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Salini v Douglas [2025] SBHC 75; HCSI-CC 199 of 2024 (29 May 2025)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 199 of 2024

BETWEEN:

GABRIEL SALINI
Petitioner

AND:

CHOYLIN YIM DOUGLAS
First Respondent

AND:

THE RETURNING OFFICER FOR NGELLA CONSTITUENCY
Second Respondent

AND:

ROBERT DAONGA
(Presiding Officer for Haroro Polling Station)
Third Respondent

Date for Hearing: 20-21, 25 February 2025, 22-23 April 2025, 26 May 2025
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2025

Mr G Suri for the Petitioner
Mr B Titiulu for the First Respondent
Ms F Fakarii for the Second and Third Respondent

JUDGMENT

AULANGA; PJ:

1. On 17^th April 2024, registered voters in Solomon Islands went to poll to cast their votes. Ngella Constituency is one of the electorates for voting. The Petitioner and the First Respondent, together with other 5 were candidates contesting for that electorate. The First Respondent was declared the winning candidate, having polled 4,255 votes. The Petitioner was the runner up candidate with 2,699 votes. A significant margin of 1,556 votes were cast in favour of the First Respondent.
2. Aggrieved with the result, the Petitioner filed the petition at the High Court on 30^th May 2024, which was later amended on 30^th September 2024. The Amended Election Petition (AEP) becomes the subject of this proceeding.
3. There are four electoral allegations in the AEP. Allegations one, two and three relate to corrupt and illegal practices of bribery, contrary to section 126(1) (a)-(b) (i)-(ii) of the Electoral Act 2018.
4. The first allegation is said to have occurred on 2^nd April 2024 at night, where Reginald Douglas, the husband, campaigner and agent of the First Respondent gave $500 to the Psalms Ministry in the prayer house at Boroheinamba village in Big Ngella with the intention of influencing the voting members of the Ministry to vote for the First Respondent and to refrain from voting any other candidates.
5. The Second allegation concerns an incident that occurred on 4^th April 2024 at about 10:00am at Rara village in Big Ngella where the First Respondent and her assistant Yvonne gave $300 to Philip Takosi with a piece of paper, which Philip Takosi then shared the money with the voters with the intention of influencing the voters to vote for the First Respondent and to refrain from voting other candidates.
6. The third allegation is said to have occurred on 16^th April 2024 at the same Boroheinamba village where the Chairman of the Psalms Children Healing Ministry made an announcement that the First Respondent would build a chapel for their Ministry. That announcement was made with the intention of influencing the members of the Ministry to vote for the First Respondent.
7. In the fourth and final allegation, the Petitioner alleges that on 17^th April 2024, an agent and strong supporter of the First Respondent by the name of Chief John Steel Kelo had interfered with the voting of many voters at Haroro Polling Station against their wish and will, and this includes pulling one voter named Brown Sade from queue of voters and led him to the Polling Station for verification, inking, receiving of ballot paper and directed him to tick the box of the First Respondent against his wish and will. The Petitioner alleges that this was done in the presence of the presiding officer and other electoral officers without their intervention contrary to section 121(a) of the Electoral Act.
8. The Petitioner therefore seeks the Court to declare the election of the First Respondent null and void with consequential orders for a bye- election for the Ngella Constituency and further, for referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions for criminal prosecutions, and for costs.
9. During the course of the trial, the First Respondent filed an application to strike out the AEP on the sole ground of non-compliance to Rule 6 (1) (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019. That is, the failure of the Petitioner to clearly identify all the Respondents together with their usual or last known address. Given the mandatory nature of Rule 6 (1) (e), it is the case of the First Respondent that the AEP should be entirely dismissed. This application was supported by the Second and Third Respondents.
10. I prefer to consider the strike out application, together with the substantive petition on the grounds as contained in the AEP at the same time, given the Court’s preference to receive all the evidence adduced by the parties during the trial.
11. In deciding this case, I am conscious of the trite standard of proof required for an election petition case, to be higher than the civil standard but lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding, as held in Maetia v Dausabea [1993] SBHC 29; Tegavota v Bennett [1983] SILR 34 and Bae v Ramofafia [2019] SBHC 89.
12. A total of 11 witnesses called by the Petitioner, 14 witnesses by the First Respondent and 2 witnesses by the Second and Third Respondents. Those witnesses gave evidence on oath at the trial. The entirety of their evidence was considered, together with all the materials filed in the proceeding.
13. Rather than to restate the respective parties’ evidence, which had been duly considered, I prefer to go straight to the findings based on the evidence before the Court.

First incident - corrupt and illegal practices of bribery Reginald Douglas (agent of the First Respondent) on 2nd April 2024 at Boroheinamba village, Big Ngella

14. For this ground, the allegation is that on 2^nd April 2024 at night at the Boroheinamba village in Big Ngella that Reginald Douglas, the husband, campaigner and agent of the First Respondent gave $500 to the Psalms Ministry in the prayer house at Boroheinamba village in Big Ngella with the intention of influencing the voting members of the Ministry to vote for the First Respondent and to refrain from voting any other candidates. There is no dispute that Reginald Douglas was the husband of the First Respondent at the material time and was part of the campaign team of the First Respondent to Boroheinamba village. This evidence is uncontested. The question is whether he can be considered as an agent of the First Respondent.
15. Section 108 (8) of the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2023 defines an "agent" as including a polling agent, a counting agent, and any person acting on behalf of a candidate during that candidate’s campaign. This broad definition in my view encompasses individuals who assist in various capacities during the election process. While the Act does not explicitly mention spouses, the inclusive language may suggest that a spouse can serve as an agent if they are acting on behalf of the candidate during the campaign. In this case, there is no dispute that Reginald Douglas was the supporter of his wife, the First Respondent. However, that does not make him an agent of the First Respondent.
16. In Wilson Maemae v Namson Tran Civil Case No. 192 of 2024, a case referred to by counsel Titiulu for the First Respondent, Palmer CJ made these clarifications on the issue of agency that must be proven with cogent evidence, and this must be distinguished from a mere supporter:
    • “36. It is crucial to note that allegations of agency, particularly in the context of alleged corrupt payments, carry significant legal implications. Establishing an agency relationship requires more than demonstrating that an individual engaged in campaign activities or supported a candidate.
    • 37. The Court has consistently held that mere involvement in a candidate’s campaign – such as distributing materials, assisting with logistical task, or acting as a supporter – does not in itself establish an agency relationship. Agency is a distinct relationship that entails a defined scope of authority, accountability, and control in managing election-related activities.”
17. Based on the above authority, in this case, being the husband of the First Respondent and involving in campaigning activities on behalf of the First Respondent in the legal sense does not automatically render Reginald Douglas to be the agent of the First Respondent. Hence, I am not satisfied that the evidence has established that Reginald Douglas as the agent of the First Respondent for the purpose of establishing liability on principal -agency relationship for this ground.
18. Furthermore, in Lusibaea v Filualea [2020] SBHC 28, Higgins J clearly stated that it is important for the Petitioner to prove that the purported corrupt or illegal practice to void the election must be authorised by the principal of the agent. Mere accusation is insufficient to say that the principal should be held liable for the mischief committed by the agent. The Court further went to state that even an adverse inference cannot be drawn upon an allegation based on insufficient evidence.
19. For this ground, these witnesses named Dorothy Kelo, Margaret Nester Tarai, Bethlyn Poke were material for the survival of the Petitioner’s case. Unfortunately, their respective evidence is fundamentally deficient on a number of crucial aspects. First, none of them said that when Reginald Douglas gave the money that night, he explicitly asked the congregation to vote for the First Respondent in return for the money given. Instead, their evidence only established that the purpose of giving the money was to support their ministry and not relating to their decision on voting. In my view, this has fallen short of proving the allegation of corruption and bribery brought under section 126 (1) (a)-(b) (i)-(ii) of the Electoral Act 2018. The element of the ‘intent to influence the voters and the decision on their voting’ in connection with the giving of the money was clearly absent on evidence. Second, none of the witnesses had stated that the giving of the money by Reginald Douglas to the Psalms Ministry in the prayer house at Boroheinamba village that night was authorised by the First Respondent. Even if an adverse inference can be drawn on the basis of the spousal relationship between the Reginald Douglas and the First Respondent, the entirety of the evidence adduced by the Petitioner is circumstantially deficient for the Court to draw such inference. There were no admissions made by the First Respondent and or her witnesses on those crucial matters. Instead, the acceptable and unchallenged evidence establishes that the money was Douglas’ own or personal money given to the ministry based on his history as an active supporter of the church.
20. It does not matter whether the money was given during the day or night to the congregation, or the type of church prayer that occurred, or whether the money given was outside of the usual time for collection of offerings. These are peripheral matters that do not assist in the proof of the allegation for this ground. The act of election bribery in general terms requires the act of giving of the money or goods has to be accompanied with spoken words for the receiver to do a return favour by voting for a candidate named in the bribery transaction. The influence upon the decision of voting is materialised when the receiver votes for that candidate.
21. Based on the authority of Lusibaea v Filualea (supra) and the above reasons, this allegation must fail.

Second incident - corrupt and bribery incident on 4th April 2024 by First Respondent and her assistant Yvonne at Rara village, Big Ngella

22. For this allegation, the Petitioner alleges that on 4^th April 2024 at about 10:00am at Rara village in Big Ngella, the First Respondent and her assistant Yvonne gave $300 to Philip Takosi with a piece of paper whereby Philip Takosi then shared the money to the voters with the intention of influencing the voters to vote for the First Respondent and to refrain from voting other candidates. The only material evidence to prove this allegation comes from Noel Miki.
23. It is expected that for this ground, there must be evidence showing the First Respondent, together with her assistant Yvonne, gave the $300 to Philip Takosi with clear instructions for him to buy voters. There must be clear evidence to show that, as a result of the money received, they voted for the First Respondent at the polling day. The evidence must be clear and unambiguous in order to ground a case under section 126 (1) (a)-(b) (i)-(ii) of the Electoral Act 2018.
24. In any event, the evidence of Noel Miki given during the trial is of little value when considering that against the evidence of Philip Takosi. First, it is unclear from Miki’s evidence whether he saw and heard the First Respondent expressly said that the money given to Yvonne and subsequently to Takosi was for the purpose of buying or bribing the voters. Second, there is no evidence from Miki to prove that, as a result of the money given and received, certain identified number of voters had voted for the First Respondent at the polling day. His evidence was clothed with uncertainty so much so that even the identity of Yvonne was only established through hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible.
25. When considering his evidence, the evidence of Takosi that the money given was for those who prepared food for the First Respondent’s campaign must be preferred. This is consistent with Miki’s evidence that the money was only distributed to the women. This must mean that the money was given purposely for the women who had prepared the food for the First Respondent’s campaign team, and not for the purpose of bribing them for their votes.
26. In any event, the entirety of Miki’s evidence has fallen short of establishing any act of corruption and bribery in the realm of election proscribed under section 126 (1)(a)-(b)(i)-(ii) of the Electoral Act 2018. Significantly, Takosi, as the receiver of the money and the one claimed to be instrumental of giving or distributing the money to the voters as a means of buying their votes, has denied the evidence given by Miki. Given this significant flaw in the Petitioner’s witness, this ground is dismissed.

Third incident – promise of a chapel by Chairman of Psalms Children Healing Ministry on 16th April 2024 at Boroheinamba village, Big Ngella

27. For this allegation, the Petitioner alleges that on 16^th April 2024 at the same Boroheinamba village where the Chairman of the Psalms Children Healing Ministry made an announcement that the First Respondent would build a chapel for their Ministry. That announcement was made with the intention of influencing the members of the Ministry to vote for the First Respondent.
28. The Petitioner relies on the evidence of Margaret Nestor Tarai, Dorothy Kelo and Bethlyn Poke. The only relevant evidence seemed to be excessively relied upon for this ground was the announcement made by Michael Seleni that the First Respondent would build a chapel for their congregation if she is successful in the national general election. There was nothing further given by the witnesses to say that Seleni also induced them to vote for the First Respondent at the time of making the announcement. Further, there were no further evidence to prove that, as a result of the announcement, a specified number of the congregational members had voted against their choice and will for the First Respondent.
29. Whilst the rebuttal evidence of Michael Seleni is noted, I am not satisfied that this ground is made out for two reasons. First, there is no evidence to prove that Michael Seleni at the material time, was an agent of the First Respondent as required by Wilson Maemae v Namson Tran (supra). In the absence of such evidence, the First Respondent cannot be held liable to any mischief or corrupt activities committed by Michael Seleni. Second, there is no evidence to prove that the First Respondent had authorised the making of the announcement said to have had an influence on the decision on voting of the members of the Psalms Children Healing Ministry as required in Lusibaea v Filualea (supra). There is a complete absence of any corrupt dealing between the First Respondent and Michael Seleni. The net effect of this is that, Michael Seleni could have gone on his own way to make the announcement which somehow misinterpreted by the Petitioner’s witnesses. Based on those reasons, there is no evidentiary basis to support this allegation and it must be dismissed accordingly.

Fourth incident – interfering with voting on 17th April 2024 at Haroro village

30. For this final allegation, it is the case for the Petitioner that on 17^th April 2024, Chief John Steel Kelo as agent and strong supporter of the First Respondent had interfered with voting of many voters at Haroro Polling Station against their wish and will. This includes pulling of one voter named Brown Sade from queue of voters and led him to the Polling Station for verification, inking, receiving of ballot paper and directed him to tick the box of the First Respondent contrary to his wish and will. The Petitioner says that this was done in the presence of the presiding officer and other electoral officers without their interception or intervention, contrary to section 121(a) of the Electoral Act 2018.
31. Section 121 (a) of the Electoral Act 2018 states:
    • “121. A person commits an offence if the person, without lawful authority:
    • (a) interferes with an elector who is casting his or her vote;”
32. The Electoral Act 2018 does not provide any definition for ‘interfere’. Hence, I adopt the definition of “interfere” as defined in Collins Concise Dictionary, referred to by Mr. Suri, to mean “to interpose esp. meddlesomely or unwarrantedly; intervene.” In Webster’s Dictionary means “to interpose, to intermeddle, to enter into or take a part in the concerns of others”. The combined definition from these two sources in effect means, to interfere is to enter or intermeddle in the affairs of others, often in an unwanted or meddlesome way. Translating the meaning to section 121 (a) of the Electoral Act 2018, it is reasonable to say that it refers to any unauthorized action or conduct that obstructs, disrupts, manipulates, or improperly influences a voter during the actual process of voting.
33. The Petitioner relies on the sworn statements and evidence of Charles Kairi, Benjamin Lelo, John Sala, John Buto, Andrew Willie Logobu and Brown Sade. In response to this allegation, the First Respondent relied on the sworn statement and evidence of John Steel Kelo, John Bole, Charles Vuda and John Vuda. The Second and Third Respondents relied on the sworn statement and evidence of Nathaniel Salini and Robert Daoga.
34. At the outset, there was a submission made by the Second and Third Respondents on whether the consequences of interference with voting can automatically nullify the result of the election, as required for electoral offences in section 129 (a)–(c) of the Electoral Act 2018. Whilst the gravamen of the submission is noted, it is to be noted that this proceeding is commenced by way of a civil petition hearing which is different from a criminal proceeding. The offences with the prescribed penalties are only applicable for criminal prosecution of the electoral offences and not for civil proceeding. With the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2023, it now clarifies that section 108 (6) obliges the Court to declare the election void if a corrupt or illegal practice was committed in connection with the candidate elected or that person’s agent. Hence, the allegation in section 121 (a) depends on the proof of the corrupt or illegal practice and its magnitude, a ground to void the election of a candidate.
35. The essence of Sade’s evidence is that he was pulled by John Steel Kelo from the queue of voters to go to the verifier, then to the ballot paper issuer, to the ballot ticking table and finally to the ballot box for voting. He said that he was forced by John Steel Kelo to vote for the First Respondent. Otherwise, he would have voted differently.
36. This was denied by John Steel Kelo, who stated that he was approached by Sade at the material time but he directed him to the officers responsible for verifying and issuing of ballot papers. The assertion that he accompanied Sade eventually to the ballot box was denied by John Bole, Charles Vuda and John Vuda. Even Robert Daoga did not see the purported interference with voting. If there was such a complaint, he, as the Presiding Officer, would have known and made a report.
37. When considering Sade’s evidence and together with the other witnesses’ evidence regarding this allegation, I am not satisfied that Sade’s voting or his decision on voting was interfered with by John Steel Kelo. If there was any undue influence or force exerted upon Sade, other voters could have seen and heard what had occurred, considering the queue of many voters and their proximity to each other. Further, if Sade’s voting has been interfered with, it is expected that Sade would have easily reported that incident to the electoral officials at the material time so that the complaint can be documented for court proceedings. That did not occur which is unfortunate.
38. I also find that if that had actually occurred, Charles Kairi would have reported that to the Electoral Officials without delay. The act of forcefully pulling a person from the queue of voters or under undue influence and eventually to the ballot box is not a small thing. It is a serious mischief that warrants an immediate reaction from the crowd of voters which could be easily brought to the attention of the Electoral Officials. The absence of this must mean that the explanations given by John Steel Kelo, John Bole, Charles Vuda, John Vuda and Robert Daoga are accepted.
39. Even if there was an interference with voting, which is denied, the evidence is crystal clear that this was not authorised by the First Respondent so that she could be held liable for the mischief of John Steel Kelo based on the principle of agency. Premised on those reasons, this ground is dismissed.

Failure to comply with Rule 6 (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019

40. There is also a fundamental issue on whether this proceeding should be dismissed, as argued in the First Respondent’s application to strike out the AEP. The application relates to the Petitioner’s noncompliance with Rule 6 (1) (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019. That is, the failure of the Petitioner to clearly identify the respondent or respondents to the petition together with their usual or last known address as required under Rule 6 (1)(e).
41. In the AEP, the Petitioner put “To: All the Respondents” in the Content and Form of the Petition. Undoubtedly, by putting only “To: All the Respondents” in the petition, the Petitioner has failed to “Clearly identify the respondent or respondents to the petition together with their usual or last known address” as mandatorily required under Rule 6 (1) (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019. In my view, this is a fundamental breach given the mandatory terms of Rule 6 (1) (e).
42. The issue of noncompliance with Rule 6 (1)(e) has been conclusively decided by the High Court and further amplified by way of confirmation by the Court of Appeal (see: in Dettke v Sade [2025] SBHC 9, Koli v Tovosia and others Civil Case No. 191 of 2024, and more recently in Tovosia v Koli [2025] SBCA 5).
43. In Dettke v Sade (supra), at paragraph 40, Lawry J made these statements when dismissing the petition due to noncompliance with Rule 6 (1)(e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019:
    • “40. I consider that as the allegations against an elected official are of election corruption there is a public interest in having allegations brought to light. There is also a public interest in making sure that when such serious allegations are made there is strict compliance with the prescribed rules. A decision that compliance with the rule is necessary is not one that causes significant disruption to the public. I therefore come back to the failure to comply with rule 6(1) (e) and conclude that I must still look at the words of the rule. I conclude that because of the clear requirement with no apparent discretion for non-compliance, the intention behind the rule must be that non-compliance with the rule would make the petition invalid”.
44. In Koli v Tovosia and others (supra), an election petition case that was dismissed due to noncompliance with Rule 6 (1)(d) and (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019, this Court, at paragraphs 12 – 15, expressed as follows:
    • “12. By failing to include the particulars required in Rule 6 (1) (d) and (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019, it therefore renders all the petitions filed in this proceeding inherently deficient as to the address of the jurisdiction for service of the petition(s), the contact details of the Petitioner or his advocate, the clear identification of all the Respondents to the proceeding and the usual or last addresses of the Respondents being named in the proceeding. This omission is fatal and goes to the validity of the petition itself which in turn linked to the question of whether this Court has the authority to hear and decide on an invalid petition, as decided in Ramoli v Electoral Commission [2024] SBHC 101, Dettke v Sade [2025] SBHC 9 and more fundamentally, by the Court of Appeal in Tovosia v Koli (supra).
    • 13. More importantly for this matter is the binding explanation and interpretation by the Court of Appeal in Tovosia v Koli (supra) for this present proceeding regarding the noncompliance with Rule 6 (1)(e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019. In that case, the Court of Appeal, at paragraphs 117 to 118, states:
      • “117. There is one other issue to raise. This issue was raised in court during the hearing. It is an issue that goes to the competency of the petition. The issue relates to the mandatory requirements of Rule 6 of the EPA Rules, 2019 and relates to – Contents and form of election petitions. The pertinent part of the Rule is 6 (1) (e). The Rule is in these terms: -
      • (1) An election petition shall-
        • (a) –
        • (b) –
        • (c) –
        • (d) –
        • (e) Clearly identify the respondent or respondents to the petition together with their usual or last known address.
    • 118. The significance of this Rule relates to service of an election petition and other related documents on the respondents to the petition. In the petition the First Respondent, simply stated – “To: All the Respondents”. This to me is a fundamental breach of Rule 6 (1) (e), which governs and regulates the election petitions and the breach of which must affect the competency of the petition, and it is a matter that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court has the duty to apply Rule (1) (e) as intended.”
    • 14. In my view, and as earlier alluded to, despite the issue on the noncompliance of Rule 6 (1) (e) was not the subject the appeal, the above statements made by the Court were binding and authoritative statements that settled any contrary arguments on Rule 6 (1) (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019.
    • 15. Given the Court of Appeal has ruled that simply addressing the petition “To: All the Respondents” without specifying who they are and their addresses is a fundamental breach, this noncompliance in my view therefore undermines the entire process and the validity of this proceeding. The effect of it therefore is that since Rule 6 (1) (d) and (e) regulate procedural steps necessary for the Court’s jurisdiction; the Petitioner’s noncompliance to the Rule now affects the petition’s competency. This is a fundamental and jurisdictional breach that this Court must act strictly to safeguard its processes from being abused given the mandatory nature of the Rule. The Court has no jurisdiction to proceed to trial unless the requirements are met”.
45. The undisputed facts in this case shows that the Petitioner filed the petition on 30^th May 2024. The Petitioner only put: “To: All the Respondents” in the Content and Form of the Petition. On 30^th September 2024 and by leave of the Court, the Petitioner filed the AEP. Again, the Petitioner repeated the same words in the Content and Form of the AEP. This remains the case until the hearing of the application to strike out the AEP.
46. Based on the above facts and the legal binding principles, there is no doubt that this is a fundamental breach as it goes to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the AEP as authoritatively held by the Court of Appeal in Tovosia v Koli (supra). That is, as alluded to, the Petitioner’s failure to comply with Rule 6 (1) (e) of the Electoral Act Petition Rules 2019 which is fatal to the survival of this proceeding. Therefore, there is no discretion left to this Court to condone such omission or to find ways to bypass this mandatory requirement and it must follow that this is also one of the grounds that this entire proceeding must be dismissed forthwith.

Orders of the Court

1. The petition in the Amended Election Petition filed on 30^th September 2024 is dismissed.
2. A certificate confirming the validity of Honourable Choylin Yim Douglas as duly elected member for Ngella Constituency to be issued to (i) the Governor-General of Solomon Islands, (ii) the Speaker of the National Parliament of Solomon Islands and (iii) the Electoral Commission.
3. Costs of the hearing to be paid by the Petitioner to all the Respondents on a standard basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

THE COURT
Hon. Justice Augustine Sylver Aulanga
PUISNE JUDGE