N9028

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR  1392 OF 2019

THE STATE

V

ESTHER EROANE

Waigani: Berrigan, J
2021: 15th, 25th June and 13th August

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – GUILTY PLEA – MURDER – S 300(1)(a) of the Criminal Code – Murder of husband’s girlfriend - Mitigating and extenuating factors - De facto provocation present – Aggravating Circumstances – Clear intention to cause grievous bodily harm, vicious attack of a defenceless and unsuspecting victim from behind, element of planning present, offensive weapon used to inflict multiple injuries, 15 years of imprisonment. 

Cases Cited:

Parkop and Make v The State (1999) SC621
Allan Peter Utieng v The State (2000) SCR No 15 of 2000
Marangi v The State (2002) SC702
Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789 
Mangi v The State (2006) SC880
Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC1017 
Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653 
The Public Prosecutor v Vangu’u Ame [1983] PNGLR 424
The State v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91 
The State v Frank Kagai [1987] PNGLR 320
Rex Lialu [1990] PNGLR 487
Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38
The State v Mek (1997) N1575
The State v Er (1998) N1749
Tanga v The State [1999] PNGLR 216
The State v Rongo (2000) N2035
The State v Jonathan Arupa Wangus (2001) N2170
The State v Peter Korak Siwi (2003) N2443
The State v Maria Tuu (2008) N3706
State v Anton (2010) N4117
The State v Alis Nema Mara (2010) N4133
State v Topi (2010) N4667
State v Uraro (2012) N5164 
State v Tinka (2013) N5439
The State v Guina (2020) N8311

References Cited

Sections 19, 300(1)(a) of the Criminal Code

Counsel

Mr F Kaipu, for the State 
Mr N Loloma, for the Offender

DECISION ON SENTENCE
13th August, 2021
1.	BERRIGAN J: The offender pleaded guilty to the murder of Fendalyn N’dranoh, contrary to s 300(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. 

2.	The following facts were admitted on the plea and supported by the depositions.  Between 6:30 and 6:45pm on Saturday 29th of October 2018 at the South Morobe Transit Motel in Henao Drive, East Boroko, Fendalyn N’dranoh was walking towards the reception area of the hotel with her boyfriend, Lovi Sakillopa.  Lovi Sakillopa was the offender’s former husband.  Lovi went into reception while Fendalyn stood outside with her back to the carpark.  The offender approached Fendalyn from behind, put her arm around her neck and held her tight.  She then started stabbing Fendalyn with a kitchen knife.  A guard who saw what was happening, picked up a piece of 2 x 1 timber and hit the offender until she stopped stabbing Fendalyn.  Lovi came out from reception and chased the offender but she ran away.    Fendalyn was taken to hospital but pronounced dead shortly afterwards from the penetrating stab wounds to the left lung, and haemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds.

Allocutus 

3.	On allocutus the offender said: Thank you to the court for giving me this opportunity to say that I am sorry. Firstly, I would like to say sorry to God for breaking his law, his commandment.  Secondly, I apologise to this court for breaking the law of this country.  I am also sorry for taking up Court’s time.  I am sorry to the family of the deceased.  I am sorry for what I did to them.  I did not mean to kill her.  I only want to give injury but I killed her and I am so sorry.  I would like to apologise to my own family, my two children.  I would like to say sorry for the big wrong I have done. I realise my mistake and I will never commit this kind of offence again. I have been in prison for two years. I partake in the work as a prisoner, including training, bakery, and church.  I have with me the certificate.  My two children have told me about the type of pain they have.  I also gave that letter to the CBC officer.  Please have mercy on me so that I may spend my sentence with my children. They need me.  Thank you.

Sentencing Principles and Comparative Cases

4.	The maximum penalty for murder under section 302 of the Criminal Code is life imprisonment. 

5.	In Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789 the Supreme Court suggested the following sentencing ranges for murder, according to four categories of increasing seriousness: 

Category	Circumstances	 Sentence 	
1.	Plea.
Ordinary cases. 
-Mitigating factors with no aggravating factors.	No weapons used. -Little or no pre-planning.
-Minimum force used. 
-Absence of strong intent to do GBH.	12 – 15 years	
2.	Trial or Plea. 
-Mitigating factors with aggravating factors.	No strong intent to do GBH.
-Weapons used.
-Some pre-planning
-Some element of viciousness	16 – 20 years	
3.	Trial or plea
-Special Aggravating 
factors. 
-Mitigating factors reduced in weight or rendered insignificant by gravity of offence	Pre-planned. Vicious attack.
-Strong desire to do GBH.
-Dangerous or offensive weapons used e.g. gun or axe.
-Other offences of violence committed.	20 – 30 years	
4.	WORST CASE – Trial or Plea
-Special aggravating factors. 
-No extenuating circumstances. 
-No mitigating factors or mitigating factors rendered completely insignificant by gravity of offence.	Pre-meditated attack.
-Brutal killing, in cold blood.
-Killing of innocent, harmless person.
-Killing in the course of committing another serious offence.
-Complete disregard for human life.	LIFE IMPRISONMENT	

6.	Defence counsel acknowledged in aggravation the use of a dangerous weapon, the nature of the injuries and the prevalence of the offence.  In mitigation he asked the court to take into account the offender’s guilty plea, cooperation with police at the earliest opportunity, lack of prior record and remorse.  He submitted that strong de facto provocation was present as a result of the conduct of the deceased and the offender’s husband.  

7.	Defence counsel submitted that the offence fell within category 2 of Manu Kovi but that a sentence range of between 10 and 14 years would be appropriate, in particular he asked for a sentence of 10 years, wholly or partially suspended.  He referred to the following cases in support of his submission:  

a.	Mangi v The State (2006) SC880: The appellant was found guilty of murder following trial.  He and the deceased were drinking beer at a club. After that they went separately to the market and a scuffle ensued between the two of them. The fight was a typical drinking fight. It was stopped twice but the deceased continued to fight the appellant. Stones were also used in the fight. In the course of the third scuffle, the appellant held the deceased in a bear hug and they fell to the ground. It was discovered then that the deceased had been stabbed on the chest, causing his death. The offender’s sentence of 35 years was reduced to 16 years in hard labour; 
b.	The State v Jonathan Arupa Wangus (2001) N2170, Kandakasi J: the offender pleaded guilty.  On his way home he met the deceased who said to the offender, "I always wanted see you face to face and now I am able to see you". The deceased started to swing the bush knife at the offender, who fought back using his own bush knife. The offender cut and severed the deceased’s right arm below the elbow and then the left at around the same spot as the right hand. The deceased also sustained a serious and deep cut to his back which cut through the back bone and penetrated internally resulting in a collapsing of both of the deceased’s lungs, causing his death. The court took into account that the deceased had raped the offender’s older brother’s wife sometime earlier. He was sentenced to 10 years in hard labour, less time spent in custody;

c.	The State v Er (1998) N1749, Injia J: the offender pleaded guilty to murder. The offender was the only lawful wife of her husband from whom she had 4 children. She killed the deceased by stabbing her once on the right side of her neck from which injury she died the same day some hours later. At the time she stabbed the deceased, the accused wanted to give her “some pain” because the deceased was seeing the accused’s husband. The deceased saw her husband and the deceased together on Thursday. After this, she was beaten up by her husband. On Sunday, she met the deceased at a village basketball game and asked her to be compensated by the deceased for the harm done to her by her husband. The deceased refused and spat on the accused. This made the accused angry and she stabbed the deceased causing her death.  She was sentenced to 8 years in light labour;

d.	Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC1017 in which the Supreme Court partially upheld an appeal against a sentence of 9 years, by wholly suspending the balance after deducting the pre-trial and post-conviction period of 2 years, 1 month in detention.  The offender went looking for her husband at the deceased’s residence. When she got there, she found the deceased seated on a chair in the living room of her house drinking coffee. The offender suggested that the deceased go and live with her and her children in her house so that their husband could look after all of them under the one roof. Rather than giving any consideration to the proposal, the deceased verbally insulted the offender and then armed herself with a knife that was there on the table and start to attack the offender. On realizing she had no way of escaping, the offender wrestled the knife from the deceased, and stabbed the deceased on her head and back many times causing the deceased to collapse and die instantly.  She pleaded guilty to manslaughter; 

e.	Marangi v The State (2002) SC702: The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment.  In dismissing the appeal and confirming the sentence the Court expressed the view that a sentence well above that was warranted.  The offender went to a house expecting to find her husband.  She found the deceased lying on a lounge chair watching TV. The deceased was seven (7) months pregnant at the time. The appellant suspected the deceased of having an affair with her husband. She stabbed the deceased with a kitchen knife in the chest twice. The appellant then left the house with the knife in her hand which she later threw away. The deceased was immediately rushed to the hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival; 

f.	Parkop and Make v The State (1999) SC621: The appellants admitted to murdering one of their own clan brothers over a piece of land. The appellant Make admitted to hitting the deceased on the head with a coffee stick and he fell to the ground. The Appellants Dot and Parkop admitted to chopping the deceased with their bush knives on his left thigh and on the right side of his back as the deceased was lying on the ground.  The deceased lost a lot of blood from which he died. The Court dismissed the appeal against the sentence of 10 years;

g.	The State v Rongo (2000) N2035, Kandakasi J:  the offender pleaded guilty to murdering his wife during the course of an argument about some items that were retrieved from her parents that morning. During the argument the deceased got very angry and was about to leave. As she did so, the offender took a piece of wood and threw it at the deceased. The piece of wood landed on the deceased’s back close to the neck. She fell down and not long afterwards, she died. The offender tried to flee the scene but was stopped.  He was sentenced to 6 years less time spent in custody;

h.	The State v Mek (1997) N1575, Injia J: the offender was found guilty of murder.  He applied several axe blows on the deceased’s head and killed him because he took sides in an argument between the deceased and the accused’s mother over one of their daughters.  The offender’s mother incited him to kill the deceased.  He was sentenced to 8 years.

8.	The State agreed that in mitigation that the offender was a first time offender, who pleaded guilty. In aggravation a person has lost their life, the victim was unarmed and defenceless, there was premeditation, and a dangerous weapon was used.  The State submitted that the offence falls within the second and third categories of Manu Kovi and that a sentence of at least 20 years should be considered.  It submitted that the presentence report was not favourable; no compensation has been paid and it appears that the offender cannot be trusted with money and this is what led to the breakdown of the marriage in the first place.  This type of offence is prevalent and warrants a deterrent sentence. 

9.	The State referred to The State v Peter Korak Siwi (2003) N2443, Jalina J, in which the prisoner pleaded guilty to one count of murdering his wife by stabbing her in the armpit from behind when she refused to return home with him from her village.  The dagger went through to penetrate her left lung causing instant death.  The offender was sentenced to 16 years in hard labour, less time spent in custody.    

10.	I have also had regard to the following cases:

a.	The State v Maria Tuu (2008) N3706, David J, the deceased who was with a small and very sick child travelled into town to have the child treated at the hospital. The child could not get treated so they left the hospital and walked towards the main market. The prisoner followed them into town by jumping on another PMV, went to the hospital and then proceeded towards the main market where she confronted the deceased with the child in her arms. An argument developed which led to a fight and during the course of the fight, the Prisoner took out a kitchen knife and stabbed the deceased on her abdomen. The knife penetrated the right kidney and a portion of her liver, causing her death. The offender pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to 16 years of imprisonment;

b.	The State v Alis Nema Mara (2010) N4133, Makail J:  the prisoner pleaded guilty to manslaughter. She had found the deceased and her husband together and fought with the deceased who was armed with a kitchen knife. The prisoner wrestled the knife from the deceased and stabbed her on the back. The knife penetrated the deceased’s back puncturing the right lung, causing her death. Makail J. considered the prisoner's plea, that she was a first time offender, the assault consisted of single knife blow inflicting a single wound, strong de facto provocation, constant abuse and eventual desertion by the husband as mitigating the offence, together with compensation. He sentenced the prisoner to 12 years;

c.	State v Uraro (2012) N5164, Toliken J:  the offender pleaded guilty to murder.  She went looking for the deceased. She found her at the Papindo Supermarket just as she was at the check-out counter trying to pay for her shopping. The prisoner approached her from the back and stabbed the deceased on her back with a kitchen knife. The deceased was rushed to the hospital but later died from heavy loss of blood.  She was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, less time spent in custody, of the 10 years, 8 months to serve, 5 years, 8 months was suspended; 

d.	State v Topi (2010) N4667, Gabi J: The offender killed the deceased with a single blow to the head with a bush knife. The deceased was 8 months pregnant at the time of her death. The offender believed the deceased was having an affair with her husband.  The prisoner was selling cooked pork meat when the deceased, whom she suspected of having sexual relationship with her husband, came by. The deceased was about eight months pregnant at the time. When the deceased came close to the prisoner, she took out her bush knife from under her and chopped the deceased on the right side of her head despite attempts by her elder sister to stop her.  She pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to 14 years in light labour, less time spent in custody;

e.	State v Anton (2010)  N4117, Cannings J: An 18-year-old woman pleaded guilty to murdering a woman the offender suspected was having an affair with the offender's husband. The offence was committed at 3 o'clock in the morning at a dance place at the offender's village. The offender saw the deceased standing with the offender's husband. She used a kitchen knife to stab the deceased three times: on the neck, head and ribs. The deceased died soon afterwards. She was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment;

f.	State v Tinka (2013) N5439, David J: The prisoner together with the deceased, Lucy Tinka, the other co-wife and their common husband were at a gathering at Kolgmulg village. The gathering was to sit with village elders to mediate over marital issues that had arisen between the prisoner, the deceased and their common husband. The prisoner was the first wife and the deceased the second wife. The gathering was to discuss the common husband's neglect of the prisoner and their 4 children. During the gathering, a disagreement broke out between the prisoner and the deceased. Frustrated, the prisoner walked to the deceased and stabbed her with a knife once in the chest area. The stabbing caused a fracture of 2 ribs and a penetration of the lung causing instant death. She pleaded guilty to manslaughter. A sentence of 10 years of imprisonment was imposed;

g.	The State v Guina (2020) N8311, Salika CJ: the offender pleaded guilty to murdering the deceased.  Both women were married to the same man.    Her husband had taken her son and did not let her know where they were.    In the morning the offender went looking for her husband at the deceased’s house.  She saw his vehicle at the house, and walked up the stairs and into the deceased’s bedroom where she, her husband and the deceased’s two children were, together with her own son.  There was a struggle and in the course of this the offender stabbed the deceased in the left breast with a small kitchen knife, causing her death.  She was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody, leaving a balance of 10 years, 2 months and 2 weeks to be served. 

Consideration  

11.	It is well established that the maximum penalty is reserved for the most serious instances of the offence:  Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653.  This case, though very serious, is not in that category. 

12.	Having regard to the fact that this was a plea matter, involving a vicious attack, strong desire to do grievous bodily harm, the use of an offensive weapon, and an element of planning, this case falls within category 2 of Manu Kovi, and thus an appropriate starting range is between 16 and 20 years.  

13.	Section 19 of the Criminal Code provides the Court with broad discretion on sentence.  Whilst guidelines and comparative cases are very relevant considerations, every sentence should be determined according to its own circumstances: Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38; Kumbamong (supra).  In a case of homicide, careful regard must be had to the circumstances of death and the way death was caused: in Rex Lialu [1990] PNGLR 487.

14.	The offender is a mature woman of 45 years of age from Sakifa Village in Ungai Bena District, Eastern Highlands. She is in good health.  She is the third born of a family of 7.  Her mother is still alive.  She lives with her relatives in Port Moresby.  She has two children of 17 and 20 years of age.  She is educated to Grade 6 and is currently unemployed.

15.	I have given serious consideration to the mitigating and extenuating circumstances in this case.

16.	In mitigation the offender is a first time offender.  Whilst some reservations were expressed about her by her community leader to Probation Services, I accept that she is of prior good character. 

17.	The offender fled the scene and was not arrested in connection with the offence for some ten months after its commission.  In the circumstances I don’t accept the submission by counsel that she cooperated from the earliest opportunity.  But I do give great weight to the fact that when she was arrested, she cooperated with police and authorities and made admissions in her record of interview.  She pleaded guilty at the first opportunity at the National Court.  

18.	I take her guilty plea into account from the perspective that it has saved the Court and authorities the time and cost of a trial.  

19.	I also take it into account as reflecting genuine remorse for her conduct, the victim and her family, which she expressed during allocutus.  

20.	I further take into account the extenuating circumstances in this case.  

21.	There is some evidence in the depositions, albeit from the offender herself in the record of interview, that she saw her husband and his girlfriend walking into the guest house whilst she was on the bus returning home from somewhere else, and that she got off to follow them.  This, and the state of the relationship between the offender and her husband, are significant matters that the parties should have resolved on the plea.  Where the State wishes to rely on a matter in aggravation it should include it in the alleged facts on arraignment, or establish it beyond reasonable doubt if it is in dispute.  In the circumstances I will proceed on the basis that the offender did not set out that day to attack the deceased. But it is clear that there was an element of planning immediately prior to the attack given the manner in which the offender crept up behind the deceased and held her tight before stabbing her. 

22.	I reject, however, defence counsel’s submission that there was a fight during which the deceased produced a knife and that the killing resulted in the course of the struggle.  Whilst the offender might have said that in her record of interview, that is not what she admitted on the plea.  It is those admitted facts, which are clearly supported by the depositions, which are relevant here: Yalibakut v State (2006) SC890.

23.	The offender was married by custom to Lovi Sakillopa for almost 21 years.  It appears that that was an abusive relationship and Lovi had a long history of seeing other women.  In November 2017 Lovi burned the offender’s clothes, threw her out of the family home and effectively abandoned her, although it appears from both his and the offender’s statement that he continued to provide financially for their children.  There was some attempt at mediation but this failed and she was left to live with her relatives.  The marriage was never formally ended and the offender regarded herself as his “rightful wife” but was told by others that he was sleeping with women at guest houses. 

24.	In the circumstances I take into account as an extenuating circumstance the presence of de facto provocation when the offender saw her husband and another woman walking into the motel together that day, and furthermore, that this was compounded by the long history of abuse, followed by his abandonment of her.  I have no doubt that, after 21 years of marriage, and particularly given her age, experience and background, this was deeply humiliating.  Not only that but it left her in a very vulnerable position, and financially dependent on her relatives.     

25.	None of that, however, justifies her behaviour.  No-one is entitled to take the law into their own hands.  As has been said countless times by the Court, the fundamental right to human life is enshrined in the Constitution: s.35.  The Criminal Code recognises that any homicide is a serious offence.  This is demonstrated by the maximum punishments which apply, including life for murder and manslaughter, and death for wilful murder.  “This reflects the value the society places on human life and its total condemnation of one person’s unlawful taking of another’s life under any circumstances”:  Tanga v The State [1999] PNGLR 216.  As the Supreme Court made clear in Manu Kovi:

“We begin with the basic principle that the sanctity and value of human life is far more precious and valuable than anything else and no amount of remorse or compensation will restore life lost. The unlawful taking of another person’s life is a serious and horrendous crime which must be adequately punished. The courts have re-iterated this basic and fundamental principle in many cases.”

26.	In addition the Supreme Court has for almost twenty years expressed concern at the increasing use of knives to settle what are sometimes referred to as “domestic disputes”. As the Court said in Anna Max Marangi v The State (2002) SC 702 (emphasis mine):

“To our knowledge, there are increasing instances of manslaughter and murder killings coming before the Courts in which a knife is used to settle domestic differences, with fatal consequences. The use of readily available kitchen knife to settle one’s domestic grievances is prevalent in this country. It is becoming a silent lethal weapon, far more dangerous than other potentially dangerous weapons like axes, bush-knives or even guns. The reason for this is because the knife is readily available, it can be easily concealed, and used on unsuspecting unarmed victims who are usually taken by surprise, and used in a calculating and precise manner, that the human body is easily penetrated and vital organs are damaged or even severed. It seems to us that more lives are being lost in this country today from the use of the knife than with any other weapon. Therefore, a strong punitive and deterrent sentence is required.”

27.	This was a very serious offence.  In aggravation, it involved an element of planning in the immediate lead up to the offence, the use of an offensive weapon, and clear intention to do grievous bodily harm as demonstrated by the manner in which the offender attacked the victim from behind, holding her tight, and the number and location of stabs wounds inflicted, three to the back and shoulder of the deceased and the fourth, delivered with such force that it severed the popliteal artery in the deceased’s knee.  This was a cowardly and vicious attack on a defenceless and unsuspecting woman, which was driven by anger and jealousy, and which only stopped when the offender was attacked with a piece of wood by the security manager. The victim’s last moments would have been terrifying and agonising.  The only mercy was that her suffering was brief. 

28.	Regrettably, little else is known about the young woman who lost her life that day.  She was only 30 years of age, and a single mother.  Not even the number or age of her children have been made known to the Court by either party or Probation Services.  The victim seems to have been forgotten in all of this.  Her brother and sister both miss her deeply, and her children will grow up not only without their mother but with the knowledge that she suffered a violent death.   I can only assume given the victim’s age that they are still very young themselves and this makes her loss all the more tragic.

29.	I have taken into account the offender’s personal circumstances, and placed great weight on the mitigating and extenuating facts, namely her lack of previous conviction, prior good character, cooperation with police, early guilty plea, sincere remorse, the presence of strong de facto provocation, the history of abuse and ultimate desertion some twelve months earlier.  Whilst these are powerful considerations, they are far outweighed by the aggravating factors outlined above.  These types of offences are increasingly prevalent and this case calls for both general and specific deterrence.  Having regard to the submissions of counsel, the guidelines contained in Manu Kovi, and comparative cases, I sentence the offender to 15 years of imprisonment.  

30.	I exercise my discretion to deduct the time spent in custody to date.

31.	The question remains whether any or all of the sentence should be suspended. 

32.	In The State v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91 the Supreme Court set out three broad, but not exhaustive, categories in which it may be appropriate to suspend a sentence, namely: where it will promote the general deterrence or rehabilitation of the offender; where it will promote the repayment or restitution of stolen money or goods; or where imprisonment would cause an excessive degree of suffering to the particular offender, for example because of bad physical or mental health.  Suspension is not an act in leniency but a form of punishment that is to be served outside the prison system in the community interest to promote restitution or rehabilitation: The State v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91; The State v Frank Kagai [1987] PNGLR 320.

33.	Probation Services does not regard the offender as suitable for probation as they conclude that she was somehow responsible for the breakdown of her marriage because she is careless with money.  That is hardly a reason for denying someone probation.  Nor is the fact that full compensation has not been paid or fully paid.  Whilst compensation may be indicative of remorse, and may play an important role in bringing peace to the community, it must not interfere with the administration of justice.     

34.	This is not a domestic matter, nor a family matter.  It is a criminal matter. These types of offences where one woman attacks another are increasingly prevalent.  They must stop.  At the heart of them lies a lack of respect for women.  The breakdown of any relationship is regrettable but nobody owns another person.  No one is entitled to attack or kill another person out of revenge, or a sense of entitlement.  

35.	In my view the reason for denying suspension of any part of the offender’s sentence is the gravity of the offence itself.  I have already reflected the mitigating and extenuating factors in the head sentence.  In my view, having regard to the circumstances of this case, Manu Kovi, and comparative cases, it appropriately reflects them, I do not intend to reduce it further.  Such factors should not be relied upon to produce an effective sentence which is overly generous to a prisoner:  Tardrew (supra).  

36.	Restitution is not relevant here.  There is no evidence that she will suffer excessively in prison and it is not in the interests of the community that the sentence be served outside of prison.  

37.	I also appreciate that the sentence imposed will cause great hardship and suffering to the offender’s family.  It is very well established that except in very extreme circumstances, however, it is not ordinarily a relevant consideration on sentence: see for example Allan Peter Utieng v The State (2000) SCR No 15 of 2000; The Public Prosecutor v Vangu’u Ame [1983] PNGLR 424.  Her children, at 17 and 20 years of age, are still young.  This case demonstrates too well the tragedy that is often left behind when one woman kills another out of rage and frustration. The ones who suffer the most here are the children.  At least the offender’s children still have their mother.
   
38.	Only service of the sentence in custody will ensure that the offender is adequately punished for her conduct, that the Court appropriately denounces such offences, and that the offender and others are deterred from committing similar offences in the future.  

39.	In the circumstances I make the following orders:

Orders

(1)	The offender is sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in light labour.

(2)	Two years, one month spent in pre-trial custody is deducted from time to be served.

Sentence accordingly.
_______________________________________________________________
Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State	
Public Solicitor: Lawyer for the Accused