N5288

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR 302 OF 2010

BETWEEN

THE STATE

V

ELISON TAYAMINA
(No 3)

Alotau: Toliken AJ
2012: 04th, 05th, 06th, 07th, 14th September
2013: 07thMarch, 10th May

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Wilful murder – Brutal attack on elderly female victim – Reputed sorceress – Multiple stab wounds – Vicious brutal attack on harmless and defenceless old woman - Juvenile offender – Belief in sorcery a mitigating factor – Prevalence of this type of killings – No respect for sanctity of life and rule of law – Denial of charge not an aggravating factor - Need for punitive and deterrent sentence – Age of prisoner taken into account – Existing sentencing guidelines considered - Sentence of 20 years - Criminal Code Act Ch. 262, s 299 

Cases Cited

The following cases are cited in the judgment:

Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653
Acting Public Prosecutor v Uname Auname & Ors [1980] PNGLR 510
Avia Aihi v The State (No. 3) [1983] PNGLR 92
Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR 105
The State v Aiaka Karavea (1984) N452 
Kwayawako & Ors v The State [1990] PNGLR 6
Rex Lialu - v - The State [1990] PNGLR 487
Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38.
The State v Kumbi Koti & Ors CR 94 of 1999 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 17th of November 2000)
The State v Apa Kuman [2000] PNGLR 319
The State v Boat Yokum (2002) N2337
The State v. Nickson Sambura & Anor (2002) N2219
The State v. John Baiga, CR 733 of 2003(Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 09th & 23rd July 2003
Joseph Mangi & Ors (2004) SC 741 
The State v Urari Siviri (2004) N2747
Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC 789 
The 	State v Maraka Jackson (2006) N3237)
The State v Sedoki Lota & Anor (2007) N3183 
Thress Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC 1017
The State v Laurie Kemuel Paugari; The State v Kopol Kepao; The State v Raywill Parapen (2011) N4438 
The State v Mavis Uraro CR 235 of 2012 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 26th November 2012)
The State v Pauline Muturu, CR 176 of 2012 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 28 November 2012) 
The State v Dubi Kais CR 136 of 2010 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 12th December 2012). 

Counsel

D Kuvi and R Auka, for the State
G Pipike, for the accused 

JUDGMENT ON SENTNCE

10th May, 2013

1. TOLIKEN AJ. The prisoner Elison Tayamina was found guilty and convicted on 14th September 2012 after trial for the wilful murder of one Seweina Nekeda an offence contrary to Section 299 of the Criminal Code Act Ch. 262. The offence of wilful murder carries the maximum penalty of death.

2. Since the prisoner is a juvenile it was necessary for a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) to be presented to the Court before sentence. A PSR was ordered and as the verdict in the matter was announced towards the end of the circuit, the mater was adjourned generally to allow for the 	preparation of a PSR before the allocutus was administered and submissions on sentence.
 
3. I was not able to take a circuit to Alotau before the end of 2012 though. A PSR had since been filed and so on 07th March 2012 I administered the allocutus on the prisoner and heard submissions on sentence from counsel. I was not, however, able to pass sentence then. I do so now. 

THE FACTS

4. The facts upon I am sentencing the accused are as follows. On the afternoon of 24th November 2009, the prisoner had gone into the bush at Wadalei village, Ferguson Island to search for mangoes. 

5. On his way back to the village he followed a creek down and up to the bush track that led down to the village. He followed the track and on the way he charged upon the deceased, Seweina Nekeda, a reputedly well known sorceress of the same village as the prisoner.

6. The prisoner set upon Seweina Nekeda, viciously attacking her with a bush knife. He inflicted multiple wounds on the deceased's body. The medical report by the Village Community Health Workers who examined the deceased's body revealed 7 major wounds and 2 superficial wounds. These were:
 
•	A cut to the trachea or windpipe.
•	3 penetrating wounds to the heart
•	2 superficial wounds to the skin.
•	3 wounds to the lungs

7. After spending the night in the bush the prisoner went home the next day and reported his crime to his father who then immediately took him to the Village Councillor.
 
8. A radio message was dispatched to Sergeant Labidi at the Esa'ala Police Post. Sergeant Labidi came to the village on the following day, viewed the body and interviewed witnesses. He, however, did not make any arrest as no suspect had yet been identified.

9. On the 16th of December 2009, Sergeant Labidi, came across from Esa'ala and apprehended the prisoner after he was again informed through the VHF radio that a suspect had owned up to the crime. 

10. Sergeant Labidi apprehended and conveyed the prisoner to Esa'ala station. There he conducted a Record of Interview which I had found on Voir Dire to have not been unfair on the prisoner despite the fact that he was a juvenile at the time of the offence. 

ANTECEDENTS

11. The prisoner was about 16-17 years at the time of the offence. He would therefore be about 20 – 21 years old now. He is from Wadalei Village, on Ferguson Island, Esa'ala District of Milne Bay Province.

12.	He comes from a family of five. While his father is still alive his mother is deceased. He is illiterate having had no formal education. He is a first-time offender.

SUBMISSIONS

13.	 Mr. Pipike for the prisoner submitted at the outset that the maximum sentence of death is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case. He submitted that there are two important factors that the Court ought to take into account in this case. These are (1) the killing in this case was influenced by a strong belief in sorcery and (2) the prisoner was a juvenile when he committed the offence.

14.	 In respect of the prisoner's belief in sorcery counsel submitted that whilst it was once held that sorcery was not a major mitigating factor (The State v Aiaka Karavea (1984) N452 per Kidu CJ.) this has now changed. He submitted that the courts now consider belief in sorcery in homicide offences as a major mitigating factor which must fall under a special category meriting special consideration and sentences have appropriately reflected that. (Acting Public Prosecutor v Uname Auname & Ors [1980] PNGLR 510; Kwayawako & Ors v The State [1990] PNGLR 6; The State v Boat Yokum (2002) N2337; The State v Urari Siviri (2004) N2747; The State v Maraka Jackson (2006) N3237).

15.	Counsel submitted that the sentences in the above cases have ranged from 6 – 25 years. Counsel argued the above cases involved more than one perpetrator and some degree of pre-planning and the belief that the victim would cause further deaths if he or she was not killed. These he said distinguished them from the present case.

16.	He submitted that the present case is distinguished by the following features:

•	There was no pre-planning
•	The prisoner acted alone
•	Prisoner stumbled upon the deceased in the bush. He found himself alone with her. The deceased transformed herself into a witch and the prisoner was overcome with fear so he killed her. 
•	He prisoner was found guilty on his own admissions in the 	record of Interview.

17.	On the fact that the prisoner was a juvenile when he committed the offence, defence counsel submitted that the sentencing trend for juveniles had been that of partial custodial and suspended sentences. He cited The State v Apa Kuman [2000] PNGLR 319 where the 16 year old prisoner was sentenced to 4 years for rape and 3 years for grievous bodily harm to be served concurrently for a total of 4 years. The prisoner was ordered to serve 2 years while the balance was to b served on probation.

18.	Counsel pointed the Court to the sentencing powers under Section 30 of the Juvenile Courts Act 1991 and invited the court to consider those powers.

19.	Counsel also submitted that the circumstances of the case places it midway between Category 1 and Category 2 of the sentencing tariffs in Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC 789 (Injia DCJ[as he then was], Lenalia and Lay JJ.) as there was no pre-planning or pre-meditation involved. He, however, further submitted that the Manu Kovi tariffs were held to be restricting the Court's sentencing discretion under Section 19 of the Code in the subsequent Supreme Court case of Thress Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC 1017(Salika [as he then was], Kandakasi and Yagi, JJ), though the guidelines provided by Manu Kovi were nonetheless good.

20.	Counsel submitted therefore that should the Court be mindful of exercising its discretion under Section 19 of the Code or the Juvenile Courts Act, s 30 (2), then an appropriate sentence should be in the range of 6 – 10 years. He urged the Court to consider the Pre-Sentence Report which among other things recommend a partial suspension as the prisoner's family had paid compensation to the deceased's family, they had reconciled and are willing to receive the prisoner back into the community. 

21.	Finally, counsel submitted that the prisoner had been in pre-trial custody since 16/12/09 (3 years, 2 months, 19 days to time of submission – now 3 years, 4 months, 23 days to today). This period should be deducted from the head sentence and the balance should be partial custody and partial probation. 

22.	Mr. Auka, for the State, conceded that it is settled law that belief in sorcery is a mitigating factor and that all the cases referred to by defence counsel are in order. However, he submitted that the Court has to also consider the environment the prisoner comes from. Counsel submitted that the prisoner is a strong believer of the United Church and counsel urged the court to consider this against his belief in sorcery.

23.	While the prisoner is a juvenile, counsel submitted that wilful murder is a very serious offence. Today very serious offences are increasingly being committed by juveniles or young people, so much so, that youthfulness is no longer a useful or mitigating consideration: Joseph Mangi & Ors (2004) SC 741. 

24.	Counsel submitted that the killing in this matter was not a spur of the moment thing. Rather it was driven by the belief that the deceased was a sorceress who was responsible to deaths in the village. The prisoner inflicted very serious injuries on the deceased's body. He cut her seven (7) times all over her body. He viciously attacked a defenceless and harmless old woman. The deceased died a painful death, having had her heart, lungs and neck cut, among other injuries.

25.	 Counsel acknowledged that the maximum penalty is reserved for worst of cases and that each case must be treated on its own merits: Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38.

26.	Counsel countered the defence's submission that the sentencing range for the type of offence is and should be between 6-10 years. He said that sentences have greatly increased as reflected in the following sorcery related cases: 

•	The State v Sedoki Lota & Anor (2007) N3183. The prisoners were sentenced to death.

•	The State v. John Baiga, CR 733 of 2003(Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 09th & 23rd July 2003). Sentence of life.

•	 The State v Kumbi Koti & Ors CR 94 of 1999 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 17th of November 2000). Sentence of 20 years.

•	 The State v. Nickson Sambura & Anor (2002) N2219. Sentenced to 18 years upon plea.

27.	Counsel submitted that the following factors should be taken into account as aggravating this offence:

•	The prisoner was found guilty after trial.
•	This was a serious killing of a harmless and defenceless woman
•	There was a strong intention to kill as reflected by the nature of the injuries inflicted on the deceased
•	The use of a dangerous weapon
•	The use of strong force on the deceased as shown by the injuries
•	Despite belief in sorcery the prisoner had no respect for the sanctity of life
•	The accused acted like an adult
•	These of type of killings have become very prevalent as reported in the papers. The people are calling on the courts to impose tougher penalties.

28.	Mr. Auka submitted that this case falls between Categories 2 and 3 of the Manu Kovi tariffs thus attracting a sentence of between 20 years to life imprisonment. However, taking into account the prisoner's belief in sorcery an appropriate sentence should 40 – 50 years. 

SENTENCING TREND

29.	Sentences for wilful murder where killings were induced by a belief in sorcery have increased concomitantly with the prevalence of these types of killings over recent the years. 

30.	While it is now settled that belief in sorcery is a mitigating factor it has not been lost to the courts that this type of killing must attract stiff punitive as well as deterrent sentences. In The State v Boat Yokum (2002) N2337, Injia J (as he then was) when sentencing the prisoners to terms of imprisonment ranging from 6 - 10 years for the murder of a reputed sorcerer, apparently with the tacit approval of the community, said:

In considering the appropriate sentence, I have had regard to and emphasize the deterrent and retribution theory of sentence as is usually done in sorcery killing cases: see Acting Public Prosecutor v. Uname Aumane & Others [1980] PNGLR 510. A strong punitive and deterrent sentence is required to punish the offenders and to send a clear message to their own community; who apparently seem to think that it is alright to kill a sorcerer or a reputed sorcerer for that matter; that it is wrong to kill another person including a sorcerer, reputed or not, and that they will be punished by the Courts, if they do.

31.	In The State v Sedoki Lota & Anor (2007) N3183 Sevua J. expressed much stronger views when he sentenced the prisoners to death for the wilful murder of a reputed sorcerer by the prisoners. Coincidentally the prisoners in that case are from the same area as the prisoner in the current case. His Honour said at paragraph 26:

"... . I accept that belief in the power of sorcery is common in many communities in Papua New Guinea today. However, it is my view  that with the introduction of Christianity, Western civilization and establishment of Government administration and authorities, the Court should not continue to treat belief in sorcery as a bar to imposing the maximum penalty in a serious wilful murder case, such as the present case."

32.	Then at paragraph 35 His Honour said:

35. In my view, the severity of this crime cannot be limited to the aggravating factors I have alluded to. The prisoners' actions in this case also constituted a blatant violation of the deceased's constitutional rights to the privacy of herhome and her right to life. They deprived her of her right to life contrary to s.35(1)of the Constitution. Her right to life had been intentionally deprived without an order of the Court.

33.	And further down at paragraph 39 he went on to say:

39. But killing someone is against the law and the Courts have a responsibility in demonstrating through the penalties they impose that the prevalence of a crime like this must be a public deterrence and retribution. The punishment must also show that the law does not approve of killing of sorcerers, no matter how much people believe in sorcery. In my view the Courts cannot continue to be indifferent in considering punishments for killing in belief in sorcery as opposed to the serious nature of such killings. I believe it is time that the Courts stopped saying that because a killing is related to the belief in sorcery, it should not attract the maximum penalty. I do not say that the belief in sorcery is not a mitigating factor, because it is. However I do not think that it should be accepted as a bar to serious punishment for the crime of wilful murder such as this case, so callous and unimaginable as it were.

34.	In The State v. John Baiga, CR 733 of 2003(Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 09th & 23rd July 2003) the prisoner was sentenced to life imprisonment. In The State v Kumbi Koti & Ors CR 94 of 1999 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 17th of November 2000) was sentenced to 20 years while the prisoners in The State v. Nickson Sambura & Anor (2002) N2219 were sentenced to 18 years upon plea.

35.	Manu Kovi v The State (supra) has now provided guidelines and tariffs for homicide offences generally. For wilful murder these are:

CATEGORY	WILFULMURDER	
SENTENCING RANGE	
CATEGORY 1	 15 – 20 YEARS	
Plea:
Ordinary cases - Mitigating factors with no aggravating factors.	No weapon used – little or no pre-meditation or pre-planning – Minimum force used – absence of strong intent to kill.
	
CATEGORY 2	 20 – 30 YEARS	
Trial or Plea:
Mitigating factors with aggravating factors.	Pre-planning – vicious attack – Weapons used – strong desire to kill.	
CATEGORY 3	 LIFE IMPRISONMENT	
Trial or Plea:
Special Aggravating factors – Mitigating factors reduced in weight or rendered insignificant by gravity of the offence.	Brutal killing – Killing in cold blood – Killing of innocent, defenceless or harmless person.
Use of dangerous or offensive weapons.
Killing accompanied by other serious offence – Victim old or young – pre-plaaning orr pre-meditation – Strong desire to kill.,. 
	
CATEGORY 4	 DEATH	
Worst Case – Trial or Plea:
Special aggravating factors – No extenuating circumstances – No mitigating factors or mitigating factors rendered completely insignificant by gravity of offence.

36.	Manu Kovi has, however, been criticized by another Supreme Court Bench in Thress Kumbamong v The State (supra) as curtailing the trial court's sentencing discretion under Section 19 of the Code. 

37.	His Honour Salika DCJ. expressing a dissenting view to Manu Kovi in The State v Laurie Kemuel Paugari; The State v Kopol Kepao; The State v Raywill Parapen (2011) N4438 held that a sentencing court should not be limited to and be bound by the range of sentences suggested by either the Supreme Court or the National Court and that the court's sentencing discretion must not be seen to be watered down.

38.	I have also previously expressed a similar but more moderate view in The State v Mavis Uraro CR 235 of 2012 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 26th November 2012), The State v Pauline Muturu, CR 176 of 2012 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 28 November 2012) and The State v Dubi Kais CR 136 of 2010 (Unreported and unpublished judgment dated 12th December 2012). 

39.	While I agreed that the Manu Kovi tariffs may indeed unnecessarily fetter and restrict the sentencing court's discretion, the factual considerations enumerated in the four categories of the guidelines are very much useful in assisting the sentencing court in arriving at an appropriate sentence. This is so, given the fact that the art of sentencing is not an exact science where the court is expected to apply specific mathematical and scientific formulas to arrive at an appropriate sentence.

40.	So with the above in mind, what should be an appropriate sentence for the prisoner?

 AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE

41.	It is trite that the maximum sentence is reserved for the worst types of cases and that each case must be treated on its own merits. Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653; Avia Aihi v The State (No. 3) [1983] 	PNGLR 92; Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR 105; Lawrence Simbe v The State (supra.); Rex Lialu - v - The State [1990] PNGLR 487.

42.	In arriving at a sentence that is appropriate for the prisoner in this matter I must determine at the outset if the circumstances of this case warrant the maximum penalty of death. In other words; is the case such that it must attract the death penalty?

43.	I agree with both counsel that it is not – that it does not fall within the worst category.

44.	I must therefore determine an appropriate sentence below the maximum. It has been suggested to me by the defence that a sentence in the range of 6 – 10 years will be appropriate – a range well below the Category 1 & 2 of the Manu Kovi tariffs. The State, however, suggested a sentence in the range between Category 2 & 3 of Manu Kovi (20 years to life) but given the prisoner's belief in sorcery an appropriate sentence of between 40 – 50 years would not be inappropriate.

45.	Let me now consider the peculiar facts of the prisoner and the circumstances of this case.

46.	The prisoner was a juvenile at the time he committed the offence. He is a first time offender. On the date in question he found himself alone in the bush with the deceased – a reputed sorceress – and believing that he may be in harm's way killed the deceased. He acted alone and he did not pre-plan to kill the deceased. I accept that he may have indeed been over-borne with fear of the deceased and that belief in sorcery was in fact strong among the people in his community. I find his belief in the harmful effects or influence of sorcery (that is "forbidden sorcery" as defined by the Sorcery Act Ch. 274) and the powers attributed to practisers of sorcery had a major influence on him that fateful afternoon.

47.	I find these to be mitigating factors in favour of the prisoner. His belief in the effects of "forbidden" sorcery is a major mitigating factor. 

48.	Against him I, however, find the following aggravating factors. The prisoner killed a harmless and defenceless old woman using a dangerous weapon. He stabbed the deceased repeatedly on her body. The Medical Report revealed deep penetrating fatal wounds to vital organs such as the heart and lungs. The trachea or windpipe was cut. There were in all 7 major wounds and 2 superficial ones to the body.

49.	I accept that despite his belief in sorcery and relatively young age the accused displayed total disrespect for the sanctity of life and further displayed a pretty strong desire to kill if the injuries on the deceased body were anything to go by.

50.	Mr. Auka submitted that the fact that the accused denied the charge and was found guilty only after trial should be taken as an aggravating factor. I disagree. This proposition rubs against the prisoner's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty under Section 37 (2) of the Constitution. Accused persons have the right to deny the State's indictment in accord with their constitutionally guaranteed right to presumption of innocence. If they are found guilty after trial their contesting the charge and any purported waste of valuable court time should not therefore be taken as an aggravating factor against them. Simply put they were merely availing themselves to the protection of the law.

51.	Now this is a tragic case, not only for the deceased but also for the prisoner. It was a totally unnecessary killing of a harmless and defenceless old woman. It was a brutal attack. The deceased obviously did not stand any chance against the prisoner. Judging by the injuries he inflicted on the deceased's body the attack seemed to have not only been brutal but also sustained. 

52.	I agree with Mr. Auka that the prisoner acted as an adult and must naturally expect to be visited upon with punishment befitting an adult. I take full cognizance though that he was a juvenile. This, however, does not mean that he was incapable of forming the requisite intention to kill the deceased or that he was incapable of fully appreciating the full extent and consequence of his action. Granted, he may have been somewhat psychologically affected of being suddenly confronted by a reputedly well known sorceress. 

53.	Youthful offenders now make up a good proportion of our prison populations in gaols throughout the country. This generally reflects the fact that a very high percentage of violent crimes are committed by them. The courts have therefore been justified in holding that youthfulness can no longer strongly mitigate serious offending by our youths.

54.	While it may be true as submitted by Mr. Pipike that most of the crimes committed by youthful offenders involve sexual penetration and robberies and that not too many involve homicides this cannot detract from the fact that our youths contribute substantially to the high rate of violent crimes in the country. 

55.	In this case the prisoner wilfully murdered the deceased – an old woman who, apart from her reputation as a sorceress – was harmless and defence-less. She has unfortunately become yet another mere statistic to the ever increasing number of people who have been extra-judicially executed by individuals and mobs for being suspected of sorcery. 

56.	Victims of sorcery accusations are seldom given an opportunity to defend themselves before their accusers who effectively assume the roles of prosecutor, judge and jury. They are expected to prove their innocence but how could they when that is as hard to prove as it is to prove that they in fact are sorcerers in the first place?

57.	There is no doubt that the prisoner's community has a strong belief in sorcery where most deaths would be attributed more quickly to acts of sorcery than to any medical or pathological cause.

58.	While most societies in the country have been exposed to western civilisation and most, if not all, profess to be Christians these influences do not seem to have had an impact at all in diminishing if not eradicating the belief. The liberating tenets of Christianity in particular have had no effect at all on the masses, who would give no second thought in executing anyone suspected of practicing sorcery.

59.	 The recent spate of public executions and killings of suspected sorcerers calls for affirmative action by the courts. As we have seen the courts have expressed strong views that this type of killings must be visited upon with strong punitive and deterrent sentences to impress upon perpetrators that such killings cannot be allowed to continue as they are a denial of the most fundamental of all human rights – the right to life.

60.	So the community legitimately expects the courts to "walk the talk" so to speak and impose appropriate sentences.

61.	When assessing the circumstances of the case at hand and transposing these against the considerations in Manu Kovi, I find that it displays some features of Category 2 & 3. This was a vicious killing, the prisoner displayed a pretty strong intention to kill and he used an offensive weapon to kill a harmless and defence-less old woman in cold blood.

62.	On the other hand I do accept that there was no pre-planning involved and that the prisoner strongly believed that the deceased was sorceress and that he was in imminent danger out there in the bush. I accept that the prisoner, given his age, would have been deprived of his power of good judgment to a certain extent.

63.	In the circumstances, if I were to apply the Manu Kovi guidelines, I would impose a sentence of between 20 years and life imprisonment. 

64.	However, with the greatest respect for the learned and esteemed bench of the Supreme Court in Manu Kovi, I feel compelled once again to agree with their learned brothers in Thress Kumbamong that my sentencing discretion under Section 19 of the Code cannot be fettered except by Parliament through legislation. No judicial pronouncement or guideline judgment can divest me of my discretion to impose a sentence which the justice of the case before me warrants providing of course that the sentence is one that falls within what is prescribed and befits the crime.

65.	I have already held that the maximum penalty of death is not appropriate in this matter. I am also of the firm view that a life sentence is also not appropriate but that an appropriate determinant term would be.

66.	 Mr. Pipike invited me to consider the sentencing powers under the Juvenile Courts Act. Due to the seriousness of the offence I, however, do not think that the limited sentencing options there are appropriate. Besides I am not bound by the provisions of that Act.

67.	Viewing the seriousness of the offence objectively I would like to think that an appropriate starting point would be 22 years. But taking all the above into account – the factors in mitigation and those aggravating the offence – I think that given the fact that the prisoner was between 16-17 years old at the time of the offence thus making him around 20 – 21 years now, an appropriate sentence should be 20 years.

68.	 I accept that the cases of The State v Sedoki Lota & Anor (supra) and The State v. Nickson Sambura & Anor (supra) involved adult persons and the circumstances were more serious including pre-planning.

69.	However, I feel that the sentence of 20 years should serve as a punitive sentence for the prisoner. It will also serve to deter him and others who think that it is justified to kill a reputed sorceress without as much as a thought about the sanctity of life and let alone taking the law into their own hands. Too many lives are being unlawfully taken in this manner and the message must ring loud and clear that people – including juveniles like the accused here – cannot continue to kill with impunity. Believing that someone has killed another by means of sorcery is no licence to take the law into one's hand let alone kill that person.

70.	Hopefully this sentence will exact respect for the sanctity of life and the rule of law on the prisoner even if it means learning this the hard way. 
 
71.	I therefore impose a sentence of 20 years imprisonment with hard labour.

72.	Of this I deduct 3 years 4 months and 23 days for the period spent in pre-trial custody. This should leave a balance of 16 years 5 months and 7 days. This will be served at the Giligili Corrective Institution. The prisoner will be by now between 20 - 21 years old hence he will serve his sentence in the adult section of the Institution.

ORDERS
 
73.	My orders are therefore as follows:

Head Sentence	20 years	
Deduction for pre-trial custody period	3 years, 4 months, 23 days	
Resultant sentence	16 years, 5 months, 7 days to be served at the adult section of Giligili Corrective Institution	
 
______________________________________________

The Public Prosecutor: Lawyers for the State
Paraka Lawyers: Lawyers for the Prisoner