N11680
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

WS (COMM) NO. 48 OF 2025 (IECMS)

BETWEEN:
GEORGE JAIRAJ-JACKLIN
Plaintiff

AND
JAY NATHAN LAI
First Defendant

AND:
JNL LIMITED
Second Defendant

AND:
TRENDS BEAUTY INTERNATIONAL
Third Defendant

WAIGANI: CAREY J
6,19 NOVEMBER 2025; 28 JANUARY 2026

NOTICE OF MOTION — Whether motion to be granted or refused — Mediation Orders – Security for Costs – Exercise of discretion
NOTICE OF MOTION – Professional Conduct Rules 1989 – Order 12 Rule 40 of the National Court Rules

The Plaintiff and Defendants filed Notices of Motion to advance their claims. The Plaintiff sought to have the matter placed into mediation and the Defendants submitted that the matter should be dismissed pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40 of the National Court Rules or alternatively security for costs be ordered for the Plaintiff.  The Court after consideration of the submissions made a ruling.

Held:
1.	Summary dismissal under Order 12 Rule 40 of the National Court Rules (NCR) should not be ordered where the pleadings and affidavit material disclose triable issues of fact or law unless the claim is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or bound to fail.

2.	Non‑compliance or delay in procedural steps such as discovery or filing a List of Documents, where subsequently regularised and absent demonstrated prejudice, constitutes a case‑management issue and does not of itself justify striking out proceedings.

3.	In ordering security for costs under Order 14 Rules 25 to 26 of the NCR, the Court exercises a broad discretion and must balance protection of Defendants against the risk of stifling a bona fide claim and the amount ordered must be proportionate, justified, and not oppressive.

4.	An order for mediation does not suspend or negate compliance with concurrent procedural orders, including the provision of security for costs.

5.	The Defendants’ application to dismiss pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40 of the NCR is refused.

6.	The Defendants’ application for security for costs pursuant to Order 14 Rules 25 to 26 of the NCR is granted in part.

7.	The Plaintiff is to provide security for costs in the sum of K60,000, by bank guarantee or payment into Court, within 28 days.

8.	The proceedings are stayed only if security is not provided by the deadline. 

9.	The Plaintiff’s application for mediation is granted. 

10.	The matter is referred to court‑annexed mediation before an internal accredited mediator. Directions to issue in substantially the terms of Form 1B (Sch. 2), with the mediation to commence within 42 days. (For the avoidance of doubt, the referral to mediation does not displace the Plaintiff’s obligation to lodge security within time.) 

11.	Costs be in the cause.

12.	Time for entry of these Orders be abridged to the time of settlement by the Registrar which shall take place forthwith.

Cases cited
Able Construction Ltd v W R Carpenter (PNG) Ltd [2014] PGNC N5636  
Arran Energy (Elevala) Ltd v OI [2023] PGNC 108
Mainland Holdings Ltd v Mandi [2009] PGNC 202
Philip Takori for and on behalf of Ben Komae, Jeff Lita, Tapukali Lita, Yas Lakain, Tom Aipi, Richard Aipi David Timon, Paulus Paliro, William Robert and Andrew Malipu v Simon Yagari as the Commander & Members of Police Mobile Squad 5 & 6 and the Commissioner of Police and Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2008] SC905
Yartlett v New Guinea Motors Ltd [1984] PNGLR 155 

Counsel
Mr. M. Adadikam, for the plaintiff
Mr. S. Ju, for the first, second and third defendants

JUDGMENT
1.	CAREY J: This is the decision in relation to Notice of Motion filed on 31st October 2025 (the NOM1) by George Jairaj-Jacklin (the Plaintiff). 

2.	Jay Nathan Lai (the First Defendant), JNL Limited (the Second Defendant) and Trends Beauty International (the Third Defendant) (collectively the Defendants) also filed a Notice of Motion on 9th October 2025 (the NOM2).

BACKGROUND
3.	The Plaintiff filed a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim on 24th June 2025.

4.	The Plaintiff, by NOM1, applies for the matter to be referred to mediation pursuant to Order 2 Rule 2(2) and/or Order 2 Rule 3(3) of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules 2022 (ADR Rules) and Section 155(4) of the Constitution. 

5.	The Plaintiff further seeks that the Court issue specific mediation orders under Order 2 Rule 3(5) of the ADR Rules, in terms substantially similar to Form 1B in Schedule 2 of the ADR Rules. 
 
6.	The Plaintiff also seeks costs of and incidental to the application to be in the cause; and that the time for entry of orders be abridged, with the Registrar to enter the orders forthwith upon settlement.

7.	In NOM2, the Defendants apply to the Court for the summary dismissal of the proceedings pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) of the National Court Rules (NCR), on the grounds that the proceeding discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious, and constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court. 

8.	In the alternative, the Defendants seek an order under Order 14 Rule 25(1)(a) of the NCR requiring the Plaintiff to deposit K100,000.00 as security for costs into the Registrar’s Trust Account. 

9.	The Defendants further seek costs of and incidental to their application, to be paid by the Plaintiff, and such further or other orders as the Court deems fit.  

10.	The Plaintiff relies on his affidavit sworn on 30th October 2025 and filed on 31st October 2025 (doc 1) and a further affidavit sworn on 11th November 2025 and filed on 12th November 2025 (doc 2).

11.	The Defendants relied on an affidavit sworn on 8th October 2025 and filed on 9th October 2025 (doc 3).

ISSUES 
12.	The following issues are for determination of this Court. They are:

a.	Whether the proceedings should be dismissed for failing to file List of Documents?
b.	Should the Plaintiff be ordered to pay security for costs?
c.	Whether the matter should be put into mediation?

DETERMINATION
13.	The Plaintiff submits that Mainland Holdings Ltd v Mandi [2009] PGNC 202 should be applied in this matter since discovery takes place after the close of pleadings.

14.	In Philip Takori for and on behalf of Ben Komae, Jeff Lita, Tapukali Lita, Yas Lakain, Tom Aipi, Richard Aipi David Timon, Paulus Paliro, William Robert and Andrew Malipu v Simon Yagari as the Commander & Members of Police Mobile Squad 5 & 6 and the Commissioner of Police and Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2008] SC905 it states that:
“23. The starting point of course is, O 12 r 40 of the Rules as interpreted and applied by the Courts. The principles built around this provision are now well established. The National Court in Kerry Lerro trading as Hulu Hara Investments Ltd v. Philip Stagg, Valentine Kambori and The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [6] (2006) N3950 extracted the relevant principles from a number of overseas and our own Supreme and National Court judgments (noted in the footnotes) in this way:
“1. Our judicial system should never permit a plaintiff or a defendant to be ‘driven from the judgment seat’ in a summary way, ‘without a Court having considered his rights to be heard.”
15.	Therefore, in considering dismissal under Order 12 Rule 40 (1)(a), (b), (c), (d) of the NCR, the Court proceeds cautiously and will not drive a plaintiff from the judgment seat unless the claim is plainly frivolous, vexatious or bound to fail. 

16.	I do not find that this claim falls into these categories which would warrant dismissal because the pleadings are satisfactory and meet the requirements of the NCR.

17.	The Plaintiff in doc 1 purports to have a written Employment Contract dated 7th August 2023, performance of services for the projects with partial payments including £7,000 housing.

18.	The Plaintiff further avers in doc 2 that the First Defendant provides a WhatsApp admission of £100,000 in relation to funds owed to the Plaintiff with a proposed repayment structure. 

19.	The First Defendant in doc 3 denied the agreement, and indicated that the Defendants do not owe any payment to the Plaintiff. 

20.	The Defendants also point to permit and stamp duty issues, raise governing law concerns, and impugn the authenticity of the signature. 

21.	I find that these are fact‑heavy merits disputes, not threshold pleading defects.

22.	The Defendants argue to dismiss the proceedings because they contend that the Plaintiff failed to file a list of documents timeously.
 
23.	The evidence before the court shows that the Plaintiff did file a List of Documents on 6th October 2025. While there was delay, it has been regularised de facto, and no specific prejudice is demonstrated.
 
24.	Moreover, the Defendants’ Notice of Discovery dated 22nd August 2025 appears to have been issued before close of pleadings, which does not support the assertion of non‑compliance as a basis for dismissal. 

25.	I find that such timing issues, even if imperfect, are case‑management matters—not grounds to strike out a suit that otherwise raises triable issues.

26.	The Defendants point to Employment of Non‑Citizens Act 2007 work permit requirements and Stamp Duties Act 1952 compliance to say the agreement is unlawful and unenforceable.
 
27.	These contentions may have evidentiary and legal consequences at trial but on the present record they do not render the claim obviously untenable, especially given the Plaintiff’s alternate bases which include arguments of work done, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and alleged admission.

28.	Therefore, such questions are for a trial to address.

29.	The Defendants aver that the Third Defendant did not exist at filing. 

30.	This does not negate the claim against the First and Second Defendants and is not a basis to dismiss the entire proceeding at this interlocutory stage.

31.	If a procedural adjustment is required such as amendment, striking out of a party or substitution it is for the party that is aggrieved to appropriately address this Court by filing documents to be granted what is sought. 

32.	The Statement of Claim, read with supporting affidavits, discloses triable issues on contract, quantum meruit, and/or debt acknowledgment and the standard for dismissal pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40(1) (a), (b), (c), (d) of the NCR is not met. 

33.	The Plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside Papua New Guinea, satisfying the gateway in Order 14 Rule 25(1)(a) of the NCR would likely be able to proceed.

34.	It should be noted that in relation to security of costs the exercise of discretion is broad and must be exercised having regard to all circumstances, consistent with Yartlett v New Guinea Motors Ltd [1984] PNGLR 155.

35.	Based on the submission of the Defendants, the claim appears bona fide.

36.	The Defendants’ blanket figure of £100,000 is unsupported by a draft bill and appears inflated. 

37.	A moderated amount will fairly protect the Defendants without stifling the claim.

38.	It is therefore reasonable that a security fixed at K60,000, to be provided within 28 days in a recognised form, otherwise, an automatic stay until provided.
 
39.	This recognizes the importance of ensuring that there is not an oppressive sum while balancing fairness of security against an overseas Plaintiff. 

40.	The Plaintiff argues that this matter should be placed into mediation. 

41.	The Defendants contend that this matter invokes exceptions as a case warranting summary dismissal. 

42.	In Able Construction Ltd v W R Carpenter (PNG) Ltd [2014] PGNC N5636 and applying in Arran Energy (Elevala) Ltd v OI [2023] PGNC 108 the naming of a deregistered business name is the exception being invoked.

43.	I do not accept that argument as persuasive to convince this Court as to why this matter should be dismissed because there is sufficient information in the Writ and Statement of Claim to move this matter toward a trial. The Defendants can seek the assistance of this Court through relevant means for removal of any party whom they assert should not be a part to the proceedings.

44.	I will therefore order this matter into mediation consistent with the approach taken by the Court that all matters should go into mediation unless certain exceptions apply pursuant to the ADR Rules.

CONCLUSION
45.	During the hearing on 19th November 2025, the Defendants’ counsel presented a fabrication to the Court in relation to the purported agreement. 

46.	It is instructive to the Defendants’ counsel that he is an officer of the Court and at all times must be truthful in advancing arguments on behalf of his clients when before the Court.

47.	In the Professional Conduct Rules 1989, it states that:

“3. DUTY OF EVERY LAWYER.
It is the duty of a lawyer–
(a) not to engage in conduct (whether in pursuit of his profession or otherwise) which–
(i) is illegal; or
(ii) is dishonest; or
(iii) is unprofessional; or
(iv) is prejudicial to the administration of justice; or
(v) may otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute; and
(b) to observe the ethics and etiquette of the legal profession; and
(c) to be competent in all his professional activities; and
(d) to respond within a reasonable time and in any event within 21 days (or such extended time of the Committee may allow) to any requirement of the Committee for comments or information on a complaint and in doing so he shall furnish in writing a full and accurate account of his conduct–
(i) in relation to the matter the subject of the complaint; or
(ii) in relation to any other matter the subject of an investigation or enquiry by the Committee; and
(e) to respond within the time and in the matter required by the Committee to any requirement of the Committee for comments or information on a complaint; and
(f) to comply with the Act and these Rules and the common law.

4. MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY.
(1) A lawyer shall not–
(a) attempt to further his client’s case by unfair or dishonest means; or
(b) knowingly–
(i) assist; or
(ii) seek to induce,
a breach of these Rules by another lawyer.
(2) A lawyer shall take reasonable care to ensure that his partners, associates or employees do not commit an act or omission which would be a breach of these Rules if committed by him.
(3) A lawyer shall properly supervise all professional work carried out for him and on his behalf by a non-lawyer.
(4) Where a lawyer becomes aware of–
(a) a breach of any provision of the Act; or
(b) a breach of these Rules,
by another lawyer he shall in accordance with his duty to the public and to the legal profession report the matter to the Committee.”

48.	The aforementioned is self-explanatory and the Defendants’ counsel should ensure that there is no repeat of the behaviour in court in which he attempted to advance his clients case by dishonest means knowingly.

49.	I am exercising my discretion not to refer the Defendants’ counsel to the Lawyers Statutory Committee.

50.	The Lawyers Act 1986 states:
“PART V. – PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
48. LAWYERS STATUTORY COMMITTEE.
[21](1) There is hereby established a Lawyers Statutory Committee–
(a) which shall be administered by the Society; and
(b) the cost of operation of which shall be borne by the Society.
(2) The Lawyers Statutory Committee shall comprise–
(a) the Attorney-General, ex officio; and
(b) one member of the Council, nominated by the Council, who shall be Chairman; and
(c) three practising lawyers with the qualifications specified in Subsection (3) recommended by the Council and appointed under Subsection (4); and
(d) two lay persons recommended by the Council.
(3) The qualifications for membership of the Committee under Subsection (2)(c) are–
(a) not less than five years’ unrestricted practice in the country; or
(b) not less than three years’ unrestricted practice as a lawyer in a country prescribed in the Rules, together with not less than two years’ unrestricted practice as a lawyer in the country.
(4) The members referred to in Subsection (2)(b), (c) and (d) shall be appointed by the Chief Justice.
(5) The membership of the Committee shall at all times comprise a greater number of practising lawyers than lay persons.
(6) The members of the Committee shall be appointed for a term of three years and are eligible for re-appointment.

52. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE.
(1) The function of the Committee is to enquire into complaints against a lawyer of improper conduct as a lawyer.
(2) Any person may request the Committee to enquire into an allegation that a lawyer has been guilty of improper conduct as a lawyer.
(3) An enquiry under this section shall continue notwithstanding that a lawyer has ceased to be a lawyer after the commencement of the enquiry.”

51.	I caution the Defendants’ counsel that this kind of conduct before this Court will not be tolerated, and it is anticipated that there is behavioural change in advocacy moving forward. 

52.	Advocacy ought to be conducted at the highest ethical and intellectual standards and it is for counsel to continually improve in legal practice through hard work, determination, honestly and with integrity. 

53.	I expect to see conduct befitting of learned Counsel. 

ORDERS
1.	The Defendants’ application to dismiss this proceeding pursuant to Order 12 Rule 40 of the NCR is refused.

2.	The Defendants’ application for security for costs pursuant to Order 14 Rules 25 to 26 of the NCR is granted in part.

3.	The Plaintiff is to provide security for costs in the sum of K60,000, by bank guarantee or payment into Court, within 28 days of this order.

4.	The proceedings are stayed only if security is not provided by the deadline. 

5.	The Plaintiff’s application for mediation is granted. 

6.	The matter is referred to Court‑annexed mediation before an internal accredited mediator. Directions to issue in substantially the terms of Form 1B (Sch. 2), with the mediation to commence within 42 days. (For the avoidance of doubt, the referral to mediation does not displace the Plaintiff’s obligation to lodge security within time.) 

7.	Costs be in the cause.

8.	Time for entry of these Orders be abridged to the time of settlement by the Registrar which shall take place forthwith.
Ordered accordingly.

Lawyers for the plaintiff: Adadikam Lawyers
Lawyers for the first, second and third defendants: Wang Dee Lawyers