N5510

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS NO 924 OF 2006

RAIKOS HOLDINGS LIMITED
Plaintiff

V

TONY TAI TUNG CHI
First Defendant

YUAN CHIEN CHENG
Second Defendant

YOUNG WADAU
Third Defendant

BUMBUM BAIS, RICKY BAIS, JACK GABOR
AND THEIR AGENTS, ASSIGNS AND ASSOCIATES
Fourth Defendant

PORCHE ENTERPRISES LIMITED
Fifth Defendant

Waigani: Cannings J
2007: 19, 23 January

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – motion to dismiss proceedings for abuse of process – National Court Rules, Order 12, Rule 40 (frivolity etc) – related proceedings pending determination.

INJUNCTIONS – motion for interim injunction – whether to grant injunction – relevant considerations re exercise of discretion by court.

CONTEMPT OF COURT – whether a person not a party to proceedings can be guilty of contempt not in the face of the court – sub judice – alleged assault on a party's lawyer – whether capable of constituting contempt.

A permit holder (the plaintiff) of a timber rights permit area under the Forestry Act had a disagreement with the company (the fifth defendant) with which it had a logging and marketing agreement (LMA). The plaintiff purported to terminate the agreement but the fifth defendant allegedly continued logging and the plaintiff commenced court proceedings against it. While those earlier proceedings were pending, the term of the LMA ended. The plaintiff contends that the fifth defendant continued logging contrary to the LMA. The plaintiff then commenced fresh court proceedings seeking a declaration that the fifth defendants operations were unlawful and other consequential relief. The court was required to rule on three interlocutory motions in connexion with the fresh proceedings: (1) a motion by the defendants that the proceedings be dismissed as an abuse of process; (2) a motion by the plaintiff for an interim injunction and other interim orders; and (3) a motion by the defendants that an associate of the plaintiff be punished for contempt of court.

Held:

(1)	There was no abuse of process as the facts relied on in the fresh (the current) proceedings are different to those relied in the earlier proceedings.

(2)	Interim orders were granted aimed at enforcing the termination provisions of the LMA.

(3)	The motion for contempt was properly before the court but the charge would more properly be prosecuted by originating summons; and an order to that effect was made accordingly.

(4)	The fresh proceedings ought to be combined with the earlier proceedings and continued on pleadings and an order to that effect was made accordingly.

Cases cited

No cases are cited in the judgment.
NOTICES OF MOTION

This is a ruling on three motions, two by the defendants and one by the plaintiff.

Counsel

I P Mambei, for the plaintiff
Y Wadau, for the defendants

23rd January, 2007 

1. CANNINGS J: This is a ruling on three motions that have been moved in the following circumstances. A dispute has arisen over forestry operations in the Rai Coast district of Madang Province. The operations have been conducted for a number of years under timber permit No 12-18, called the Rai Coast TRP, issued under the Forestry Act. The main dispute is between the permit holder, Raikos Holdings Ltd (the plaintiff) and the company with which it entered into a logging and marketing agreement (LMA), Porche Enterprises Ltd (the fifth defendant). The plaintiff purported to terminate the agreement but the fifth defendant allegedly continued logging and the plaintiff commenced court proceedings against it. While those earlier proceedings were pending, the term of the LMA ended. The plaintiff contends that the fifth defendant still continued logging, contrary to the LMA. The plaintiff commenced fresh court proceedings (the current proceedings) seeking a declaration that the fifth defendant's operations were unlawful and other consequential relief. Neither the earlier proceedings nor the current proceedings have yet been to trial.

2. Three interlocutory motions are now before the court in the current proceedings:

•	a motion by the defendants that the current proceedings be dismissed as an abuse of process;

•	a motion by the plaintiff for an interim injunction and other interim orders; and

•	a motion by the defendants that an associate of the plaintiff be punished for contempt of court.

PARTIES

3. The parties to both the earlier and current proceedings are:

•	the plaintiff – Raikos Holdings Ltd – the permit holder;

•	first defendant – Tony T T Chi – managing director of the fifth defendant;

•	second defendant – Yuan C Cheng – general manager of the fifth defendant;

•	third defendant – Young Wadau – lawyer for the other defendants;

•	fourth defendant – Bumbum Bais, Ricky Bais, Jack Gabor and their agents, assigns and associates – persons allegedly connected with the fifth defendant who have allegedly been trying to remove the plaintiff's managing director, Andrew Sallel, from office; and

•	the fifth defendant – Porche Enterprises Ltd – the contractor under the LMA.

4. The plaintiff was first issued the timber permit on 20 July 1990. It had a ten-year term. On 4 February 2005, an extension was granted to 30 November 2006.

5. On 25 February 2005 the plaintiff and the fifth defendant entered into the LMA. It is a 31-page document containing 31 clauses and various schedules. A deed of variation was made on 18 June 2005. By clause 6, the term of the LMA was ten years subject to the following:

PROVIDED THAT in the event that the permit is terminated or expires at an earlier date, this agreement shall expire at the date of termination or expiry of the permit …

6. In March 2006 the plaintiff wrote to the fifth defendant alleging that a number of conditions of the LMA had not been complied with and asking it to show cause why the LMA should not be terminated.

7. In April 2006 the plaintiff notified that the LMA was cancelled. The fifth defendant, however, allegedly continued logging.

8. On 5 September 2006 the plaintiff filed proceedings (the original proceedings) against the fifth defendant, in OS No 616 of 2006, in the Madang Registry of the National Court.

9. The plaintiff filed an amended originating summons (still under OS No 616 of 2006) on 6 October 2006, seeking the following relief:

1	Order that the First and Fifth Defendants pay to the Plaintiff sale proceeds of the last two shipments dated 07th May 2006 in vessel name MV G. Stau and that 10th July 2006 in Vessel name MV San Wai within fourteen (14) days.

2	Order that the Fifth Defendants is restrained from any felling of logs or harvesting the timber resources in Rai Coast TRP project as the Logging and Marketing Agreement had been terminated on 06th April 2006.

3	Orders that the First, Second, Third and Fourth Defendants be restrained from interfering with the smooth operation of the Plaintiff and its legitimate Directors and Managing Director by not to conduct illegal meetings, forum, meeting with people, intimidating and threatening.

4	Orders that The First, Second and Fifth Defendants comply with the letter from the Provincial Forest Office from National Forest Services to pay the Plaintiff who is the permit holder immediately within Fourteen (14) days.

5	Orders in the nature of declaration that the Logging and Marketing Agreement entered between the Plaintiff and the Fifth Defendant on the 25th February 2005 and varied on 18th June 2005 had been terminated on the 06th April 2006 by the Board of Directors in a Meeting No 009 dated 04th April 2006 pursuant to Clause 22 of the said Logging and Marketing Agreement.

10. On 20 October 2006 the plaintiff moved a motion for restraining orders before Gavara-Nanu J at Madang. His Honour refused the orders sought and directed that the substantive matter be set down for trial.

11. On 30 November 2006 the plaintiff's timber permit expired. That triggered expiry of the LMA under clause 6 of the LMA (as set out above). The consequences of expiry of the LMA are set out in clause 23 of the LMA, which states:

Upon termination of expiry of this Agreement in accordance with the terms hereof:

(a)	all felling of logs shall immediately cease and within one (1) month of receipt of such notice of termination or expiry all logs felled shall be removed, hauled to a loading area, loaded and shipped pursuant to the terms and conditions contained herein should be shipped out within 3 months from Log Pond.

(b)	if the Contractor, immediately prior to the termination or expiry of this Agreement or within three (3) month or receipt of notice of such termination, desires to remove its fixed or moveable plant and equipment and/or buildings from any part of the land occupied by it at the date of such termination or expiry, the Contractor shall give at the date of such termination or expiry, the Contractor shall give notice to the Permit Holder of such desire and hereby shall grant to the Permit Holder the right or option exercisable within six (6) months thereof to purchase on site and said fixed or movable plant and or equipment and/or building or any part thereof at the marked value therefore as agreed or failing agreement as to the value by valuer nominated by the president of the Institute of Papua New Guinea of Civil Engineers.

(c)	Each party shall be at liberty to take such action (if any) as may be open to each of them arising out of the other party's breach of this Agreement.

(d)	In entering into this Agreement, the Owner hereby acknowledged that substantial investments have to be made by the Contractor to construct the logging operation infrastructure, logging roads and bridges as well as the wharf faculties. As such, due consideration and compensation to the Contractor will be required in the event of premature termination of this Agreement by the Owner without due course. Any such claim by the Contractor if not agreed by upon the Owner shall be arbitrated in accordance with the Arbitration Act (Chapter 46). [sic]

23.2.	This clause shall continue in force and shall not merge with this Agreement notwithstanding the termination or expiry of the rest of this Agreement and may be relied upon or enforced by a party to this Agreement.

23.3.	The Contractor has the first right to continue the Contract after the permit expires.

12. On 21 December 2006 the plaintiff filed the current proceedings, OS No 924 of 2006, in the Registry of the National Court at Waigani, seeking a declaration that the fifth defendant's operations were unlawful and other consequential relief. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion, seeking this relief:

1	Interim injunction restraining the First, Second and Fifth Defendants from continuing to harvest round logs and other forest products from Rai Coast Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) in Rai Coast District, Madang Province pending the determination and hearing of the matter listed for trial in Madang in proceedings OS No 616 of 2006.

2	Interim injunction to restrain the First, Second and Fifth Defendants from shipping round logs now kept in the log pond at Malaun Log Pond and if the ship has been loaded be restrained from shipping the said logs pending the trial of the matter in OS No 616 of 2006 at Madang National Court early next year 2007.

3	Orders that the Fifth Defendant remove machines now in operation in Rai Coast TRP area operated under Timber Permit No TP 12-18 and returned to Madang Town.

4	Orders that the First, Second, Third and Fourth Defendants be restrained from interfering with the smooth operation of the Plaintiff and its legitimate Directors and Managing Director by not conducting illegal meetings, forum, meeting with people, intimidating, issuing threats and bribery in any form and submitting Forms to IPA to change Directors until the matter in OS No 616 of 2006 is determined and heard.

5	In the alternate orders that summary judgment entered in favour of the Plaintiff as per the relief sought in the Originating Summons herein pursuant to Order 12, Rule 38 of the National Court Rules for reason that LMA between the Plaintiff and Fifth Defendant had expired as per Clause 22.3 when Timber Permit No TP 12-18 expired on 31st November 2006.

13. On 28 December 2006 the defendants filed a notice of motion seeking orders that the entire proceedings be dismissed as an abuse of process; or that the current proceedings be merged with OS No 616 of 2006 and transferred to Madang.

14. On 29 December 2006 the defendants filed a notice of motion seeking orders for punishment of the plaintiff's managing director for contempt of court.

15. On 19 January 2007 I heard the three motions at Waigani. I will deal with the motions in this order:

•	First, the defendants' first motion re dismissal of the proceedings;

•	Secondly, the plaintiff's motion for an interim injunction etc;

•	Finally, the defendants' second motion re contempt.

THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION RE DISMISSAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS

16. It is brought under Order 12, Rule 40 (frivolity etc) of the National Court Rules, which states:

(1)	Where in any proceedings it appears to the Court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings—

(a)	no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or
(b)	the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious; or
(c)	the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court,

the Court may order that the proceedings be stayed or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings.

(2)	The Court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under Sub-rule (1).

17. The defendants rely in particular on Order 12, Rule 40(1)(c). Mr Wadau, for the defendants, argues that the current proceedings duplicate the earlier proceedings in OS No 616 of 2006. I disagree. The earlier proceedings were filed and the motion for restraining orders was heard at a time when the LMA was current. The LMA has subsequently expired so the issues about whether the fifth defendant is operating unlawfully are now different. Relief, whether substantive or interim, under the current proceedings turns on interpretation and application of a different clause of the LMA – clause 23 – than the clauses at the centre of OS No 616 of 2006. I do not consider there is a duplicity of proceedings. There is no abuse of process as the facts relied on in the fresh (the current) proceedings are different to those relied in the earlier proceedings. I will refuse the motion to dismiss the proceedings under Order 12, Rule 40(1)(c) of the National Court Rules. I will address the alternative relief about merging the two OS matters later in this judgment.

THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION SEEKING INTERIM ORDERS ETC

18. The plaintiff is seeking five orders. The first three are to do with the logging operations. The fourth would be an order stopping the defendants "interfering with" the plaintiff's operations and stopping the defendants holding meetings and intimidating and bribing people. The fifth seeks an order for summary judgment.

The first three orders sought

19. They are not warranted by a proper interpretation of the LMA. I refuse the application for these orders. The types of things sought by these orders are covered by clause 23 of the LMA (cited above). The parties simply have to comply with that very important clause of the LMA. However, for the avoidance of doubt, I will declare that:

•	The LMA expired on 30 November 2006 and all felling of logs had to cease on that date and not continue thereafter.

•	All logs felled had to be removed, hauled to a loading area, loaded and shipped pursuant to the terms and conditions of the LMA by 31 December 2006. No more hauling, loading or shipping (other than provided for below) can take place after 31 December 2006.

•	The fifth defendant has until 28 February 2007 to ship logs from the Log Pond.

•	The fifth defendant has until 28 February 2007 to give notice to the plaintiff of its desires regarding fixed and movable equipment under clause 28.1(b) of the LMA.

The fourth order sought

20. This sort of order offends against basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 46 (freedom of expression) states:

(1)	Every person has the right to freedom of expression and publication, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by a law—

(a)	that imposes reasonable restrictions on public office-holders; or
(b)	that imposes restrictions on non-citizens; or
(c)	that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).

(2)	In Subsection (1), "freedom of expression and publication" includes—

(a)	freedom to hold opinions, to receive ideas and information and to communicate ideas and information, whether to the public generally or to a person or class of persons; and

(b)	freedom of the press and other mass communications media

(3)	Notwithstanding anything in this section, an Act of the Parliament may make reasonable provision for securing reasonable access to mass communications media for interested persons and associations—

(a)	for the communication of ideas and information; and
(b)	to allow rebuttal of false or misleading statements concerning their acts, ideas or beliefs,

and generally for enabling and encouraging freedom of expression.

21. Section 47 (freedom of assembly and association) states:

Every person has the right peacefully to assemble and associate and to form or belong to, or not to belong to, political parties, industrial organizations or other associations, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by a law—

(a)	that makes reasonable provision in respect of the registration of all or any associations; or

(b)	that imposes reasonable restrictions on public office-holders; or

(c)	that imposes restrictions on non-citizens; or

(d)	that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).

22. Besides asking the court to make orders that would infringe on the human rights of a number of people, the plaintiff's application to prevent intimidation, threats and bribery is too broadly expressed and unsupported by evidence. I refuse the fourth order sought.

The fifth order sought

23. This is not a case that is ripe for entry of summary judgment. Many of the issues are arguable on each side of the case. I refuse the motion for summary judgment.

THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION RE CONTEMPT

24. Mr Young Wadau, the third defendant and lawyer for all defendants, has sworn an affidavit deposing to an incident on Thursday morning 28 December 2006 at the PNGFA offices at Hohola, Port Moresby. He deposes that he was present in connexion with the extension of the Rai Coast timber permit, which relate to the current proceedings, when a man who holds himself out as managing director of the plaintiff, Mr Andrew Sallel, disturbed a meeting between Mr Wadau and a National Forest Service officer, Ms Maihua. Mr Wadau deposes that Mr Sallel acted in a violent and threatening manner, hitting Ms Maihua's office door and shouting at Mr Wadau in the following terms:

You fucking stupid lawyer. I am going to punch you, yu savi long mi ha! Bai mi kilim yu. I am the owner of the timber permit. You do not come here to get information.

25. There are other alleged actions of Mr Sallel, which the defendants maintain amounts to contempt of the court. The notice of motion asks that Mr Sallel be punished for contempt.

26. Contempt of court is a criminal matter, prosecuted in accordance with Order 14, Division 6 of the National Court Rules (Rules 37 to 50). These rules are set out in full below:

Subdivision A.—Preliminary.

37.	Interpretation of Division 6. (55/1)

In this Division "contemnor" means a person guilty or alleged to be guilty of contempt of the Court.

Subdivision B—Contempt in the Face or Hearing of the Court.

38.	Arrest. (55/2)

Where it is alleged, or appears to the Court on its own view, that a person is guilty of contempt of Court, committed in the face of the Court or in the hearing of the Court, the Court may—

(a)	by oral order direct that the contemnor be brought before the Court; or

(b)	issue a warrant for the arrest of the contemnor.

39.	Charge, defence and determination. (55/3)

Where a contemnor is brought before the Court, the Court shall—

(a)	cause him to be informed orally of the contempt with which he is charged; and

(b)	require him to make his defence to the charge; and

(c)	after hearing him, determine the matter of the charge; and

(d)	make an order for the punishment or discharge of the contemnor.

40.	Interim custody. (55/4)

(1)	The Court may, pending disposal of the charge—

(a)	direct that the contemnor be kept in such custody as the Court may determine; or

(b)	direct that the contemnor be released.

(2)	The Court may make a direction under Sub-rule (1)(b) on terms, which may include a requirement that the contemnor give security, in such sum as the Court directs, for his appearance in person to answer the charge.

Subdivision C.—Motion or Proceedings for Punishment.

41.	Application. (55/5)

This Subdivision does not apply to a case in which the Court proceeds under Rules 38 to 40.

42.	Procedure generally. (55/6)

(1)	Where contempt is committed in connexion with proceedings in the Court, an application for punishment for the contempt must be made by motion on notice in the proceedings, but, if separate proceedings for punishment of the contempt are commenced, the proceedings so commenced may be continued unless the Court otherwise orders.

(2)	Where contempt is committed, but not in connexion with proceedings in the Court, proceedings for punishment of the contempt must be commenced by originating summons, but, if an application for punishment of the contempt is made by motion on notice in any proceedings, the application may be heard and disposed of in the latter proceedings, unless the Court otherwise orders.

43.	Statement of charge. (55/7)

A statement of charge, that is, a statement specifying the contempt of which the contemnor is alleged to be guilty, shall be subscribed to, or filed with, the notice of motion or originating summons.

44.	Evidence. (55/8)

(1)	Subject to Sub-rule (2), the evidence in support of the charge shall be by affidavit.

(2)	The Court may, on terms, permit evidence in support of the charge to be given otherwise than by affidavit.

45.	Service. (55/9)

The notice of motion or summons, the statement of charge, and the affidavits shall be served personally on the contemnor.

46.	Arrest. (55/10)

Where—

(a)	notice of a motion for punishment of a contempt has been filed or proceedings have been commenced for punishment of a contempt; and

(b)	it appears to the Court that the contemnor is likely to abscond or otherwise withdraw himself from the jurisdiction of the Court,

the Court may issue a warrant in Form 64 for the arrest of the contemnor and his detention in custody until he is brought before the Court to answer the charge, unless he, in the meantime, gives security in such manner and in such sum as the Court directs, for his appearance in person to answer the charge and to submit to the judgement or order of the Court.

47.	Motion or proceedings by Registrar. (55/11)

(1)	Where it is alleged, or appears to the Court on its own view, that a person is guilty of contempt of the court or of any other court, the Court may, by order, direct the Registrar to apply by motion for, or to commence proceedings for, punishment of the contempt.

(2)	Sub-rule (1) does not affect the right that any person other than the Registrar may have to apply by motion for, or to commence proceedings for, punishment of contempt.

Subdivision D.—General.

48.	Warrant. (55/12)

A warrant in Form 65 for the arrest and detention under this Division of a contemnor shall be addressed to the Sheriff and may be issued under the hand of the Judge presiding in the Court directing the arrest or detention.

49.	Punishment. (55/13)

(1)	Where the contemnor is not a corporation, the Court may punish contempt by committal to prison or fine or both.

(2)	Where the contemnor is a corporation the Court may punish contempt by sequestration or fine or both.

(3)	The Court may make an order for punishment on terms, including a suspension of punishment or a suspension of punishment where the contemnor gives security in such manner and in such sum as the Court may approve for good behaviour and performs the terms of the security.

50.	Discharge. (55/14)

Where a contemnor is committed to prison for a term, the Court may order his discharge before the expiry of the term.

27. Mr Mambei, for the plaintiff, objects to the motion for punishment. He argues that even if the facts as alleged in Mr Wadau's affidavit are true (which is not admitted) they do not constitute contempt of court. They might give rise to a cause of action in assault but the court's processes have not been interfered with. There has been no scandalising of the court and no disrespect of the court's processes has been demonstrated. In addition, Mr Sallel is not a party to the proceedings. He is not the plaintiff.

28. Mr Wadau, on the other hand, submitted that it is unacceptable for persons involved in court proceedings to behave in such a manner.

29. I reject Mr Mambei's submissions and agree with those of Mr Wadau. I do not make any findings of fact, however, so the facts deposed to in Mr Wadau's affidavit remain allegations at this stage. Lawyers are officers of the court. If a lawyer is assaulted physically or verbally in connexion with the work he or she is doing as a lawyer in connexion with particular court proceedings, such an assault can constitute contempt of court. The assault does not have to be in the precincts of the court. Nor does it have to be committed by a person who is a party to the court proceedings. I will not strike out the motion for contempt. I will allow it to continue, subject to an order that it be prosecuted by a separate originating summons.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TWO ORIGINATING SUMMONS SHOULD BE MERGED

30. All parties seem to agree that if the current proceedings are to continue, they should be merged and that the merged proceedings should be filed and heard in Madang. This seems a sensible course of action. However, I will go one step further and order that the merged matter continue on pleadings in accordance with Order 4, Rules 31 and 35.

Order 4, Rules 31 and 35

31. Order 4, Rule 31 (directions) states:

(1)	The Court may exercise its powers under this Rule at any time after the commencement of the proceedings.

(2)	The Court shall give such directions as are convenient for the just, quick and cheap disposal of the proceedings.

(3)	Without limiting the generality of Sub-rule (2), the Court may—

(a)	make orders for defining the issues by pleading or otherwise; and

(b)	direct that the whole or any part of the evidence be given on affidavit or orally; and

(c)	make any orders relating to the conduct of the proceedings which it might make on motion by a party. 

32. Order 4, Rule 35 (continuation of pleadings) is also relevant. It states:

(1)	The Court may order that the proceedings continue on pleadings.

(2)	The Court may, on or after making an order under Sub-rule (1)—

(a)	order that any affidavits stand as pleadings; or
(b)	make orders for the filing of a statement of claim or other pleadings.

(3)	The provisions of these Rules concerning proceedings commenced by writ of summons shall, except as far as the Court otherwise orders, and except so far as the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires, apply to proceedings ordered under this Rule to continue on pleadings.

33. This is the sort of matter that lends itself to being continued on pleadings. This is the best way for the issues to be defined. The plaintiff may wish to make a claim for damages based on breaches of the LMA. That will mean that the defendants will have the opportunity to file a defence. Once the pleadings are closed the matter can be set down for trial. I will make appropriate orders under Order 4, Rules 31(2), (3)(a), 35(1) and 35(2)(b).

COSTS

34. Both sides of the dispute have won various aspects of these interlocutory proceedings so it is appropriate that the parties bear their own costs.

ORDERS

(1)	the defendants' motion for dismissal of the proceedings is refused;

(2)	the five orders sought by the plaintiff's motion are refused and instead it is declared that:

(a)	the LMA expired on 30 November 2006 and all felling of logs had to cease on that date and not continue thereafter;

(b)	all logs felled had to be removed, hauled to a loading area, loaded and shipped pursuant to the terms and conditions of the LMA by 31 December 2006 – no more hauling, loading or shipping (other than provided for below) can take place after 31 December 2006;

(c)	the fifth defendant has until 28 February 2007 to ship logs from the Log Pond;

(d)	the fifth defendant has until 28 February 2007 to give notice to the plaintiff of its desires regarding fixed and movable equipment under clause 28.1(b) of the LMA;

(3)	the defendants shall be at liberty to prosecute Andrew Sallel for contempt provided that the application for punishment for the contempt is made by originating summons filed in the National Court at Madang;

(4)	the causes of action in OS Nos 616 and 924 of 2006 shall be merged and OS No 924 of 2006 must be transferred to the Madang Registry of the National Court;

(5)	the provisions of the National Court Rules concerning proceedings commenced by writ of summons shall from now on apply to the merged proceedings;

(6)	the plaintiff has 14 days from the date of entry of these orders to file a statement of claim relating to the merged proceedings, failing which the entire proceedings will stand dismissed for want of prosecution.

Ruling accordingly.
_______________________________________________
Mambei Lawyers & Consultants: Lawyers for the Plaintiffs
Young Wadau Lawyers: Lawyers for the Defendants