HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Case name: 	Knox v Xiang Lin Timber (SI) Ltd 	
		
Citation:		
		
Date of decision: 	21 November 2025	
		
Parties: 	Thomas Knox and Theresa Yanda v Xiang Lin Timber (SI) Limited, John Uto, Attorney General, John Peter Metoula, John Meoblir, James Beu and Daniel Teti, Philip Metali	
		
Date of hearing: 	21 November 2025	
		
Court file number(s): 	119 of 2025	
		
Jurisdiction: 	Civil 	
		
Place of delivery: 		
		
Judge(s): 	Nott; PJ	
		
On appeal from:		
		
Order:	a. Proceedings numbered 119/2025 (including any interlocutory relief) is struck out forthwith;
b. Any interim or interlocutory orders previously made in these proceedings are discharged;
c. The strike-out is recorded on the Court file;
d. The Registrar is directed to notify all parties in accordance with r 9.74 of the Rules; and
e. Costs are reserved.	
		
Representation: 	Ms N Tongarutu for the Applicant/Claimant
Mr M Ale for the First Respondent/Defendant
Mr S Clement for the Second Respondent/Defendant
Ms P Rofeta for the Third Respondent/Defendant
Mr D Nimepo for the Fourth Respondent/Defendant

Catchwords: 		
		
Words and phrases:		
		
Legislation cited:	Local Court Act 2009, S 12-14, S 11 to 14 [cap 19], S 12 (1), S 12 (1) (a), S 12 (1) (b), S 12 (1) (c), S 12 (2), S 12 (3)
Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rule 2007, r 9.72 to 9.74	
		
Cases cited:	Veno v Jino [2006] SBCA 22, Chinogo v Kalahaki Company Ltd [2007] SBHC 11, Zobule v Attorney General [2008] SBHC 87, Simbe v East Choiseul Area Council [1999] SBCA 9, Namusu v Fairtrade Company Ltd [2016] SBHC 7	

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 119 of 2025

BETWEEN:

THOMAS KNOX AND THERESA YANDA
(Representing himself, Theresa Yanda, her siblings& members of the Noubu and Noubebla Clan of Taipe)
Applicant/Claimant

AND:

XIANG LIN TIMBER (SI) LTD
(Licencee & Contractor)
First Respondent/Defendant

AND:

JOHN UTO (HURO)
(Representing himself & Brown Kola)
Second Respondent/Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Representing the Commissioner of Forests)
Third Respondent/Defendant

AND:

TARGET LOGGING (SOLOMON) LTD
Fourth Respondent/Defendant

AND:

JOHN PETER METOULA, JOHN MEOBLIR, JAMES BEU AND DANIEL TETI
(Representing themselves)

AND:

PHILIP METALI 
(Representing himself & Xiang Lin Timber Co. Ltd)
Sixth Respondent/Defendant

Date of Hearing: 21 November 2025
Date of Ruling: 21 November 2025

Counsel:

Ms N Tongarutu for the Applicant/Claimant
Mr M Ale for the First Respondent/Defendant
Mr S Clement for the Second Respondent/Defendant
Ms P Rofeta for the Third Respondent/Defendant
Mr D Nimepo for the Fourth Respondent/Defendant

Nott; PJ
EX TEMPORE RULING 
EX PARTE URGENT INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION 
Background
1. 	This matter has come before me by way of an Urgent Interlocutory Application. I note that the substantive proceeding has been managed by His Lordship Justice Talasasa, including the earlier interlocutory orders presently in force. His Lordship is not available today, and in his absence this urgent application has been placed before me for determination.
2. 	The Application was filed on behalf of the Claimant on 18 November 2025 and was listed today for hearing.
3. 	The Application seeks to restrain the First, Third and Fourth Respondents from engaging in various activities. I note that there are a series of injunctive restraining orders currently in force against the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Respondents.
4. 	On reviewing the materials filed in support of the Application, it was not apparent that the statutory preconditions for this Court to exercise jurisdiction had been satisfied. In particular, the material did not clearly establish locus standi or demonstrate compliance with the statutory pathway prescribed by s 12 to 14 of the Local Courts Act 2009. In order to clarify these matters, on 18 November 2025 the Court directed the Applicant to file written submissions, by 12 noon on 19 November 2025, addressing:
a.	how the evidence presently before the Court satisfies the requirements of s 12 to 14 of the Local Courts Act 2009; and
b.	the relevance, if any, of Veno v Jino [2006] SBCA 22 and Chinogo v Kalahaki [2007] SBHC 11.
5. 	The Applicant’s solicitor subsequently sought an extension of time until midday on 20 November 2025. That request was granted in chambers. The court received submissions at 1:50pm which have been read and considered.
6. 	Although the Application was filed on an ex parte basis, counsel for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents appeared at the commencement of the hearing, having become aware of the Application and its listing. In those circumstances, the basis for proceeding without notice was no longer engaged. As the Respondents were present, prepared to be heard, and no prejudice would arise from their participation, leave was granted for them to appear and make submissions.
Brief Facts
7. 	On 2 May 2025, the Applicant filed an Amended Statement of Claim seeking a range of relief concerning activities allegedly carried out by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Respondents on Taipe Customary Land Blocks 5, B and C.
8. 	The claim asserts that the Applicant’s entitlement to the land is based on birthright as recognised by the Landstok Decision of 30 June 1997, which is said to identify the Noubu clan as the primary rights-holders over 29 parcels of land.
9. 	In sworn evidence, the Applicant states that they are members of the Taipe community and that the Noubu clan has always been recognised as the primary rights owner of customary land at Udaabir in Taipe, relying on the 1997 Chiefs’ Landstok Decision in support. The Claimants allege that they have been aggrieved by trespass, the harvesting of round logs for export, and environmental damage said to arise from logging operations.
Issue
10. 	The preliminary question for determination is whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory application, or the substantive proceeding more generally.
11. 	Only if the Court is satisfied that jurisdiction exists does the second issue arise, namely whether any interlocutory relief should be granted. It follows that the jurisdictional question must be addressed first, as the High Court cannot grant interlocutory relief in aid of a proceeding that has not been validly commenced, nor can it make orders where the statutory preconditions for invoking the Court’s jurisdiction have not been met.
12. 	The issues therefore to be determined at the outset of the hearing are:
a.	whether the claimant has complied with the mandatory statutory requirements under s 12-14 of the Local Courts Act 2009;
b.	whether the Court’s jurisdiction has been properly invoked; and
c.	if jurisdiction has not been established, whether the proceeding should be struck out under r 9.71 to 9.74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules for failure to comply with Court directions and for failure to take the necessary procedural steps to progress the matter.
Statutory Framework
13. 	Sections 11 to 14 of the Local Courts Act (Cap 19) do not themselves determine customary land rights, nor do they govern the substantive resolution of customary land disputes. Rather, they prescribe the statutory mechanism by which a dispute concerning customary land, whether contested, arising from a chiefs’ decision that is not wholly accepted, or one that is accepted, may be brought within the jurisdiction of the courts. These provisions define the necessary steps for transforming a customary dispute into a matter capable of being heard by the Local Court and, in turn, for engaging the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
14. 	Section 11 establishes that the exclusive original jurisdiction to determine customary land disputes lies with the Local Court. That section defines the subject matter (“questions of customary land”) and the forum that must first adjudicate them. Sections 12 to 14 then set out the mandatory statutory pathway by which the s 11 jurisdiction is enlivened, through referral to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional processes, the generation of a chiefs’ decision, the prescribed documentation under s 12, or submission of the agreed decision to the Local Court under s 14. 
15. 	Unless each of these statutory steps has been strictly complied with, the Local Court’s jurisdiction does not arise, and the High Court cannot be seized of the matter. The High Court’s jurisdiction in customary land matters is strictly derivative and supervisory; it cannot be invoked unless the Local Court’s jurisdiction has first been engaged.
16. 	Section 12(1) provides that a Local Court has no jurisdiction to hear a customary land dispute unless:
a.	the dispute has been referred to the chiefs (s 12(1)(a));
b.	all traditional means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted (s 12(1)(b)); and
c.	the chiefs have not produced a decision wholly acceptable to both parties (s 12(1)(c)).
17. 	These are jurisdictional facts which must exist before any court process can commence. Even where those conditions are satisfied, the Act imposes mandatory procedural requirements:
a.	Form 1 Certificate signed by at least two chiefs (s 12(2)); and
b.	a written statement by the aggrieved party setting out:
i.	the extent to which the chiefs’ decision is unacceptable; and
ii.	the reasons for that dissatisfaction (s 12(3)).
18. 	Both documents must accompany any referral to the Local Court.
19. 	Veno v Jino, the Court of Appeal held that compliance with s 12(3) is mandatory, and failure to comply is fatal to the existence of jurisdiction. Form 1 alone is insufficient to commence proceedings: both components, Form 1 and a s 12(3) statement, must be provided.
20. 	Section 14 operates in a different context. It applies only where the chiefs have made a decision that is wholly acceptable to both parties. In such circumstances, either the chiefs or any party may, within the prescribed period, cause a copy of the decision to be recorded by the Local Court in Form II. Once recorded, the agreed chiefs’ decision is deemed to be a decision of the Local Court for all legal purposes. Section 14 therefore provides a mechanism for consensual determinations to acquire legal effect through recording; it does not deal with disputed land, and it does not replace or modify the mandatory requirements governing disputed matters under s 12.
21. 	Read together, s 11 to 14 distinguish between:
a.	disputed customary land, which must follow the statutory pathway in s 12–13 before the Local Court acquires jurisdiction; and
b.	agreed customary determinations, which may be formally recorded as Local Court decisions under s 14.
22. 	This statutory structure ensures that both contested and uncontested customary land matters follow the processes prescribed by Parliament before they can acquire the status of decisions recognised by the courts.
Applicant’s Submissions
23. 	Written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant contend that the Applicant’s entitlement to the land derives from birthright as recognised in the Chiefs’ Hearing and Landstok Decision of 30 June 1997. He submits that he is a member of the Taipe community, that the Noubu clan has always been recognised as the primary customary owner of land at Udaabir in Taipe, and that the Applicant has been aggrieved by trespass, the harvesting of round logs for export, and environmental damage caused by logging operations.
24. 	On this basis, the Applicant submits that he has locus standi as one of the primary beneficiaries of the land identified by the chiefs. The Applicant submits that s 12 of the Local Courts Act empowers chiefs to inquire into ownership of customary land and does not prescribe any particular procedure or formalities for such inquiries, nor stipulate the composition of chiefs involved.
25. 	The Applicant further contends that s 12(3) does not require documentary proof of having invoked the chiefs’ process and that, where a chiefs’ decision is unchallenged, the absence of a s 12(3) statement should be interpreted as acceptance of that decision. As to s 14, the applicant submits that it is administrative in nature and that the inability to locate a certificate should not invalidate the 1997 chiefs’ decision. The Applicant contends that in the absence of any evidence from the Respondents challenging the 1997 decision, it should be treated as accepted by all parties and therefore res judicata. Finally, the Applicant submits that standing also arises from environmental harm, which in his view can be pursued independently of customary ownership.
26. 	In oral submissions today, counsel for the Applicant submitted that this Court has already accepted jurisdiction by virtue of interlocutory orders previously made by Talasasa J, which remain extant. She further argued that the Applicant continues to rely on the 1997 Landstok Decision to establish customary ownership, and that although the claimant is not named in the document, his entitlement may be traced through his mother and siblings, who were said to be involved in the 1997 processes.
27. 	Counsel contended that Blocks B and C were not in issue before the chiefs in 1997 because the dispute over those parcels only arose once logging commenced in 2024. She accepted that the Landstok Decision lacks boundary descriptions but submitted that subsequent boundary inspections undertaken with clan members, including Mr Uto, assist in identifying the relevant land. Counsel maintained that the Landstok Decision was wholly accepted within the community until logging commenced. She submitted that any failure to comply with s 14 does not nullify the chiefs’ decision, describing s 14 as administrative and suggesting the chiefs may simply have overlooked the requirement. Counsel also argued that environmental damage is a central cause of action and that the Court may have inherent jurisdiction to intervene where justice requires.
28. 	In essence, counsel submitted that the 1997 Landstok Decision is sufficient, of itself, to establish the claimant’s customary ownership and thereby enliven this Court’s jurisdiction in the absence of compliance with the statutory pathway under the Local Courts Act. She argued that chiefs’ decisions are binding unless challenged under s 12, and that the description of the 1997 document as “directive not mandatory” does not diminish its customary effect. On this basis, counsel contended that the Landstok Decision provides an adequate legal foundation for standing and for the grant of interlocutory relief, notwithstanding the absence of referral to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional dispute resolution, a chiefs’ decision arising from this dispute, Form 1, a s 12(3) statement, or any referral under s 14.
Counsel for 1st Respondent
29. 	Counsel for the First Respondent, who appeared after the Fourth Respondent, adopted the submissions of the Fourth Respondent and contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunction sought. He submits that the causes of action pleaded, trespass, breach of statutory duty and related claims, each require proof of ownership, which the Claimant has not established. As the land is customary land, only the Local Court has jurisdiction to determine customary ownership, and conclusive evidence of ownership can only arise through the statutory pathway under the Local Courts Act. The 1997 Landstok document, he submits, is not an official chiefs’ determination, is insufficient to invoke jurisdiction, and cannot confer ownership; it merely initiates a process that was never completed in the Local Court.
30. 	Without a chiefs’ determination, Form 1, a s 12(3) statement or referral under s 14, the Claimant has no conclusive evidence of ownership, and this Court cannot assume it. Counsel further argues that even if the Landstok document were accepted, it is ambiguous as to the land and boundaries to which it applies, and any attempt by the Court to resolve those ambiguities would require impermissible assumptions, contrary to Zobule v Attorney-General (22 October 2008, SBHC). He also relies on Simbe v East Choiseul [1999] SBC 9, paras 23-25, submitting that the High Court may only grant interim relief where a dispute is pending before the Local Court or the Customary Land Appeal Court; here, there is no such pending dispute. Counsel emphasises that the manner in which the claim is pleaded presupposes ownership, and without jurisdiction to determine that question, the Court cannot entertain the trespass, conversion or related claims. For these reasons, he submits that the application is misconceived and that the Court lacks jurisdiction.
Counsel for 2nd Respondent  
31. 	Counsel for the Second Respondent adopts the submissions made by counsel for the first and fourth respondents and likewise contends that the Court has no jurisdiction. He submits that the Landstok Decision is not compliant with s 12–14 of the Local Courts Act and cannot amount to a chiefs’ determination within the meaning of the Act. Counsel argues that the document is, in substance, a memorandum rather than a formal decision, does not name the Claimant, does not confer any ownership upon him, and amounts only to speculation as to customary rights. In response to the Claimant’s reliance on the informality of the 1997 process, counsel submits that informality does not cure the jurisdictional defect; rather, it reinforces that the document cannot be treated as a formal chiefs’ determination. Counsel relies on Namusu v Fair Trade Company Ltd (2016), where Faukona J reiterated that only chiefs, the Local Court, or the higher appellate customary forums may make binding determinations of customary ownership. The Landstok document does not disclose who made the decision, does not demonstrate that it was made by chiefs, and is addressed to an individual. If it was made by only one person, counsel submits, that further confirms its informality and non-compliance. On this basis, the Second Respondent submits the Court has no jurisdiction.
Counsel for 4th Respondent
32. 	Counsel for the Fourth Respondent submits that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the injunction sought, as the Claimant has not demonstrated any enforceable legal or equitable interest in the land. It is argued that the 1997 Landstok document is not a chiefs’ determination within the meaning of s 11-14 of the Local Courts Act, but is more akin to a memorandum of understanding: it is unsigned by chiefs, its authorship is unclear, and it does not record any customary hearing or adjudicative process. Counsel contends that there is no evidence that the document is binding, and that it cannot confer legal rights, proprietary interests or standing capable of grounding injunctive relief. As a matter of law, an interlocutory injunction may only be granted to protect a recognised legal or equitable interest, and where no such interest exists, there can be no serious question to be tried. On this basis, counsel submits that the application is misconceived and must fail for want of standing and jurisdiction.
Applicants Submissions in reply 
33. 	In reply, counsel submitted that the Respondents’ criticisms of the 1997 Landstok Decision were inconsistent, noting that the Respondents themselves rely on sworn statements that, in her submission, indirectly support the Claimant’s position. She argued that the Local Courts Act does not prescribe the manner in which chiefs must record their decisions, and that informality does not invalidate a customary decision.
34. 	Counsel relied on the exhibit marked JU2 in the Second Respondent’s sworn statement and the sworn statement of Chief Nelson filed in 2025, asserting that these materials corroborate the Claimant’s familial connection to the 1997 process and correct misnaming of the Applicants mother in the Landstok Decision. She submitted that chiefs’ decisions are binding unless challenged under s 12, and that describing the 1997 document as “directory not mandatory” does not strip it of its effect. Counsel also argued that the chiefs’ process should not be disregarded merely because of administrative shortcomings and that ownership was unchallenged until 2024. She submitted that the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction to grant urgent relief and that environmental damage supports a separate basis for standing.
The Landstok Decision
35. 	The Applicant relies heavily on the Landstok Decision dated 21 November 1997 as the foundation for asserting an entitlement to the land. Given the weight placed on this document in the Claimant’s submissions, it is necessary to examine its status and relevance to the present dispute.
36. 	Having reviewed the Landstok Decision, I make the following observations.
a.	First, the Applicant does not appear to be a party to the actual decision. There is no mention of the Applicant or his relationship with the person named.
b.	Secondly, the document expressly states on two separate occasions that it is “directive not mandatory”, indicating that it does not purport to be a binding adjudication of rights.
c.	 Thirdly, the land described is referred to only in broad terms as “29 parcels of land within the tribal land of Taipe Village land block with others still to be identified in addition to the 29…”. There appears to be no clear way to reconcile the land referred to in the Landstok decision with the specific blocks at issue in these proceedings, including Blocks 5, B and C.
37. 	The Landstok Decision does not appear to arise from a dispute involving the present parties, nor does it appear identify the relevant land with sufficient particularity. There is also nothing in the document identifying the claimant as a member of the Noubu or Noubebla clans, nor is there any indication of who the decision makers were or the process by which the document was produced.
Application of the Statutory Framework to the Evidence and Submissions
38. 	At the outset, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of the question before the Court:
a.	The question is not whether the 1997 Chiefs’ Landstok Decision was correct, valid, or fairly reached. 
b.	The question is not whether the claimant’s clan may historically have been recognised as rights-holders. 
c.	The question is not whether the claimant may have a legitimate grievance about logging operations, environmental damage, trespass, or misuse of resources. 
d.	The question is not whether the respondents acted lawfully, prudently or in accordance with customary norms.
e.	And The question is not whether the claimant’s evidence, taken at its highest, might ultimately disclose a serious question to be tried if the Court had jurisdiction.
39. 	The fundamental question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding at all. The correctness of the chiefs’ Landstok Decision, the merits of the grievance, and the underlying factual controversy are all irrelevant unless and until the statutory pathway under s 12 to 14 of the Local Courts Act has been strictly complied with. The Court cannot analyse the substance of the Applicant’s complaint until it is first satisfied that it has lawful authority to inquire into the matter.
40. 	The Local Courts Act sets out a mandatory statutory pathway for customary land disputes, and unless those steps have been taken, referral to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional processes, a chiefs’ decision arising from this dispute, a Form 1 Certificate, and a statement under s 12(3), or alternatively registration under section 14, neither the Local Court nor the High Court can be seized of the matter. This jurisdictional threshold must be satisfied before any aspect of the claim, interlocutory or substantive, may be addressed.
41. 	The Applicant’s submissions do not overcome the jurisdictional difficulties identified by the Court. The Local Courts Act prescribes the exclusive statutory pathway by which questions of customary land may enter the jurisdiction of the courts. As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Veno v Jino, compliance with the requirements of s 12 is mandatory, and failure to comply is fatal to the existence of jurisdiction. In Chinogo v Kalahaki, the High Court similarly reaffirmed that this Court has no original jurisdiction to determine customary ownership and may only act where the statutory preconditions have been strictly satisfied. Viewed against that framework, the Court must determine whether the material before it is capable of establishing the jurisdictional facts required by the Local Courts Act to bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of the Local Court, and in turn, to engage the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
42. 	The Applicant relies heavily on the Chiefs’ Hearing and Landstok Decision of 30 June 1997 as the foundation for asserting customary entitlement, submitting that it identifies the Noubu clan as the primary rights-holders. The Applicant further argues that he has locus standi by virtue of birthright and the alleged environmental damage and trespass said to have been caused by logging operations. However, the statutory scheme requires more than an assertion of customary rights. The Local Courts Act prescribes the exclusive pathway by which a customary land dispute may be brought within the jurisdiction of the courts. Demonstrable compliance with that pathway, referral of this dispute to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional mechanisms, the existence of a chiefs’ decision arising from this dispute, and the filing of the mandatory documentation, is required before the Local Court’s jurisdiction can be enlivened and, in turn, before the High Court can exercise any supervisory jurisdiction. Reliance on the 1997 Landstok Decision cannot substitute for those statutory requirements.
43. 	It is therefore necessary to consider whether the material before the Court is capable of establishing any of the statutory preconditions required to invoke jurisdiction.
44. 	First, the Applicant’s reliance on the 1997 Chiefs’ Decision cannot satisfy s 12(1)(a). Nothing before the Court suggests that this dispute, concerning Blocks 5, B and C, has ever been referred to chiefs for determination. The Applicant did not identify any chiefs, council of chiefs, or recognised customary forum to which this specific dispute was taken.
45. 	Secondly, there is no evidence that all traditional means of resolving this dispute have been exhausted, as required by s 12(1)(b). The Applicant’s sworn evidence does not refer to any customary reconciliation meeting or hearing relating to this dispute. The Applicant’s submission that s 12 does not specify the composition or structure of the chiefs’ forum does not address the fundamental problem that no chiefs’ process took place at all.
46. 	Thirdly, s 12(1)(c) requires a chiefs’ decision arising out of this dispute which is unacceptable to one or more of the parties. The Applicant submits that the 1997 Landstok Decision should be treated as accepted unless challenged, but this reverses the statutory requirement. Section 12 presupposes a chiefs’ decision generated from the present controversy between these parties, concerning the specific land now in issue. A document created in 1997, decades before the current dispute, cannot satisfy that requirement. Even taken at its highest, the Landstok Decision does not identify Blocks 5, B or C with the clarity or specificity required by the Act, nor does it establish that the persons now before the Court were parties to, or bound by, any process that occurred in 1997. It therefore cannot constitute the chiefs’ decision contemplated by s 12(1)(c).
47. 	Fourthly, no Form 1 Certificate has been produced, as required by s 12(2). This is a mandatory statutory document, and its absence is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Local Court. This alone prevents the statutory gateway from opening.
48. 	Fifthly, The Applicant’s submission that the absence of a document filed by the Respondent under the Local Courts Act implies acceptance of a chiefs’ decision cannot be reconciled with the plain words of the statute or the Court of Appeal authority.
49. 	Sixthly, if there was agreement between the parties, there is no evidence that any document was lodged under s 14 to allow the decision to be recorded as one of the Local Court. The claimant suggests that s 14 is merely administrative, and that inability to locate the certificate does not nullify the decision. However, s 14 is the statutory mechanism by which a Landstok decision is placed before the Local Court. Without evidence of referral, the Local Court cannot have been seized of the matter. Without Local Court jurisdiction, the High Court (as a general rule) cannot have supervisory jurisdiction. 
50. 	The Applicant’s submission that the 1997 Chiefs’ Decision constitutes res judicata is untenable. Res judicata requires a final, binding determination between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter. The 1997 document expressly states that it is not binding, involved different parties, and concerned ambiguous land parcels.
51. 	Counsel for the Applicant also submits that they have locus standi because they allege harm arising from trespass and environmental damage. However, in the context of a customary land dispute, the question of standing is not determined by whether an Applicant alleges civil wrongs. It turns instead on whether the person has established a recognised customary entitlement through the statutory pathway prescribed by s 12-14 of the Local Courts Act. Until those mandatory steps have been taken, referral of the dispute to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional processes, and the production of a chiefs’ decision capable of engaging s 12(2) and s 12(3), or submission pursuant to s.14, the Applicant cannot establish the necessary foundation to demonstrate that he is a rights-holder for the purpose of these proceedings. Thus, the locus standi issue here is a jurisdictional question, not a merits-based question about trespass or environmental damage.
52. 	Although the Applicant submits that he has standing to seek injunctive relief on the basis of environmental damage, that submission ultimately depends upon the very customary ownership he asserts. His claimed “interest” is not a free-standing environmental interest; it is entirely derivative of the landownership he alleges. As put, the applicant says he is “likely to be affected” because the land is his customary land. Whether he possesses any customary right in Blocks 5, B or C is itself the jurisdictional question governed by s 12 to 14 of the Local Courts Act. Unless and until those statutory steps are complied with and a recognised customary interest is established, the applicant cannot qualify as an “interested person” capable of grounding an environmental injunction. Environmental allegations cannot be used to confer jurisdiction where the statutory gateway to customary land jurisdiction remains unopened.
53. 	In light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that none of the Applicant’s submissions demonstrate compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Local Courts Act. There is no evidence of referral to chiefs, no exhaustion of traditional means, no chiefs’ decision arising out of this dispute, no Form 1 Certificate, no s 12(3) statement, and no referral to the Local Court under s 14. The statutory gateway to jurisdiction has therefore not been opened.
54. 	Accordingly, the Court cannot determine rights, grant interlocutory relief, or entertain the proceeding further. The facts, taken at their highest, fall well short of establishing jurisdiction. As the statutory preconditions have not been met, the Court is compelled by authority and by statute to conclude that it has no jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding. The High Court cannot assume a jurisdiction that Parliament has confined to customary processes and the Local Court.
55. 	The point is this: the Court is not being asked to decide whether the 1997 Landstok Decision was right or wrong, nor to assess who may hold customary rights or whether wrongs have occurred on the land. The central and determinative issue is whether this Court has jurisdiction at all. Under the Local Courts Act, jurisdiction only arises once a strict statutory pathway has been followed, referral of this dispute to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional mechanisms, a chiefs’ decision arising from this dispute, and the filing of the mandatory documents prescribed by s 12. None of those steps have been taken. Until they are, neither the Local Court nor the High Court can be seized of the matter. Everything else, including the Applicant’s grievance, the 1997 document, and any alleged harm, is downstream of that threshold, and cannot be reached unless jurisdiction is properly invoked.
56. 	For completeness, I emphasise that nothing in this decision should be understood as determining, undermining, or casting doubt upon the correctness, validity, or customary effect of the 1997 Landstok Decision, nor upon any rights that the Applicant or others may ultimately establish through the proper statutory processes. The Court expresses no view on the merits of any customary claim or grievance. The sole basis for this outcome is the absence of the mandatory statutory steps required to enliven jurisdiction under the Local Courts Act. Should the parties pursue those processes, any future court seized of jurisdiction will assess the effect of the Landstok Decision according to law and on proper evidentiary footing.
Striking Out Under r 9.71–9.74
57. 	The Court having determined that the statutory preconditions under s 12 -14 of the Local Courts Act 2009 have not been met, it follows that the proceeding has not been validly commenced. The Court of Appeal in Veno v Jino [2006] SBCA 22 established that compliance with s 12 is mandatory and that failure to comply is fatal to the existence of jurisdiction. The High Court in Chinogo v Kalahaki [2007] SBHC 11 reaffirmed that this Court cannot determine customary ownership and has no authority to intervene unless the Local Court’s jurisdiction has first been enlivened. In the present case, the statutory gateway has not been opened and the High Court’s jurisdiction has not been invoked.
58. 	This jurisdictional defect goes to the foundation of the claim: without a referral of the dispute to chiefs, exhaustion of traditional processes, a chiefs’ decision arising from this dispute, a Form 1 certificate, a statement under s 12(3), or registration of an agreed decision under s 14, there is no statutory basis upon which the proceeding can move forward. The proceeding is, in effect, a nullity. No amount of evidence, argument or urgency can cure the absence of jurisdiction. The statutory scheme simply does not permit the claim to advance.
59. 	In circumstances where jurisdiction has not been validly invoked, the Applicant cannot take the steps necessary to ensure that the proceeding continues. Rule 9.71(a) applies where a claimant has not taken the steps required by the rules to ensure the proceeding continues. While r 9.71(a) does refer to steps required under the Rules themselves, it necessarily encompasses steps that are legally indispensable to the lawful progression of the claim. In a customary land matter, compliance with s 12 to14 of the Local Courts Act to enliven the High Court’s jurisdiction is such an indispensable step. Without those statutory preconditions being met, the claim cannot progress in any lawful manner in this court to ensure the proceeding continues, and the Applicant is therefore unable to satisfy r 9.71(a).
60. 	Rule 9.72(b) provides that where r 9.71 is engaged, the Court may strike out a proceeding at a hearing. The matter is before the Court today for hearing, and the jurisdictional defect is plain on the face of the material. The proceeding is incapable of continuation and is therefore properly struck out under r 9.71 and 9.72.
61. 	Even if r 9.71 and 9.72 were thought not to apply, the Court retains an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its own process. That jurisdiction arises where a proceeding is fundamentally defective, cannot lawfully progress, or seeks to invoke the Court’s authority in a manner inconsistent with Parliament’s allocation of jurisdiction. A proceeding that has been commenced without compliance with the statutory gateway for customary land matters is one that the Court is not empowered to entertain. To permit such a proceeding to remain on foot would be to allow the Court’s process to be used for a purpose for which it has no jurisdiction. The Court’s inherent power therefore provides an independent basis upon which the proceeding must be struck out.
62. 	The combined effect of (a) the jurisdictional failure to comply with s 11-14 of the Local Courts Act, (b) the resulting impossibility of the claim lawfully proceeding, and (c) the Court’s powers under r 9.71–9.72 and its inherent jurisdiction, is that the proceeding cannot remain on foot. It must therefore be struck out.
Orders
63. 	For the reasons given above, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain either the interlocutory application or the substantive proceeding. The mandatory statutory preconditions under s 12–14 of the Local Courts Act 2009 have not been satisfied, and the statutory gateway to jurisdiction has not been opened.
64. 	Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:
a.	Proceedings numbered 119/2025 (including any interlocutory relief) is struck out forthwith;
b.	Any interim or interlocutory orders previously made in these proceedings are discharged;
c.	The strike-out is recorded on the Court file;
d.	The Registrar is directed to notify all parties in accordance with r 9.74 of the Rules; and
e.	Costs are reserved.
By the Court
Hon. Justice Gina Maree Nott
Puisne Judge