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Supreme Court of Palau |
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
APPELLATE DIVISION
ERIC KLOULUBAK, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF PALAU, Appellee. |
Cite as: 2018 Palau 3
Civil Appeal No. 17-003
Appeal from Civse Case No. 15-044
Decided: May 18, 2018
Counsel for Appellant....................................................... Johnson Toribiong
Counsel for Appellees....................................................... Caroline Baird, AAG
BEFORE: ARTHUR NGIRAKLSONG, Chief Justice
JOHN K. RECHUCHER, Associate Justice
R. BARRIE MICHELSEN, Associate Justice
Appeal from the Trial Court, the Honorable Kathleen Salii, Associate Justice, presiding.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
[ 1] Kloulubak appeals the trhe trial court’s award of $100 damages for the night he spent in the Koror jail. On appeal, he argues that since the trial court found the conditions of his incarion constitutionally deficieficient, his damages should be compensated at a rate of $10,000 an hour, or $180,000. Because the trial court’s findings of fact contain no clear error, and on those facts we also find no abuse of discretion regarding the award amount, we affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[ 2] rial court’s findifindings included the following:
On New Year’s Eve of 2014, Plaintiff Eric Kloulubak was under the influence of alcohol and engaged in a heated arg ... outside the Peleliu Cliu Club in Medalaii, Koror. Around 1:45 a.m. on January 1, 2015, Plaintiff was arrested by BPD officers .. and transported to the Koror Jail where he was detained for over eighteen hours before being released from custody.
Due to overcrowding at the jail, Plaintiff was handcuffed to a metal pipe or post outside the jail, in view of the parking lot, together with other detainees. This pipe is referred to in the Bureau of Public Safety’s logbook entries as the “Pipe of Shame” ...
[Four duty officers testified that they] observed Plaintiff as being intoxicated, loud, and argumentative, demanding that he be moved from the Pipe to the jail facilities. He also banged on the pipe with his hands and head; as a result, the other detainees who were cuffed to the pipe asked that Plaintiff be moved away from them. As a result of his conduct and request, officers then decided to move Plaintiff from the Pipe to a solitary cell inside the jail, for his protection as well as for the protection of the other detainees. He was processed and moved to one of the solitary cells at 2:35 a.m. on January 1, 2015, and was released at 11:10 p.m. the same day, just short of 24 hours since he was placed in custody. He was locked in the solitary confinement cell for most of that time.
Kloulukab v. ROP, CA 15-044, Decision at 2-3 (May 16, 2017) (hereinafter, “Trial Court Opinion”).
[ 3] te that this is not the the first time the Trial Division has heard evidence regarding solitary confinement conditions at the jail. In re Ngirchomlei, CA No. 99-49 (Tr. Div. 1999) (ord release of six inmates fros from solitary confinement, back to general prison population). In re Angelino, 22 ROP 183 (Tr. Div. 2014) (ordering release of an inmate from solitary confinement).
[ 4] After thellant pleaded gded guilty to disorderly conduct regarding his involvement in the incident at the Peleliu Club, he sued the Republic of Palau and various officed supervisory personnel of the Bureau of Public Safety and and the Ministry of Justice for violation of his constitutional rights during his confinement.
[ 5] The parties filed crotiomotions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the individually-named defendants, with the remaining defendant being the National Government. That dismissal is not appealed. Also ppealed is the trial court&ourt’s rejection of the government’s argument that it is not liable on the evidence presented. Consequently, this appeal concerns the adequacy of the damages award.
STANDARDS ON APPEAL
[ 6] ding of fact concerning ning damages will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, 11 ROP 79 (2004). Findings of the lower court are set aside if they lack evidentiary sary support in the record such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached that conclusion. Gabriel v. Children of Urrei Bells, 19 ROP 117 (2012).
[ 7] We have not had occato c to consider the standard of review for the adequacy of an award for general damages, but since such damages include pain and suffering, enjoyment of life, imilar intangibles not susceptible to mathematical calculatculation, the trial court’s assessment of general damages will be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
TRIAL COURT FINDINGS
[ 8] on the trial court̵’s findings of fact, the court held that the solitary confinement conditions at the Koror jail subjected Plaintiff to a violation of his constitution right to be of “cruel, inhumane oane or degrading treatment,” Palau Const. Art. IV § 10. The court then turned to assessing damages.
Compensatory damages, otherwise known as “actual damages,” “are recoverable at law from a wrongdoer as compensation for the actual loss or injuries sustained by reason of the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing. The term, while excluding damages characterized as punitive or exemplary, contemplates the usual common-law measure of damages.”
Nebre v. Uludong, 15 ROP 15, 31 (2008) (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 25 (2003)).
[ 9] There is no reas adopt aopt a separate compensation approach for damages brought to vindicate constitutional rights. Like all civil cases, Plaintiffs may plead and prove their l damages for a legal wrong done. Because United States feds federal courts have long experience in litigation involving civil rights, we turn to that experience to consider standards for assessing general damages.
[ 10] “A Plaintiff who alleges the violation of a constitutional right is not entitled to compensatory damages unless he can prove actual injury caused e violation.” King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing CaCarey v. Piphus, [1978] USSC 41; 435 U.S. 247, 264[1978] USSC 41; , 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978). Moreover, “damages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, [1986] USSC 147; 477 U.S. 299, 310[1986] USSC 147; , 106 S.Ct. 2537 (1986). However, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate.” Id. at 310-11. In these cases of difficult-to-establish injuries, “presumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure.” Id. at 311.
[ 11] The trialt’s appr approach here matched those standards. The transcript shows, as the trial court stated, “Plaintiff did littre than simply assert how much he should be given.” The Plaintiff’s case includncluded “no evidence to show that Plaintiff missed any work, suffered any lasting physical effects, or suffered any lasting emotional effects.” Trial Court Opinion at 9.
[ 12]example, Appellant made made the following responses on cross-examination:
[ 13] Q : Au still go about yout your business, right? You still spend time with your kids, I’m sure. Go to various functions, despit fact that this incident occurred?
[ 14] A : Yes. [ 16] A : No.
[ 17] Q : Su hav217;t beennoiagnoiagnosed with any type of, uh mental condiconditions as a result of this incident?
[ 18] A : No.[ 20] A : Yes, t8217;ht. [ 21] Q : Andly, your daily lily life hasn’t changed a bd a bit, has it?
[ 22] A do you me
[ [ 23] Q : Well, re still goin going to work, right? Your arer are still spending time with your family, kione of those have changed?
[ 24] A : No.
[ 25 : Corr Correct?
[br> [ 26] A : Correct.
[ 27] Tr. 105:6-28 & 106:1.
[ 28] The trial colso noted tted that the Plaintiff’s exnce oonstinal trel treatmenatment was “partly offset, however, by the fact that Plaintiff was iwas intoxicated and likely asleep for much of tme he was confined.” 221; Trial Court Opinion at 10. The court’s use of the expression “likely asleep” should not be interpreted simply as speculation. The testimony of Hobson Sechalboi, BPS Officer at the DOC, included the following responses:
[ 29] Q when you checked up d up Mr. Kloulubak on your hourly head count, what was he doing?
[ 30] A : He was sleeping.
[ 31] Q : And every time ent went around did you see him sleeping?
[ 32] A :
[   33] Tr. 118:1
[ &182; 34] Allen Bemorrections Offs Officer at the DOC, testified: [ 36] A : He : He was sleeping.
[ 37] Q : Du ever seedoing anng anythinything else besides sleeping.
[ 38]: Nope.
[ 39] Tr:19-23.
2;] Me1] Melvin Ubedei, Corrections Officer at the DOC tDOC testified:
[ 41] Q : IQ : I’m trying to figure out, did yor che on Mr. Kloulubaklubak to see what he was doing in that celt cell?
[ 42] A : Yes. I went anid chid check on him that ftime and he appeared to have calmed down and was sitting ding down. And the second time I went in for routine check he was already, s asleep.
[ 43] THE CO He’s what what what?
[ 44] A : He was asleeplockblockquote>...
[ 45]So, once Mr. Kloulubak ibak is in the cell. You said that you were still checking, you were doing your head count, right? To make sure that everybody was there and you saw Mr. Kloulubak in thl a couple of times. Did yoid you have any further reactions with him?
[ 46] A : No. arlier, early trly that morning I went to check on him again and when I went he was still asleep. So, I just moved that latch or unlatched, the latch for the dod then I left.
[ 47] 48:15-24 & 14p; 149; 149:2-12.
[ 48] Q : How do yow that Erit Eric was sleeping?
[ 49] A : I flashedhe wind window.
[ 50] Was he lying down on h on his back or side?
[҈51] A : He was face up on the cement. And snoring.
[ 5. 157:13-16.CONCLUSION
[ 53]conditions for solitary tary confinement do not appear to have changed at all since the Ngirchomlei case in 1999. As deplorable as the facts are in this case, and as troubling as it is for almost twenty years mems members of this Court have noted with disapproval the unchanging solitary confinement conditions at the Koror jail, a Plaintiff who asks for compensatory damages must prove them. In light of the dearth of evidence concerning damages, the trial court’s assessment of presumed damages was not an abuse of discretion.
[ 54] Affirmed.
SO ORDERED, this 18th day of May, 2018.
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