PNG Law Reports 1993
[1993] PNGLR 100
N1157
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
ROBERT SAGA
V
LAWYERS STATUTORY COMMITTEE
AND LINDSAY KIVIA
Waigani
Amet J
17 February 1993
14 July 1993
LAWYERS ACT - Statutory Committee - Improper conduct by lawyer - Excessive lawyer client costs.
Facts
The facts are set out in the judgment.
Held
1.       The lawyer/client bill of costs may be determined as being grossly excessive by the Lawyers Statutory Committee based upon the nature of work carried out by the lawyer for his client and the members of the committee using their experience as a yardstick.
2.       The taxation of costs by the National Court was in relation to party and party costs of the proceedings and not lawyer and client costs, which were the subject of the complaint. It had no relevance to the enquiry by the committee.
Counsel
R Saga, appellant in person.
P Payne, for the respondent.
14 July 1993
AMET J: The appellant was on 20 August 1992, after an enquiry by the Lawyers Statutory Committee (hereafter, the Committee), found guilty of improper conduct as a lawyer, based on the following complaint:
"That on or about 9 May 1992 you rendered a bill of costs to your client, Lindsay Kivia, in the sum of K37,200 - which bill of costs you knew or ought to have known was unjustified and excessive having regard to the work you performed for your client."
On 11 November 1992, after a further hearing as to the appropriate penalty, the Committee imposed the following penalties:
1.       a finding of improper conduct as a lawyer; and
2.       an order pursuant to s 54(2) of the Lawyers Act that he reduce his fees in respect of the work carried out by him, the subject of the inquiry, to the sum of K10,000; and
3.       an order that he pay compensation to his client, Lindsay Kivia, in the sum of K27,200 on or before 30 November 1992; and
4.       suspension from practise as a lawyer from 30 November 1992 if the monetary penalty shall not then have been paid until it shall have been paid.
Mr Saga appeals from these decisions on diverse grounds, which I summarise as follows:
1.       the Committee was in contempt of the National Court order that the costs be taxed, which taxation had not yet been done by the taxing officer;
2.       the Committee was pre-empting the Court's powers by declaring $27,200 of the costs unreasonable and excessive;
3.       The Committee did not give an opportunity to be heard before it passed penalty;
4.       members of the Committee, Messrs Batari and Baker, had conflicts of interest in that the bill of costs to be taxed was ordered to be paid by the State, and both members were employees of the State Department of the Attorney-General;
5 and 6. complaints against client complainant, Lindsay Kivia;
7.       the Committee acted ultra vires in overtaking the Registrar of the National Court's powers; and
8.       the penalty imposed was excessive.
The Committee filed an affidavit by its secretary, Mr James Baker, deposing to the conduct of the enquiry and annexing the records of the proceedings of 20 August 1992 and 11 November 1992 and copies of two letters to the appellant advising of the enquiries. The first letter, dated 21 August 1992, advised that the Committee conducted an enquiry into the complaint on 20 August 1992. The letter stated that the committee noted that the appellant failed to appear but had presented written submissions. The Committee proceeded, determined that the allegation had been made out, and made a finding of improper conduct. The letter further advised that the enquiry would resume on a date to be notified to the appellant for the purpose of determining penalty, and that the appellant may make written submissions on or before that date or he may appear in person for that purpose. The second letter, dated 4 September 1992, advised that the enquiry would resume on 14 October 1992 at 9:30 am for the purpose of determining penalty.
Mr Baker, the Committee's secretary, deposed that the Committee was unable to meet on 14 October 1992 due to a lack of quorum. In any event, the appellant did not attend the venue of the proposed committee meeting. Mr Baker deposed that he believed he wrote to the appellant advising of the Committee's enquiry being adjourned to 11 November 1992.
I quote the whole of the record of proceedings in respect of the two enquires:
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
20 August 1992
The allegation was read by the Secretary and the correspondence in support of the allegation was produced and tendered to the Committee. The lawyer did not attend but had provided written submissions. The Committee noted that the taxation of costs by the National Court to which the lawyer referred, was in relation to the party and party costs of the proceedings, and that the allegation was concerned with the lawyer and client costs. The Committee considered therefore that the National Court taxation had no bearing on the matter. The Committee considered the lawyer/client bill of costs prepared by the lawyer and agreed that the costs charged were grossly excessive having regard to their own experience and to the nature of the work carried out for the client. The Committee noted especially that the judgment against the State had been a default judgment and that the matter had gone to trial for only one day on an assessment of damages. The Committee accordingly made a finding of improper conduct against the lawyer. The committee then stood over the enquiry to a date to be fixed to enable the lawyer to make submissions on penalty.
11 November 1992
The enquiry resumed. The lawyer did not attend but had made further written submissions which the committee considered. Applying their own knowledge of the fees normally charged for matters of the kind dealt with by the lawyer the Committee considered that fees would fall into the K8,000-K10,000 range. Giving the lawyer the top of the range the Committee considered that a figure of K10,000 for costs was appropriate. The decision of the Committee would be therefore that the lawyer reduce his fees to K10,000 and pay compensation of the difference between the amount charged and received and the reduced fees to the client on or before 30 November. The lawyer would be suspended from practice with effect from 30 November if the compensation was not paid on or before that date.
I now turn to deal with the different grounds of appeal. Grounds 1, 2, and 7 can be dealt with together. These grounds are quite simply misconceived. The Committee had properly dismissed the submission by the appellant. The taxation of costs by the National Court was in relation to party and party costs of the proceedings and not lawyer and client costs, which was the subject of the complaint. Taxation of party to party costs had no relevance to the enquiry by the Committee.
Under ground 3, the appellant contended that the Committee did not give him opportunity to be heard before it imposed penalty. The records disclose that on 21 August 1992, the day following the Committee hearing and the finding of improper conduct against the appellant, the secretary of the Committee advised the appellant by letter that "the enquiry will resume on a date to be notified to you for the purpose of determining penalty. You may make written submissions on or before that date or you may appear in person for that purpose." Again, by letter dated 4 September 1992 the secretary to the Committee advised the appellant that the "enquiry will resume on 14 October, 1992 at 9:30 am for the purpose of determining penalty." The Secretary, Mr Baker, deposed in an affidavit that the Committee was unable to meet on 14 October 1992. The appellant did not attend the venue, but had forwarded to the Committee submissions on penalty.
In these circumstances, I consider that ground 3 is without merit. The appellant had been given ample notice and opportunity to be present and forward written submissions, which he did.
Grounds 5 and 6, which relate to complaints against the complainant Lindsay Kivia, are quite irrelevant to the merits of the appeal.
The remaining ground takes issue with the penalty as being excessive. I am satisfied that the finding of improper conduct is proper. The second order on penalty that the appellant reduce his fee in respect of work done to K10,000, is not really challenged at all. The appellant submitted that he had charged K37,200 - but if, upon taxation, he was assessed to have overcharged then he would have been prepared to reimburse the client complainant. Well, that just illustrates the misconception that the appellant was under. His professional peers considered "that the costs charged were grossly excessive having regard to their own experience and to the nature of the work carried out for the client". The Committee noted especially that the judgment against the State had been a default judgment and that the matter had gone for trial for one day on an assessment of damages.
I too consider the costs charged to be grossly excessive. I add that it is this kind of quite unjustified excessive charges on clients which could bring the good name of the profession into disrepute and cause loss of credibility.
The profession, through its peer group disciplinary structure, will re-assert and establish that good name and credibility by properly holding members accountable for improper conduct.
The further order to repay the amount of K27,200 as compensation to the complainant by 30 November 1992, and failing such repayment by that date the appellant shall be suspended from practise as a lawyer until it shall have been paid, is not excessive punishment.
Therefore ground 8 is dismissed. Consequently, the whole appeal is dismissed, and orders of the Committee are affirmed.
The orders have been stayed pending determination of this appeal. I now make the following orders for the enforcement of the orders:
1.       Robert Saga repay his client, Lindsay Kivia, the amount of K27,200 on or before the 31 July 1993, and
2.       in default, Robert Saga be suspended from practise as a lawyer from 31 July 1993 until the full amount of K27,200 shall have been paid.
3.       The appellant shall pay the costs of the respondent.
Lawyer for the appellant: Robert Saga Lawyers.
Lawyer for the respondent: Blake Dawson Waldron.