SC2753
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SCA NO. 100 OF 2024 (IECMS)

BETWEEN:
POM INVESTMENT GROUP LIMITED
Appellant

AND
ROWHANI LIMITED trading as Mills Dental Care 
Respondent

WAIGANI: HARTSHORN J, DINGAKE J, WOOD J
      23 JUNE, 11 JULY 2025

SUPREME COURT –  agreement entered into for works and supply of furniture at the respondent’s new dental clinic – a dispute arose regarding the scope, duration and amount payable for the project – allegation raised at trial that the appellant, as a foreign owned company did not have a certificate issued under the Investment Promotion Act to authorise it to carry on business in Papua New Guinea – evidence advanced by appellant that it held the relevant certification, however, the evidence was not admitted at trial – denial of right to be heard

The respondent argued the scope of works were limited to K600,000 and that the appellant did not provide a formal written agreement – on appeal, the Court was satisfied three tender letters constituted the agreement – on appeal, also held the evidence in the National Court also demonstrated that the respondent had agreed to pay the amount detailed in the tender letters
 
Held:  

1.	Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal filed on 21 August 2024 are upheld and the appeal is allowed.

2.	The Judgment of the National Court delivered on 18 July 2024 in proceeding WS (COMM) No. 23 of 2023 is quashed and substituted with an order that the respondent shall pay the appellant the amount of K434,672.17, which constitutes the balance owing for the project work, services and supply of furniture at levels 2 and 3, Arawa Annex Building, Brampton Street, 
Port Moresby.

3.	The respondent shall pay interest on the amount of K434,672.17 at the rate of 8% per annum pursuant to the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act, from 18 July 2023 when the Amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim was filed. 

4.	The respondent shall pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental of National Court proceeding WS (COMM) No. 23 of 2023 on a party/ party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

5.	The respondent shall pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal on a party/ party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

Cases cited
Kuso Maila Anda Ltd v United Pacific Corporation Ltd [2019] SC1894
Odata Ltd v Ambusa Copra Oil Mill Ltd [2001] N2106
Yaga v Sallel [2012] N4612

Counsel
Ms O Tiri for the appellant 
Ms N Tamutai and Mr M Chou-Lee for the respondent

1.	BY THE COURT: The matter before the Court on 23 June 2025 was the hearing of the Notice of Appeal filed on 21 August 2024.  

Background

2.	The Notice of Appeal is an appeal relating to the delivery of the written decision on 18 July 2024 by the trial Judge in National Court proceeding 
WS (COMM) No. 23 of 2023 (the proceeding).  In the proceeding, the appellant claimed that it entered into three agreements with the defendant (now respondent) to renovate and provide new furniture to the second and third floor of the respondent’s new office at levels 2 and 3, Arawa Annex Building, Brampton Street, Port Moresby (the project).

3.	The appellant claims that the proposals relating to the project were contained in three letters, which we shall refer to as the ‘three Tender letters’, namely:

a)	Letter of Tender dated 16 May 2021, entitled ‘Re: Proposed Renovation for Medical Clinic of Second Floor at POM’ in the amount of K385,562.13;

b)	Letter of Tender dated 20 August 2021, entitled ‘Re: Proposed Renovation for Medical Clinic of Third Floor at POM’ in the amount of K488,735.10; and

c)	Letter of Tender dated 20 August 2021, entitled ‘Re: Proposed Furniture Supply and Install for Medical Clinic of Second and Third Floor at POM’ in the amount of K160,374.94.

4.	The appellant further claimed in the proceeding that the respondent accepted the proposals for the services and work, with the cost of the project agreed as comprising of the three amounts that are referred to in the above letters, which were in the total amount of K1,034,672.17.  

5.	The respondent paid K600,000 under the agreements, but in the affidavit of
Dr Naysan Hamadani filed on 22 August 2023, he stated that the budget for the project was K600,000, the estimated timeframe for the project was three months and the specifics of the project would have to be ‘…laid out in a written agreement.’  In reply, the appellant claimed that the respondent failed to settle the outstanding amount of K434,672.17.

6.	In the Judgment in the proceeding, the trial Judge determined that the plaintiff company did not have a certificate under section 25 of the Investment Promotion Act 1992 (the Act).  The trial Judge also held that there was no evidence that the plaintiff company was registered as a foreign enterprise.  The trial Judge also stated that as the sole shareholder, Mr Roy Wang admitted in Court that he was not a citizen of Papua New Guinea, but on the Company Extract, held by the Investment Promotion Authority (the IPA) in relation to the plaintiff company, he deposed that he is a Papua New Guinea citizen.  In this regard, the trial Judge determined that ‘Therefore as a foreign enterprise without a certificate from the IPA to carry on business in Papua New Guinea the Plaintiff should not carry on such business in pursuit of purported contract with the Defendant.’

7.	The trial Judge also stated that there was no evidence that there was a written letter of acceptance of the agreement.  The trial Judge accepted that while K600,000 was paid by the respondent, having considered the evidence in its total context, he rejected the argument that the ‘…Plaintiff and Defendant entered into three agreements.’  As part of the Orders made in the proceeding, the trial Judge determined (and ordered) that the plaintiff did not prove there was an agreement between the parties.  His Honour also ordered the plaintiff operated illegally in carrying on business in Papua New Guinea pursuant to section 25 of the Act.

The Notice of Appeal

8.	There are seven grounds of appeal, which are set out in the Notice of Appeal as follows:

‘GROUNDS

1)	The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to give sufficient consideration to the undisputed fact that an agreement existed between the parties based on which services were provided by the Appellant to the Respondent for payment.

2)	The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in finding that there was no written Agreement between parties and in doing so failed to give sufficient consideration to the fact that the Appellant conceded that there was no written Agreement between the parties and that the Agreement was part oral, part written and part implied.

3)	The Learned Judge erred in law and fact by making a conclusive finding that the Appellant was carrying on business illegally pursuant to Section 25 of the Investment Promotion Act 1982 (IP Act) when;

a)	Relying on a company extract generated by the Appellant from the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) website;

b)	Failing to give sufficient consideration that the IPA is solely responsible for the contents of a Company Extract generated from the IPA website;

c)	Finding that the Appellant has deposed to the contents of the extract generated from the IPA website; and

d)	Finding that the Appellant had deposed that he was a Papua New Guinean citizen when in fact the Appellant has stated that he was not Papua New Guinean but was Chinese.

4)	The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in finding that the Appellant was illegally carrying on business within the country as a foreign enterprise:

a)	By exercising his discretion under Order 1 Rule 7 of the National Court Rules 1983 (NCR) to waive the requirements of Order 8 Rule 14, allowing the Respondent to raise the issue of the Appellant’s purported illegally during the trial, without adequately considering that that exercise prejudiced the Appellant and was therefore not in the interest of justice, since:

i)	The Appellant was taken by surprise when the Respondent raised that issue during trial; and

ii)	The Appellant was not given an opportunity to defend that allegation, amounting to breach of natural justice and procedural fairness and further, a premature determination of the issue.

b)	By not giving sufficient consideration to the established principles governing pleadings and the requirement for specific pleadings;

c)	By misapplying Order 8 Rule 11 of the NCR to allow the Respondent to raise the issue of the Appellant’s purported illegality during trial without having specifically pleading that in its Defence, when:

i)	the case concerned breach of contract and the Appellant had pleaded the necessary facts relating to that cause of action, hence was taken by surprise when the burden of proof shifted with the rising of the issue of illegality during trial.

d)	When he failed to give sufficient attention to:

i)	The Appellant’s witness’ testamentary evidence indicating that the Appellant is a foreign enterprise and that it is certified to carry on business within the country; and

ii)	The Appellant had filed an application on record that sought leave to reopen the Appellant’s case and provide evidence in rebuttal to produce the Appellant’s certificate issued under Section 25 of the IP Act, which although dismissed, demonstrated that the Appellant has proof of being a certified foreign enterprise.
5)	The Learned Judge erred in law and fact when he found that the Appellant was illegally operating as a local company, by placing more attention on the Appellant’s Company Extract to support a conclusive finding:

i)	When the proceeding was not one that was instituted under Section 418(1) of the Companies Act 1997 (CA) for him to consider that issue and subsequently the Extract;

ii)	Without considering the case of Yaga v Sallel [2012] N4612, which established that a company register is only prima facie but not conclusive evidence; and

iii)	When the Extract was not conclusive evidence pursuant to Section 398(5) of the CA.
6)	The Learned Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to give sufficient consideration to the principles discussed in the cases of Odala Ltd v Ambusa Copra Oil Mill Ltd [2001 N2106] and Paradise Farms Ltd v Bank of South Pacific [2010] 3825 in that;

a)	The Agreement between the parties was valid despite not having provided the Foreign Certificate of Incorporation;

b)	The Respondent failed to ascertain or confirm the Appellants status before entering into an Agreement with the Appellant and therefor was estopped from raising this issue; and

c)	The Respondent or the IPA did not apply under Section 41 of the IP Act to declare the Agreement between the parties illegal and void and that no cross claim was filed to declare the agreement unlawful and void.

7)	The Learned Judge erred in law and fact in finding at paragraph 28 of his judgment that:

a)	The Appellant did not make a case for unjust enrichment against the Respondent without considering that the elements for unjust enrichment as stated in the cases of Eli Pandopa v Yapili Urupu (2020) N8510 and Vuksich & Borich (NZ) Ltd v Pacific Energy Aviation (PNG) Ltd [2024] N10714, were present in the case; and

8)	The Appellant has acted ultra vires to the law with the expectation of receiving a profit when the Learned Judge has erred in law and fact as specified in grounds 3, 4 and 5 above.’

Issues relating to whether the appellant company was a foreign company and foreign certification issues and what evidence was considered by the trial Judge

9.	In the analysis of the above grounds, it is necessary to consider sections 25, 41 and 41A of the Act, which provide as follows:

25.  CERTIFICATION.

(1) The Authority may, in accordance with this Part, grant a certificate permitting a foreign enterprise to carry on business in the country.
(2) Subject to Section 26, a foreign enterprise shall not carry on business, unless a certificate has been granted under this Part.
(3) A certificate granted under this Act does not of itself relieve a foreign enterprise from compliance with any other law.
(4) A foreign enterprise which is granted a certificate under this Part shall comply with any law applying to it and such compliance is deemed to be a condition of every certificate issued under this Part.

41.  OFFENCES.
(1) A foreign enterprise and an officer or owner (however described) of a foreign enterprise which or who–
(a) carries on business without a certificate under Part IV or Part IVA; or
(b) carries on business in an activity that is reserved for a citizen; or
(c) carries on business in an activity that is reserved for a national enterprise; or
(d) subject to Section 36G, acquires or holds a relevant interest in a citizen enterprise or in a national enterprise without a certificate under Part IV or under Part IVA; or
(e) fails to comply with the terms or conditions of a certificate issued under either Part IV or Part IVA,
is guilty of an offence.
Penalty: A fine not exceeding K100,000.00.
Default penalty: A fine not exceeding K10,000.00.
(1A)  A national enterprise and an owner or officer (however described) which or who sells, transfers or otherwise disposes of a relevant interest in a national enterprise to a foreign enterprise prior to that foreign enterprise obtaining a certificate under Part IVA, is guilty of an offence.
Penalty: A fine not exceeding K100,000.00.
Default penalty: A fine not exceeding K10,000.00.
(2) A national enterprise and an officer, member, shareholder or owner (however described) of a national enterprise who carries on business in an activity that is reserved for a citizen is guilty of an offence.
Penalty: A fine not exceeding K100,000.00.
Default penalty: A fine not exceeding K10,000.00.
(3) In a prosecution of an offence under this Section, the burden of proof that a foreign enterprise or a national enterprise–
(a) was not carrying on business; or
(b) was lawfully carrying on business under Section 27(5) and (6); or
(c) was carrying on business only for the purpose of winding-up its affairs,
is on the foreign enterprise or national enterprise.
(4) A certificate purporting to be signed by the Managing Director, stating that on a specified date or during a specified period–
(a)  a term or condition of a certificate granted under this Act had not been complied with; or
(b)  a foreign enterprise or national enterprise was carrying on any business; or
(c) a foreign enterprise was not certified,
is prima facie evidence of that matter.
41A. CONTRACT, ETC., TO BE UNLAWFUL AND VOID IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
Where a contract, agreement or understanding is entered into between a foreign enterprise and another enterprise and–
(a) that foreign enterprise had not been issued a certificate at the time at which the contract, agreement or understanding was entered into; or
(b) the subject matter of the contract relates to business activities outside of the nature of the activities for which the foreign enterprise is certified to carry on business,
the court may, on the application of that other enterprise or of the Authority, declare the contract unlawful and void.

10.	 During cross-examination in the trial in the proceeding, the Managing Director for the appellant, Mr Roy Wang, was cross-examined on his affidavit.  As part of that cross-examination, Mr Wang was questioned as to why the IPA extract for the appellant company (which was annexure B to his affidavit filed on 19 April 2023) detailed that he was a Papua New Guinean citizen, whereas he agreed in cross-examination that he was a Chinese citizen.  In cross-examination, Mr Wang stated that the appellant company was registered under the Act as a foreign enterprise.  He also agreed in cross-examination that the reference in the IPA extract to him being a Papua New Guinean citizen was wrong.

11.	 During cross-examination, it is apparent that the appellant’s lawyer (Mr Noki) raised this issue with the trial Judge and submitted that the appellant had been taken by surprise with this line of questioning, which he said should have been raised as a preliminary issue.  During this exchange with the trial Judge, the appellant’s lawyer also submitted that company extracts were not conclusive proof of the matters contained within them.  We note that in reply, the trial Judge stated that the issue could be raised in submissions.

12.	 We note from the transcript when the parties made submissions in the proceeding on 12 June 2024, that the appellant’s lawyer submitted to the trial Judge that the appellant had filed an application to adduce evidence that the appellant company was indeed a foreign company and that Mr Wang had registered the appellant company as a foreign enterprise in Papua New Guinea.  Furthermore, the appellant’s lawyer submitted the IPA extracts are only prima facie evidence, and not conclusive proof, that the appellant company was an overseas company and therefore operating (on the respondent’s case) without a certificate issued by the IPA.  On this issue, the appellant relies on the decision in Yaga v Sallel [2012] N4612, per Cannings J, in which the National Court held at page 2 that ‘The Registrar of Companies, including historical extracts, is prima facie, not conclusive, evidence of a company’s shareholdings and directorships.’  We agree with this submission that the IPA extract was only evidence as a prima facie issue, including that there was no IPA extract admitted into evidence to demonstrate that the appellant company (as a foreign owned company) was operating in Papua New Guinea without a certificate as required pursuant to section 25(2) of the Act.

13.	 Furthermore, we note that the issue of whether or not the appellant company was operating in Papua New Guinea without a certificate as required by section 25(2) of the Act was not raised in the respondent’s Defence.  In addition, we note in the Statement of Relevant Facts & Issues for Resolution filed on 25 September 2023, which was signed by the parties’ lawyers, in reply to the appellant’s statement that the appellant was an incorporated company, the respondent stated at part A(1) of the document that ‘The Defendant does not know and does not dispute or agree to this fact.’  In the circumstances, we consider the reference to ‘does not dispute’ whether the appellant company was incorporated, in fairness to the appellant should also extend to the issue of whether the appellant was operating in Papua New Guinea in compliance with section 25 of the Act.

14.	 We also note in the Supreme Court decision of Kuso Maila Anda Ltd v United Pacific Corporation Ltd [2019] SC1894, per Yagi, Kariko and Polume-Kiele JJ, it was stated as follows in relation to the principles of natural justice that:

‘12. Section 59 of the Constitution is a right based on the principles of natural justice which imposes a minimum duty to act fairly. The duty applies to decision making processes in an administrative or judicial proceeding.

13. The Courts have regarded this constitutional principle of natural justice to be a very significant right to the extent that where a breach of this right is committed in a judicial proceeding the breach amounts to procedural irregularity and is an appellable error. This principle entails due process and procedural fairness is observed in the dispensation of justice. There are ample case law authorities that support this statement of the law.

14. In Peter Sharp v Warwick Andrew (2016) SC1797 the Supreme Court by majority (Hartshorn J and Yagi J) held that a denial of a right to be heard constitutes an appellable error of law and would vitiate any decision resulting therefrom. That was a case where the primary judge in the course of hearing a notice of motion dealt with it on a piece meal basis. The primary judge heard a preliminary issue and adjourned the balance of the motion to another occasion. However, the primary judge when delivering his ruling on the preliminary issue went further to determine the entire notice of motion without hearing the parties. The majority in holding that a breach of natural justice had occurred stated:

It is clear in our view that the appellant was denied natural justice in that he or his counsel were not given the opportunity to fully argue the merits of the application after the primary judge had found that the respondent was a non-resident. We concur with the submissions of Counsel for the appellant that this denial constitutes an appealable error of law and vitiates the decision of the primary judge in the court below, even if that decision was made pursuant to a discretion conferred upon the primary judge with respect to a matter of practice or procedure: Conroy v. Conroy (1917) 17 SR NSW 681, at 682-683; RG v. DG [2013] NTSC 66 at [17]- [24]. Consequently an identifiable error has occurred in the exercise of the primary judge’s discretion: Curtain Bros (PNG) Ltd v. University of Papua New Guinea (2005) SC788. [Our emphasis]’

15.	 Based on the matters detailed above, including the principles as confirmed in the judgement of Kuso Maila Anda Ltd v United Pacific Corporation Ltd (supra), we consider that the trial Judge erred in not allowing the appellant to adduce evidence as to whether it had a certificate to carry on business as a foreign enterprise in Papua New Guinea.  

16.	 Furthermore, we note in the trial of the proceeding that the appellant’s lawyer also made submissions that the respondent had not made an application under section 41A of the Act, which was that because the respondent contended that the appellant did not have the requisite certificate to carry on business in 
Papua New Guinea as a foreign enterprise, that the Court may, on the application of the respondent, declared the agreement was unlawful and void.  In its submissions in support of this point we note the appellant relies on the judgment in Odata Ltd v Ambusa Copra Oil Mill Ltd [2001] N2106, in which Justice Kandakasi (as he was then) stated at page 18 as follows:

‘2.	Odata as a foreign enterprise’s failure to obtain a certificate under s.25 of the IPA Act does not automatically render its contract with Ambusa null and void. Instead, s. 41A grants a right to the Defendants to apply for a declaration that such a contract is unlawful and void which right they have not exhausted.
3.	When an application under s. 41A of the IPA Act is made it has to be considered on its own merits including the principles of fairness and equity in the interest of doing justice, having regard to the conduct of the parties.
4.	The corporate veil may be lifted in a number of circumstances including when it is fair to do so in all of the circumstances and having regard to the extent of the control of the affairs of the company by whoever is behind it.’

17.	 We agree that the trial Judge noted in his judgment that the respondent had not made an application under section 41A of the Act to declare that the agreement was unlawful and void.  In this regard, we consider, based on the above reasoning in Odata’s case (supra) that the trial Judge should have considered all evidence, including to consider any affidavit to demonstrate the grant of a certificate under section 25 of the Act.  This is necessary to ensure that ‘.. the principles of fairness and equity in the interest of doing justice, having regard to the conduct of the parties...’ are applied.   In this regard, we consider the trial Judge erred in not requiring that an application under section 41A of the Act be made, or at least, that all relevant evidence be considered.

18.	 Based on the above reasons, we uphold grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal.  Notwithstanding this, we also consider it necessary to consider other grounds of the appeal.

Whether there was an agreement between the parties, and if so, what services were performed?

19.	  In the affidavit of Dr Naysan Hamadani filed on 22 August 2023, he stated that ‘in around June 2021’, Mills Dental (the respondent), allowed the appellant to commence work on both level 2 and 3 of the new clinic.  He states that on 
6 July 2021, without any progressive invoice, Mills Dental made a cheque payment of K200,000 for the work done so far.  He further stated that notwithstanding the continuous delays by the appellant, on 9 September 2021, Mills Dental made another cheque payment of K200,000 to the appellant for the progressive work.  He further stated that on 2 November 2021, whilst the project was still ongoing, Mills Dental made another cheque payment of K100,000.  He also stated that in around December 2021, the project was still not completed by the appellant, however, because COVID-19 had hit hard on all businesses in the country, including Mills Dental and the respondent was not able to maintain rental payments on both the old and new clinics, on 
9 December 2021, Mills Dental made the final cheque payment of K100,000 to the plaintiff and moved into the new clinic.

20.	 While the respondent submits that there was no written agreement between it and the appellant, it is necessary to look at the conduct of the parties.  In this regard, we consider there was no evidence adduced by the respondent that it rejected or disputed the three Tender letters, other than that Dr Hamadani deposed in his affidavit filed on 22 August 2023 that he requested a draft written agreement.  In our view, if Dr Hamadani was insistent that a written agreement be signed between the parties, he should have refused entry of the appellant into the clinic to commence work on the project, or at the very least, refused to make any payments. 

21.	 In relation to the respondent’s claim that the budget for the project was K600,000, with a timeframe of three months and the project would be laid out in a written agreement, we consider there was no evidence adduced by the respondent in support of those claims, other than what was contained in 
Dr Hamadani’s affidavit.  In other words, there was nothing put into evidence by the respondent as to the time, date or location and the details of any supposed conversation, meeting or telephone discussion in which those terms were agreed between the parties.  Nor were any e-mails or other documents annexed to Dr Hamadani’s affidavit in support of that claim.  

22.	 In contrast, in Mr Wang’s affidavit filed on 19 April 2023, he annexed e-mail correspondence between Dr Hamadani and himself.  In particular, in an e-mail sent from Dr Hamadani to Mr Wang on 5 April 2022, which was in reply to a request by Mr Wang for the payment of the amount of K434,672.17, 
Dr Hamadani stated: 

‘Dear Roy, I am unable to settle this immediately due to a number of issues.  It would be good to meet to discuss the outstanding issues and also agree to a payment schedule that will be satisfactory to the both of us.
Regards Naysan.’

23.	 We consider in the circumstances that Dr Hamadani agreed to the payment of the amount of K434,672.17, otherwise he would not have stated in his above e-mail that he was unable to settle the amount immediately.  Moreso, in his above e-mail he stated that he wanted to discuss matters to ‘…agree to a payment schedule that will be satisfactory to the both of us.’  We consider this to be an admission that the amount of K434, 672.17 would be paid, but that a payment plan had to be agreed upon.

24.	 We also note in Dr Hamadani’s affidavit filed on 22 August 2023 that he stated that he was surprised to receive on 26 August 2021 the ‘2nd Proposal’ and the 
‘3rd Proposal’.  We do not accept this account on the basis that the 1st Proposal, which is contained in the letter dated 16 May 2021, stated in the title of the letter and the column under ‘Project’, that it related to the renovations on the second floor.  In contrast, the 2nd Proposal stated in the title of the letter that it related to the renovation work on the third floor and the column under ‘Project’ stated that it related to the third floor.

25.	 In addition, the 3rd Proposal clearly related to the supply and installation of furniture on the second and third floor.  On our analysis of the three Tender letters, we consider the work and scope contained within the letters was different and not a repeat of earlier work or matters that were agreed.  On the basis of the above matters, we consider the three Tender letters constituted the agreement between the appellant and respondent for the payment of the amount of K1,034,672.17 for the project, albeit that the project time ran longer than expected.  For these reasons we uphold grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal.  Given our reasons in upholding grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal, we are of the view it is not necessary to consider ground 7 of the Notice of Appeal.
 
Conclusion 

26.	 On the basis of our above reasons, we consider there is no utility in remitting the matter back to the National Court.  Rather, having considered the evidence which was before the trial Judge in the proceeding, this Court will exercise its’ powers under section 16(b) and (c) of the Supreme Court Act as detailed below.

Orders

27.	 In the circumstances we make the following orders:

1.	Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal filed on 21 August 2024 are upheld and the appeal is allowed.

2.	The Judgment of the National Court delivered on 18 July 2024 in proceeding WS (COMM) No. 23 of 2023 is quashed and substituted with an order that the respondent shall pay the appellant the amount of K434,672.17, which constitutes the balance owing for the project work, services and supply of furniture at levels 2 and 3, Arawa Annex Building, Brampton Street, 
Port Moresby.

3.	The respondent shall pay interest on the amount of K434,672.17 until payment of that amount in full at the rate of 8% per annum, pursuant to the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act, from 18 July 2023 when the Amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim was filed. 

4.	The respondent shall pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental of National Court proceeding WS (COMM) No. 23 of 2023 on a party/ party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

5.	The respondent shall pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal on a party/ party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

Lawyers for the appellant: Lane Lawyers
Lawyers for the respondent: Namani & Associates