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Klobak v Ueki [2018] PWSC 17; 2018 Palau 17 (19 September 2018)

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
APPELLATE DIVISION

Cite as: 2018 Palau 17
Civil Appeal No. 17-001
Appeal from Civil Action No. 14-043 & 14-165 (consolidated)

Decided: September 19, 2018

Counsel for Appellant Pro se

Counsel for Appellee Lalii Chin Sakuma

BEFORE: ARTHUR NGIRAKLSONG, Chief Justice
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice
DENNIS K. YAMASE, Associate Justice

Appeal from the Trial Division, the Honorable Lourdes F. Materne, Associate Justice, presiding.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

[ 1] case arises out of a disa dispute surrounding a funeral and burial, but the heart of the dispute is broader and extends back decades. Nine years ago at the conclusion of extensive litigation, Court noted that, in 2007, 007, the Trial Division marked the underlying conflict between the parties as a “‘more-than-20-year-old dispute.’” Orak v. Ueki, 17 ROP 42, 42 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
[ 2] The lants/Cross-Appelleeellees (Plaintiffs below; hereinafter “Appellants”) filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injue relief, and the Appellees/Cross-Appellants (Defendants below; hereinafter “Appelleeellees”) brought a counterclaim, also requesting declaratory relief. Intervening parties contended that the burial was not authorized and sought to have the deceased’s remains removed from the burial location. The Appellees also filed a separate lawsuit suing the Appellants for trespass. The cases were then consolidated. The Trial Division granted a temporary restraining order and, following trial, determined that the intervening parties did not control the land and denied most declaratory relief sought by the parties because there remained no live controversy and “harm or dilution of some right [was] not present in the Counterclaim.” Findings of Fact and Decision 4 (“Decision”). It further denied the Appellants’ request for damages. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND in part.

FACTS

[ 3] The undeg cases in dispudispute began in 2014 when the Appellants filed suit to prevent the Appellees from interfering with a funeral at the Ngerbachesis Bai in Ngermida member of the Uchelkeyukl Clan who the Appellants claim waim was Rechiungel of the clan. The Appellants sought a temporary restraining order preventing the Appellees from interfering in the funeral and burial of the deceased, compensatory and punitive damages, and declaratory relief.
[ 4] The Appellees brou countcounterclaim seeking various declaratory relief, including a judgment that they are the strong members of Yungel Lineage of Uchelkeyukl Clan with authority to appoint the title bearers oelkeyukl Clan.^[1] They also contended that the deceased was not Rechiungel of Uchelkeyukl Clan as the Appellants claimed and sought related declaratory relief.^[2] Additional intervenors claimed to own the land where the burial took place and sought to have the deceased’s remains exhumed. In a second lawsuit (before it was consolidated with the first trial court case), the Appellees sued the Appellants for trespass.^[3]
[ 5] Thal Division issued a td a temporary restraining order against the Appellees, enjoining them from interfering with the funeral at Ngerbachesis Bai and the burial that followed on Cadastral Lot 08 B 39, referred to by they the parties as Ngerkesulang. After trial, the Trial Division determined that Ngerkesulang is owned by Ngerkesulang Lineage and found that the individual intervenors were at best ulechell members of Ngerkesulang Clan and that there were living ochell members of that clan, including one who testified that he did not object to the deceased’s burial at Ngerkesulang. As a result, the Trial Division concluded that the intervenors did not have exclusive authority over the use of Ngerkesulang. The Trial Division refused to consider the declaratory relief sought by the parties, in part, “because of the lack of a live controversy as between the parties.” Decision 8.
[ 6] The partive filed cross-ross-appeals in this matter.^[4] They contend the Trial Division erred “when it determined that cltters should be decided by the clan and not the court.̶” Appellees’ Br. 1. The Appellants further claim that the Trial Division “erred in not deciding the issue of damages.” Appellants’ Br. 4. They argue that both compensatory and punitive damages were proven at trial and are not a customary matter “and therefore should be decided by this court.”^[5] Id. at 10.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[ 7] This Cous previously andy and succinctly explained the appellate review standards as follows:

A trial judge decides issues that come in three forms, and ision on each type of issue requires a separate standard ofrd of review on appeal: there are conclusions of law, findings of fact, and matters of discretion. Matters of law we decide de novo. We review findings of fact for clear error. Exercises of discretion are reviewed for abuse of that discretion.

Kiuluul v. Elilai Clan, 2017 Palau 14 4 (internal citations omitted).

[ 8] is appeal, the issues raes raised by the parties regarding the Trial Division’s refusal to consider claims for declaratory relief and its denial of punitive damages involve the Trial Div’s exercise of discreiscretion. See id. at 6 (“‘a decision by a Trial Division whether to intervene in a customary matter and issue a declaratory judgment . . . is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the Trial Division and cannot be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion’” (quoting Filibert v. Ngirmang, 8 ROP Intrm. 273, 276 (2001))) and W. Caroline Trading Co. v. Kloulechad, 15 ROP 127, 128 (2008) (stating that an award of punitive damages is a matter of the Trial Division’s discretion). Thus, the question on appeal is whether the Trial Division abused its discretion. “Under the abuse of discretion standard, a Trial Division’s decision will not be overturned on appeal unless the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable or because it stemmed from an improper motive.” W. Caroline Trading Co. v. Kinney, 18 ROP 70, 71 (2011) (citing Ngoriakl v. Gulibert, 16 ROP 105, 107 (2008)).
[ 9] The Trial Division&;s fi;s findings of fact concerning compensatory damages are reviewed for clear error. Otei v. Smanderang, 2018 Palau 4 10 (citing Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, 11 ROP 79, 81 (2004)). “Under the clear error standard, findings will be reversed only if no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion based on the evidence in the record.” Id. (citing Imeong v. Yobech, 17 ROP 210, 215 (2010)).

ANALYSIS

I. Declaratory Relief Related to Clan Matters

[ 10]Appellees argue that thet the Trial Division “failed to apply the [Republic of Palau Rule of Civil Procedure] 57 discretionary standard at all” in determining whether it should weigh in on the customary clan matters presented by the parties. Appellees’ Br. 2. They state that the Trial Division “found that the parties’ claims for declaratory judgment were non-justiciable.” Id. The Appellants make a similar argument: the Trial Division “chose to use the cover of clan matters as outside the jurisdiction of the court” rather than apply Rule 57 to determine whether to consider declaratory relief. Appellants’ Br. 8.
[ 11] The partiimarily rely oely on Kiuluul to support their positions. In that case, there was a dispute regarding who held the Melachelbeluu and Obaklubil Reikl titlethe Elilai Clan. 2017 Palau 14 2. The lawsuit also clso contained a claim that the defendant who purportedly held the Melachelbeluu title had alienated certain clan lands. Id. The Trial Division determined that the parties did not prove their claims for damages and concluded that the claims for declaration of the proper titleholders of the clan “failed to ‘present a justiciable controversy that is ripe for adjudication.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Elilai Clan v. Kiuluul, Civil Action No. 13-018, at 4 (Mar. 30, 2015)). The parties appealed.
[ 12] This Court ruled that “[t]he Trial Division did not apply the correct standard in deciding whether to entertain the parties’ claims for declarajudgment.” Id. at 16. It reasoned that the Trial Division “failedailed to apply the Rule 57 standard at all,” id. at 7, and “applied a more rigorous standard to the parties’ declaratory judgment claims” because they involved customary law, id. at 15.
[ 13] Unlike rial Divisionon’s conclusion in Kiuluul, the Trial Division here does not proclaim customary title disputes non-justiciable.^[6] Rather, in its written opinion, it fout found that there was no live controversy remaining in the lawsuit on which to base declaratory relief. Decision 4.
[ 14] 0;[P]arties seeking decg declaratory judgments based on customary law should enjoy the same access to the courts as those seeking declaratory judgments based on other sources of law.” , 2017 Palau 14 &#18 13 (citing Beouch v. Sasao, 20 ROP 41 (2013)). “Declaratory relief is appropriate where it will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations of the parties or terminate the uncertainty and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Senate v. Nakamura, 8 ROP Intrm. 190, 193 (2000) (citation omitted).
[ 15] Rule 57 reads, in part, as follows: “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, the court, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” ROP R. Civ. P. 57; see also 14 PNC § 1001 (the Declaratory Judgment Act). “The decision whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief is committed to the Trial Division’s sound discretion.” Whipps v. Idesmang, 2017 Palau 24 7.
[ 16] In this case, the Appellees sought a declaration that “Minoru Ueki and members of his immediate family are strong members of [Uchelkeyukl] Clan wie authority under Palauan custom to appoint Chief Rechiungel and Ebilrechiungel.” Cou; Counterclaim Count 1 Prayer for Relief 1. The Trial Division explained that there was “no basis for the Court to make declarations as to membership of Uchelkeyukl Clan,” in part, because it was already established, in Orak v. Ueki, 17 ROP 42 (2009),^[7] that “neither Minoru Ueki and his relatives nor Maria Asanuma and her relatives are strong members of Uchelkeyukl Clan.”^[8] Decision 8. It also explained that it had repeatedly told the parties throughout the course of the case “that it was not inclined to make declarations involving membership and strength of the parties within Uchelkeyukl Clan without any live controversy.” Decision 3. For these reasons, the Trial Division declined to consider declaratory relief for Appellees on the strength of their membership in Uchelkeyukl Clan.
[ 17] To the extent that determined the strength of membership in Uchelkeyukl Clan for various parties to this lawsuit, the Trial Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to consider declaratory relief regarding strength of membership in Uchelkeyukl Clan. Collateral estoppel prevents the Trial Division from relitigating an issue “‘when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.’” Ngarameketii/Rubekul Kldeu v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 2016 Palau 27 10 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)). Such a “‘determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 ). On issues of clan membership and strength, the parties and their representatives have had their day in court (and then some). Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Division’s decision not to consider the declaratory relief sought with respect to membership and strength of membership issues decided in Orak. Those matters have been fully litigated and finally determined by this Court.^[9]
[ 18] The Appellantwever, als, also sought a declaration that the Appellees are not members of Ngerbachesis Klobak of Ngermid Hamlet, have no authority over Ngerbachesis Bai, and ot have authority to interfere with the funeral planned at d at that location. Decision 2. The Appellees similarly asked the Trial Division to issue a declaratory judgment providing that Ngermelei Klobak and Ngerbachesis Klobak “have equal say over the use and control of” Ngerbachesis Bai. Counterclaim Count 4. The Trial Division granted a temporary restraining order preventing the Appellees from interfering in the funeral and granting the Appellants’ use of Ngerbachesis Bai for the funeral. Once the funeral had taken place, the Trial Division reasoned, it was “not necessary anymore to make any declarations of who the members of Ngerbachesis are.” Decision 6. The Trial Division also stated that “it was not firmly established at trial that the Ngerbachesis Bai belongs to the Ngerbachesis Klobak.” Id. Rather, based on testimony at trial that Ngerbachesis Bai was built with money from federal grants from the Head Start Program and Koror State Government funds, the Trial Division postulated, but did not decide, that “the building seems to be a public building and as such can be used by people from Ngermid,” including the deceased who was from Ngermid. Id. at 6–7. For those reasons, the Trial Division did not consider the declaratory relief sought.
[ 19] That the funeral had dlready occurred does not eliminate the question of who can use or determine the use of Ngerbachesis Bai. The question may not even be one of custom, given the nce presented regarding public funds expended on the buildiuilding’s construction. The Trial Division’s primary reason for not addressing the parties’ requests for declaratory judgment with respect to Ngerbachesis Bai was because it found that no “live controversy” remained once the 2014 funeral and burial had taken place. Given this Court’s ruling in Koror State Legislature v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 2017 Palau 28, the Trial Division’s reliance on the concept of “live controversy” is misplaced.^[10]
[ 20] This Courlier brushed uhed up against determining the meaning of “controversy” in Rule 57 and the Declaratory Judgment Act i decision in Senate v. Nakamura, 8 ROP Intrm. 190 (2000) (“Nakamura&#82>”). See id. at 192–94. We acknowledged that the Declaratory Judgment Act “is based on the Declaratory Judgment Act of the United States” and “turn[ed] to the law of the United States for guidance in construing [it].” Id. at 192. In that instance, we noted that “[i]t is unclear whether [the Declaratory Judgment Act] incorporates the ‘case and controversy’ jurisdictional requirement of [A]rticle III of the U.S. Constitution or the jurisdictional grant of [A]rticle X of the Palau Constitution.” Id. at 193 n.3. We further determined that we did not need to decide the issue then “because in our view the case meets the potentially more restrictive ‘case and controversy’ standard.” Id.
[ 21] In light of our recelinruling in Koror State Legislature, now is the time to address the question in Nakamura: Do Rule 57 and the Declaratory Judgment Act “incorporate[] the ‘case and controversy’ jurisdictional requirement of [A]rticle III of the U.S. Constitution or the jurisdictional grant of [A]rticle X of the Palau Constitution[?]” Id.
[ 22] as we determined in n Koror State Legislature that “[o]ur current standing jurisprudence does not honor the distinction between the broad language of our Constitution and the more limiting language of the U.S. Constitution,” id. at 15, it is similarly inappropriate to impose limitations presented by the U.S. Constitution on Rule 57 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. U.S. courts have treated the “actual controversy” requirement in the U.S. Declaratory Judgment Act as a “jurisdictional prerequisite.” Océ-Office Sys., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 805 F. Supp. 642, 643 (N.D. Ill. 1992); see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, [1996] USCA2 764; 94 F.3d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The Declaratory Judg[]ment Act permits declaratory relief only in cases presenting ‘actual controvers[ies],’ 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), a requirement that incorporates into the statute the case or controversy limitation on federal jurisdiction found in Article III of the Constitution.” (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, [1937] USSC 43; 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937))). As explained in Koror State Legislature, no such jurisdictional prerequisite is in our Constitution. Because “[o]ur Constitution does not so limit our jurisdiction,” Koror State Legislature, 2017 Palau 28 15, we hold that the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not incorporated into Rule 57 or the Declaratory Judgment Act.
[ 23] Rather, relief pur to R to Rule 57 and the Declaratory Judgment Act should be looked at through the lens of jurisdiction as defined in Koror State Legislature, despite theof the term “actual controversy” in Rule 57 and7 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. In addition, where parties seek declaratory relief based on customary law, they “should enjoy the same access to courts as those seeking declaratory judgments based on other sources of law.” Kiuluul, 2017 Palau 14 13.
[ 2cordingly, we remand the pthe parties’ claims for declaratory relief with respect to the use and control of Ngerbachesis Bai to the Trial Division with intions to apply the jurisdictional standard defined in KoKoror State Legislature. The Trial Division need only consider whether to grant declaratory relief where the relief sought is not collaterally estopped by the decision in Orak v. Ueki, 17 ROP 42 (2009).

II. Damages