PNG Law Reports 1993
[1993] PNGLR 451
N1165
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
PAULA PURI
V
REUBEN PURI
Mount Hagen
Woods J
19 July 1993
6 August 1993
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES - Dissolution of customary marriage - Maintenance - Customary adoption.
APPEAL - Dissolution of customary marriage - Maintenance - Customary adoption - Proof of - Role of National Court.
Facts
The parties were married by custom in 1984. They were childless and took into their care a child of the appellant's aunt in 1989. The appellant alleges the child was adopted by both parties, but the respondent submits that there was no formal adoption by custom. There is no documentation concerning the adoption from any Village Court. The marriage was dissolved by the Village Court in 1992, and no mention was made of the child. The appellant sought and obtained maintenance for her and the child from the Local Court. The District Court discharged this order.
Held
1.       The National Court should ensure that justice is done between parties. It should consider customary law where relevant, but it should be careful not to intrude where lower courts, particularly the Village Court, have carefully considered the matter and where the major relevant factor is the customary arrangement.
2.       There is no evidence of any adoption that has been properly recognised by custom or the community. It is of major importance that the Village Court made no mention of the child when it recognised the dissolution of the customary marriage.
Counsel
Appellant, in person.
P Kunai, for the respondent.
6 August 1993
WOODS J:  The appellant is appealing against an order of the District Court, ordered that the respondent is discharged from payment of maintenance as ordered under a maintenance order of the Local Court.
The parties were apparently married by custom in around 1984. There were no children of the marriage. The appellant says that, because they were childless, they talked about adopting a child, and that in 1989 they took into their care a child from an aunt of hers. The respondent does not agree that they talked about and agreed to adopt a child. He says that the appellant just started looking after the child herself, and that the child came from one of her relatives. He says that there was no formal adoption made by custom and that, therefore, there was no responsibility on him to look after the child. He also says that, by custom, the child cannot enter his line, as it will not be his tribal son and would never enjoy the rights of his clanship.
There is no documentation or order from any Village Court recognising the adoption by custom. In September 1992, the marriage between the parties was declared dissolved by the Village Court. The order makes no mention of the child.
The appellant sought maintenance for herself and the child from the Local Court on the basis that the respondent was obliged to maintain her and the child even though the marriage had been dissolved by custom. The respondent disputes that and says that once the customary divorce was recognised by the Village Court, there was no obligation to pay maintenance. He also says that because the child had never been the subject of a proper customary adoption, it is not his child and he is not responsible for it. He says that the child could and should go back to its natural parents.
I find that it is important that the Village Court made no mention of the child when it recognised the dissolution of the customary marriage. 
What should be the role of the National Court in this matter? Whilst the National Court is always there to ensure that justice is done between the parties and should consider customary law where relevant, it should be very careful not to intrude where lower courts have carefully considered the matter, where the major relevant factor is the customary arrangements, and where the Village Court has already been involved in the matter. The Adoption of Children Act Ch 275 s 53 recognises customary adoptions for the purposes of any law. Thus, the law on maintenance could be applicable if there was a recognised adoption. However, the Court must still have the evidence of any adoption or customary arrangement.
The major point in this Court's consideration of the matter is that there is no evidence of any adoption that was properly recognised by custom or the community. It appears to have been a casual arrangement with the appellant's relatives, but without the support of the husband. So it is, therefore, impossible for any Court to find that the law on maintenance and support can have any relevance.
I, therefore, find that the District Court was correct in discharging the maintenance order of the Local Court.
I dismiss the appeal.
Lawyer for the respondent: P Kunai.