N11684
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

WS NO. 55 OF 2024

BETWEEN:
APELIS IGOMOT WILLIAM
Plaintiff

v

PNG POWER LIMITED
Defendant

KOKOPO: CHRISTENSEN J 
19 DECEMBER 2025; 30 JANUARY 2026

CIVIL – TRIAL – Negligence claim – fire causing destruction of house – contended faulty electricity supply – reports as to cause of fire – inadequacies in expert evidence – opinion that fire may have been caused by power fluctuation – reliance on hearsay evidence in expert reports – no credible evidence from eyewitnesses – res ipsa loquitur not applicable – claim dismissed

Cases cited

Eovo v PNG Electricity Commission [1998] PGNC 105, N1785
H and H v Director of Child Welfare [1980] PNGLR 89
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Motor Vehicles Insurance Limited v Ken [2023] PGSC 170, SC2522 
PNG Ports Corporation Ltd v Islands Salvage Towage Ltd [2009] PGNC 166, N3780
Savi v PNG Power Limited [2024] PGNC 451, N11162
State v Kaiwi (No 4) [2023] PGNC 346, N10431

Counsel

R Lenalia, for the plaintiff
J Ainui, for the defendant

TRIAL ON LIABILITY
Claim of negligence 
1.	CHRISTENSEN J:     By way of writ of summons filed 12 March 2024 the plaintiff claims relief from the defendant, PNG Power Limited, for loss of property and damages.  The plaintiff contends that the defendant is responsible for the destruction of his house in Ravat Village, Raluana LLG, Kokopo, which was destroyed by fire on 6 September 2019.  

2.	The claim is one founded in tort and contends negligence.  The defendant denies liability.  

3.	A trial was conducted based on affidavit material adduced by both parties, with no witnesses required to give oral evidence.  This is the decision as to liability.  

THE CLAIM 

4.	The plaintiff built his family home, a high steel post three bedroom home of 150 square metres, in Ravat Village in 1994.  The plaintiff claims the house and its contents to be worth K614 903.50.  

5.	On the night of 6 September 2019, the house caught on fire.  The plaintiff’s claim, and his evidence, is that this occurred between 9pm and 10pm after power was restored following a black out. 

6.	Fire officers attended and despite defensive firefighting, the house and its contents were completely destroyed by fire.  The plaintiff asserts in his affidavit that [sic] “the fire started from the PPL [the defendant’s] service line entry into the house and directly contact with the facer board and quickly spread to all other rooms ... the fire started from a power surge after couple of power interruptions that evening which caused the PPL service line to spark after power was restored and directly contact with the face board and fire eventually started”.  

7.	The plaintiff’s claim, per the statement of claim and the submissions made, relies heavily on a fire investigation report which provides that [sic] “the fire may started as a result of power fluctuation that happened during the evening time which sparky erupted at the PPL entry point at the right hand side of the building at the first floor area”.  The weight that can be applied to this, and the other evidence, is to be carefully considered. 

8.	While the defendant does not admit knowledge of the fire in its defence, at trial, it was not in issue between the parties that a house fire occurred and that this led to the destruction of the plaintiff’s house and its contents.  What is in issue is whether the defendant has any responsibility for that destruction.  That is, whether the defendant’s contended negligence caused the fire.  

EVIDENCE 	

9.	The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff, and the subject of rebuttal evidence adduced by the defendant, can be categorised as relating to three aspects.  These relate to the fundamental issues in dispute, being whether the evidence establishes that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and whether that duty was breached.  Each of these aspects of the evidence will be considered in turn. 

[A] 	Evidence as to PNG Power connection to house

10.	The evidence adduced by the plaintiff includes evidence as to the defendant company having inspected and approved the electrical wiring to the house, and as to the defendant company been the electricity supplier to the house at the relevant time.  The defendant’s evidence responds that the plaintiff was not a registered easy pay customer, and the defendant does not accept that the company responsible for the wiring was a licensed contractor for the defendant.  Further, the defendant’s evidence and submission is that the plaintiff did not adopt the required process to report the fire.  

11.	I accept the plaintiff’s evidence and submissions as to this issue in dispute.  The evidence of the plaintiff includes evidence from the managing director for a company responsible for the installation and connection of electricity to the house.  While the named company is no longer trading, the evidence adduced satisfies me that the electricity supply to the plaintiff’s house was done by a licensed contractor and included a connection to PPL.  This evidence includes an easy pay receipt as to the defendant company being the supplier of electricity to the plaintiff’s house.  

12.	As to the evidence and submission that the plaintiff did not undertake the proper process to report the fire, which I understand is relied upon the defendant to suggest that the plaintiff was not a customer of the defendant company, I do not accept this.  The evidence clearly establishes that the plaintiff has sought to engage with the defendant company about the fire.  Whether there was strict compliance with the defendant’s apparent processes for this is of little consequence as to the issue of the defendant’s duty of care.  

13.	The evidence adduced by the plaintiff satisfies me that at the relevant time, the defendant company was the electricity supplier for the plaintiff’s house, via a connection that was installed and inspected by a licensed contractor approved by the defendant company.  It follows that, consistent with authorities relied upon by the plaintiff in this regard, that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.   The issue then becomes whether that duty was breached.  

[B]	Defendant’s evidence as to faulty electricity supply

14.	A core aspect to the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant company was negligent relates to contended issues with electricity supply at the relevant time.  The plaintiff submits that faults with the electricity supply occurred, and that the defendant company failed to switch off the main line or alert residents.  

15.	The information from witnesses that is relied upon by the plaintiff is that there were multiple black outs on the night of the fire, and that the fire started immediately after a restoration of power.  The plaintiff submits that “general knowledge” that surges of power can cause serious fires establishes liability: Eovo v PNG Electricity Commission [1998] PGNC 105, N1785.  

16.	The defendant submits that the records of the company establish that there was only one blackout on the relevant date, and this was as a result of planned outage work on ‘Kokopo Feeder 4’.  The defendant adduced evidence from a team leader of systems control in Gazelle as to whether there were “continuous power outages” along the service entry line on the relevant evening.  The team leader deposes, with reference to a spreadsheet of operational data, that there was only planned outage work and only one black out at 4.52pm.   The team leader denies that there were three continuous power outages.  

17.	However, this evidence does not appear to be consistent with what the operational data spreadsheet shows.  The spreadsheet records that there was a blackout for a period of 5 hours and 59 minutes from 1042 hours to 1641 hours, with no mention of a blackout at 4.52pm.  Further, there is no explanation in the team leader’s evidence as to a second record of data for ‘Kokopo Feeder 4’ that appears to record a blackout for a period of three minutes from 1702 hours to 1705 hours.  

18.	I have been assisted by the submissions of counsel for the plaintiff as to whether to accept the documentary evidence as to the records of electricity supply on the relevant date.  These submissions included, as I understood them, that:

(a)	it is not clear why the team leader who provides the evidence is not the team leader for the area where the house is located;
(b)	that the deponent was not employed with the defendant at the time of the fire; and 
(c)	it is not clear that ‘Kokopo Feeder 4’ is the supply line for the plaintiff’s house.  

19.	The last of these submissions is particularly persuasive.  There is no evidence that the plaintiff’s house was supplied electricity from ‘Kokopo Feeder 4’ and that accordingly the records relied upon by the defendant are those relating to this particular house.  

20.	While the evidence adduced by the defendant gives me pause as to there being only limited electricity supplies issues at the relevant time, the defendant’s evidence is not sufficiently explained such that I am satisfied that it is records relating to the relevant line and electricity supply.  Accordingly, I reject the evidence of the defendant as to there being only one occasion of blackout on the relevant date.  

21.	This leaves for it to be considered the evidence from the plaintiff as to the contended faulty electricity supply.  

[C] 	Plaintiff’s evidence as to faulty electricity supply

22.	The first of this to observe is evidence from the managing director of the electrical company that did the installation.  He deposes in his affidavit that [sic]:

... from around 2013 with the situations of PPL continuous blackouts and low currents the family stated to experience issues regarding burnt service lines leading to their residents and had to make numerous calls to PPL to attend and restore power supply until the report of the burning of the house down and attended to by the PPL senior inspector in 2019. 
 
23.	These contended incidents and issues are not further detailed in the affidavit, nor are they explained or detailed by the plaintiff himself.  In those circumstances, this is not evidence capable of advancing the plaintiff’s case.  

24.	The plaintiff then relies primarily on what are described as two reports.  The reports are attached as annexures to the plaintiff’s own affidavit filed 12 March 2024.  The first, annexure “A” is dated 27 March 2020 and is titled ‘Investigation Report’.  The second, annexure “B” is dated 18 October 2019 and is titled ‘Fire Report’.  Each of these reports will be considered in turn.  

25.	It is relevant to observe from the outset that they were admitted without objection.  In such circumstances, and despite there potentially being admissibility issues with the reports (drawing from principles in, eg, Motor Vehicles Insurance Limited v Ken [2023] PGSC 170, SC2522 and H and H v Director of Child Welfare [1980] PNGLR 89), I have considered the contents of the reports in full.  

Annexure A – Investigation Report

26.	The first annexure is comprised of four pages of documents, two pages which contain summaries and two pages which are the substance of the report.  

27.	The summary pages reference the fire as being in a category of ‘electrical’ and ‘accidental (electricity current fluctuations)’.   These summaries do not in themselves advance the plaintiff’s case given the limited information.  It is the two page report that is the critical evidence.  

28.	The report is set out as correspondence by A/ Superintendent Paul Yalongi addressed to the Chief Fire Officer Mr Bill Roo.  Acting Superintendent Yalongi sets out the interviews he conducted with witnesses, these reported as involving:

(a)	A son of the property owner, Mr David Igomot William Jnr, who stated that he was present when the fire started “at the first area”.  After arriving from work, he joined his cousins’ telling stories outside the lawn area.  While they were sitting down, they all heard a loud bang inside their house “directly at the right hand corner of the building on the first floor where the power entry point is located”.  Not long after the noise, they noticed smoke and fire coming out from the right hand corner of the building.  The fire quickly spread throughout the building and completely destroyed the building.  

(b)	An employee of the plaintiff who was present at the scene when the fire started from the building.  He “specifically mentioned and confirmed that power was fluctuating that night when they were sitting outside of the building”.  He stated that “they all heard a loud bang on the right hand corner of the floor area and not long after, they saw the flames and smoke”.  

(c)	Senior Inspector Johnson Ishmael, an employee of the defendant attached to the Kokopo Branch, who “clearly pointed out and said that power interruption was happening during the night time ... [a] continuous power outage of three times which resulted in the overload along the service entry line to the residence which directly caused the fire to happen”. 

29.	Acting Superintendent Yalongi’s report then provides [sic]:

Based on statements presented by witness and the study, the fire may started as a result of power fluctuation that happened during the evening time which sparkly erupted at the PPL entry point at the right hand side of the building at the first floor area.  [emphasis added] 

30.	This is the critical evidence relied upon by the plaintiff to establish his claim.   However, it is not evidence that I am satisfied establishes on the balance of probabilities negligence by the defendant in the manner that the plaintiff contends. 

31.	The reasons for this are firstly that the centrality of this evidence to the plaintiff’s claim is apparent by the inclusion of this finding in the statement of claim.  However, the extract in the statement of claim omits the word ‘may’, inadvertently elevating the certainty of the purported finding. Rather, at its highest, the opinion of A/ Superintendent Yalongi is that the fire may have been started as a result of power fluctuations, not that it was started as a result of power fluctuations.  I am not persuaded that power fluctuations being a possible cause of the fire establishes on the balance of probabilities that the defendant breached any duty owed.  

32.	Secondly, the extent to which weight can be applied to the opinion of A/ Superintendent Yalongi is difficult to assess in the absence of direct evidence from the witness and any information as to his qualifications, training, and experience in assessing the cause of fires: PNG Ports Corporation Ltd v Islands Salvage Towage Ltd [2009] PGNC 166, N3780 at [34] – [37].  While it was not challenged that he is an expert witness, it is still for the court to assess his credibility and the weight that can be applied to his opinion.  Acting Superintendent Yalong has not himself given an affidavit deposing the truth of his opinion and the basis for the finding he made.  

33.	It is further relevant to observe as to the weight that can be applied to A/ Superintendent Yalongi’s opinion is that the opinion is one based on hearsay evidence.  The plaintiff did not produce any evidence directly from any of the apparent eyewitnesses.  This undermines the extent to which the expert opinion can be given weight.  As Wawun-Kuvi AJ (as then was) said in State v Kaiwi (No 4) [2023] PGNC 346, N10431 at [148]:

... parties who call pathologists or any expert as witnesses must keep in mind that the facts on which pathologists and experts base their opinions must be proven by admissible evidence.  The nature and quality of that evidence will determine the weight applied to the expert’s opinion.  

34.	The limitations in the plaintiff’s case by not producing evidence directly from these eyewitnesses can be demonstrated by the contended evidence of ‘sparks’ having occurred immediately before the fire.  This is something stated by A/ Superintendent Yalongi in the conclusion of his report, and is something the plaintiff has submitted occurred.  However, with the only purported evidence of this being a conclusion drawn by A/ Superintendent Yalongi in a report annexed to an affidavit of the plaintiff, the court is unable to make a factual finding that such ‘sparking’ occurred.  

35.	It is not, as the plaintiff submitted, an answer to these issues to submit that an expert report is a form of exception in evidence law.  An expert report, and the opinion it contains, is an exception in evidence law in so far as it permits opinion evidence when such evidence would ordinarily be inadmissible.  But an expert report does not make what is otherwise hearsay evidence admissible: Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [85], applied in State v Kaiwi (No 4).  Here, where the plaintiff is asking the court to make findings of what occurred in the lead up to the fire, the plaintiff needed to adduce direct evidence of this from eyewitnesses.  The court would then have been in a position to consider that evidence, along with the finding of the expert, and to make an assessment as to whether the defendant company breached their duty of care.  

36.	Nonetheless, even if that had of occurred, the highest that the expert’s finding would be is still that the fire ‘may’ have started as a result of power fluctuations.  As already observed, this does not establish the cause of the fire to the requisite standard.  It also does not exclude other explanations for the fire such as a kerosene or solar lamp battery explosion.  Accordingly, for completeness, even considering the evidence at its speculative highest if the eyewitnesses had given direct evidence as they did to the report writer, the plaintiff’s case is not established based on the annexure A report.  

Annexure B – Fire Report 

37.	The other expert report relied upon by the plaintiff is a one page document complied by PNG Power Limited Senior Installation Inspector Johnson Ishmael, this being the third witness that was spoken to by A/ Superintendent Paul Yalongi.  Mr Ishmael describes having conducted interviews with three persons.  

38.	His report provides that the information provided was that “there was no one in the house and the baby sister locked the gate behind her while she left to another house about 250 metres for reasons unknown”.  The three witnesses were telling stories about 50 metres away from the house.  At about 9.45pm, there was a black out and a few seconds later the power came back again.  Then the power went off again and some seconds later it came back again.  At that instant they heard a big bang, and they all saw flames coming from the service line close to where the entry box is located.  

39.	The weight that can be applied to this report suffers the same limitations from hearsay and its annexing only to the plaintiff’s affidavit rather than being evidence from the expert themself as arises with the annexure A report.  That is, there is limited, to no, weight that can be applied to it, nor weight that can be applied to the purported witness accounts.  

40.	In any event, this report itself does not advance the plaintiff’s case.  The conclusion made by Mr Ishmael was that [sic] “the cause of the fire could not be confirmed unless we interview other witness ... to be honest, only fire expert will tell us if the fire was caused by electrical or not”.  As already observed, the apparent fire expert himself cannot say whether the fire was caused by electrical fault.  Additionally, the evidence of Mr Ishmael in this report is not consistent with his purported account in the report of, A Superintendent Yalongi further undermining the weight that can be applied to the Annexure A report.  

CONCLUSION

41.	The plaintiff has not adduced any credible evidence upon which weight can be applied as to the circumstances leading up to the fire and the cause of the fire.  No evidence from eyewitnesses to the fire have given evidence, and the expert evidence relied upon goes no higher than a possibility that power fluctuation was the cause.  

42.	The plaintiff submitted as to the limitations of the evidence that this is not entirely the fault of the plaintiff.  It is submitted that the defendant company had indicated that they had been present and were going to produce a report, and that an insurance assessor report was to be produced.  The plaintiff has not received these despite numerous requests.  I accept that the finding of Woods J in Eovo v PNG Electricity that “a householder in PNG does not necessarily have access to expert fire assessors” still remains a relevant consideration in contemporary times, but this does not absolve a plaintiff from the need to prove the circumstances of the fire.  In Eovo v PNG Electricity, Woods J found liability with reference to “quite clear” evidence from the plaintiff and his witnesses as to the fire starting at the main switch box.  No such evidence is available here.  

43.	Further, I have considered a submission of the plaintiff to the effect that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is of application, that is, that ‘the thing speaks for itself’.  I am not satisfied that this evidential maxim is applicable.  Similar to the finding of Wawun-Kuvi J in Savi v PNG Power Limited [2024] PGNC 451, N11162, here, it is not possible on the evidence adduced to determine the cause of the fire.  As her Honour observed, “to merely say that the cause of the fire is unknown is not adequate”.   The first element of res ipsa loquitur is not established.    

44.	Accordingly, the plaintiff has not proved the defendant company breached any duty of care and that it is liable on a basis of negligence.  

ORDERS

45.	For those reasons, the following orders are made:

(1)	The plaintiff’s claim is refused and the proceeding dismissed.    

(2)	The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs on a party-party basis to be taxed if not agreed. 

(3)	Time for entry of the orders is abridged to the date of settlement by the Registrar which shall take place forthwith.  

Lawyers for the plaintiff:  Warner Shand Lawyers 
Lawyers for the defendant:  Ainui Legal Services