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Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands

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Billy Hilly v Pitakaka 1 [1994] SBCA 1; CA-CAC 299 of 1994 (22 October 1994)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Appeal Case 299 of 1994

class="MsoNormal" aal" align="center" style="text-align:center; margin-top:1; margin-bottom:1">BETWEEN:

ass="MsoNormal" aal" align="center" style="text-align:center; margin-top:1; margin-bottom:1">BILLY HILLY & OTHERS
Plaintiffs

AND:

ass="MsoNormal" aal" align="center" style="text-align:center; margin-top:1; margin-bottom:1">PITAKAKA & ANOTHER
Respondents

Before: Connolly P.
Los JA

Delivered this 22nd day of October 1994

JUDGMENT OF CONNOLLY P AND LOS JA

On 17 October 1994 an Originating Summons was issued by the plaintiffs against the defendants for declarations as to the powers of the 1st defendant as Governor General of Solomon Islands. The second danendant is Leader of the Opposition. He has not aedeared and does not wish to take any part in the proceedings. The plaintiffs the Prime Minister elected pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Constitution after the gehe general elections of 1993, The Speaker e National Parliament and the Commissioner of Police.

On 21st October the question of law arising on the hearing of the Originating Summons was referred to the Court of Appeal by Palmer J under section 14 of the Court of Appeal Act and the Court, having regard to the high importance of the matter proceeded immediately to hear and determine the questions raised, the Attorney General appearing for the plaintiffs and Mr Teutao of Counsel for the Governor General.

The circumstances out of which these proceedings arise may be shortly stated as follows. As a resu the general elections in 1993, The Hon Francis Billy Hilly MP on 18 June 1993 received 24 votes in the election for Prime Minister to 23 cast fo opponent. Thirt held thid this that was an absolute majority of the Parliament of 47 members for the purposes of Schedule 2 to the Constitution. s, noless, the, the narrowerrowest such majority possible and his position was obviously vulnerable to possible defections from supporters. So it pr The minuf a me a meeting between the Governor General and the Prime Minister of 31 August record that His Excellency questione Parlt had not coot convened and the Prime Minister’s response was that his party was “uncertain it had the necessary strength to pass legislation and defeat the no-confidence motion planned by the Opposition.” He acknowledged that he had only two options, to delay calling Parliament indefinitely or resign.

By the beginning of October 1994 6 members including 5 ministers had left his party and on 2 October he gave His Excellency to understand that he would list his supporters and resign if he did not have a majority. This, in itself, suggested that he would not have survived a vote of no confidence had the Parliament been sitting: and in fact, on 5 October formed His Excellency in writing that he no longer had the numbers, which was clearly arly an admission that this was the position. The House however had not sat since January. an>Had it been sittingtting and had a motion of no confidence been moved, he would have lost it and been obliged to resign pursuant to s.34 of the Contion. His Excs Excellenvi advised him to resolve the situation. His continued prevarication thereafter could only have signified (a) that there was no significant improvement in the level of support he couunt on; and (b) his deis determination to continue in office notwithstanding. ttorney-Generaeneral argued that the Prime Minister is proposing to call the Parliament together in November but in the lig the history of this matter that cannot necessarily be guaranteed.

The implications are so serious that the circumstances can properly be described as extreme when coupled with the decision of the High Court on 4 October 1994 in Abe –v- Minister of Finance and Attorney General that the Hilly Government has borrowed millions of dollars in excess of Parliamentary authorisation, in breach of s.105 of the Constitution.

The central feature of the structure of government under the Constitution of Solomon Islands is majority rule. The PMinister ster is elected by the procedure set out in Schedule 2, a procedure conducted by the Governor General to identify the candidate with an absolute majority. He isHe is as , as in many countries including the United Kingdom, selected by the Head of State. Should he lose the support of the majority of the Parliament he may be defeated on a motion of no-confidence passed by an absolute majority of votes whereupon the Governor General is required to remove him from office: s.34. Indeed this Court in the Speaker v Danny Phillip (Appeal No. 5 of 1990) gave as a reason for limiting the application of Standing Order 36(3) which was said to deny the right to move a motion of no-confidence, that if interpreted literally it could result in a government without a majority remaining in office for a long period when it no longer had popular support.

“The result could be that the mechanism provided by the Constitution for the removal of a Government may become inoperative, and even a Government which does not have the confidence of the House may continue in an unchallenged position for many months. In odgment, sut, such a conclusion would be quite unsatisfactory and inconsistent with the principle for which Mr Nori strongly as we think, rightly contended, that is, the principle of majority rule in a Parliameliament democracy. Mr Nressed us with with the proposition that it is our duty to interpret the Constitution in a way which advances rather than impedes the principles of majority Government.”

His Excellency, in his Speech to the Nation on 17 October 1994 was, in our judgment, correct in saying:

“The democratic principle of ‘government by majority rule’ forms the bedrock of our constitutional system.”

This position reflects the British practice of identifying the Prime Minister by his leadership of the majority party or political grouping in the House of Commons, although, of course, the Constitution of Solomon Islands does not give to the Governor General the function of identifying the candidate with majority support but substitutes the electoral procedure set out in Schedule 2.

What differentiates Australian constitutional practice from that of Solomon Islands is that dismissal of a Prime Minister by the Governor General is provided for only in s.34, that is, after this defeat on a motion of no-confidence. Wr this proposroposition is for all circumstances can await another day. What ast is es establishe our judgment is that a Prime Minister who hangs on to offi office while conceding that he has no majority is in no position to t that the Governor General’s functions can only be exbe exercised on his advice.

S.72(1) vests in the Governor-General the function of appointing the place and the time of the holding of sessions of the Parliament. His Excey, has, has ordered the Speaker convene the National Parliament on Monday 31 October next.& In the circumstances there can be no doubt about the validity of that order. The question whethehether the first plaintiff has been validly removed from office would appear to be academic.

The questions asked of us and our answers are as follows:-

(i) Whether it is lawful for the Leader of the Opposition to advise the Governor-General to cause the Prime Minister to step down or otherwise remove him from office outside the floor of Parliament;

Answer: The Leader of Opposition may lawfully express such an opinion but he can give no advice within the meaning of s.31(1) of the Constitution.

(ii) Whether it is lawful for the Governor-General to act on the advice of the Leader of Opposition to remove the Prime Minister from outside the floor of Parliament;

Answer: See answer to (i).

(iii) Whether it is lawful for the Governor-General to remove the Prime Minister from office on the basis that he has lost majority support outside the floor of Parliament;

Answer: Unnecessary to answer.

(iv) Whether it is lawful for the Governor-General to unilaterally direct the Speaker of the National Parliament to convene Parliament as directed by the Governor-General in whatever form;

Answer: Yes, in the circumstances which obtained in 13 October 1994.

(v) Whether it is lawful for the Governor General to direct Commissioner of Police to execute warrant signed and issued on Thursday 13th October, 1994.

Answer: Unnecessary to answer.

We find it unnecessary to discuss the existence and extent of the reserve powers of the Governor-General. ugh there was was no extensive argument on the point it would seem that His Excellency should not have been sued in his personal name but in that of his office.

CONNOLLY, P.
LOS, JA


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