Papua New Guinea Law Reports - 1965-66
[1965-66] PNGLR 206
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]
UNABA-OVE
V.
ARO-SIARE
Port Moresby
Frost J
21 March 1966
24 March 1966
CRIMINAL LAW - Spreading lying reports tending to give rise to trouble or ill feeling - Meaning of “spreading” - Native Regulations, 1939.
By r. 71 of the Native Regulations, 1939, “Any native who . . . (b) spreads lying reports tending to give rise to trouble or ill feeling amongst the people as a whole, or between individuals . . . shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding £3 or in default of payment to a period of imprisonment not exceeding four (4) months of imprisonment in the first instance to a period not exceeding six (6) months.”
Held:
(1)      If a native person makes a lying report to one person only, and there is no evidence that it was otherwise circulated, he cannot be said to have spread that report within the meaning of r. 71 (b).
(2)      In support of an information under this regulation it is not necessary to prove that the persons to whom the reports are made believed them to be true. It is sufficient that the nature of the reports should tend to give rise to trouble or ill feeling.
Appeal from Local Court.
The facts appear sufficiently from the judgment.
Counsel:
Broadley, for the appellant.
Croft, for the respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
24 March 1966
FROST J:  This is an appeal against the appellant’s conviction for an offence under reg. 71 (b) of the Native Regulations 1939 made under the Native Regulation Ordinance 1908-1963, whereby the appellant was sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment with light labour. Regulation 71 is as follows: “Any native who . . . (b) spreads lying reports tending to give rise to trouble or ill feeling amongst the people as a whole, or between individuals . . . shall be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding £3 or in default of payment to a period of imprisonment not exceeding four (4) months or imprisonment in the first instance to a period not exceeding six (6) months.”
The facts appear from the record of the proceedings. One, Aro-Siare, the complainant, gave evidence that her husband had informed her that the appellant had told him that whilst she, the complainant, was drunk, she went to kiss her brother-in-law, which was false. The complainant’s husband, Seura-Dai, gave evidence that the appellant informed him that his wife, the complainant, “when she drinks goes around with many men to many places”, and with one man, Uma-Arona, presumably the complainant’s brother-in-law, “she took his hand and kissed him, and I saw her with another man also”. This caused trouble between the complainant and him.
The appellant pleaded not guilty, and then made a statement before the court that “Seura was telling me that my husband was with other women. Therefore I said these things about his wife - but they weren’t true.”
The terms of the complaint were that on or about January, 1965, at Hanubada, in Port Moresby, the defendant (the appellant in this appeal) did spread lying reports tending to give rise to trouble or ill feeling to Aro-Siare, the complainant. Upon this complaint the appellant was convicted and sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment with light labour. Presumably the evidence was taken to show that the report tended to give rise to trouble between the complainant and her husband. There was evidence that the appellant had made a lying report to the complainant’s husband, but there is no evidence that such report had been told to any other person.
The original ground of appeal was that the sentence was excessive, but at the hearing Mr. Broadley, who appeared for the appellant, sought leave to amend the grounds of appeal by adding a further ground as follows - “that there is no evidence on the face of the record to support the finding that the appellant had spread lying reports”. There being no objection by Mr. Croft, who appeared for the respondent, I allowed the amendment.
Mr. Broadley then argued that there was no evidence that the appellant had, within the meaning of the regulation, spread a lying report and he also argued that, there being no evidence that Seura believed the report to be true, it could not be said that it tended to give rise to trouble between individuals. The latter argument appears to me to have no substance. It is sufficient that the nature of the report should tend to give rise to ill feeling, etc. It was open to the magistrate to find that the appellant’s statement did tend to have this effect.
Counsel’s first argument, however, depends upon the dictionary meaning of “spread”, for which he cited the Concise Oxford Dictionary as meaning, in the context of rumours spread from mouth to mouth, “diffuse”, which in turn in the same dictionary is defined as meaning “to send forth” or “spread abroad”. He argued that the phrase “spreads lying reports” imports the notion of a report being circulated amongst a number of people, or possibly a number of places. He argued that the only evidence before the court in this case was that the appellant had made, on an isolated occasion, a lying statement to the complainant’s husband and that this did not fall within the ordinary meaning of the word “spread”.
It is necessary to ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the regulation. The Native Regulations are drafted in simple language designed both to be easily understood by the native people and also to be applied by officers of the Administration, one of whose many duties would be, as lay magistrates, to hear complaints in the field brought under this regulation. They are not cast in technical language. The regulation seems to me to aim at the prevention of trouble amongst the people as a whole or between individuals, arising from lying reports being circulated at least amongst several people, and not at the making of a lying statement proved to have been told on a single isolated occasion.
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines the word “spread” as follows: “To disseminate or diffuse; to cause to become prevalent or (more) widely existent, present, known, felt.” I thus consider that the word “spread” does import the notion of a report being circulated amongst a number of people. Accordingly, if the facts were that a native made, to a group of people, a lying report or repeated a lying report to several individuals, that would clearly constitute an offence, if on the facts the report tended to give rise to trouble amongst the people as a whole or between individuals. Also, if it were proved that a lying report, such as the regulation is concerned with, was being circulated amongst a number of people, and that the defendant had passed that report on even to one person, it could be said that the part he took in relation to the report was one of spreading the report, within the meaning of the regulation, in the sense that he was making it more widely known. But in my opinion if a person makes a lying report to one person only, and there is no evidence that it was otherwise circulated, he cannot be said to have spread that report within the meaning of the regulation. I consider that such an isolated act would clearly fall outside the purview of the section. For these reasons I would uphold the appeal and set aside the conviction.
Appeal allowed.
Solicitor for the appellant: W. A. Lalor, Public Solicitor.
Solicitor for the respondent: S. H. Johnson, Crown Solicitor.