IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Criminal Case 120 of 2004

Regina

v

Chris MAE
Moses Su’u

Count 1	Demanding with menaces, contrary to section 295 Penal Code
Count 2	Theft, contrary to section 261 Penal Code

Date of hearing: 19 August 2005
Date of sentence: 7 September 2005

SENTENCE

Chris Mae and Moses Su’u have each pleaded guilty to two offences. Those offences are demanding property with menaces and theft of motor vehicles. Both played different parts in this criminal activity. The criminal activity was to demand from the partners of a local law firm two motor vehicles. That is the subject of the demanding with menaces charge. The taking of two motor vehicles subsequently is the subject of the theft charge.

Chris Mae together with others went uninvited to the offices of the legal firm Sol Law. This was on 24 May 2002. Moses Su’u was not one of the men who were there. Threats were made to the staff and members of the firm. Furniture was thrown at one or two members of the firm. They were stopped from trying to summon assistance from the police. Some partners were threatened with death if they did not leave the country.

The purpose of this visit was to obtain the keys to two vehicles owned by Sol Law. In that, the visit was a failure. Nevertheless the offending of demanding with menaces was committed.

Later the same day Mae with others returned to the same building and stole the two vehicles without trying to get the keys from the owners. This time Mae was armed, and threatened people around the vehicles that he would shoot if they did not move. The attempt this time to steal the vehicles was successful. One vehicle has been recovered, one remains unrecovered.

Moses Su’u was involved in this activity not by physical presence but because he told the others who did go to the law firm to do this and to steal the motor vehicles. By so ordering he is guilty as if he were there.

The guilty pleas to these offences are proper and the court accepts them and accordingly convicts these two accused.

In determining the right sentence for these offences a number of matters must be considered. The first matter is whether the two offences should be considered as part of a series of offences that are really one and the same. The demands were made in an attempt to steal the vehicles. The vehicles were eventually stolen. The victims were the same people, namely the partners in Sol Law. They were the ones who were threatened and they were the ones who owned the vehicles and suffered the loss of those vehicles. The time between one event and the next was short, everything happened during the same day. In those circumstances I think it would be perfectly proper to consider that this is really one course of conduct split into two distinct stages or events.

This decision is further complicated by Su’u position. He was not there. He issued the order. No doubt the order was to go to Sol Law and steal the motor vehicles. He did not order a two stage process. He probably expected the order to be carried out in one visit. But that did not happen. He must expect to be held responsible, though, even if he did anticipate only one event. He would have to be bound by any decision of the court whether it was to deal with the offences separately or as one incident. That could result in a degree of unfairness to him.

The decision to treat these offences as part of a series of similar offences against the same victim committed over a short period of time suggests that any custodial sentences imposed should be concurrent.

The second factor that must be taken into consideration is what account can properly be taken of a guilty plea. It is already the practice here that a guilty plea can serve to reduce any sentence imposed. In this case it deserves particular attention. The decision of these two men to plead guilty may well have been a difficult decision. The reasons given to the court for the offences in the first place suggests that these two may well have been unduly influenced by another into ordering and committing the offences in the first place. Thus their decision to plead guilty acknowledges that, even if the encouragement from another was there, they should still not have acted as they did. This has not been overlooked by this court and will be a significant factor in determining length of sentence.

Many other factors were drawn to the attention of the court. Chris Mae has no previous convictions. Moses Su’u was has been convicted of offences in the past, mostly as a juvenile. Because most of his offences occurred when he was a juvenile, and he is now 38 years of age, the court does not regard those previous convictions as significant. Both will be sentenced primarily for the offences they face today, and not for any previous convictions. There has been cooperation with the police. There are signs of remorse. Both men have family responsibilities. There appear to be good previous work records. Each of these factors can be properly and has been taken into account by this court. 

But the offences were serious. They involved the threat of violence, and a relatively small degree of actual violence. They occurred at a time when demanding with menaces was prevalent. They clearly merit an immediate custodial sentence. 

Looking at other sentences imposed at and around this time, it could well be concluded that a total sentence exceeding the maximum five years for either of these offences is justified.

Taking particular account, however, of the limited use of actual violence and the plea of guilty from each of the two that sentence should be and is reduced from that which might have been imposed. It needs to be very clear that this court will acknowledge the effect of a guilty plea, and will reduce in a meaningful way a subsequent sentence.

For the demanding with menaces, each of these two accused are sentenced to thirty months imprisonment. For stealing the two motor vehicles each of the accused are sentences to twenty five months imprisonment to be served concurrently. The total effective period of imprisonment is thirty months and that will be ordered to run from the date on which each of the accused went into custody for these offences, allowing credit for periods spent on remanded in custody but not for periods during which they were released on bail or held otherwise than for these offences.