IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS COURT OF APPEAL

Case name: 	Worldlink Resources Ltd v Bintan Mining (SI) Ltd 	
		
Citation:		
		
Decision date: 	12 May 2025	
		
Nature of Jurisdiction	Application for leave to appeal out of time 	
		
Court File Number(s):	5 of 2023	
		
Parties: 	Worldlink Resources Limited v Bintan Mining (Is) Limited, Asia Pacific Investment Development Limited, China Fancy International Development Pte Limited	
		
Hearing date(s): 	15 March 2023	
		
Place of delivery: 		
		
Judge(s): 	Palmer; CJ (Sitting as single Judge of Appeal) 	
		
Representation: Applicant/Appellant 
First Respondent:	
L. Kwaiga 
-	
Second Respondent 
Third Respondent 	G. Suri 
R. Kingmele 	
Catchwords: 		
		
Words and phrases:		
		
Legislation cited:	Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rule 2007, r 10 (2)	
		
Cases cited:	Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1968] UKHL 4, Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, Price Waterhouse v Reef Pacific Trading Ltd [1996] SBCA 5	
		
Ex Tempore/Reserved:		
		
Allowed/Dismissed:	Judgment of the Court-Dismissed 	
		
Pages:	1-7	

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
1. 	This is an application for leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment of the High Court (Keniapisia J.), dated 3rd February 2023 pursuant to Rule 10(2) of the Solomon Islands Court of Appeal Rules, 1983. 
2. 	That judgment/ ruling dismissed the application of the Appellant (Defendant in the High Court), and instead granted the application of the Third Respondent (China Fancy International Development PTE Limited), (Applicant in the High Court) and the Application of the Second Respondent (an Interested Party in the High Court), inter alia, awarding costs, against the Appellant and releasing the sum of $90,000 of the Security Money in favour of the Second Respondent and the balance in favour of the Third Respondent.
3. 	The total sum of the Security Money in dispute was $1.75 million, which had been held in security inter alia to enable the ship MV Shor-e-Punjab and its cargo of bauxite to be released.  The security money should have been paid by the Appellant, but as it had no money, it was paid into Court instead by the Third Respondent.
4. 	Following the release of the ship, the Appellant filed an application to have the money released to it, which was refused by the Court.
5. 	The Appellant accordingly lodged an appeal against the orders of the Court below.
The Appeal.
6. 	The Application for leave to file an appeal seeks inter alia, a stay of proceedings and an order that the sum of SBD 1.75 million held as security be released to the Appellant.
7. 	While the ruling of the learned judge refers to an application filed on 18 November 2022, it is accepted that the relevant application was filed on 11 August 2022.
8. 	The Third Respondent, opposes the grant of leave to appeal on two principal grounds: 
i.	that the proposed appeal has no arguable prospect of success; and 
ii.	that, in any event, the appeal would serve no practical purpose, as the trust funds have already been lawfully disbursed.
The Draft Notice of Appeal
9. 	The Appellant’s draft Notice of Appeal is set out as follows:
	“
1.	That the learned Judge erred in law and/or fact and/or his discretion when he dismissed the Appellant's Application for Stay of Proceeding and Release of Security Monies (the "Application") filed on 18 August 2022 without considering the evidence filed for and on behalf of the Appellant.
2.	That the learned Judge erred in law and/or fact and thereon misdirected himself when he dismissed the Appellant’s Application on the basis that a Quistclose Trust existed by failing to properly consider and apply the said principle of law as enunciated in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investinents Ltd [1968] UKHL 4 as it applied to the proceeding before him.
3.	That the learned Judge erred in law and/or fact and miscarried when he dismissed the Appellant's Application without considering the entire circumstances of the parties and/or all evidences filed for and on behalf of the parties.”
The Application for Leave to Appeal.
10. 	In the application for leave to appeal, the Appellants submits that the learned Judge's Interlocutory Judgment is prejudicial to the Appellant in that the Appellant's rights to the Security Monies were not considered fully.
11. 	The Appellant also submits that the learned Judge erred in his interpretation and application of the principle of law/equity namely the Quistclose Trust and resulting in an erroneous decision being issued.
Grounds of the Proposed Appeal
12. 	The three main grounds identified in the Appellant’s draft Notice of Appeal can be summarised as follows:
(1) 	That the learned judge erred in law and/or fact by failing to consider the Appellant’s evidence in support of the Application;
(2) 	That the learned judge misapplied the legal principle of a Quistclose Trust, as set out in Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1968] UKHL 4;
(3) 	That the judge failed to consider all relevant circumstances and evidence.
13. 	The Appellant contends that the security deposit was paid for specific purposes—namely, the release of the vessel MV Sher-e-Punjab and the protection of cargo interests—and that those purposes having been fulfilled, the funds ought to have been returned to it.
14. 	The Appellant further submits that no responsive evidence was filed by the Respondents opposing the stay application, and that the High Court erred in determining that the funds were subject to a Quistclose Trust in favour of the Third Respondent.
ANALYSIS - No Arguable Prospect of Success
15. 	To obtain leave for an appeal against an interlocutory order or direction, the applicant must demonstrate that there is some merit, indicating a reasonable prospect of success.
16. 	Upon review, the Court finds no arguable prospect that the proposed appeal would succeed. The Appellant's primary submission—that the funds were no longer subject to trust obligations—rests largely on factual claims unsupported by admissible evidence.
17. 	The Third Respondent has rightly pointed out that the Appellant's evidence below consisted of inadmissible hearsay regarding payments allegedly made by its buyer, Alaska. Even accepting that demurrage may have been paid by the buyer, such payment does not establish a right in the Appellant to the funds. A payment made by a third party (i.e., the buyer) does not extinguish the obligations or liabilities between the Appellant and the Third Respondent.
18. 	The High Court was entitled to conclude that the security deposit remained governed by a Quistclose Trust. As clarified in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, such a trust arises where funds are advanced for a specific purpose and are not to be used for any other. The learned judge found that the security deposit retained its trust character, and that determination does not appear plainly wrong.
19. 	It is incumbent upon the Appellant to demonstrate that the judge erred in his application of both the facts and the law regarding the security deposit. If the Quistclose Trust does not apply, the Appellant must provide sufficient evidence to support its claim that the security deposit belonged to it. I am not satisfied that such evidence has been established in this case.
20. 	The Appellant's submissions, while referring extensively to English authorities, fail to demonstrate any misapplication of law or serious procedural irregularity on the part of the High Court.
21. 	Moreover, it would be inequitable to permit the Appellant—whose conduct allegedly necessitated the posting of security in the first instance—to benefit from the return of funds it did not itself deposit, especially where the loss to the Third Respondent has not been discharged.
22. 	If the Appellant claims that money is owed, it bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence to support that claim and demonstrating that the determination of the judge was erroneous.
23. 	I am not satisfied that has been shown or established on this application for leave. 
No Practical Utility
24. 	Even if arguable grounds existed, the proposed appeal would serve no practical purpose. The unchallenged affidavit of Mr Kingmele, filed on 14 March 2023, confirms that the trust monies have already been disbursed following the High Court’s orders.
25. 	Accordingly, any appeal—if allowed—would be rendered nugatory, as the funds are no longer in court or solicitor control and cannot be the subject of an effective order for restitution.
26. 	In any event, if some merit had been established (which is denied), this matter would have been addressed in the appeal. 
Conclusion
27. 	For the reasons set out above, the Court finds that the proposed appeal lacks both arguable merit and practical utility and the application for leave to appeal is refused.
Orders of the Court:
1.	Refuse Application for leave to appeal.
2.	Award costs in favour of the Third Respondent to be taxed if not agreed.
Sir Albert R. Palmer CBE
Judge of Appeal.