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Forest v Ali [1994] SBHC 54; HCSI-CC 1 of 1994 (12 April 1994)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No.1 of 1994

FOREST & ANOTHER

-v-

MAHLON ALI & ATTORNEY GENERAL

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Palmer J.)
Civil Case No.1 of 1994

Hearing: 7th April 1994
Judgment: 12th April 1994

P. Lavery for the First & Second Plaintiffs
Qotterson Q.C.)
M. Rackemann) for the 1st Defendant
F. Waleilia)
C. Ashley for the 2nd Defendant

PALMER J: On the 5th of January 1994, a Writ of Summons was filed together with a Statement of Claim by the plaintiffs. The Statement of Claim in essence stated that the First Defendant was not the customary landowner of Kotokuriana Island, including Mondo Mondo Island, although he was a member of the Vahole Tribe. The Plaintiffs instead allege that they are the true representatives of the Vahole tribe, and the customary landowners of Vahole Land, which included, Kotokuriana Island,·Mondo Mondo Island and Vahole Land, on the main land of New Georgia Island. On that basis they allege that the First Defendant had trespassed on their land and had caused damage and loss. In the alternative, they claim that the First Defendant had unlawfully converted the trees and thereby caused loss to the tribe and the Plaintiffs. On top of this, the Plaintiffs claim that the First defendant had acted illegally by extracting and exporting round logs, without a licence issued under section 5 of the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act, and that these therefore constitute, an offence under section 4 of the said Act.

Also on the same date, a Notice of Motion (ex-parte) was filed and heard by this court for a restraining order to be made against the First Defendant. The affidavit of Jack Forest, filed also on the same date, was attached in support of the application. An interim order was accordingly issued dated the 20th January 1994.

On the 29th March 1994, a Summons to set aside the interim order was filed on behalf of the First Defendant. Several affidavits have been filed in support of this summons.

On the 5th of April 1994, two further Notices of Motion have been filed by the Plaintiffs, seeking an amendment of the interim order to include Mondo Mondo Island and Vahole Land between Ombo and Tita Rivers; and seeking that a preliminary point of law be determined by the Court. The latter point was in respect of whether the Commissioner of Forests had power under section 7 of the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act to issue mill licences which also authorised the felling, extracting or exporting of round logs.

The first point to consider as already clearly laid down in the case of American Cyanamid Co. -v- Ethicon Ltd [1975] UKHL 1; (1975) A.C. 396, and recognised subsequently in other rulings of this Court, including the case of Meke - v- Solmac Construction Company Ltd (1982) Civil Case No. 44 and 45 of 1982, on the question of whether an interlocutory injunction should issue, is whether there is or are triable issues, or serious issues before this court.

In the first affidavit of Mahlon Ali, filed on the 31st March 1994, at paragraph 2, he states that he is a member of the Vahole Tribe, residing in Vahole Customary Land, and is a land owner of Vahole Customary land, including Kotukuriana Island. At paragraph 3, he states that the plaintiffs are not members of the Vahole Tribe. He did not specify which tribe the plaintiffs belonged to, but simply stated that they and their tribes came from Chubikopi village, Marovo Island.

In the first affidavit of Joseph Zio filed on the 5th April 1994, at paragraph 1, he states that he is a member of the Vahole Tribe. At paragraph 3, he states that Ikan Rove and himself were the tribe’s representatives in a discussion carried out with officers of Land use Development and Planning Unit (Ministry of Agriculture) in 1991, in an attempt to formulate some agricultural program that would benefit the community.

In Joseph Zio’s second affidavit, filed on the 6th April 1994, at paragraph 3, he states that neither Jack Forest (who is the brother of James Vora) nor John Nonga were members of the Vahole Tribe. He stated that they descended from Kema, who married Ade, who was of the Babata Tribe.

Also in the affidavit of Jonathan Evu, filed on the 5th April 1994, at paragraph 1, he states that he is the Chief by custom of the Vahole Tribe. At paragraph 2, he admits that Kotokuriana Island is owned by the Vahole Tribe. At paragraph 3, he states that the Plaintiffs are not members of the Vahole tribe, nor do they have any interest in custom in Vahole lands, and neither are they representatives of the Vahole Tribe.

At paragraph 4 of his affidavit, he states that the Plaintiffs are members of the Babata Tribe on Marovo Island.

In the hearing before this court on the 7th April 1994, the Plaintiff, Jack Forest, gave oral evidence, in which he stated that his grandfather, Kanijama, was the last known Chief of Vahole Tribe. He also referred to a land acquisition proceeding in 1972 and 1973 in which his father spoke on behalf of the Vahole tribe. The other claimant in that acquisition proceeding was the holy Mama, from the Christian Fellowship Church. An appeal was lodged against the finding of the Acquisition Officer, and so the matter was brought before the Magistrates’ Court sitting at Munda. His father, he said won the claim at that hearing.

I have already briefly outlined what the claim of the Plaintiffs was in the beginning of this ruling. The crucial issues in this case boil down to the questions as to;

(i) What is the Vahole Tribe? What is the genealogy of that tribe? And/or any distinguishing features of that tribe;

(ii) Who are, or is the Chief of Vahoe Tribe?

(iii) Who are or is the true representative of the Tribe and therefore lawfully entitled to grant the timber rights over that customary land (Vahole Land); in this respect, are the plaintiffs, or the First Defendant, the true representatives of the Vahole tribe?

In the affidavits filed on behalf of the First Defendant in this application, although there is a denial of the Plaintiffs as being members of the Vahole Tribe, there is no corresponding evidence to show forth what in their view or understanding was the genealogy of the Vahole Tribe, such that the Plaintiffs are not included in that tribe . I appreciate the fact that the issues raised above are matters solely within the jurisdiction of the local chiefs, the Local Courts and the Customary Land Appeal Court to determine. However, if it is to be raised before me, that the Plaintiffs do not have standing in custom to bring these proceedings, then at least it should be explained in sufficient detail why that is so. At this point of time, there are mere claims and allegations raised against each other, and the only way or the proper place where these matters can be properly dealt with, is under the recognised procedures, laid down under the Local Court (Amendment) Act 1985 and before the Local Court and the Customary Land Appeal Courts.

Have the issues raised by the plaintiffs, without evidential backing?; or in other words, are they frivolous and vexatious?

In the case of Mothercare Ltd -v-Robson Books Ltd (1979) F.S.R 466 at page 474, Sir Robert Megarry V.C. said:

“The prospects of the plaintiff’s success are to be investigated to a limited extent, but they are not to be weighed against his prospects of failure. All that has to be seen is whether the plaintiff has prospects of success which, in substance and reality, exist. Odds against success no longer defeat the plaintiff, unless they are so long that the plaintiff can have no success, but only a hope. If his prospects of success are so small that they lack substance and reality, then the plaintiff fails, for he can point to no question to be tried which can be called ‘serious’ and no prospect of success which can be called ‘real’.”

With due respects to the submissions of learned Counsel, Qotterson Q.C., for the Defendants, I am not satisfied at this point of time that the issues raised in custom by the Plaintiffs are without evidential backing. The questions that arise in custom from this claim cannot be heard by this Court, as Parliament has already laid down that such matters are to be dealt with under the local chiefs, the local courts and the customary land appeal court. Until these customary issues are determined, the claims of trespass and or unlawful conversion will remain in limbo.

This brings me to consider the preliminary question raised by the plaintiffs. The Office of the Commissioner of Forests is set up under the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act (Cap. 90). By the Forests and Timber (Amendments) Act 1984 at section 3, the Principal Act was amended at section 2(1) so that the ‘Conservator of Forests’ was changed to the ‘Commissioner of Forests Resources’. The Act is described as ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to forests and to control and regulate the timber industry and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith’.

The powers, duties and functions of the Commissioner of Forest Resources must necessarily emanate from the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act. Section 4(1) of the Act reads:

“Any person who fells any tree or removes any timber from any land for the purpose of sale thereof or of the products thereof otherwise than-

(a) for use within the Country as firewood or unmilled timber;

(b) for supplying logs for milling to a mill licensed under section 7, from within the area that mill is by its licence authorised to draw unmilled timber;

(c) for such other purpose declared by the Minister by notice to be exempt from the provisions of this section; or

(d) under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a valid licence issued under section 5, shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of three thousand dollars or to imprisonment of two years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.”

The words of section 4(1) is very clear. It refers to any person. Mr Lavery submits that it also includes any person who claims to be a landowner, or person(s) lawfully entitled to grant the timber rights over those trees.

Section 5(1) (c) of the Act as amended by the Forests and Timber (Amendment) Act 1984, makes specific provision for the granting of a licence ‘authorising the felling of trees upon and removal of timber from any customary land, when such felling and removal are the subjects of rights granted under an agreement duly approved by the Minister under Part IIA...’. Subsection 5 (1A) then makes provisions for the Commissioner of Forest Resources to set such terms and conditions as he may deem appropriate, in addition to six requirements as set out in paragraphs (a) to (d), of the same subsection.

The key word in section 5(1) (c) is the word ‘when’. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition vol. 5, at page 3001, it defined the word ‘when’ as ‘usually creating a condition precedent’. In terms of a licence to fell and remove trees under section 5(1) of the Act, it simply means that, unless there is a timber rights agreement duly approved by the Minister under Part IIA of the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act, then no licence should be issued by the Commissioner of Forest Resources over such customary land. And if no licence is issued by the Commissioner of Forest Resources, then section 4 of the Act applies unless, the action of the Defendants fall within the exceptions.

The question then arises, what about the customary landowner, who claims to be the lawful owner of the trees within that customary land? First, section 4 does not make any distinctions or restrictions as to the use of the word ‘person’. However, the contextual use of that word must be borne in mind when that section is being considered. Any customary landowner or member of any indigenous tribe within the country engaged in the timber industry must necessarily be wary of the provisions of section 4, but more importantly, he must look to the provisions of the said Act to guide him as to his conduct. The only situation recognised under the Act whereby a licence may be issued to fell trees and remove timber over customary land is as provided for under section 5(1) (c). Paragraph 5(1) (c), refers to an agreement under Part IIA of the said Act. One therefore must necessarily look next to the provisions of Part IIA. That part of the Act commences with section 5A, which is the definition section, of the words specifically used. Section 5B (l) then reads;

“Any person who wishes to carryon business in Solomon Islands as a timber exporter or sawmiller, and desires to acquire timber rights on customary land shall make application to the Commissioner in the prescribed form and manner and obtain his consent to negotiate with the appropriate Government, the area council and the owners of such customary land.”

How do the above provisions apply in the case of Mahlon Ali trading as Hovah Hardwood Enterprises? Does Mahlon Ali wish to carry on business in Solomon Islands as a timber exporter or sawmiller? Yes. Does he desire to acquire timber rights on customary land. The answer again in my view is yes. Section 5B (1) then requires (it is mandatory), that he shall make application in the prescribed form and manner etc.......

Another question then arises, what if a tribal group or a landowning group claiming itself to be the customary owners of the customary land, and therefore entitled to grant timber rights, wishes to carry on business in Solomon Islands as a timber exporter or sawmiller? Under what provision of the Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act does the group come under, or can it make its application, for a timber licence from the Commissioner of Forest Resources?

It is clear that a customary landowner is not exempt from the provisions of section 4. This simply means that such a person requires a licence to fell trees and remove timber. Section 5(1) (a) refers to any public land in which the Government has an interest. Paragraph 5(1) (b) refers to any other land other than customary land. The only other applicable provision is paragraph 5(1) (c), of the Act. I am unable to agree with the learned submissions of Mr Ashley and Mr Qotterson, that section 5(1) and (lA) is restricted only to Applicants who are not customary landowners. The most common case obviously is where the applicant is a foreign investor. That does not necessarily follow that if an applicant is a customary landowner that the provisions of such an Act then do not apply. That would be reading words into the Act which it did not say. The only difference in this particular instance is that we have an applicant, who is a national of the country, and therefore does not require Foreign Investment Board approval, but also is one, who is claiming to be the owner(s) of the land, and the timber rights. The matter is quite simple. The procedures as laid down in Part IIA of the Act must be complied with insofar as they are applicable. It is possible to assume that that part of the Act was enacted specifically with the foreign investor in mind, and that perhaps at the time of enactment, the very issue that is now before this Court was never contemplated. That may be unfortunate, but until Parliament intervenes to make the necessary changes, this Court is bound to give such fair, wide and liberal interpretation to the provisions of the act, short of usurping the role of Parliament as the law making body. In so doing, I am not satisfied that the submissions presented on behalf of the Defendants are correct.

I will now deal with the specific issue of the licensing of mills. Section 6 makes it an offence to install and or operate a mill otherwise than as provided for under section 7. Section 7 in turn provides:

(1) Upon application therefore and payment of the prescribed fee (if any) and subject to any general or special directions that may be given by the Minister, the Conservator may issue a licence to install and operate a mill subject to such terms and conditions as he may therein specify and may, at any time, with the agreement of the licensee, alter or amend the licence.

(2) Every licence issued under subsection (l) shall specify-

(a) the area or areas from which unmilled timber to be milled at the mill may be drawn; and

(b) the maximum quantity of unmilled timber that may be acquired or milled or the maximum quantity of milled timber that may be produced, during any specified period, and, without prejudice to the power to specify terms and conditions under subsection (1), every licence may specify the maximum quantities to be drawn or acquired from any specified area during any specified period.

The word ‘mill’ is defined in the Act and reads:

“means a sawmill and includes any mechanical powered plant, machinery or equipment for converting unmilled timber into milled timber, but does not include any plant, machinery or equipment which the Minister may be notice declare not to be a mill for the purpose of this Act.”

And the word ‘unmilled timber’ means ‘timber that has not been converted into milled timber’.

Mr Ashley submits that the Minister may by general or special directions empower the Commissioner of Forests to issue a mill licence which enables the licence holder to fell, extract and export timber as well.

What is the position of the sawmiller in respect of customary land? Section 5B (l) refers to any person who wishes to carry on business inter alia, as a sawmiller and desires to acquire timber rights. A person, who falls into that category, is obliged in the same way as the timber exporter, to comply with the requirements of Part IIA of the Act. With specific reference to Mahlon Ali, did he wish to carry on business as a sawmiller? The answer is yes. Did he desire to acquire timber rights on customary land? The answer again is yes.

It is immaterial at that point that he, as an applicant is also claiming to be a landowner and or the representative of the landowning group. That is a matter that will become evident as the procedure under Part IIA of the Act is set in motion and the public meeting is held under section 5C(1) of the Act for the Area Council to make determinations in respect of the matters listed in paragraph 5C(3). Ownership of customary land can never be taken for granted. Even in the clearest of cases, some dispute or claim usually emerges.

Once the sawmiller has acquired the timber rights over the customary land, that then entitles him to fell trees and remove timber for the sawmill. The Commissioner of Forest Resources can then impose the same standard requirements, relating to proper and safe logging practice, which currently apply to timber exporters. The only difference is that, whilst the timber exporter fells and removes timber for export, the sawmiller fells trees and removes timber to take to the sawmill. In such a case, the Sawmiller does not require a licence under section 5(1) and (1A) to fell trees and remove timber. He already would have acquired the timber rights which would have entitled him to fell and remove trees for the Sawmill. (See the definition section of the words ‘timber rights’).

He would not then be committing an offence under section 4(1) (b). In that particular case, it is my view that the Commissioner of Forest Resources can under section 7 impose as a term or condition, an export quota under that milling licence. The Sawmiller would already have under the timber rights agreement the right to fell trees and remove timber, over customary land for the sawmill. Accordingly, if for some reason the sawmiller considers it appropriate to export some of the logs to assist in the installation and operations of the sawmill, then it would in my view be within the ambit of the powers of the Commissioner of Forest Resources, to impose an export quota as a term or condition in that milling licence. But if I am wrong, and it should be held otherwise that no power lies with the Commissioner of Forest Resources, to authorise an export quota, then there is nothing to stop the sawmiller from also lodging an application under section 5(1) and (1A) and then relying on exactly the same timber rights agreement as obtained with the milling licence over the same customary land, to enable the saw miller to obtain a licence which would include an export quota. Note that it is already not an offence for the sawmiller to fell and remove trees. All that his second application under section 5(1) and (IA) would have been made simply for is so that he could get an export quota.

I will now turn to consider the mill licence issued in this particular case. The mill licence was issued to ‘Hova Hardwood Sawmilling Project’, with a licence No. TIM 3/135 and date of issue, 21/6/93. The licence was described as a ‘licence to operate a mill’ and in brackets on the front page it says ‘Where the Licencee is not authorised to fell trees’.

This is important to bear in mind because, under a letter dated the 13th July 1993, the Commissioner of Forest Resources subsequently granted an export quota to Hovah Hardwood Sawmilling Project of 30,000m3. On one hand I am satisfied, that that could easily be accommodated within the terms and conditions that the Commissioner of Forest Resources may specify, in the mill licence. That is however, clearly not a licence to fell trees under the mill licence. Round logs in my view clearly fall within the definition of ‘unmilled timber’, and accordingly, an export quota could be accommodated in that licence. The issue of that mill licence accordingly was proper. What was illegal or wrong, was the subsequent reliance by the First Defendant on that licence, to fell trees so that he could do exporting. Secondly, any reliance on the same mill licence to authorise the felling of trees for supply to the sawmill will also be illegal.

The question then may be asked, what about the felling of the trees by the landowners themselves for supply to the sawmill. That may be possible, but where as in this case, there is a challenge to the ownership of those trees or the correct representatives of the owners of those trees, then either an action is opened up in the recognised courts which have jurisdiction over customary matters, or the procedure: for granting of timber rights under Part IIA of the Act should be considered. As the mill licence stands, it does not authorise the felling of trees and removal of timber either for export or for sawmilling purposes.

The question therefore posed in the Notice of Motion filed on the 5th of April, to a certain extent is misconceived, in this particular case. The Commissioner of Forest Resources did not authorise the felling of trees under the mill licence. All that was authorised was an export quota of round logs. On the other hand where timber rights have been granted pursuant to Part IIA of the Act, the issue of felling trees would not arise, and what could possibly happen is that the Commissioner of Forest Resources may simply decide then to give an export quota, attached to that mill licence as well. In- this particular example, the Commissioner of Forest Resources would be acting within his that depending upon the circumstances of each case, the Commissioner of Forest Resource does have power to authorise an export quota in round logs under a mill licence.

The position therefore with the mill licence which the First Defendant holds is that he does not have a licence to fell trees, either for export or for milling. No one therefore can rely on that mill licence to fell trees, simply because he did not acquire any timber rights for that purpose under Part IIA of the Act.

The problem with the argument advanced that it is the customary landowners who are supplying the logs to the sawmill is that that right of the customary landowners is now under challenge. It seems that the dispute or challenge raised is not so much a customary land dispute, since the ownership of that customary land, and the boundary or area of that customary land, is not in dispute. Both parties agree over the area of Vahole land as including Kotokuriana Island, Mondo Mondo Island and an area of land on the mainland. Both agree that Vahole Land is owned by Vahole Tribe. The dispute is over the issue of Chieftainship, perhaps genealogy, and membership of the tribe and the right to represent the tribe. These are important issues, and the appropriate court to commence proceedings with would be the Local Court.

I now turn to consider the criterion of damages as a remedy on the question of whether an interlocutory injunction should issue. The question to be considered is, will damages be an adequate remedy for either party? or as stated in the case of Evans Marshall &: Co. Ltd -v-Bertola SA. (1973) 1.W.L.R.349, per Sachs L.J:

“The standard question in relation to the grant of an injunction – ‘Are damages an adequate remedy?’-might in the light of recent authorities, be re-written-’Is it just, in all the circumstances, that a plaintiff should be confined to his remedy in damages?’”(p.379H).

Mr Qotterson submits that because all the exportable logs have been felled, that the only remedy available to the plaintiffs is one in damages. With respect, that is not entirely correct, as Mr Lavery has correctly pointed out that, millable trees are still in place, and that accordingly, it would be proper that the plaintiffs claim be protected concerning those trees and what the plaintiffs may possibly wish to do with the land should they win the case. Irreparable damage to the land may be caused and development undertaken which the plaintiff may not necessarily agree with, should the injunction be not granted.

On the other hand, the Defendants allege that they stand to lose out on a number of seedlings (1,500) if the remaining trees are not felled in time for them to be planted, and the risk of losses as enumerated in page 8 at paragraph (c) of the written submissions of Mr Qotterson. I am satisfied on the other hand, that damages will be an adequate remedy. However, the question of whether the Plaintiffs will be able to foot the bill if they lose out is another matter. This is obviously the reason why no undertaking has been provided.

The question of whether an undertaking for damages must be given where an injunction is obtained is not necessarily a mandatory requirement. The court will not generally deny the plaintiff an interlocutory injunction to which he would be otherwise entitled simply because his undertaking in damages would be of limited value. This is especially so in the case of landowners taking claims against richer, more powerful companies or persons. Mr Lavery referred to the case of Hitukera -v- Hyndai Timber Company Ltd & Maepeza CC132/92, judgment delivered on the 24th August 1992, in which· the court recognised that the plaintiff in that case was legally aided by the Public Solicitor, and dispensed with the requirement for an undertaking for damages. I think the same can be said in this particular case.

In his submissions Mr Qotterson has also pointed out that the risk of actual loss that the plaintiffs might suffer if the injunction is refused is small. He points to the fact that the plaintiffs are not residents of Kotokuriana Island, do not have family groups and do not identify themselves with any block on the island. In the oral evidence of Jack Forest, the last time he said he visited the island was about 1972-1973. Accordingly, an injunction he says should not be issued on the balance of convenience. I have already weighed this point with the irreparable damage and loss that the plaintiffs could suffer concerning their claim, if an injunction is refused, but that the plaintiffs eventually wins this case. The balance of convenience in my view weighs more on maintaining the status quo.

On the issue of delay, Mr Qotterson submits that there has been prolonged delay in the commencement of these proceedings and as a result a lot of work had already been carried out by the Community over Kotokuriana Island and Mondo Mondo Island. Mr Lavery however, points out that the Plaintiff had done what they could in the circumstances where communications and transport are difficulty. He referred to the affidavit of Jack Forest filed on the 5th of January 1994 in which he outlined the actions taken since becoming aware of the activities of the 1st Defendant. I am not satisfied that the issue of delay has been made out.

The purpose of an interlocutory injunction in essence is like, holding the fort pending the hearing of the substantive issues. It seeks to maintain the status quo without having to express any opinion on the merits of the case as far as is possible. In Spry, Equitable Remedies, (2nd Ed.) p430 states:

“An interlocutory injunction is an injunction that is directed to ensure that particular acts do not take place or continue to take place pending the final determination by the Court of the rights of the parties.”

An in, ‘Commercial Litigation: Pre-emptive Remedies by I.S. Goldrein and K.H.P Wilkinson, 1987 page 1, the learned authors point out that it seeks:

“......to regulate the position of the parties pending trial whilst avoiding a decision on issues which could only be resolved at trial.”

On weighing all the relevant factors together, I make the following orders:

(i) The First Defendant, his servants or agents are restrained from felling, extracting and exporting timber from Kotokuriana Island, Mondo Mondo Island, and Vahole Land between Ombo and Tita River.

(ii) Logs or timbers already felled and currently on the ground can be disposed off (including to be exported) but the proceeds of sale should either be paid into court or into a Solicitor’s trust account by agreement with the parties until trial or further order. Reasonable expenses may be deducted but a complete statement of account must be provided.

(iii) The First Defendant, his servants or agents are restrained from disposing of any proceeds of sale of such timber and to pay all such sums in their possession or which may come into their possession into court or into a solicitor’s trust account by consent between the parties.

(iv) An account of all logs felled and exported and the proceeds obtained to date must be filed with the court within 30 days or as soon as is possible thereafter.

(v) Part 2 of the Notice of motion filed on the 5/4/94 and seeking an order under O.53 R.4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1964 requiring National Bank of Solomon Islands Limited to detain and preserve any funds belonging to the Defendant is denied. The orders made are sufficient to cater for that.

(vi) The Plaintiff shall commence proceedings with the appropriate Local Court (either the Marovo Local Court or the Roviana Local Court) within 30 days from today’s date, failing which the Defendant shall be at liberty to apply to have the interlocutory injunction discharged. (This is not a direction by this court to the Local Court. This means that any determination of the Local Court will be subject to the rights of appeal of the parties to the Customary Land Appeal Courts in the normal way).

(vii) Costs in the cause.

(A.R.Palmer)
JUDGE