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Toniki v Bedord [2006] SBHC 39; HCSI-CC 232 of 2006 (11 August 2006)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No. 232 of 2006

JOYCE TONIKI

-v-

RICHARD BEDORD

Date of Hearing: 11th August 2006
Date of Ruling: 11th August 2006

Mr. P. Southey for the Applicant
Mr. P. Lavery for the for the Respondent

Ruling on Claim for extension of time in affiliation proceedings

Brown P J: This is a claim to extend time by virtue of the proviso to s. 3 of the Affiliation, Separation & Maintenance Act.

The section speaks of a claim for maintenance with-in 3 years of the birth of an exnuptial child and the section of the Act provides, in other subsections for circumstances which afford an applicant an opportunity to institute proceedings where, for instance the putative father has paid moneys within that period.

I’m not satisfied, on the material before me, that any moneys were paid with the 3 years period of the birth.

Mr. Southey has cogently argued that the applicant was unaware of her rights for she was residing for the greater preponderance of the time since, in Renbel Province. Once she became aware of her rights, she brought an application in the Magistrates Court although out of time. She also points to the payment of money as late as April this year, and Mr. Southey says, the claim under the Act cannot surprise the putative father.

Mr. Lavery says that since the child is now 11 and the Act speaks of 3 years, the claim now would be unjust and unfair. The Ac t does provide for proofs necessary when parentage is at issue and the section suggests, as Mr. Lavery argues, that this 3 year period of opportunity for claim is reasonable when the need for proof of paternity is necessary for affiliation proceedings. In other words a putative father after 11 years may have difficulty defending a claim by a mother and whilst corroboration is necessary after this length of time, a court must be faced with a particularly difficult cause for adjudication when the putative father is then obliged to defend after such time.

Statute of limitations speak of a 6 years period for simple contractual debt and a 12 year period when a squatters may well claim an interest in land, clearly as Mr. Lavery says, the fact of limitation must be borne in mind by a court considering the grant of leave.

While moneys have been paid, as here, in the circumstances, it cannot afford the applicant sufficient cause to outweigh weight the weight which I should give to the legislative intent to restrict claims to a particular time frame.

In the courts view this claim to extend leave is without justification after such a delay for the delay would detrimentally affect the respondents ability to defend the claim.

Application for leave is refused. I make no order as to costs.

THE COURT