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Vangavoli v Dalsol Ltd [1995] SBHC 51; HC-CC 123 of 1995 (21 September 1995)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No. 123 of 1995

THOMAS VANGAVOLI
AND JOSEPH PEA

-V-

DALSOL LIMITED

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(PALMER J)

Hearing: 21st September 1995
RULING: 21st September 1995

P Lavery for the Plaintiff
T Kama for the Defendant

PALMER J: Plaintiffs assert ownership rights over the disputed land. Their claim of ownership stems from a purchase of a block of land inclusive of the disputed area by the people of Tsapanamanu from the Kidipale Tribe of Satona in January 1970 in accordance with custom - the hand-over ceremony occurring in February of 1974 (see affidavit of Joseph Pea filed on the 27th of April, 1995). They claim by virtue of those ownership rights over the said land inter alia, that the Defendants therefore have trespassed and claimed damages.

In its defence, the Defendants submit:

(i) that the said disputed land area was not owned by the Plaintiffs, but by the Lakuili Tribe and that permission had been granted under a felling agreement between the Defendant and Aniseto Kekepuala and Banaventure Manele, representatives of the Lakuili Tribe. (See par. 3 of the Defence filed on the 19th of May, 1995);

(ii) that the late John Baptist Manumate had signed a Timber Rights Agreement dated the 9th September, 1989 (1988), granting timber rights to the Defendant in Tobo-Kakabona land, and that they were not aware that it had been terminated or withdrawn.

By summons dated 8/5/95, two matters have been raised for determination by this Court:

(i) That the landowners claiming to be owners of Vatukeke Land adjacent to Tobo-Kakabona Land who permitted road construction, namely Aniseto Kekepuala and Banaventure Manele be joined as defendants in this action.

The issue before this court which arose in the hearing of that summons was whether the Plaintiffs could adduce evidence challenging the validity of the Timber Rights Agreement of 1988 and any other Timber Rights Agreement which the Defendant may be relying on, in support of their objections to the two matters raised in the summons. The point raised by Mr Lavery, of Counsel for the Plaintiffs is that if it can be shown that the Agreement entered into whether in 1988 or subsequently, was invalid, then that would assist one Court greatly in exercising its discretion against granting the application of the Defendants. Unfortunately, attractive though the argument be, it overlooks a cardinal principle in contract law as to the rights of third parties under such an Agreement made between two separate entities.

It is my view that to take that course would be prejudicial to the claim as raised in submissions so far concerning their denials of ownership of the said land by the Plaintiffs. Such an approach would imply concession of ownership on the part of the Defendants to the Plaintiffs (which is strongly in the event that it should transpire that ownership is vested in the Plaintiffs, then, only then does the issue of validity of the Timber Rights Agreement became relevant.

It is noted that the issue of validity of the Timber Rights Agreement may become a valid issue, but that at this point of the proceedings and by virtue of the claim of the Plaintiffs it is not appropriate to permit the raising of that issue by the Plaintiff. To do so would be prejudicing the real contentious issues at this point of time.

The defence raised by the Defendants as to the existence of a valid Timber Rights Agreement is based on an Agreement with a separate and distinct land-owning group, the Lakuili Tribe. The issue of the validity of that Agreement therefore, is one confined to the parties in that Agreement. The link which the Plaintiff seeks to come in through is by way of the assertion of their ownership rights over the disputed land.

The issue of ownership over the said land therefore is not only a triable issue but the real contentious issue in this claim. If the Plaintiff is not the owner of the said land, then that would dispose of their claim. If they are the true owners, then the alternative claim of the Defendants of the signing of that Timber Rights Agreement in 1988 or 1989 by the late John Baptist Manumate can then be addressed and the issue of the validity of that Timber Rights Agreement and any other Agreement can then be addressed, but not at this stage.

The simple reason is this. If the ownership of that disputed land is vested in the land-holding group with which the Defendants have signed a Timber Rights Agreement with, then that is the end of the Plaintiff’s claim and they have no jurisdiction to raise any further claim as against the Defendants, that is, even to raise the challenge of the validity of that Timber Rights Agreement.

Accordingly, it is not open and proper to raise those questions of the validity or invalidity of that Timber Rights Agreement at this stage, and I would ask that Counsel’s submissions be restricted to the grounds as raised in the summons.

A. R. PALMER
JUDGE