SC2759

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SCRA NO. 51 OF 2024

JOEL RUANA TAHA
Applicant

AND
THE STATE
Respondent

WAIGANI: DAVID J, AUKA J, BERRIGAN J
31 JULY AND 1 AUGUST 2025

CRIMINAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – Aggravated robbery – Section 386(1)(2)(a)(b), Criminal Code – Robbery with threats of violence, in company with others, whilst armed with factory made pistols, of K1.195m in cash from the Air Tropic terminal at Jacksons International Airport -  Trial judge failed to take into account mitigating factors – Appeal upheld – Parity - Principles applied - Sentence of 30 years quashed and substituted with one of 18 years of imprisonment. 

Cases cited
William Norris v The State [1979] PNGLR 605 
Sanawi v The State (2010) SC1076
Kaya v The State (2020) SC2026
Yalibakut v State (2006) SC890
Gimble v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 271
Tau Jim Anis and Others v The State (2002) SC564 
Phillip Kassman v The State (2004) SC759

Counsel
N Hukula, for the appellant
C Langtry, for the respondent

DECISION ON APPEAL

1.	BY THE COURT: The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, such that he stole K1,195,000 in cash, belonging to the Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies (RH), with threats of violence, whilst in company and armed with dangerous weapons, contrary to ss 386(1)(2)(a)(b) of the Criminal Code, for which the maximum at the time of sentencing was life imprisonment. He appeals against his sentence of 30 years of imprisonment. 

2.	On arraignment the appellant admitted that between 7 and 8 am on 3 November 2016 at 7 Mile, Jacksons International Airport, National Capital District, he with four other accomplices drove in a utility, Ford Ranger, into the Tropic Air terminal armed with offensive weapons, namely factory-made pistols. The appellant and two others went through the arrivals gate and entered the cargo bay area where parcels of money were kept. They threatened to shoot the Tropic Air staff and RH personnel and ordered them to lie flat on the ground, following which the appellant took six parcels containing cash totalling K1,195,000 belonging to RH, before fleeing the scene in the waiting vehicle. 

3.	The appellant raised a number of grounds on appeal some of which were contested. The State properly conceded, and it does appear from the materials, that the learned sentencing judge did not take into account the factors in mitigation. That was an error which had the effect of vitiating the sentence: William Norris v The State [1979] PNGLR 605 applied.

4.	It therefore remains for the Supreme Court to determine an appropriate penalty. The State submits that a sentence of 15 to 20 years is appropriate. The appellant submits that a sentence of 10 to 15 years should be imposed. 

5.	Counsel referred us to a number of cases and provided us with a copy of the decision in The State v Alphonse Lance Moha, Donald Joe Steven, Charlton Erick and Jason Yvia Kawi, unreported, 13 November 2020, in which sentences of 16, 18, 16 and 15 years of imprisonment were imposed on the appellant’s four accomplices, respectively, by Mogish J following trial. It appears that the sentencing judge in this case was not made aware of that decision by the parties. 

6.	Of the other cases referred to we consider the following most relevant: 

(a)	The State v Francis Vau Kamo, unreported, 6 April 2006, Cannings J in which a young offender was sentenced to 13 years for robbing a bank cash shipment of K380,000 at Hoskins Airport, whilst in company with three others and in possession of firearms;
(b)	The State v William Nanua Kapris (2011) N4305 in which twelve offenders were sentenced to between 10 and 25 years for their role in the charge of armed robbery of K2.4m in cash from the Madang branch of Bank South Pacific (that is before the cumulation of sentences for other offences of kidnapping, ransom, receiving stolen property and so forth were considered).

7.	In aggravation this was a very serious offence committed in company by four men, armed with pistols. It involved significant planning and resulted in the loss of an extremely large amount of cash monies. It appears to be the second largest armed robbery in the history of the country. It is also well accepted that regardless of any physical injury, the victims of such offences are often left with psychological scars that live on long after the incident itself. In addition, the fact that the offence took place at the country’s main international airport, albeit at a smaller domestic carrier’s terminal, is a seriously aggravating factor. 

8.	Airports are critical infrastructure at which members of the public, airport staff and security personnel are present. The potential disruption and danger to a large number of people in the event of an armed robbery is extremely high in the circumstances. Moreover, airports are of vital importance in the circumstances of Papua New Guinea, not only to those accessing the country from outside for the purposes of business or tourism but, as in this case at the smaller Tropic Air terminal, to those seeking to travel within the country, especially given that travel to many provinces is restricted to air. We agree with Mogish J that robbery committed in the premises of an airport only hinders development. The risk of such offences could ultimately lead to companies grounding their aircraft causing inconvenience to the general public as well as those who rely on aircraft to do business, not to mention the potentially chilling impact such offences may have on foreign investment. It is essential that sentences in such cases send a strong deterrent message in the interests of public safety and confidence both internationally and within the country.  

9.	In mitigation there were several factors in the appellant’s favour. He had no prior conviction. He immediately cooperated with police upon apprehension. He made admissions during his record of interview and gave the names of his accomplices. He pleaded guilty before the National Court. Those matters should be taken into account both as indicative of his remorse, which he expressed on allocutus, and on the basis that it has saved Court time and the State and its witnesses the cost and inconvenience of a trial. The appellant asserts that he returned K75,000 to police upon his apprehension. There appears to be some dispute about that but it is apparent from what was put to the appellant by police in his record of interview that at least K50,000 was returned to the police upon his arrest. 

10.	The parity principle recognises that equal justice requires that, as between co-offenders, there should not be a marked disparity which gives rise to 'a justifiable sense of grievance’. Like offenders should be treated in a like manner but if there are relevant differences due allowances should be made for them. Parity is a matter to be determined having regard to the circumstances of the co-offenders and their respective degrees of culpability: Sanawi v The State (2010) SC1076 adopting Mario Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; affirmed Kaya v The State (2020) SC2026.

11.	As for the culpability of the appellant, he played a critical role in physically committing the offence but he did not admit and the material does not establish that he was its mastermind: Yalibakut v State (2006) SC890 applied.  It does not appear from the material before us that there is any marked difference in the personal circumstances of the appellant and his four convicted accomplices. 

12.	We have also had regard to the starting points for sentences suggested in the guideline decisions of Gimble v The State [1988-89] PNGLR 271, Tau Jim Anis and Others v The State (2002) SC564 and Phillip Kassman v The State (2004) SC759.  In our view those sentences must be regarded as outdated having regard to the prevalence of aggravated robbery.

13.	In all the circumstances we intend to substitute a sentence of 18 years. Whilst he pleaded guilty we do not consider that this represents any marked disparity in the treatment of the appellant from his accomplices. Moreover, it is our view that the sentence is necessary to reflect the nature and gravity of the offending.

ORDERS

14.	We make the following orders:

(1)	The appeal against sentence is upheld.
(2)	The sentence of 30 years of imprisonment is quashed and substituted with a sentence of 18 years of imprisonment.
(3)	Time spent in custody shall be deducted from time to be served.
_______________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the appellant: Public Solicitor
Lawyer for the respondent: Public Prosecutor