SC2847

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SCA NO 66 OF 2025

BETWEEN:
ANDY HAMAGA, CHAIRMAN, HIDES PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT LICENCE 7 LOCAL – LEVEL GOVERNMENT SPECIAL PURPOSE AUTHORITY
First Appellant

AND:
HIDES PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT LICENCE 7 LOCAL – LEVEL GOVERNMENT SPECIAL PURPOSE AUTHORITY
Second Appellant

AND:
ECO CARE ENGINEERING LIMITED
Respondent

WAIGANI: YAGI J, DOWA J, PURDON SULLY J
2025: 18 DECEMBER 2025; 4 FEBRUARY2026

SUPREME COURT – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Adjournments – Whether the Judge erred in refusing oral application for – Application for adjournment must be supported by evidence - Primary Judge did not err in exercise of discretion to either grant or refuse adjournment – Discretion must be exercised on proper factual and legal basis - No  evidence before primary Judge to demonstrate refusal to adjourn would result in prejudice to applicant.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Summary judgment – To be invoked in clear case only – Whether there was a clear case – Appeal upheld - Order 12 Rule 38 (1) (a) and (b) of the National Court Rules – Costs of appeal considered – Each party to bear own costs

Facts

The respondent commenced debt recovery proceedings in the National Court against the appellants and then made application for summary judgment based on admissions made by the appellants in their Defence.  The appellants made oral application for an adjournment of the respondent’s application which was refused. The primary Judge proceeded to hear the application for summary judgment finding a clear case had been made out for the making of the orders sought by the respondent. The appeal concerned whether the adjournment should have been refused and whether a clear case had been made out for the making of an order for summary judgment.

Held:

1.	The National Court did not err in refusing the application for adjournment that application made orally unsupported by evidence, Counsel for the appellants acknowledging before the primary Judge that the relevant principles for adjournment as outlined in Supreme Court authority had not been met.
2.	The National Court did err in granting summary judgment where there was a factual dispute clear on the evidence of the respondent (plaintiff before the primary Judge) with respect to particular charges rendered, a dispute properly determined at trial.
3.	Appeal upheld.
4.	Each party to bear own costs of appeal.

Cases cited

PNG Deep Sea Fishing Ltd v Critten [2010] SC1126
Curtain Bros (PNG) Limited v. UPNG (2005) SC788
The State & Sam Akoita v. Central Provincial Government (2009) SC977
Asuma (trading as Andy Asuma Trading) v Tiong Juk Chuong (2019) SC1887
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Inc v. Kimas (2022) SC2280
Colbran v. Ilaisa (2022) SC2273
H.R. Holdings Ltd v Taka [2023] PGSC 51; SC2411
Tsang v Credit Corporation (PNG) Ltd [1993] PNGLR 112
Chief Collector of Taxes v T A Field Pty Ltd [1975] PNGLR 144

Counsel

Mr. M Alyata for the appellants
Ms. G. Kogora for the respondent 
1.	BY THE COURT: This is a decision on a contested appeal from a National Court judgment and order of 25 February 2025 which upheld an application for summary judgment filed by the respondent.  

2.	The background to the matter is that the respondent is the owner and operator of a lodge located at Gordons in Port Moresby.

3.	In about January 2018 the first appellant entered into a verbal agreement with the respondent’s General Manager to provide accommodation and meals to the second appellant’s employees, servants and agents at its lodge for six (6) months from 31 January 2018 to 15 June 2018. 

4.	In June 2018 the respondent issued as a group the monthly invoices for the relevant period totalling K1,365,210.

5.	On 29 June 2018 the appellants made a part-payment in the sum of K350,000.  

6.	No further payments were made and on 27 February 2024 the respondent commenced debt recovery proceedings in the National Court by way of Writ of Summons seeking orders that the Second Defendant pay the outstanding invoices in the sum of K1,015,000 together with general and special damages, interest and costs.

7.	On 15 August 2024 the appellants filed a Notice of Intention to Defend.

8.	On 23 August 2024 the appellants filed a Defence in the following terms:
1.	The First and Second Defendant generally admit the matters pleaded under paragraphs 1 to 11 of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim but say:
a.	The Second Defendant has paid K350,000 already of the total invoices issued so far on 29 June 2018 as a result of a simple verbal agreement.
b.	The Second Defendant owes certain amounts of the outstanding invoice but not the total outstanding as claimed by the Plaintiff in the sum of K1,015,000.
c.	The First and Second Defendants are not able to settle the outstanding owed to the Plaintiff at the moment due to lack of funds.
d.	Further, the outstanding invoice amount as claimed is subject to assessment.
2.	The First and Second Defendants say therefore that the Plaintiff is not entitled to all of the reliefs sought including the total outstanding as alleged.

9.	On 5 September 2024 the respondent filed a reply admitting paragraph 1 (a) of the Defence and joining issue with the appellants on paragraphs 1 (b), (c), (d) and 2 save when same consists of admission.

10.	On 9 October 2024 the respondent filed a Notice of Motion seeking that summary judgment be entered in the sum of K1,015,000 pursuant to Order 12 Rule 38 (1) (a) and (b) of the National Court Rules (NCR) together with an assessment of general and special damages pursuant to Order 12  Rule 38 (2) and (3) of the NCR, interest and costs.

11.	 On 11 November 2024 the respondent’s Notice of Motion was adjourned to 2 December 2024.

12.	The matter was not heard on the adjourned date and listed for hearing on 18 March 2025.  However on the 24 February 2025 the parties were informed that the matter would be heard on 25 February 2025.  

13.	On 25 February 2025 Counsel for the appellants informed the primary Judge that they were not ready to proceed and made oral application for an adjournment.  The primary Judge refused the application and proceeded to hear the motion.

14.	At the conclusion of the hearing His Honour made the following orders (the orders):
a.	Summary judgment be entered in the sum of K1,015,000.00 in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendants pursuant to Order 12 Rule 38(1)(a) & (b) of the NCR.
b.	Interest at 8% pursuant to Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 (as Amended) is awarded to the Plaintiff.
c.	The matter is returnable on 1 April 2025 at 9.30am for hearing of the Plaintiff’s claims for General and Special Damages pursuant to Order 12 Rule 38(2) & (3) of the NCR.
d.	Costs are awarded in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendants to be taxed, of not agreed.
e.	Time to abridge.

15.	On 26 March 2025 the appellants sought leave to appeal the orders.  Leave was granted on 23 April 2025 as was the appellant’s further application to stay the orders.

16.	On 13 May 2025 the appellants filed their Notice of Appeal seeking inter alia that the orders be quashed and the matter be remitted to the National Court for hearing before another Judge.

THE APPEAL

17.	The appellants raise five grounds of appeal, however it is submitted on behalf of the appellants, and we accept, that the issues raised by the grounds of appeal are two-fold as follows:
a.	Whether the learned primary Judge erred in refusing the appellant’s oral application for adjournment; and
b.	Whether the respondent’s application for summary judgment met the requirements of summary judgment application.

18.	 We proceed to discuss these issues in this order.
Whether the learned primary Judge erred in refusing the appellant’s application for adjournment

19.	The appellants contend, as pleaded under Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the Notice of Appeal, that the primary Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion and in dispensing justice in refusing the adjournment where the matter had been fixed for hearing at a later date, the parties having been advised in December 2024 that the matter would be heard on 18 March 2025.  It is submitted that notwithstanding being given that fixed date the parties were given short notice of the hearing by email to chambers at around midday on 24 February 2025, the hearing to commence the following day at 9.30am.  It is contended that in refusing the oral application for adjournment the learned judge wrongly applied the principles enunciated in PNG Deep Sea Fishing Ltd v Critten [2010] SC1126 the factual circumstances of that case different from the present case.  It is contended that the best Counsel for the appellants could do in the circumstances was attend court and apply for an adjournment.  Further there was no urgency, the refusal prejudicial to the appellants given the amount of money involved.

20.	We reject the appellants’ submissions.  

21.	To set aside a decision an appellant needs to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court the existence of a clearly identifiable error in the decision appealed against, or that the decision is so unreasonable and plainly unjust which could point to an error (Curtain Bros (PNG) Limited v. UPNG (2005) SC788 and The State & Sam Akoita v. Central Provincial Government (2009) SC977). This an appellant can do by demonstrating the trial judge has acted upon a wrong principle, or gave weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failed to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations or made a mistake as to the facts (Asuma (trading as Andy Asuma Trading) v Tiong Juk Chuong (2019) SC1887; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Inc v. Kimas (2022) SC2280; Colbran v. Ilaisa (2022) SC2273; H.R. Holdings Ltd v Taka [2023] PGSC 51; SC2411).

22.	We do not find an identifiable error in the primary Judge’s decision to refuse the appellants’ application for an adjournment of the hearing on 25 February 2025. Nor are we able to conclude that the decision to refuse was so unreasonable and plainly unjust that the primary Judge fell into error in the exercise of his discretion.

23.	In PNG Deep Sea Fishing Ltd v Critten (supra) the Supreme Court (Kandakasi J (as he then was), Hartshorn & Sawong, JJ) in considering the practice and procedure to do with applications for adjournment observed at [2] as follows:
2. Before we could hear the appeals, Mr. Ketan of counsel for the Appellant, applied for an adjournment. He sought the adjournment on the basis that, counsel having carriage and conduct of the appeals on behalf of his client ceased employment with his firm, Ketan Lawyers, and that he was in no position to argue the appeals. The Court declined Mr. Ketan''s application because:
(a) The counsel who had the prior carriage of the matter was his employed lawyer. Hence, Mr. Ketan was under an obligation to supervise and know what matters his employed lawyer was handling, when any of those matters were coming before what court and ensure amongst others that, the lawyer was adequately and properly attending to the matter;

(b) If he discharged his obligations as noted above, Mr. Ketan could have known the date set for the hearing of the appeals in this matter and ensured that someone within his firm or himself was attending to this matter;

(c) When counsel having carriage of the matter ceased his employment with Ketan Lawyers, Mr. Ketan was under an obligation to ensure that someone was attending to the matter in sufficient time to ensure the hearing of the appeal did proceed on the dates set or otherwise apply earlier for an adjournment. Mr. Ketan did neither and merely turned up in Court and asked for an adjournment without any supporting affidavit setting out facts disclosing steps he had taken toward the hearing of the appeal but for say circumstances beyond his control.

(d) There is already case law in our jurisdiction on adjournments such as the decision in Melina Limited trading as CN Mercantile v. Fred Martens,[1] where the Court endorsed the decision of Kapi DCJ (as he then was) in OK Tedi Mining Limited v. Niugini Insurance Corporation and Ors (1)[2] and said:
"In this case, without having undertaken and complied with the requirements for actually getting the case ready for trial and proceed with the trial on the date set for the trial, the plaintiff came into Court on the day of the trial and asked for an adjournment to cover for its own failure. It has been held that the Court does have the power to grant or to refuse an application for adjournment of proceedings set down for trial. An applicant for an adjournment bears the onus of showing why a refusal to adjourn would result in injustice to him or her. He or she also has the obligation to make the application promptly and must prove actual prejudice and not a mere speculation of prejudice. When considering such an application, the Court is required to also consider the interest of the respondent to such an application. That is to say the Court should consider whether an adjournment would result in injustice to the respondent."
(e) In the case before us as we already observed, Mr. Ketan did not place before us any affidavit material or evidence of the steps the counsel then having the carriage of the matter, Mr. Ketan, anyone in his firm or the Appellant taking any step toward getting the Appeal ready for hearing on the set date. Consequently, Mr. Ketan and his client did not demonstrate to our satisfaction of their giving their best efforts to proceeding with the hearing of the appeals but for circumstances beyond (such circumstances properly identified) their control, they were not able to do that.
[Underlining added]

24.	 While the facts in PNG Deep Sea Fishing Ltd may differ from the present case, the principles enunciated with respect to applications for adjournments apply.

25.	In considering the appellants’ request for adjournment the learned primary Judge referred to these principles, correctly observing that the decision bound him and that an applicant for adjournment bears the onus of showing why a refusal to adjourn would result in an injustice to him or her and that in considering the application the court is required to consider the interests of the respondent to such an application, namely whether an adjournment would result in an injustice to the other side.  Relevantly, His Honour observed that in that regard there was no application to adjourn before him and no evidence in the form of an affidavit outlining anything for the court to consider.  His Honour then went on to reject the further explanation of Counsel for the appellants that the matter was listed for hearing on 18 March 2025 at which time they were minded to file affidavit in response.

26.	It is unchallenged that notwithstanding Counsel for the appellants having been notified of the rescheduled hearing at lunchtime the day before the hearing, no application for an adjournment was prepared.  No explanation for Counsel’s inability to prepare that application between midday on 24 February 2025 and 9.30 am on 25 February 2025, is in evidence.  We accept the submission of Counsel for the respondent that the appellants had sufficient time to draft an application and affidavit to support an application for adjournment.

27.	The learned primary Judge was correct is observing that there was no application for an adjournment before him and no evidence for him to consider in support of that application based on the principles he was required to apply which he correctly identified. Relevantly, Counsel for the appellants acknowledged their failure, in the following exchange as recorded at pages 4 and 5 of the transcript:
HIS HONOUR:	Let me – it is not just an exercise of my discretion. Supreme Court precedence bind, I quote “An applicant for adjournment bears the onus of showing why a refusal to adjourn would result in injustice to him or her. He or she has an obligation to make the application promptly and must provide actial prejudice and not mere speculation of prejudice. When considering such an application, the court is also required to consider the interests of the respondent to such an application.  That is to say, the court should consider whether an adjournment would result in injustice to the other side”. You have only given me the injustice in your mind that would affect your client.
MR ALYATA:	Yes, your Honour
HIS HONOUR:	But the interest of justice is applicable to all parties.  That is another PNG Supreme Court case.  There has been no application for adjournment, there is no affidavit outlining anything for this court to consider.  You are simply speaking from the bar table. We are not in LTI.  We do that in LTI practice runs.  This is real life court.  I am not going to lambast you or tongue lash you.  That is not my intention. My intention is to operate this court professionally so when the public observes us, they have regard and respect for how we function and we are not embarrassing ourselves or insulting the public’s intelligence. So, if there is nothing further, I am obligated by applying the interests of justice applicable to all parties and by the failure of counsel to provide a proper application for adjournment, to proceed with this motion.
MR ALYATA:	Yes, we do appreciate that we have failed to actually comply with this Supreme Court ruling.

28.	That was a concession made by Counsel for the appellants.

29.	There is a further difficulty, however, for the appellants with their submissions and it is their argument that they were not ready to proceed in the expectation of a hearing on 18 March 2025 and the unfairness inherent in being called on to defend on short notice as a consequence.  However, the respondent’s application for summary judgment was first listed for hearing on 11 November 2024.  It did not proceed that day.  It was adjourned for hearing to 2 December 2024 at which time it was again adjourned for hearing to 18 March 2025.  The appellants should have been ready to defend the application for summary judgment on 11 November and 2 December 2024, the respondent’s Notice of Motion having been filed and served on 9 October 2024.  

30.	We thus reject the appellant’s further submissions that the granting of an adjournment would have saved time and money, including judicial time.   The  applicant was ready to proceed on 25 February 2025. The court was ready to hear the matter.  The only parties not ready were the appellants. 

31.	Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the Notice of Appeal are dismissed.
Whether the respondent’s application for summary judgment met the requirements of summary judgment application.

32.	This issue encompasses Grounds 3.4 and 3.5 of the Notice of Appeal.

33.	With respect to these grounds the primary Judge in rejecting the appellants argument that a clear case for summary judgment had not been made out by the respondent concluded that the essential elements of the claim for the outstanding amount owing to it had been established by the respondent.  He rejected the appellants arguments by reason of inter alia, the admissions made by the appellant in its defence, the fact that part-payment had been made by the appellants, the evidence in the form of the invoices and lack of follow up by the appellants if they disputed the invoices, and that the evidence contradicted much of what the appellants claimed was not owed.  

34.	Relevantly, the learned primary Judge said at page 17 of the transcript:
In this particular case the plaintiff makes the argument that they have provided and adduced evidence for the court’s consideration by way of these invoices that date back to 2018 and their letter of June 2018 and their demand letter of August 2019 to the defendants which outlined the details.
[Underlining added]

35.	It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the primary Judge erred in granting summary judgment by reason of the applicant failing to satisfy the requirements as expounded in Tsang v Credit Corporation (PNG) Ltd [1993] PNGLR 112 in that the appellants in their filed Defence made a partial admission only. They denied they owed the total amount claimed and had sought assessment, the respondent failing to provide evidence proving the essential elements of the claim based on inconsistencies in the pleadings and evidence and insufficiency of evidence. In that regard it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that:
a.	There was no evidence of the invoices raised and issued to the respondents at the end of each month when each invoice became due, the invoices lumped together and served after the payment of the K350,000.
b.	 There was no evidence of the respondent having properly communicated the claim including by way of updated statements of account and follow up letters.
c.	The appellants did not deny the services provided for by the respondents to their agents and servants or employees, the admission however insufficient for the respondent and the court to form the view that the appellants had admitted the entire claim alleged.
d.	The main affidavit in support of the respondent’s affidavit relied upon misleading annexures.

36.	In reply, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the appellants have failed to point to identifiable error and that:
a.	The respondent met the requirements for entry of summary judgement under Order 12 rule 38(1)(a) and ((b) of the NCR and the requirements outlined in Tsang (supra).
b.	The respondent’s evidence via Mr Dennis Kal provided the essential elements of the claim and that in his belief there was no defence.
c.	The Statement of Claim was clear and succinct providing evidence of the invoices, total debt, part payment made and balance owing.

37.	Turning these submissions, the application for summary judgment was brought under Order 12 rule 38 of the NCR which provides:
(1) Where, on application by the plaintiff in relation to any claim for relief or any part of any claim for relief of the plaintiff:
(a)	there is evidence of the facts on which the claim or part is based; and
(b)	there is evidence given by the plaintiff or by some responsible person that, in the belief of the person giving the evidence, the defendant has no defence to the claim or part, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed,
the Court may, by order, direct the entry of such judgment for the plaintiff on that claim or part, as the nature of the case requires.
38.	In Tsang v Credit Corporation [1993] PNGLR 112, when discussing this rule the Supreme Court (Kapi DCJ (as he then was), Sheehan & Brown JJ) said at [117]:
There are two elements involved in this rule:
(a)	evidence of the facts proving the essential elements of the claim; and
(b)	that the plaintiff or some responsible person gives evidence that in his belief there is no defence.
....
The plaintiff will not be entitled to summary judgment if there is a serious conflict on questions of fact or law. Whether a case should go to trial on these issues will be determined on the facts of each case. However, the authorities show that the summary jurisdiction should only be invoked in a clear case; see Chief Collector of Taxes v T A Field Pty Ltd [1975] PNGLR 144.
39.	In Chief Collector of Taxes v T A Field Pty Ltd [1975] PNGLR 144 Raine J said:
The plaintiff has applied by way of notice of motion for an order under O. XVIII r. 1, namely, that he should be given leave to enter final and summary judgment in the action. In my opinion the summary jurisdiction conferred by the rule should only be invoked in a clear case. Great care should be taken not to shut out a defendant unless it is quite clear upon the facts and/or the law that he has no defence. Summary proceedings in ejectment in New South Wales under the old Rules in that State were only made use of by the Judges of the Court in very clear cases. See Burnstein v. Lynn[clxxx]4�and Pearch v. Gyucha[clxxxi]5, where Street CJ said:
Jurisdiction under this Order does not entitle the Court to deprive the parties of their right to proceed to a hearing before a jury if there is a serious conflict on questions of fact and that, of course, involves not only the surrounding facts themselves, but inferences of fact to be drawn from the evidence. If there is no such serious question between the parties, then I think that this Court should exercise the power which it has to determine the matter summarily and prevent continuous litigation over a claim which has little or no substance.
There are other cases in New South Wales to which I could refer, but I believe that the above references will demonstrate that I am not unaware of the serious responsibility that is borne by me, should I decide to accede to the application. I do not believe this was argued before me, but it is a matter of importance.
40.	In the present case Counsel for the appellants submits that the first element was not met as the appellants had filed their defence to the claim denying the entire or total sum claim by the respondent.  Further, the respondent had failed to prove the essential elements of the claim had been made out on its evidence.  While we accept the difficulties that emerged at the hearing by reason of the wording of the appellants’ Defence we are not satisfied that the respondent made out a clear case on the evidence for the making of an order for summary judgment.

41.	During the course of argument before the primary Judge Counsel for the appellants made the following submission.
Your Honour, it is clear that the defendants do not admit they owe the plaintiff the amount that is being claimed. It is subject to assessment, your Honour. And the defendants are yet to file their affidavit in response to the claim and the matter should be properly tried by assessing evidence shown by both parties foe the substantial amount of money that wad claimed by way of notice of motion for summary judgment.
And this is not a clear case Your Honour.  For summary judgment to be entered the defendants dispute – highly dispute that they owe the plaintiff that total amount claimed in their statement of claim and the notice of motion. And also there are a few notes that I want the court to take note of.
In terms of the pleading, the plaintiffs plead at paragraph 6 ion the statement of claim – your Honour our submission is that the pleadings are quite confusing. The pleadings are contained in the statement of claim. This is not corroborated, supported by evidence as well, your Honour. The plaintiffs have pleaded that he agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants commenced on 1 January 2018 to 30 June under paragraph 7 in terms of the invoices issued as pleaded. However, if your Honour looks at the evidence which actually my learned friend has relied on in support of the motion for judgment, your would note that invoices were issues from the date, from some time in October 2017 all the way of June 2018. 
...
Because if your Honour looks at one of the invoices that was issued for the month of January, that is annexed to the affidavit in support of Dennis Kai, Annexure B, in fact the first invoice. It has got invoices raised from October 2017 – sorry Your Honour commencing the 13th. It is mentioned somewhere in the invoice of 13 October 2017.
So, the agreement was reached in January 2018...... So our submission is that that this case is not clear for this court to enter summary judgment in the total sum as claimed in the notice of motion and the writ of summons and statement of claim. The court probably needs to assess evidence by both sides. And this is a matter for trial, and the plaintiff should not be driven from the summary judgment seat. 
42.	The relevance of this submission is that on the evidence of Mr Dennis Kai, the respondents’ Managing Director, the parties entered into a verbal agreement in January 2018 to provide services from 31 January 2018 to 15 June 2018.  However, it is clear that the invoices rendered related to services provided before and after those dates.  This may be explained, at least in part, by reference to the fact that the accounts were rendered at the end of each calendar month relating to services provided for the whole of that month, that is the number of days in the month that preceded the date of the invoice however that is a matter for evidence.  Further, given Mr Kai’s evidence and the respondent’s pleadings in its Statement of Claim, it does not explain the services rendered by the respondents in the months of October, November and December 2017 which predate the unchallenged evidence that the parties only entered into their agreement in January 2018.  The submissions of Counsel for the appellants on the point were not addressed by the primary Judge.  Nor does it explain why the June account dated 30 June 2018 yet sent under cover of a letter dated 6 June 2018 included services from 1 to 30 June 2018 notwithstanding Mr Kai’s evidence that the agreement to provide services was to 15 June 2018.

43.	These are questions of fact that could only be properly determined at trial.

44.	For this reason, the appeal against summary judgment is upheld and the matter remitted to the National Court.
COSTS

45.	In our view each party should bear their own costs of the appeal. 
 
46.	The appellants’ arguments on the adjournment were unmeritorious.  Given the concession made before the primary Judge, it should not have been advanced.
  
47.	Relevantly, on the question of costs, the whole of the evidence suggests a concerning lack of proactivity on the part of the appellants in resolving what appeared to be a simple debt dispute, where the appellants admit they still owe a substantial sum of money to the respondent but have done little to address that circumstance in over seven (7) years.  They made no complaint or enquiry following receipt of the accounts in June 2018, the perfect time to do so being when they made their part-payment.  The argument advanced before us by Counsel for the appellants that there was no evidence of the respondent having properly communicated the claim including by way of updated statements of account and follow up letters is unsupported on the evidence. There were repeated attempts on behalf of the respondent to address their outstanding debt.  It was thus left to the respondent to pursue litigation for payment.  Further, it is difficult to accept that the Chairman of a government authority would approve the part payment made without an invoice before him.

48.	The further argument by the appellants that the accounts should have been rendered monthly and not as a group also lacked persuasive force. It was a trivial, peripheral complaint, a waste of court time, in circumstances where there was no evidence led by the appellants that the oral agreement with the respondent required accounts to be raised and delivered to them on a monthly basis.  It was an argument advanced before the primary Judge and properly rejected.  

49.	Finally, the primary Judge was rightly critical of the appellants’ Defence.  Described by His Honour as “a legal manoeuvring” and “an admission there is money owed but in vague legal terms chose not to say we owe the entire thing”, the nature of the pleading exposed the appellants to a motion for summary judgment. In that sense they contributed to the circumstances in which they found themselves. The appellants then failed to file material that they asserted was important to their case notwithstanding more than sufficient time to do so, raising various complaints on appeal that were the consequences of their own actions and/or tardiness.   
ORDERS
a.	The appeal is upheld.
b.	The stay order issued by this Court on 23 April 2025 be discharged. 
c.	The National Court orders made on 25 February 2025 be set aside.
d.	The matter is remitted to the National Court for hearing before a Judge other than the primary Judge.
e.	Each party bear their own costs.
________________________________________________________________ 
Lawyers for the appellants:     Strategic Legal Services
Lawyers for the respondent:    Holingu Lawyers