Supreme Court of Palau

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[ 5] We revie Land Court̵’s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Eklbai Clan v. KSPLA, 22 ROP 139, 141 (2015). “Wherre are several plausible interpretations of the evidence, tce, the Land Court’s choice between them shall be affirmed even if this Court might have arrived at a different result.” Id. Credibility determinations are generally the province of the trial court. See id. at 145. “A party seeking to set aside a credibility determination must establish extraordinary circumstances for doing so.” Id. (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Lots 18, 19, and 22 (Smengesong Lineage v. Ramon Rechebei)

A. Claims and Decision Below

[ 6] Ramon Rei (Ramon) claimelaimed Lots 18, 19, and 22 were called Ultouch and had belonged to his adoptive father, Rechebei. Other sses also testified that the land had belonged to Rechebei. Around 1980, Rechebei took Ramk Ramon to the land and showed him the boundaries, which included natural landmarks as well as monuments. In 1982, Rechebei executed a witnessed deed purporting to convey these lands to Ramon. Since that time, Ramon has given permission to several individuals to build houses on the land. In 2002, Ramon filed a civil suit against two individuals who were using parts of the land without his permission.
[ 7]gesong Lineage claimed thed these lots as part of a larger land claim in the area. The lineage contended that Rechebei was a meof the lineage who bore the chief title Ilabsis but did not own these lots individually. Ty. The principal witness for the lineage was Martha Iechad (Martha), who also referred to at least some of these lots as Ultouch. She testified that her maternal ancestor, Ebulmau, had married a chief of Ngerngas Clan who controlled Ultouch and that the land was later transferred to Ebulmau as elbechiielel. Martha testified that various members of Smengesong Lineage have used the land and that she, in her role as a school teacher, had at times taken students there to make gardens. Other witnesses testified that members of the lineage had used the land and that Rechebei had not owned Ultouch as his own.
[ 8] The Land Court found &#8t “the weight of the credible evidence shows that Rechebei treated the land as his individual property and not lineageerty, and that he conveyed his interest to his son, Ramon.” The court found that evit evidence of Rechebei’s ownership began with a 1975 court judgment that referred to “property owned by Rechebei.” Although Rechebei did not live on this land, the Land Court credited testimony that his son cultivated a farm there and that the land was “generally referred to as Rechebei’s property.” The court found that while the 1982 deed from Rechebei to Ramon did not describe the transferred property in terms of lots, the record of a 1976 monumentation coupled with Ramon’s testimony that his father pointed out the boundaries “prove the location of the property” transferred.
[ 9] As to the lineage&#821ons contention that the land had come to the lineage as elbechiielel a Ebulmau, the Land Court noted that even if that han true, there was an “absence of any demonstrable acts of ownership” along with with “inconsistencies” between subsequent land claims by various lineage members. As proof of ownership, lineage witnesses had testified that lineage members gave the Japanese permission to build tarikerab on the land near Ramon’s house and later gave permission to others to take the same tarikerab for scrap metal; however, the court credited “ample testimony” that Ramon’s house is located on land outside Lots 18, 19, and 22, and that even if the lineage’s testimony was correct, it did not substantiate control of ownership of these lots. The court did credit Martha’s testimony that she had taken her students to gardens in the area, but found the activity was limited in duration and “there was no evidence that this activity continued for any length of time to substantially demonstrate ownership.”
[ 10] Tnd Court characterizedrized a 1988 land claim filed by Edluchel Eungel as “perhaps the strongest evidence supporting” the lineage’s claim to ohip. Edluchel had succeeded Rechebei to bear the title Ilae Ilabsis and “was presumably knowledgeable about lineage properties.” In 1988, Edluchel claimed the land as the lineage’s, using the same description of the boundaries as described in Rechebei’s 1982 deed of transfer to Ramon. Importantly, however, Edluchel had signed that same 1982 deed as a witness; the court observed that the lineage had not explained or discussed this contradiction, and found that it “diminishes the credibility” of Edluchel’s later claim on behalf of the lineage. The Land Court also noted “another inconsistency” in the claims filed by Martha. The court observed that earlier filings claimed Ultouch for the lineage, but the most recent stated that “Ultouch mesei” was listed under “Kitang Bechab’s name, and claimed the land and mesei as individual properties.”
[ 11] The Land Coutimately coly concluded that the weight of the evidence showed that Lots 18, 19 and 22, were the individual property of Rechebei and not lineage land. The cournd that Rechebei had conveyed the land to his son Ramon andn and accordingly awarded the lots to him.

B. Arguments on Appeal

[ 12] Smengesineage first argt argues that the 1982 deed from Rechebei to Ramon was ineffective. In Salii v. Omrekongel Clan, the Court explained that “in orde a deed to operate as a legal conveyance of title, the land land intended to be conveyed by the grantor must be described with sufficient definiteness and certainty to locate and distinguish it from other lands of the same kind. If the land intended to be conveyed cannot be identified from the deed, with the aid of extrinsic evidence, the deed is inoperative.” 3 ROP Intrm. 212, 214 (1992). The Court affirmed these general principals in Uchelkumer Clan v. Sowei Clan, further explaining that “to effectively convey title to land, a grantor must sufficiently declare his intention to pass title.” 15 ROP 11, 14-15 (2008). Smengesong Lineage argues that “[Rechebei’s] deed is inoperative to transfer the title,” principally because of asserted ambiguity about the northern boundary of the land.
[ 13] The deed clearly evidenvidences an “intention to pass title.” Unlike the document in Uchelkumer Clan, which “contain[ed] no reference anywof land being conveyed or title passing,” 15 ROP at 1 at 14, the deed here is unequivocal. It is titled “Deed of Transfer,” and states that by it Rechebei did “transfer . . . unto Ramon Rechebei, [my] heir and assign forever, the exclusive right and ownership of said property.” The deed was signed, witnessed, and recorded. The lineage’s argument thus turns on whether the property can be “identified from the deed, with the aid of extrinsic evidence.” Salii, 3 ROP Intrm. at 214.
[ 14] The lineage argues the the deed, with extrinsic evidence, “fails to describe the northern boundary of the lands claimed by Ramon.” But the Land Court’s decision explicitly referred to a 1976 entation record that clearllearly depicts two Japanese monuments at the northern corners of land labeled “Rechebei.” The court found that this monumentation record, along with Ramon’s credible testimony that his father had shown him definite markers at the boundaries of the land, were sufficient extrinsic evidence to enable the court to identify the property transferred as the land encompassed by Lots 18, 19, & 22. The lineage does not meaningfully address the finding that the 1976 monuments define the northern boundary of Rechebei’s lands; as such, there is no basis for us to conclude that that finding was clear error. Given the Land Court’s undisturbed finding about the northern boundary, we conclude that the deeded property can be “identified from the deed, with the aid of extrinsic evidence,” Salii, 3 ROP Intrm. at 214.
[ 15] The lineage also arghat that the record evidence can support only a finding that the land belongs to Smengesong Lineage. We disagree. There is record evidence, including prior monumentation and claim records, which supports a finding that the lots were the individual property of Rechebei before he deeded them to Ramon. See, e.g., Eklbai Clan, 22 ROP at 141 (“The factual determinations of the lower court will be set aside only if they lack evidentiary support in the record such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion.”) These record facts, coupled with the credible testimony of Ramon, provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for a finding that, as between Ramon and the lineage, Ramon had the strongest claim to title. Cf., e.g., id. at 146. Accordingly, we affirm the determinations that Ramon owns Lots 18, 19, and 22.

II. Lots 26 and 27 (The Children of Teriong Beouch v. Ngerchemuul Clan)

A. Claims and Decision Below

[ 16]Children of Teriong Beou Beouch^[5] claimed Lots 26 and 27 as part of the land known as Ididch. The claim flows a man named Kadoi. According to the Children, Kadoi gave gave these lots to his adopted son Beouch, who in turn gave the lots to his son Teriong. Beouch lived at Ididch during the Japanese times and died in 1943. The Children claimed that Beouch was buried at the odesongel at Ididch. Teriong and his wife had a house and lived at Ididch as early as World War II. Witnesses testifiet Teat Teriong and his wife cultivated the lots and allowed various relatives to live on parts of the lots over the years. A 1997 land claim filed by Teriong stated that Beouch was the owner of the lots and that a member of Ngerchemuul Clan, Tkoel, had confirmed after Beouch’s death that his lands would be retained by Beouch’s children.
[ 17] Representatif Ngerchemuchemuul Clan testified that the lots were near the clan’s kerdellir (landing site) and that there was an odesongel there where their ancestor, Llut, is buried. The clan denied that Kadoi ever gave Ididch to Beouch. Clan witnesses testified that Teriong’s presence on the land was due to the fact that Itei had given permission for Teriong to build his house on the land. Another witness testified that when the chief of Ngerchemuul learned that Itei had allowed Teriong to build his house, that the chief, Rebechall Inabo, went to Teriong and warned him not to sell or give away any portion of the land.
[ 18] The Lourt identified thed the dispositive issue as whether Kadoi gave the land to Beouch as his individual property, or whether the land remained clan land on which the clan permitted Beouch’ Teriong to live. The Land Land Court noted that Teriong’s long occupation of Ididch “seem to weigh in [his] favor.” However, the fact of Teriong’s occupation would also be consistent with the clan’s position that the lots belonged to it and that it had merely given Teriong permission to use them.
[ 19] The court ultimately found that “the record contains strong evidence that belie Teriong’s claim that Kadoi gave the property to Beouch.” hildren had introduced Teriong’s 1997 land claim as their Exhibit 1. However, the cohe court noted that the record included an earlier claim for Ididch filed by Teriong in 1988. “On his earlier claim, Teriong states that he was ‘the son of the person who was trustee for the land, namely Beouch’ and that he claimed the land for Ididch Lineage, with himself as trustee.” The court found that “Ididch Lineage” was a lineage within Ngerchemuul Clan. The court found Teriong’s earlier statements “more credible that the statements made on his later claim.”
[ 20]court also pointed to a to a June 1989 Land Claims Hearing Office (LCHO) document in File No. 07-19-89. The document, signed bee hearing officers, included a “Title Determination” for land known as Sebu>Sebuu. The dispute was between Teriong’s brother, Ngirkiklang, and Ngerchemuul Clan; like Teriong with Ididch, Ngirkiklang claimed that Kadoi gave Sebuu to Beouch, who in turn gave it to him. The Land Court here found the result of the 1989 proceeding irrelevant, but noted that the LCHO’s summary of testimony in the case undermined Teriong’s claim. In particular, the Land Court observed that the LCHO summarized Kadoi’s niece, Isebong, testifying that “Beouch obtained no property from Ngerchemuul Clan.”
[ 21]Land Court ultimately foly found that Isebong’s statement and Teriong’s 1988 claim form outweighed the mere fact of Teriong’s residence as evidence that Teriong’s presence on the land was the product of clan permission and not by right of ownership. The court accordingly awarded the lots to Ngerchemuul Clan.

B. Arguments on Appeal

[ 22] The Children first challenge the use of Isebong’s statement from the 1989 LCHO proceeding. They argue that the trial court “erred in basing its determination on the incid testimony of Isebong, now deceased, in an unrelated case fase for different land.” As an initial matter, the court below did not “base” its determination on the record of Isebong’s testimony in the LCHO proceeding; the court found it to be probative, corroborating evidence that the clan had not given Beouch any clan land as his own.
[ 23] The Cen do not cite to e to any legal authority that bars consideration of the LCHO document. Instead, they assert that because Isebs deceased, they were denied their right to cross-examine her. This assertion willfully ovly overlooks the fact that introduction of recorded or hearsay evidence of statements by long-deceased individuals is routine practice in Land Court proceedings. It is simply the reality attendant to adjudicating purported land transfers that occurred 70 to 80 years ago. Even assuming Isebong’s recorded testimony would ordinarily constitute hearsay, “there is no hearsay rule applied to the Land Court.” KSPLA v. Ngermellong Clan, 21 ROP 1, 5 n.5 (2012).^[6] The Children correctly observe that the 1989 LCHO proceeding involved different land. This is true, but the trial court did not find the 1989 adjudication to be legally preclusive. The court found the record of Isebong’s statement to the LCHO that the clan had given no property to Beouch was probative of the question here whether the clan had given Ididch to Beouch. The Children cite to no authority that the court legally erred in doing so.
[ 24] The Children next argat that the trial court “misapprehended the probative value of [Teriong’s] 1988 return of land claim.” They contend that the 1988 claim was fdifferent, adjacent piece of property. Therefore Teriongng’s statement that Beouch had only been trustee of that land does not undermine Teriong’s 1997 claim that Ididch was individually owned.
[ 25] The 1988 claim form iswsomewhat ambiguous, and it is possible that it refers to an adjacent lot rather than Lot 26 or 27. However, even assuming thisrue, the Children have not shown it warrants reversing the Land Court. First, the 1988 cla8 claim form was not the only evidence the court found supported the clan’s claim. Second, the Children’s reading of the 1988 claim form still casts some doubt on their theory of individual ownership; under their reading, Kadoi must have allowed Beouch to use some clan lands as trustee (the land claimed in 1988) and other lands, namely Ididch, as individual property. This is not impossible, but the Children have not consistently advanced such a theory and there does not appear to be any particular evidentiary support for it. Finally, even if the 1988 claim form is wholly irrelevant, the Children do not point to any legal authority that the Land Court was required to credit Teriong’s 1997 claim statements. The Land Court exists in large measure to evaluate and weigh conflicting claim statements. Teriong’s 1997 statements are not legally conclusive—the Land Court must weigh and evaluate the statements of other claimants and other testimony and record documents. Teriong’s 1997 statements are not legally entitled to any particular weight, and the Land Court could decline to credit them even if no other claim forms existed.
[ 26] The Children’al anal argument is that they have established ownership of Lots 26 and 27 through adverse possession. Among the numerous elements of an adverse possession claim, the claimant must show that the possession of the property is “hostile or adverse” rather than permissive. See, e.g., Petrus v. Suzuky, 19 ROP 37, 40-41 (2011). The Land Court found that Beouch’s and Teriong’s entry into and use of the land was with permission of the clan, a finding that the Children have not shown to be clearly erroneous. “The original permissive use of the land raises the presumption that continued use is permissive, rather than hostile, until the contrary is affirmatively shown.” Seventh Day Adventist Mission of Palau, Inc. v. Elsau Clan, 11 ROP 191, 194 (2004). In other words, the twenty-year adverse possession clock never started if the lots were being used by permission of the owner. Ucheliou Clan v. Oirei Clan, 20 ROP 37, 39 n.2 (2012) (“Permissive use is inconsistent with the hostility element.”). Because the Children have not established that their possession of the lots was hostile to the clan’s ownership, their adverse possession claim fails.
[ 27] At bottom, there were two theories of the historical evidence. Ngerchemuul Clan pressed the theory that it had granted Beouch and Teriong permission to use clan lands. The Children pressed the theory that the land had been given to Beouch and Teriong as their individual property.^[7] The main evidence consisted of competing testimony: the Children’s testimony that Kadoi gave Beouch the land and the clan’s testimony that Kadoi and his relatives merely granted permission to live and farm there. The task of making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence falls to the Land Court and that court ultimately weighed the credible evidence as favoring the clan’s theory. On appeal, the Children must show not that their view of the evidence is the most plausible, but rather that the Land Court’s view of the evidence is clearly erroneous. “Where evidence is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, a court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous even if this Court might have arrived at a different result.” Kebekol v. KSPLA, 22 ROP 38, 40 (2015). Even if the Children have established a reasonable interpretation of the record in their favor, they have not established that Land Court’s interpretation of the record was unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the determination that Ngerchemuul Clan owns Lots 26 and 27.

III. Lot 24 (Smengesong Lineage and Dirraechetei Ito v. Dirraklang Ngirametuker)

A. Claims and Decision Below

[ 28] Several partiesmed the the mesei that corresponds with Lot 24. Vincent Ito (“Ito”) pressed the claim of his mother Dirraec Ito. Ito claimed that Rechebei owned the mesei and gave it to his mother. Ito teso testified that he walked the boundaries of the mesei with his mother in 2003.
[ 29ngesong Lineage claimed tmed the mesei as part of a much larger claim to land in the area. Anemary Edeaoch testified that her mother, a member of the lineage, farmed several different including Lot 24, and that that others used the mesei as well. Anemary testified that she did not see anyone else using the adjacent properties.
[ 30] Dirraklang Ngirametuket testified that she purchased the mesei from Matlab in 1962 and that she cultivated it for many years until her advanced age would no longer allow her to. She testified that the mei> she worked abutted the mesei used by Setsko and another used by Yaoch Iechad. Dirraklang Ngirametuker said her mesei was more rectangular than the map depiction of Lot 24 and ran to the shore. During rebuttal, she stated that her mesei corresponded to Lot 19, a strip of land on the mangrove shoreline lying below all the mesei.
[ 31] I decision, the Land Cond Court first rejected Ito’s claim. The court found he had “presented hardly any evidence ofof the mesei by either his mother or Rechebei, who allegedly wanted [her] to have thve the mesei.” “The evidence presented was not sufficient to prove the Rechebei owned a mesei and that he gave or left if for [Ito’s mother].” The court continued that even if she had owned a mesei, Ito’s testimony established that it was in a different location than Lot 24.
[ 32] The court then turn Aneo Anemary’s testimony that Smengesong Lineage used a mesei in the area. The court credited Dirraklang’s testimony that lineage members had used a mesei above hermesei that corresponesponded to a different lot, Lot 24A. The Land Court found that Lot 24A was “most probably the mesei that Smengesong members used and owned.”
[ 33] The Land Court statat &hat “Dirraklang is found to be the most reliable and credible witness among these claimants.” “Her knowledge is personal, and not narrateher by someone else.” The court found that she purchpurchased the mesei in Lot 24 from Matlab in 1962 and had used it for many years. As to her statement on rebuttal that her mesei corresponded to Lot 19 on the map, the court characterized this as coming “out of nowhere” and observed that “her demeanor was of one simply disheartened by the dispute and making a statement that she does not believe in.” The court chose not to credit her statement about Lot 19 and awarded Lot 24 to her.

B. Arguments on Appeal

[ 34] Both Smengesong Lineage and Ito advance variations of the argument that the Land Court erred in awarding Lot 24 to Dirraklang after she stated late in the hearing that her mesei [ 35] In focusingirraklangng’s late-hearing statement that her mesei did not correspond to Lot 24 on the map, the appellants do ngage with the substance of Dirraklang’s claim or the whole of her testimony and evideevidence. The lineage and Ito do not seriously contend that Dirraklang did not assert a claim to a mesei in the area or that she did not testify credibly that she had cultivated that mesei for many years. Nor do they challenge the court’s finding that Dirraklang purchased a mesei from Matlab or meaningfully address Dirraklang’s testimony about the relative position of her mesei to other mesei in the area.
[ 36] The recordides more thae than adequate support for a factual determination that Dirraklang Ngirametuker claimed a mesei within the area of land being heard by the court. Cf. Etpison v. Skilan, 16 ROP 191, 195 (2009) (t9) (the existence of a claim is a question of fact, and the Land Court has considerable flexibility to determine whether a claim exists). The remaining question, then, is whether the court clearly erred in finding that Dirraklang had the strongest claim to title for the land corresponding to Lot 24.
[ 37] The Lanrt found that Diat Dirraklang was “the most reliable and credible witness among these claimants.” “Her knowledge is personal, and not nad to y someone else.” The court credited Dirrakirraklang&lang’s testimony about the relative position of her mesei to other mesei used by Setsko, Yaoch Iechad, and the lineage itself. This testimony is strong evidence that Dirraklang’s mesei corresponded to Lot 24—i.e., surrounded by the lots of Setsko (who was awarded Lot 23), Yaoch Iechad (who was awarded Lot 25), and the lineage (who was awarded Lot 24A). In contrast, the Land Court found that Ito had presented “hardly any evidence” that his mother owned this mesei. The court also observed that Ito “offers no evidence” as to how his mother learned the boundaries and that Ito “did not appear to know much about it and seemed to merely repeat what he had been told by others, including obvious errors in the recollection of his informants.” As to the lineage’s claim, the court found that the testimony of various credible witnesses established that the mesei used by lineage members “is most probably” Lot 24A, which the court awarded to the lineage.
[ 38] Basedhe foregoing evideevidence, it would certainly not be clear error for the trial court to find that Dirraklang had the strongest to Lot 24. The question is wheDirr Dirraklang’s statement that her claim correcorresponded to Lot 19 precluded the Land Court from awarding her Lot 24. The answer is no.
[ 3though the lineage assertsserts that Dirraklang “never claimed any part of [Lot 24],” this is not the case. Reviewing the whole of Dirraklang’s testimony and the record of pdings below makes clear thar that her testimony and actions, as a whole, provide a solid evidentiary basis to award her Lot 24. As the Land Court noted, Dirraklang went to the site with Land Registration Officer (LRO) Flavin Uro and confirmed that existing concrete markers accurately demarked her mesei. Records indicated that these particular markers bounded Lot 24, and at various times during the hearing Dirraklang stated that what was shown to her in the field was “accurate.”
[ 40] It was only later when looking at the plotted Lot 24 on the hearing map that any ambiguity arose. Dirraklang expressed concern that on the map Lot 24 appeared more triangular and her land was more rectangular. She also stated that her claim “goes straight to the sea.” As Lot 19 was the most seaward lot, Dirraklang stated that this lot corresponded to her claim.
[ 41] We observe, a the Land Land Court, that her identification of Lot 19 on the map is inconsistent with essentially all of her other testimony. For example, Dirraklang repeatedly testified about the relative location of her mesei to the mesei of others. Her mesei was “sandwiched between Yaoch [Iechad] and Setsko.” But Lot 19 is not sandwiched between anyone. Moreover, Dirraklang testified that she cultivated the mesei for many years. But Lot 19 was found to be principally mangrove, rather than cultivatable mesei; Lot 19 runs in a strip of mangrove below a line of mesei under cultivation.
[ 42] In short, Dirrakla217;s217;s changed statement was based almost entirely on her concern about the apparent shape of Lot 24 as plotted on the map. However, the LRO stated on the record that the mesei shecated during the field visi visit was definitely inside what was depicted as Lot 24 on the map. Although Dirraklang presumably is best suited to identify the actual boundary markers of her land in the field, it is reasonable to assume that the LRO is better suited to identify the correct location of those markers plotted on the map. The Land Court found that there was no plausible way to link Lot 19 to her claihe court foun found that her demeanor indicated that she was “making a statement that she does not believe in” and was “simply disheartened by the dispute.”
[ 43] Ultimately, the Land Court chose to credit the bulk of her testimony—(about the physical location of the mesei and its relation to other mei>)—and the testimony and records of the LRO, and declined to credit one other portioortion of her testimony—(about what cadastral map lot number corresponded to the physical mesei). It is well within a trial court’s discretion to credit some, but not all, of a witness’s testimony. See, e.g., Irikl Clan v. Renguul, 8 ROP Intrm. 156, 160 n.9 (2000) (finding “no merit” to the argument that a trial court must either credit all or none of a witnesses testimony); see also, e.g., Bekebekmad v. Children of Sabino Bekebekmad, 19 ROP 200, 204 (2012) (not error for trial court to disregard some portions of testimony from a witness otherwise credited); cf. Estate of Nobor King v. Rengulbai, 19 ROP 9, 13 (2011) (“The Trial Division therefore chose between two versions of inconsistent testimony. Given that the court noted the inconsistencies, justified its reliance on [some] testimony, and was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of these witnesses, we find no clear error.”). The court declined to hold Dirraklang to a statement that was apparently a product of confusion in reading the cadastral map and counter to her other credible testimony about the physical location of the mesei. She had been to the field and confirmed the actual monuments, and the attending LRO had confirmed that the monuments bounded Lot 24. Lot 24 also aligns with Dirraklang’s credible testimony about the relative location of her mesei to the others. It was not clear error for the Land Court to award Lot 24 to Dirraklang.
[ 44] Finally, Itonces one adne additional argument. He argues that Dirraklang’s mesei is actually within Lot 23 and that the court d have ordered a parcel split and awarded a portion of that lot to Dirraklang. Ito did notd not specify the awardee of Lot 23, Setsko Techur, as an appellee or indicate that the Land Court’s decision with respect to Lot 23 was being appealed. Cf. ROP R. App. P. 3(c) (Notice of Appeal “shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from, and shall specify the party or parties against whom the appeal is filed.”) Any substantive argument about Lot 23 is not properly before this Court. Regardless, the argument simply presents an alternative view of the evidence. Even assuming that view is reasonable, the burden on appeal is to show that the Land Court’s view was unreasonable. For the reasons discussed above, the Land Court’s view of the evidence was reasonable. “Where evidence is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, a court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous even if this Court might have arrived at a different result.” Kebekol, 22 ROP at 40 (2015). Accordingly, we affirm the determination that Dirraklang Ngirametuker owns Lot 24.

IV. Lot 25 (Smengesong Lineage and Kesol Clan v. Yaoch Iechad)