SC2770

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SCRA NO. 62 OF 2024

BETWEEN:
LAVINA JACOB
Appellant

AND:
THE STATE
Respondent

WAIGANI:   MANUHU J, GEITA J, DINGAKE J
25 AUGUST 2025

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – Wilful Murder – Appeal against sentence –Mother pleaded guilty to killing her three young children by drowning – Sentenced to life imprisonment without parole – Whether sentencing judge erred in failing to consider prolonged domestic abuse and diminished mental state – Whether life imprisonment without parole manifestly excessive – Sentencing discretion – held  - sentencing judge committed no error – appeal dismissed.

The appellant, a mother, pleaded guilty to wilful murder after taking her three children (aged 15 months, 5 years, and 8 years) to a river and drowning them. The trial judge sentenced her to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, she argued that the judge failed to adequately consider (i) her history of prolonged domestic abuse, (ii) her diminished mental state, and (iii) that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Held:

(1)	The appellant failed to show that an error had occurred that had the effect of vitiating the trial judge’s discretion on sentencing.
(2)	The maximum penalty of life without parole is in accordance with the Criminal Code Amendment Act of 2022
(3)	The trial judge noted and gave due weight to the appellant history of emotional and physical abuse
(4)	The sentence of life imprisonment without parole was not manifestly excessive having regard to the aggravating factors.
Appeal dismissed.

Cases cited
William Norris v. The State [1979] PNGLR 605
State v Onda [2011] PGNC 276; N4988
Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653

Counsel
Mr. Vincent Ngibe for the appellant
Mr. Philip Tengdui for the State

JUDGMENT

1.	BY THE COURT: INTRODUCTION: This is a tragic case. It lies heavy on the heart as the facts will show. It is a story of deep shadows, where a mother’s love was swallowed by a darkness so complete it led to an unthinkable act. Three young lives, full of promise, were lost in the waters of the Kagul River. Their mother, Lavina Jacob, now stands before this Court, not to contest her guilt, for she has pleaded guilty to three counts of wilful murder, but to challenge the severity of her sentence. She was condemned to spend the rest of her life in prison, without hope of release. 

THE FACTS: THE UNFOLDING OF A TRAGEDY

2.	The facts in this case speak for themselves. There are as simple as they are horrifying. On the 13th of October 2022, Lavina Jacob took her three children on a walk. Their ages tell a story in themselves: 15 months, 5 years, and 8 years. She took them to a bridge over the Kagul River. There, she performed a heartbreaking finality. She removed their shirts and hung them on the bridge rail. Then, she jumped into the river, holding her children. She rose from the water. They did not. They died.

3.	It would seem that prior to the horrific act she had a quarrel over bananas with her husband, Pais John.

THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

4.	The Appellant appeals in effect on three core grounds:

(1)	The sentencing judge erred by not fully considering the abuse she suffered.
(2)	The judge erred by not considering her diminished mental state.
(3)	The sentence of life imprisonment without parole was manifestly excessive.

THE SHADOW OF ABUSE: WAS IT FULLY CONSIDERED?

5.	The Appellant’s counsel speaks of sixteen years of emotional, physical, and financial abuse. He submits the judge failed to take this into account. But we must look at the record. And the record shows, clearly and unequivocally, that the learned trial judge did note this history. He did not turn a blind eye. The trial judge noted that the appellant was depressed and going through “ a deeply emotional and psychological phase in her life”.

6.	To say he did not consider it is therefore incorrect. 

7.	The aggravating factors in this case were strong. The appellant took the life of her children in the most brutal manner. We echo the remarks of the trial judge when he observed that one shudders to think of the terror the that the children went through when they fought against the current of the Kagul river.

8.	The principle from Goli Golu v State (1979) PGSC 9, is clear: the maximum penalty must be reserved for the worst category of cases. Is this one? It certainly is. It was a cold blooded, calculated act, by the appellant.

9.	The law on appeals against sentence is governed by section 22(d) of the Supreme Court Act. The law was illuminated in the case of William Norris v The State (1979) PNGLR 605. The case stands for the position that the sentence by trial judge should not be disturbed on appeal, if no error can be demonstrated. 

10.	A sentencing judge has discretion. We cannot interfere merely because we might have balanced the factors differently. We can only interfere if the judge made an error of principle. On this first ground, we find no such error.

WAS THE SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE?

11.	Learned counsel for the appellant sought to convince us that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

12.	We do not agree that the sentence was excessive having regard to the circumstances of this case - especially when weighed against the factors in aggravation.
13.	In holding that it was not excessive, we have been persuaded by the approach and holding in the case of State v Onda (2011) N4988, which is like the present case. In that case the prisoner had pleaded guilty to four counts of wilful murder of her four children in circumstances like the present case. The prisoner in that case had thrown her four children and herself into the river, all of whom died, and she survived. The prisoner was sentenced to four life sentences for the four deaths.

14.	The principle from Goli Golu v The State is our guiding star: the maximum penalty is reserved for the very worst category of cases. The killing of three innocent children is as grave an offence as can be imagined.

15.	Finally, we conclude that this sentence is just. It is severe, as it must be, having regard to the facts of this case and the dictates of the law.

CONCLUSION

16.	The appeal is dismissed.

Lawyer for the appellant:		Public Solicitor 
Lawyer for the respondent:	Public Prosecutor