HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Case name: 	Gaveregolomo v Misiava	
		
Citation:		
		
Date of decision: 	10 December 2025	
		
Parties: 	Luke Gaveregolomo v Michael Misiava, Patudoka Enterprise Limited, Pacific Everest Lumber Limited, Choiseul Provincial Executive 	
		
Date of hearing: 	10 December 2025	
		
Court file number(s): 	463 of 2025	
		
Jurisdiction: 	Civil 	
		
Place of delivery: 		
		
Judge(s): 	Nott; PJ	
		
On appeal from:		
	(a) 	The Amended Claim filed on 27 November 2025 is struck out in its entirety pursuant to r 9.75(b) of the Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 on the basis that it does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and that the High Court’s jurisdiction is not enlivened.
(b) 	The proceeding is dismissed.
(c) 	Costs of the application are awarded to the First, Second and Third Defendants.
(d) 	For avoidance of doubt, nothing in these Orders prevents any party from pursuing the resolution of customary issues through the processes and jurisdictions prescribed by the Land and Titles Act (Cap 133) and the Local Courts Act (Cap 19).	
Order:		
		
Representation: 	Mr R Sanga for the Claimant 
Mr J Duddley for the First, Second and Third Defendant 
Ms P Refota for the Fourth Defendant 	
		
Catchwords: 		
		
Words and phrases:		
		
Legislation cited:	Land and Titles Act S 254 [cap 133], S 254 (1), 
Constitution of Solomon Islands 1978, S 77 (1)
Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rule 2007, r 9.75, r 9.75 (c), r 9.75 (b)
Local Court Act S 12 (2) – (3)	
		
Cases cited:	Daiwo v Lano [2011] SBHC 15, Riumana v Manegere [2025] SBCA 8, Sa'oghatoga v Mugaba Atoll Resources Company [2015] SBCA 4	

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 463 of 2025

BETWEEN: 

LUKE GAVEREGOLOMO
[Chief who representing 3 tribes of Mavara Concession]
Claimant

AND: 

MICHAEL MISIAVA 
First Defendant

AND: 

PATUDOKA ENTERPRISE LIMITED
[License holder A102132]
Second Defendant

AND: 

PACIFIC EVEREST LUMBER LIMITED 
Third Defendant

AND: 

CHOISEUL PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE 
Fourth Defendant

Date of Hearing: 10 December 2025
Date of Ruling: 10 December 2025

Counsel;

Mr R Sanga for the Claimant 
Mr J Duddley for the First, Second and Third Defendant 
Ms P Rofeta for the Fourth Defendant 

Nott; PJ
RULING ON APPLICATION FOR STRIKE OUT 
Background
1. 	On 1 October 2025 a Statement of Claim was filed, later amended on 27 November 2025. A subsequent application was then brought seeking that the claim be struck out on the basis that it does not disclose any reasonable cause of action.
2. 	The Claimants represent themselves and their tribal members of Mavara concession area, and are customary land owners at Mavara.
3. 	The First Defendant is one of the identified timber right grantors for Mavara Customary land pursuant to Form 11 certificate of customary ownership dated 1st February 2022. The First Defendant was a chief and represents his tribal members of Marava customary land /concession area.
4. 	The Second Defendant is the holder of felling license A1011723 that covers Mavara customary land that contracted the third defendant through a Technology and Management Agreement dated 12th August 2023 to conduct logging operation on areas covered by felling license A1011723.
5. 	Today, Counsel for the Claimant sought a further adjournment on the basis that the Claimant has now sworn an additional statement in support of the amended claim and requires time for its consideration. Both counsel appearing for the Applicants in the strike out application objected. They submit that the Court has already extended considerable courtesy to the Claimant, including granting an adjournment on the last occasion and permitting the filing of the Amended Claim on 27 November 2025.
6. 	Counsel for the defendants further emphasise that there are already six sworn statements filed in support of the Claimant’s case, which together set out the factual matters relied upon. In their submission, the Claimant has had ample opportunity to place before the Court all material considered necessary to resist the present strike-out application. To allow a further adjournment at this stage would, they argue, operate unfairly to the defendants, who have diligently prepared their arguments and sworn statements in reliance on the procedural timetable set by the Court and who now face ongoing prejudice through delay, uncertainty, and the continued pendency of what they say is a fundamentally defective claim.
7. 	Counsel submit that the Claimant’s late attempt to introduce a new sworn statement, after amendments have been allowed and after the defendants have filed complete submissions, appears to be another attempt to shift or supplement the factual basis of the claim, and that the Court should not permit a party to extend the litigation in this manner without compelling justification. They argue that no such justification has been shown. The proposed evidence is neither said to be newly discovered nor unavailable with reasonable diligence prior to the earlier adjournment. Accordingly, the Defendants contend that the interests of justice and the efficient administration of the Court’s process now weigh heavily against any further adjournment.
8. 	I observe that jurisdiction is a primary matter that counsel ought to consider before commencing proceedings in the High Court. While the Court recognises that, in some cases, new information may arise during litigation that alters or clarifies jurisdictional foundations, this is not such a case. The jurisdictional issues here were apparent from the outset and have been the subject of submissions. The late filing of a further sworn statement does not alter the central difficulty confronting the Claimant, namely, the absence of any legally recognised determination of customary ownership capable of enlivening this Court’s jurisdiction. In those circumstances, and given the procedural history already outlined, the Court is not satisfied that a further adjournment would serve any legitimate purpose.
Application 
9. 	Although the matter was listed for hearing of the strike-out application, upon review of the material before the Court it became apparent that a threshold issue concerning jurisdiction arose. Counsel were contacted by the Court and advised of the issue, and were requested to provide submissions specifically addressing whether and how the jurisdiction of the High Court is enlivened in the circumstances of this proceeding and to be prepared to address the court on this threshold issue before the strike out application.
10. 	In light of that development, the jurisdictional issue was required to be heard and determined as a preliminary matter before the strike-out application could properly be considered. The First, Second and Third Defendants seek that the Amended Claim filed on 27 November 2025 be struck out pursuant to r 9.75 on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious, and constitutes an abuse of the Court’s process. They further submit that the Claimant has no locus standi.
Jurisdiction
11. 	Counsel for the Claimant submits that there is a dispute as to the ownership of Mavara land. The Defendants adopt a different position. They contend that there is no dispute over ownership at all; rather, they characterise the disagreement as one arising between the acknowledged owners concerning the use to which the land is being put, not a dispute about ownership of the land itself. On their view, the Claimant’s objections relate to the manner in which the timber rights process has been exercised, not to any competing assertion of customary ownership.
12. 	Whatever the correct characterisation, the controversy as presented by both sides plainly arises “in connection with” customary land. Whether the dispute concerns ownership, or the authority of those entitled to exercise rights over the land, it necessarily engages the statutory jurisdictional framework governing customary land in Solomon Islands. In either case, ownership or authority, jurisdiction is triggered.
13. 	The Claimant’s case is that neither the First nor the Second Defendants hold customary title to Mavara. He states that the lands of Mavara, Pasuni and Suaku were historically divided among three brothers, Koloma, Dokara and Nasanasa, and that he is descended from Koloma through his late father. On that basis he asserts that he is the rightful descendant and customary landowner. He further submits that, if the Defendants now assert ownership, these proceedings should be stayed pending resolution of the matter by the Tavula Kolara Council of Chiefs.
14. 	The Defendants, by contrast, maintain that the First Defendant was a recognised chief and trustee of Mavara, and that they possessed, at the relevant time, proper authority to conduct operations on the land pursuant to the forest licensing regime. Both positions rest upon questions of customary history, lineage, authority and usage, precisely the matters that Parliament has assigned to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Local Court under s 254 of the Land and Titles Act (Cap 133).
15. 	Section 254(1) of the Land and Titles Act confers upon the Local Court exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil matters “affecting or arising in connection with customary land.” A determination of the Local Court on such matters is final and conclusive, subject only to appeal to the Customary Land Appeal Court under s 256, and thereafter to the High Court on questions of law or procedure. It follows that the High Court has no original jurisdiction to determine ownership, use, boundaries or rights of occupation over customary land, nor may it adjudicate any rights that depend upon resolution of those matters.
16. 	Counsel for the defendant referred the Court to Daiwo v Lano [2011] SBHC 15, where the High Court reaffirmed that a claim alleging trespass or other relief concerning customary land cannot succeed unless the claimant first proves customary ownership on the balance of probabilities. Ownership is an essential element of standing. The Court also confirmed that while a Timber Rights Determination or timber rights agreement under the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act is not conclusive proof of ownership, it remains evidence that may contradict an otherwise unproven claim. Critically, Daiwo reiterates that the High Court has no jurisdiction to determine customary ownership in the first instance; that function lies exclusively with the Local Court. Unless ownership is established through the statutory processes, any claim dependent on customary title must fail.
17. 	Consistent with that reasoning, counsel for the Defendants submit that the present dispute “clearly concerns custom,” and I accept that characterisation. The competing assertions about lineage, tribal authority, the identity of trustees, and the historical allocation of Mavara land arise directly from, and depend upon, customary law and customary tenure.
18. 	As reaffirmed in Daiwo v Lano, questions of customary ownership are foundational. No claim for trespass or related relief can succeed unless ownership is first proved, and the High Court has no jurisdiction to determine ownership of customary land in the first instance. Section 254 of the Land and Titles Act gives exclusive original jurisdiction to the Local Court, and only after compliance with the processes in s 12 of the Local Courts Act. Where, as here, the dispute concerns custom and no statutory determination has been made, the High Court cannot proceed to determine rights dependent upon that unresolved customary question.
19. 	Counsel also referred to Riumana v Manegere [2025] SBCA 8, which confirms that while the High Court has general jurisdiction under s 77(1) of the Constitution, matters involving custom, including tribal authority, internal governance and issues connected with customary land, must be resolved in the courts of custom established by Parliament. Section 254 of the Land and Titles Act cannot be circumvented by seeking declaratory or other relief in the High Court. Internal tribal declarations have no legal force unless endorsed through chiefs’ processes or the Local Court. Commencing such disputes in the High Court rather than the Local Court may amount to an abuse of process under r 9.75(c).
20. 	Whether the dispute is properly described as a challenge to ownership, as the Claimant contends, or as a disagreement between recognised landholding groups concerning the use and management of Mavara land, as the Defendants assert, the fact remains that it is a dispute “affecting or arising in connection with customary land” within the meaning of s 254(1). No determination of the Local Court has been produced to establish either the ownership of Mavara or the scope of authority held by those entitled to speak for it. Nor has any certificate or written statement been provided under s 12(2)-(3) confirming that traditional settlement processes have been undertaken and exhausted.
21. 	The High Court’s jurisdiction in customary land matters is derivative and limited: it may intervene only on appeal from the Customary Land Appeal Court and only on questions of law or procedure. To proceed would require the High Court to determine, as a matter of first instance, precisely the issues of customary authority, entitlement and control that Parliament has placed exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Local Court and the chiefs.
22. 	The Defendants further rely on the fact that their operations on the Mavara concession were carried out under the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act (“FRTU Act”), following each statutory step required for a valid timber rights process. Those steps included publication of a Form 1 application and a public hearing notice under s 8, the convening of a timber rights hearing, issuance of a Timber Rights Determination naming the First Defendant and others as timber right grantors, issuance of a Form II Certificate identifying ten trustees including the First Defendant, issuance of Form 3, the grant of a felling licence, and the execution or approval of all relevant agreements and plans.
23. 	These steps, while not determinative of customary ownership, which remains the exclusive function of the Local Court, demonstrate that government authorities proceeded on the basis that the First Defendant and others were the appropriate trustees and timber right grantors. The Timber Rights Determination remains lawful and operative unless overturned through the statutory appeal mechanisms, which the Claimant did not pursue.
24. 	Accordingly, while the Timber Rights Determination does not confer ownership, it does mean that the High Court cannot disregard the statutory process or grant relief inconsistent with it while the customary foundation of the parties’ rights remains unresolved. Whether the Claimant disputes ownership or disputes the authority of those exercising rights under the timber regime, the High Court cannot intervene unless and until jurisdiction over the customary issues is properly enlivened. In the present circumstances, the Court has no lawful foundation upon which to act.
The Power to strike out 
25. 	Rule 9.75 empowers the Court, on the application of a party or on its own initiative, to dismiss a proceeding where it is frivolous or vexatious, where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or where the proceeding constitutes an abuse of process. The rule is directed to ensuring that matters which are not properly maintainable, or which seek to invoke the Court’s processes in circumstances where it has no lawful authority to act, do not proceed.
26. 	Where a question of jurisdiction arises, it must be addressed as a preliminary and threshold issue. The existence of jurisdiction is a precondition to the exercise of judicial power. A claim that depends upon the Court determining matters assigned exclusively to another forum by statute cannot, as a matter of law, disclose a reasonable cause of action for the purposes of r 9.75(b), nor can it properly engage the Court’s processes. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement, acquiescence, amendment of pleadings, or the accumulation of further evidence. If the statutory preconditions for the Court’s jurisdiction are not met, the proceeding is incapable of being cured and must be dismissed.
27. 	The Court of Appeal in Sa’oghatoga v Mugaba Atoll Resources Company [2015] SBCA 4 reaffirmed that the strike-out power is to be exercised sparingly, and only in plain and obvious cases where no reasonable amendment could cure the defect. The Court emphasised that a judge determining an application under r 9.75 must not weigh competing evidence or embark upon a mini-trial; if a pleading discloses a recognised cause of action, and there exists a real possibility that further evidence or amendment could support it at trial, the matter should ordinarily proceed. That principle, however, assumes that the Court’s jurisdiction is properly enlivened. Where, as here, the defect is jurisdictional and foundational, rather than evidential or procedural, no amendment can confer a jurisdiction the Court does not possess.
Conclusion
28. 	The central difficulty for the Claimant is not the adequacy of the pleadings nor the sufficiency of the evidence but the absence of jurisdiction. The dispute, however characterised, arises in connection with customary land and engages the statutory framework that assigns exclusive original jurisdiction to the chiefs’ processes and the Local Court. No certificate under s 12 of the Local Courts Act has been issued, no Local Court determination has been made, and no appeal has been brought to the Customary Land Appeal Court. In the absence of those statutory preconditions, this Court lacks the jurisdiction required to entertain the claim or the relief sought.
29. 	The Claimant’s submissions cannot overcome that foundational barrier. The existence of an unchallenged Timber Rights Determination, while not determinative of ownership, further underscores that the High Court cannot intervene in a manner inconsistent with the statutory regime while the underlying customary issues remain unresolved. To proceed would require the Court to determine, as a matter of first instance, questions of customary ownership, authority and entitlement that Parliament has expressly reserved to other fora.
30. 	In those circumstances, the proceeding is not one that can be cured by amendment, further sworn evidence or adjournment. The defect is jurisdictional and therefore absolute. The claim cannot disclose any reasonable cause of action for the purposes of r 9.75(b), and to permit its continuation would constitute an abuse of process under r 9.75(c).
31. 	For these reasons, and for the reasons set out above, the Court is satisfied that the Amended Claim filed on 27 November 2025 cannot proceed and must be dismissed.
Orders
32. 	The Court accordingly makes the following Orders:
a) 	The Amended Claim filed on 27 November 2025 is struck out in its entirety pursuant to r 9.75(b) of the Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 on the basis that it does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and that the High Court’s jurisdiction is not enlivened.
b) 	The proceeding is dismissed.
c) 	Costs of the application are awarded to the First, Second and Third Defendants.
d) 	For avoidance of doubt, nothing in these Orders prevents any party from pursuing the resolution of customary issues through the processes and jurisdictions prescribed by the Land and Titles Act (Cap 133) and the Local Courts Act (Cap 19).
By the Court
Hon. Justice Gina Maree Nott
Puisne Judge