Security Services Ltd), and the Defendant is Alfred Tuasulia. There is no material alteration in the alignment of parties or in the capacity in which they sue or are sued.
31. Secondly, both pleadings trace the dispute to the incorporation of JUK Security Services in 2011. Each asserts that prior to incorporation the business was operated by the First Claimant, that the Defendant was invited to manage the business, and that the Defendant subsequently promoted himself to a 50% shareholding without proper consultation or agreement.
32. Thirdly, both pleadings allege that the Defendant’s 50% shareholding was not paid up and that he contributed no capital to the company. The allegation that the First Claimant’s pre-incorporation assets were carried into the company without proper valuation appears in materially identical form in both pleadings.
33. Fourthly, both pleadings allege that from about 2012-2013 the Defendant, while in control of the Second Claimant, diverted contracts and monies to Focus Security Services (FSS), described in both pleadings as a separate entity established or controlled by the Defendant.
34. Both pleadings identify the same commercial contracts and relationships said to have been diverted, including contracts with TOLL, Solomon Airlines (Point Cruz), Panatina Plaza, Solbrew and the Forum Fisheries Agency. The pleaded allegation in each case is that contracts properly belonging to the Second Claimant were executed or administered through FSS or in the Defendant’s own name.
35. Both pleadings further allege that the Defendant exercised unilateral control over bank accounts and cheque books and excluded the First Claimant from participation in management and decision-making.
36. While the relief sought in the 2025 proceeding is framed somewhat differently, placing greater emphasis on breach of a verbal agreement and damages for loss of business, the substance of the relief remains directed to the same alleged wrongdoing: namely, the Defendant’s alleged wrongful assumption of shareholding, diversion of corporate opportunities, and misappropriation of company income.
37. The earlier proceeding sought declarations concerning majority shareholding, accounting for contract monies payable to the Second Claimant, and damages arising from alleged financial impropriety. The present proceeding seeks declarations of breach, damages for loss of business, interest and costs. Although the language differs, both claims are directed to redress the same alleged diversion of business and corporate control. The core factual allegations, the alleged misconduct, the time period relied upon, the commercial entities involved, and the underlying dispute between the parties are materially indistinguishable.
38. The present claim does not introduce a new transaction, new wrongful act, or materially different cause of action. Rather, it re-pleads the same controversy in modified form. In those circumstances, the Court is satisfied that Civil Case No. 475 of 2025 is, in substance, the same claim as that advanced in Civil Case No. 365 of 2020. In substance, the present proceeding seeks to pursue the same controversy advanced in Civil Case No. 365 of 2020.
39. Rule 9.70 is not a mere technical formality. It reflects a deliberate procedural discipline. Once proceedings are discontinued, the Rules do not permit the claimant unilaterally restore the same controversy to the Court’s docket at will. A claimant cannot evade that discipline by changing the file number and re-pleading, in slightly altered language, what is in substance the same claim. To permit such a course would reduce Rule 9.70 to an empty gesture and deprive it of practical effect.
40. The Court is concerned with substance rather than form. Where a fresh proceeding advances materially the same parties, the same factual foundation, the same alleged wrongdoing, and substantially the same relief, it is not meaningfully distinct from the discontinued claim. It is, in truth, an attempt to revive it.
41. The proper course, if the Claimants wished to continue to pursue that controversy, was to apply for leave to revive the discontinued proceeding in accordance with Rule 9.70(a). That mechanism exists to ensure that the Court retains control over whether and on what terms a discontinued claim may be restored. No such application was made.
42. The present proceeding, being in substance a resurrection of Civil Case No. 365 of 2020 without leave of the Court, is inconsistent with the scheme of Rule 9.70. The Court cannot allow its processes to be used in that manner. The commencement of this proceeding therefore amounts to an impermissible revival of a discontinued claim.
43. In light of that conclusion, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine the remaining grounds advanced in support of the strike-out application. The finding that the present proceeding constitutes an impermissible revival of a discontinued claim is dispositive of the application.
44. For completeness, the Court notes that separate issues were raised concerning the deregistration of the Second Claimant and the adequacy of particularisation. Those matters need not be finally determined given the conclusion reached under Rule 9.70. Nothing in this ruling should be taken as expressing a concluded view on those issues beyond what has been stated.
45. The appropriate course is therefore to strike out the proceeding in its entirety.
46. For the avoidance of doubt, this ruling does not determine the substantive merits of the dispute between the parties. It determines only that the present proceeding has been commenced in a manner contrary to Rule 9.70.
47. Nothing in this decision prevents the Claimants, if so advised, from applying for leave under Rule 9.70(a) to revive Civil Case No. 365 of 2020. Whether such leave ought to be granted, and upon what terms, would be a matter for the Court to determine upon proper application.
48. The Court’s function is to enforce the procedural discipline imposed by the Rules. That discipline requires leave before a discontinued claim may be revived. It does not foreclose the possibility of revival where the interests of justice so require.

Orders

1. The Claim filed in Civil Case No. 475 of 2025 is struck out.
2. The Respondent are to pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.
3. For the avoidance of doubt, this order does not determine the substantive merits of the dispute between the parties.
4. Nothing in this ruling prevents the Claimants, if so advised, from applying for leave pursuant to Rule 9.70(a) to revive Civil Case No. 365 of 2020.

By the Court
Hon. Justice Gina Maree Nott
Puisne Judge