N8409

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS (JR) No. 05 OF 2020

BARRICK (NIUGINI) LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND
STANLEY NEKITAL in his capacity as the Registrar of Tenements
First Defendant

AND
MINING ADVISORY COUNCIL
Second Defendant

AND
MINERAL RESOURCES AUTHORITY
Third Defendant

AND
HON. JOHNSON TUKE, MP as MINISTER FOR MINING
Fourth Defendant

AND
HON. JAMES MARAPE, MP as Chairman and representing all other members of the NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
Fifth Defendant

AND
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Sixth Defendant

AND
MINERAL RESOURCES ENGA LIMITED
Seventh Defendant

AND
HON. DAVIS STEVEN, MP as Attorney General and nominal defendant on behalf of the Head of State
Eight Defendant

Waigani:  Kandakasi DCJ,
2020:  12th May
2020:	05th June

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Application for leave for review of National Executive Council decision –standing – applicant has standing as it is directly affected by the decision - Grounds for – Breach of natural justice and procedural fairness, failure to take into account relevant considerations, breach of statutorily prescribed process, bad faith unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense – only ground made out -  failure to disclose copy of relevant decision – effect of –implies lack of good reason for decision – leave granted – decision maker to provide copy of decision with reasons for the decision.  

Facts

At the expiry of a mining lease and mining development agreement between the Plaintiff and the State, the National Executive Council (NEC) decided not to renew the lease.  The NEC did not provide the Plaintiff with a copy of the decision with the reasons for its decision.  Aggrieved by that decision, the Plaintiff applied for judicial review of the relevant decision. It argued that the NEC breached the principles of natural justice, statutorily prescribed procedure and it failed to accord the Plaintiff procedural fairness, take into account relevant factors, the decision was arrived in bad faith and that the decision is not reasonable in the Wednesbury sense.  In response, the State argued, the Plaintiff lacks the necessary standing to bring the application and, in any case, the Plaintiff has not made out the basis for its application.

Held:

1.	The Plaintiff has standing as the operator of the Porgera Gold Mine and holder of the relevant Special Mining Lease and one who is directly affected by the decision sought to be reviewed.

2.	It is trite law that all decision makers especially those in the public sector have an obligation to give reasons for their decision and produce a copy of the decision and the reasons for that decision in Court.  If reasons are not given, or if they are given but are not clear or insufficient, the inference is that there are no good reasons for the decision. 

3.	The failure by the decision makers in this case to provide copies of the decisions with its reasons for the decision lends support to the Plaintiff’s claim that the decision makers failed to take into account relevant factors, the decision was arrived at in bad faith and the decision is not reasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

4.	In a judicial review proceeding, what the parties and the Court should be focused on is requiring the parties to plead succinctly and clearly a statement of the relevant facts disclosing at least one or more of the basis or grounds upon which judicial review can be granted and as long as a valid ground for judicial review is pleaded, that should be sufficient. No knit-pick on the pleadings should be encouraged and permitted to avoid unnecessary lawyering, delay and increased costs.

5.	Mining is an activity that is regulated and controlled by the Mining Act 1992 and as such the Plaintiff was obliged to demonstrate which of the provisions, including its right to be further heard after a mining wardens hearing has been breached. This the Plaintiff failed to do and the Court held that there was no breach of the principles of natural justice.

Cases Cited:
Papua New Guinea Cases

Leto Darius v. The Commissioner of Police (2001) N2046.
GR Logging Ltd v David Dotaona (2018) SC1690.
John Wanis Wek v. Sobol Trading Ltd (2016) SC1535.
Alois Kingsly Golu v. NEC (2011) N4425.
Jim Kas v. Sevua (2000) N2010.
Papua New Guinea Air Pilots Association v. The Director of Civil Aviation and the National Airline Commission trading as Air Niugini [1983] PNGLR 1.
NTN Pty Limited v. The Board of Post & Telecommunications Corporation [1987] PNGLR 70
Arawe Logging Pty Ltd v. The State [1988-89] PNGLR 216.
National Capital District Interim Commission v. Crusoe Pty Ltd [1993] PNGLR 139.
Steamships Trading Limited v. Garamut Enterprises Ltd (2000) N1959.
Aquila Sampson v. NEC (2019) SC1880.
David Kabomyap Allolim v Biul Kirokim (2018) SC1735.
Sir Arnold Amet v. Peter Charles Yama (2010) SC1064.
Hobai Haro v. The State (2019) SC1841.
Mission Asiki v. Manasupe Zurenoc & Ors (2005) SC797.
Agriculture Resources Technology Ltd v. Ray-Paul (2017) N6937.
Gire Gire Estates Ltd v Barava Ltd (2016) N6473.
Isaac Lupari v. Sir Michael Somare, MP – Prime Minister & Chairman of the National Executive Council &Ors (2010) SC1071.
Frontier Copper (PNG) Ltd v. The Hon. Puka Temu, Minister for Mining &Ors (2008) 31st October.
Jimson Sauk v Don Pomb Polye (2004) SC769.
Ginson Goheyu Saonu v Bob Dadae (2004) SC763.

Overseas Cases:

Inland Revenue Commissioners; ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Limited [1981] 2 WLR 722.
Australian Conservation Foundation Inc. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493; 54 A.L.JR. 176).
Robinson v. The Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 C.L.R. 283.

Counsel:	

Mr. D. Wood, A. Edo and L. Evore, for the Plaintiff
Mr. R. Leo, for the First to the Third Defendants
Mr. N. Saroa, for the Fourth Defendant
Mr. L. Kandi, for the Fifth Defendant
Mr. T. Tanuvasa, and Ms I. Mugugia, for the Sixth and Eight Defendants
Mr. G. Geroro, for the Seventh Defendant

05th June, 2020

1.	KANDAKASI DCJ:	Barrick (Niugini) Limited (Barrick) is applying for leave for judicial review of a decision by the National Executive Council (NEC) and another by the Head of State.   The decisions were respectively made on 11th March and 27th April 2020 refusing an application for extension of the Porgera Special Mining Lease (SML) upon its expiration. 

Parties’ claims or arguments

2.	Barrick claims those decisions were arrived at without according its natural justice and procedural fairness.  It also claims before arriving at the decisions the decision makers, failed to take into account relevant considerations, breached procedures prescribe by statute and the decision was arrived in bad faith.  Further, Barrick claims, the decisions are unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.  The State in response, takes issue with Barrick’s standing to bring this application and further submits, Barrick has not established an arguable case for a grant of its application in that it has failed to:

(a)	produce evidence of the decision of 11th March 2020;

(b)	clearly set out the decision-making process under the Mining Act 1992 and point out to the alleged breaches of them; and

(c)	plead with particulars proper grounds for judicial review.

 3.	Additionally, the State argues, Barrick’s application is effectively questioning the correctness of the decision as opposed to procedure adopted to arrive at the decision.  Further, upon expiry of the SML, Barrick has no legitimate expectation capable of protection through judicial review. 

4.	The parties’ claims or arguments present a number of issues for the Court to consider and determine.  These are:

(1)	Does Barrick have the necessary standing to bring this application?

(2)	Who has the duty to produce evidence disclosing the decisions in question with their reasons?

(3)	Has Barrick pleaded its grounds with particulars that clearly disclose reviewable grounds in terms of disclosing the NEC and the Head of State as the decision makers:

(a)	denying Barrick its natural justice;

(b)	failing to take into account relevant considerations;

(c)	breached procedure prescribed under the Mining Act;

(d)	arrived at the decision in bad faith; and

(e)	the decisions are not reasonable decisions in the Wednesbury sense?

5.	The principles governing applications for leave for judicial review are well settled going by relevant case law on point. Learned counsel for Barrick, Mr. Wood drew the Court’s attention to my decision in Leto Darius v. The Commissioner of Police (2001) N2046.There, after considering the relevant case authorities on point at the time and the relevant provisions of the Court Rules, I held that:

“According to these rules and the case law on it to date, the requirements amongst others that must be met by an applicant for leave for judicial review, can be summarised as follows:

1.	He has the locus standi, that is he has sufficient interest in the matter or has a right which is being affected by way of an injury or damage by the decision sought to be reviewed;
2.	The decision sought to be reviewed is that of a public body or authority;
3.	The applicant has an arguable case on the merits;
4.	All other available remedies have been exhausted; and
5.	The application is being made promptly without undue delay.”

6.	A number of National and Supreme Court decisions have adopted and applied this statement of law.  These includes the Supreme Court decisions in GR Logging Ltd v David Dotaona (2018) SC1690, per Cannings, Collier & Dingake JJ and John Wanis Wek v. Sobol Trading Ltd (2016) SC1535, per Kirriwom, Cannings & Neill JJ.

7.	In the present case, given the parties arguments, there is no issue that the decision makers are public bodies or authorities which are at the highest level of executive government decision making bodies, namely the NEC and the Head of State: see Alois Kingsly Golu v. NEC (2011) N4425, per Gavara-Nanu J.  Also, there is no available remedy for Barrick to exhaust before coming to the Court with its application.   Finally, there is no issue with Barrick coming to this Court without delay. These leaves us to consider Barrick’s need to meet the requirements of locus standi and arguable case which gives rise to the issues I have set out above.  I start with the issue of standing or locus standi.

Issue 1- Locus standi

8.	Considering my decision in the Leto Darius case and the cases I referred to there and other cases I now have looked at, the following principles appear clear to me:

(1)	Locus standi is a threshold issue which must be determined first up: See Inland Revenue Commissioners; ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Limited [1981] 2 WLR 722 per Lord Diplock adopted and applied in Jim Kas v. Sevua (2000) N2010, per Sakora J.

(2).	Depending on the nature of the relief being sought, a plaintiff will in general have a locus standi when he can show actual or apprehended injury or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or economic interests and perhaps to his social or political interests (per Mason J in Australian Conservation Foundation Inc. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493; 54 A.L.JR. 176): Papua New Guinea Air Pilots Association v. The Director of Civil Aviation and the National Airline Commission trading as Air Niugini [1983] PNGLR 1, at page 3.

(3)	The cases are infinitely various and so much depends in a given case on the nature of the relief, which is being sought, for what is a sufficient interest in one case may be less than sufficient in another: per Mason J in Robinson v. The Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 C.L.R. 283 at 327-328.

(4)	The Courts have on many occasions expended the categories or situations in which a person could have locus standi simply by reference to having ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter, which may not necessarily be a right: See NTN Pty Limited v. The Board of Post & Telecommunications Corporation [1987] PNGLR 70; Arawe Logging Pty Ltd v. The State [1988-89] PNGLR 216; and National Capital District Interim Commission v. Crusoe Pty Ltd [1993] PNGLR 139;

(5)	Sufficient interest is essentially a mixed question of fact and law, a matter of fact and the degree of the relationship between the Plaintiff and the subject matter of his complaint. Generally, a Plaintiff will have standing if he can show that he has reasonably arguable claim that by an invalid exercise of statutory power, some private right in law has been affected or that he has suffered some prejudice:	see Steamships Trading Limited v. Garamut Enterprises Ltd (2000) N1959 as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Aquila Sampson v. NEC (2019) SC1880, per Anis J with Kassman and Toliken JJ agreeing; David Kabomyap Allolim v. Biul Kirokim (2018) SC1735, per Batari J, David & Frank JJ at paragraphs 25 – 26.

(6)	But the right to invoke the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is not restricted to protection of personal rights only. It can extend to more public issues. In determining standing, Court decisions in this country lean strongly towards the granting of status to citizens seeking to complain of what is seen as breaches of laws of the country: Steamships Trading Limited v. Garamut Enterprises Ltd (supra) as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Aquila Sampson v. NEC (supra).

(7)	The decisions on point show an inclusive rather than an exclusive view of applicants with standing, holding that challenges by citizens to the validity of decisions of statutory or public authorities should not too readily be excluded from the Courts on grounds of lack of direct personal involvement. Very often determination of standing is only possible with an examination of the complaint itself: Steamships Trading Limited v. Garamut Enterprises Ltd (supra) as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Aquila Sampson v. NEC (supra).

9.	Applying these principles, I note Barrick is directly affected by the decisions, the subject of this proceeding.  Section 36 of the Mining Act allows for applications for extensions of SMLs.  This in my view, creates an expectation on the part of Barrick that its application would be considered on its merits and a decision either to grant or not to grant would be arrive at upon a proper consideration of all the relevant factors that need to be considered.  If Barrick did not have such an expectation it would not have applied for the extension.  The expectation is evident in the application itself.  Certainly, Barrick is not a meddlesome busy body interfering in the State’s business.  Instead, it has sufficient interest in the matter as the operator of the Porgera Gold Mine and on the basis of the SML. Its interest and rights are clearly affected by the decisions. Accordingly, I find Barrick has the necessary standing to bring this application.

Issue 2 - Who has the duty to produce evidence disclosing the decisions in question with their reasons?

10.	I now turn to the second issue before me.  That is the question of which of the parties have the duty to produce evidence disclosing the decisions the subject of this proceeding.  At the conclusion of their respective submissions, the parties did not provide a clear answer to the question.  I therefore directed them to file further submissions answering that question.  All parties have filed further submissions on 19th May 2020.  The purpose of that direction was for counsel to provide a straight answer to that question with brief reasons for their answers.  Instead, of doing that, the parties have gone into more elaborate submissions put in motion by the learned counsel for the State.  That has attracted an objection and an elaborate response.  The Courts order was not an open invitation for parties to make further submissions. I therefore decided to disregard fully the parties’ further submissions.  I have instead, allowed myself to be guide by the law on point.     

11.	It is trite law that all decision makers especially those in the public sector have an obligation to give reasons for their decision. If reasons are not given, or if they are given but are not clear or insufficient, the inference is that there are no good reasons for the decision. There a numerous authority on point but I mention three decisions of the Supreme Court supporting that proposition: Sir Arnold Amet v. Peter Charles Yama (2010) SC1064, per Salika DCJ (as he then was), Batari & Davani, JJ; Hobai Haro v. The State (2019) SC1841, Manuhu, Kariko and Anis JJ and Mission Asiki v. Manasupe Zurenuoc & Ors (2005) SC797, per Jalina, Cannings & Manuhu JJ.

12.	Following on from the need to provide reasons, there is also clear law that the decision maker must produce the copies of the decision, the subject of a judicial review application.  This requirement has been recently codified in the 2005, amendments to Order 16 of the National Court Rules.  The relevant provision is O.16, r.13 (7) (2) which reads:

“The Respondent or his/her lawyer is responsible for ensuring that the decision the subject of the review and the other documents considered relevant for the purposes of the review are included in the Review Book.”

13.	In Agriculture Resources Technology Ltd v. Ray-Paul (2017) N6937, His Honour Anis AJ (as he then was) granted leave in the hope that a copy of the decision would be provided at the judicial review hearing.  His Honour also asked the relevant question and answered it in a number of other decisions, an example of which is his decision in Gire Gire Estates Ltd v Barava Ltd (2016) N6473.  There His Honour asked and answered the relevant question in the following terms:

“I ask myself this question:  In a judicial review proceeding like this case where the Court is considering how a title had been acquired, whose duty is it to provide evidence of compliances, information, relevant documentations or a copy of the land's file concerned to assist the Court?  The answer I believe may be found under Order 16 Rule 13(7)(2) of the National Court Rules.”

14.	On my part, in the Leto Darius case, I granted leave for judicial review noting that, there was a lack of complete provision of the material that was before the decision maker which formed the foundation for his decision.  I then express hope of the defendant providing the copies of the relevant documents and indicated why that was necessary in these terms:

“At the hearing of the review proper, I trust the Commissioner will produce all of the evidence he had before him and provided details as to the matters he took into account before arriving at his decision and show what he took into account and his reflected in his decision. Only upon a consideration of all of the relevant evidence, will the Court carrying out the review, be able to determine whether or not the plaintiff should be granted the other relieves sought.”

15.	Having regard to the law on point, there is no doubt the State Defendants that are responsible for relevant decisions are under an obligation to provide a copy of the decision with reasons for the decision.   In this case, learned counsel for the State indicated that, all Barrick had to do was to make a request for a copy of the decisions and they would have been provided.  The Court expects the State to comply with the requirements of the law, unless it is protected with a specific state secrete or confidentiality law. 

16.	Just to ensure that the parties are guided on this point, may I point out that, this is not the first time a NEC decision has been the subject of judicial review. A large number of them (review applications) have been successful.  I will only mention the five-member Supreme Court decision, in Isaac Lupari v. Sir Michael Somare, MP – Prime Minister & Chairman of the National Executive Council &Ors SC1071, per Salika DCJ, Kandakasi (as we then were), Batari, Gabi & Hartshorn JJ, as an example of a case on point. 

Issue 3 – Arguable case

17.	I now turn to the third issue which in short, is the issue of whether Barrick as presented an arguable case for judicial review.  Before turning specifically to the sub-issues, I deal with the issue of pleadings raised by the State.   The decision relied upon is an unpublished and reported judgment in the matter of Frontier Copper (PNG) Ltd v. The Hon. Puka Temu, Minister for Mining & Ors. (2008) 31st October, per Injia DCJ (as he then was). That decision refers to earlier decisions his honour had published touching on pleadings and equating a statement that is usually filed in support of an application for judicial review or a proceeding commenced by Originating Summons (OS) to a statement of claim.  This in my view, has the potential of defendants and the Court engaging in exercise of closely scrutinizing the pleadings which might lead to a meritorious case for judicial review being shut out or met with inordinate delay.  Like election petitions, OS proceedings and in particular judicial review proceedings are meant to be expedited.  Unfortunately, the notion of pleadings has caused a lot of good petitions being shut out: see Jimson Sauk v Don Pomb Polye (2004) SC769, Sakora, Sevua ,Gavara–Nanu JJ and Ginson Goheyu Saonu v Bob Dadae (2004) SC763, Sevua , Gavara–Nanu, Davani JJ.  Whilst, it would greatly assist to have clear and succinct pleadings in a judicial review, there is the danger of too much unnecessary lawyering resulting in increased costs and delay by giving much more prominence to pleadings. Hence, what the parties and the Court should be focused on is the requirement to plead succinctly and clearly a statement of the relevant facts disclosing one or more of the basis or grounds upon which judicial review can be granted. As long as a valid ground for judicial review is granted, that should be sufficient. No knit-pick on the pleadings should be encouraged and permitted.  Checking what is stated in the statement in support in the present case, in any case clearly shows both the facts and the grounds on which judicial review is being sought.

Issue 3 (sub-issues (a) and (b)) - denial of natural justice breach of any statutory procedure

18.	Having resolved the pleadings issue that way, I now turn to the first sub-issue under the third main issue.  That is the question of whether, Barrick had a right to be heard and that was denied.   For this and the other sub-issues the whole scheme and or process and procedure under the Mining Act 1992 needs to be considered.  The question then is, what is the scheme or process or procedure under the Act in the context of this case?  The context in this case is that, Barrick was on 12th June 1989 granted a SML for 30 years with a scheduled expiry date of 16th August 2019.   On 29th June 2017, it applied for an extension of the SML. Following no decision on that application, Barrick apply to the Court for declaration that it could lawfully continue to mine under s. 116 of the Act until a decision was made on its application. In view of s, 112 clearly providing in those terms, the presiding Judge, Her Honour, Thompson J, granted the application.   Parties have now come back to Court following the decisions the subject of this proceeding. 

19.	In terms of the process and procedure under the Act, I remind myself that all mining or mining related activities are regulated by the said Act.  The starting point for all purposes is s. 5 (1).  This provision makes it clear in no uncertain terms that:

“All minerals existing on, in or below the surface of any land in Papua New Guinea, including any minerals contained in any water lying on any land in Papua New Guinea, are the property of the State.”

19.	The Act in the relevant provisions provides for various kinds of interests in the form of tenements that are available and could be granted to interested parties to access for commercial purposes and the terms and conditions on which such interests could be granted. Parties who are interested and applied for a particular kind of tenements have no right or interest until granted in accordance with the process and procedures laid out in the Act.  Those who are fortunate to be granted such rights or interests are usually on terms and hold those rights or interests subject to the terms of the grant.

20.	In this case, Barrick applied for an extension of its SML, more than 2 years before its expiry date.   The relevant process under the Act by ss. 96 – 110 as all learned counsels ably assisted with their submission is this:

(a)	Registrar receives the tenement holder’s application to extend the term of the mining lease;
(b)	The registrar gives notice of the tenement holder’s application to relevant interested parties;
(c)	The registrar receives objections;
(d)	A Mining warden hearing is held for interested parties;
(e)	The Mining Warden presents a report to the Mining Advisory Board;
(f)	The Mining Advisory Board makes recommendations to the Minister; and 
(g)	The Mining Minister makes a decision.

21.	Duly noting this, I first consider specifically the issues of denial of natural justice and breaches of statutory procedure.

22.	The principle of natural justice has two components.  The first is to accord a person who stands to be affected by a decision a real opportunity to be heard in a procedurally fair process.  The second is a requirement for the decision maker to provide reasons for his decision.  Turning firstly, to the first component, I note, there is no claim, argument or submission by Barrick that it was not accorded its right to be heard at the Warden’s hearing under s. 108 (2) (b) of the Act.  Similarly, he is taking no issue with the conduct of proceedings and the outcomes of the relevant Warden’s hearing.   If Barrick had a further right to be heard after lodging its application and in addition to the warden’s hearing, it had the obligation to draw to the Court’s attention a particular provision in the Act of a grant of such a right and assist the Court with the basis for its claim of having such a further right to be heard.  Barrick did not draw my attention to any provision in the Act or elsewhere that supports its submission.  Barrick had the opportunity to put its case as best as it could in its application for extension and then present its case at the Warden’s hearing in accordance with s.108 (2) (b) of the Act.  In the absence of any such expressed additional requirement for a right to be further heard, I find Barrick does not have any additional right to be further heard on its application.  Hence, subject to a meeting of the requirements of the Act, it was the prerogative of the State to come to a decision following the process I outlined above, including the warden’s hearing and its outcome.   Hence, I find Barrick’s argument that it was denied its right to be heard cannot be sustained.

23.	However, that is not the end of the matter. This takes me to second component on the principles of natural justice.  There is no issue that the decisions the subject of this proceeding were made.  The issue is around proper or good reasons for the decision.  

24.	As already noted in the context of the foregoing discussions, the law requires all decision makers, including the NEC, to give reasons for their decisions.  A failure to give reasons can be fatal.  It would mean the decision maker had no good reason to arrive at the decision and entitle a plaintiff in a judicial review matter, judicial review and a grant of the reliefs it might be seeking.   The Hon. Prime Minister’s letter of 28th April 2020 and the earlier media statement dated 24th April 2020, the only evidence on the decisions, do not give any reason at all of the NEC and the Head of State’s decisions.  This is complicated by the lack of a copy of the relevant decisions and their reasons adduced in evidence by the State.   The legal presumption for the purpose of leave for judicial review is that, the decision makers had no good reason for their decisions.  Leave for judicial review ought therefore to be granted and allow for the State to produce a copy of the decisions and the reasons for the decisions at the substantive judicial review hearing.

Remaining sub-issues 

25.	Turning to the remaining sub-issues of (b) failing to take into account relevant considerations, (c) arrived at the decision in bad faith and (e)	 the decisions are not reasonable decisions in the Wednesbury sense, are issues that can be determined by reference to the reasons for decision and what factors the decision makers took into account before arriving at their respective decisions.   Subject to a provision of a copy of the decisions, the factors or matters taken into account and reasons for decision and a careful consideration of those, the presumption is, these factors are made in favour of Barrick at this point. 

26.	Based on the foregoing reasons, I find that, Barrick has made out a case for a grant of leave for judicial review. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1.	Leave pursuant to Order 16, Rule 3 of the National Court Rules to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of the National Executive Council of 11th March 2020 to refuse the application that was lodged by the Plaintiff for extension of Porgera Special Mining Lease 1(P) which application for extension was lodged on or about 29th June 2017 under the Mining Act 1992 and to purportedly terminate the Mining Development Contract dated 12th Mary 1989 and to provide advice to the Head of the State to that effect is granted.

2.	Leave pursuant to Order 16 Rule 3 of the National Court Rules to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Head of State acting on advise made on 27th April 2020, purportedly acting pursuant to Section 36 of the Mining Act 1992 and other powers, to refuse the application that was lodged by the Plaintiff for extension of the Porgera Special Mining Lease 1(P) and to purportedly terminate the Mining Development Contract dated 12th May 1989, which decision was published in the National Gazette notice no. G229 on 27th April 2020, is granted.

3.	The substantive application for leave for judicial review is fixed for hearing on Monday 20th July 2020 at 2:30pm or soon thereafter.

4.	The State Defendants and their Counsel shall produce the decision the subject of this proceeding to the Plaintiff by Friday 12th June 2020.

5.	The parties shall file and serve affidavits of any evidence they rely on by Friday 19th June 2020 and replies thereto by Friday 26th June 2020.

6.	The Plaintiff shall draft and forward a Review Book by Friday 26th June 2020, to which the Defendants shall respond by Friday 03rd July 2020 and a Certified Review Book shall be filed by Friday 10th July 2020.

7.	The parties shall file and serve their respective submissions by Tuesday 14th July 2020 and any reply thereto by Friday 17th July 2020.

8.	The Plaintiff/ Applicant’s application for interlocutory stay and interim relief are fixed for hearing on Friday 12th June 2020 at 2:30pm and any other application the parties wish to make for interim reliefs.

9.	Any application not yet filed as of today must be filed and served by Wednesday 10th June 2020.

10.	The time for entry of these orders is abridged to take place forthwith upon the Court signing the Orders.

  ________________________________________________________________
Ashurst Lawyers:			Lawyers for the Applicant
Leo Lawyers:			Lawyers for the First to Third Defendants
Nelson Lawyers:			Lawyers for the fourth Defendant
M.S. Wagambie Lawyers:	Lawyers for the Fifth Defendant
Solicitor General:  			Lawyers for the Sixth and Eight Defendants
Geroro Lawyers:			Lawyers for the Seventh Defendants