

# IMPERIALISM, "DEVELOPMENT" AND THE UNDER-DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY.

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## I. Introduction.

All forms of human behaviour are fundamentally social behaviour. Individual behaviour does not occur in a vacuum, but in a situation structured by the social relationships in a particular society. This applies even to isolated acts which directly involve only one person; such acts only have meaning when interpreted according to the norms and values which have developed within the particular social structure. Thus the same act of kneeling and talking to oneself might be interpreted as praying (legal), as irrational (requiring involuntary confinement in mental hospital) or as witchcraft (illegal). Thus in order to understand criminal behaviour and to develop a criminology, the first requirement is an analysis of the society in which that behaviour occurs. Only such an analysis can provide the basis for understanding why people act as they do and why some forms of behaviour are interpreted and punished as criminal and others are not.

The above thoughts were prompted by a recent publication, edited by David Biles, dealing with crime in Papua New Guinea,<sup>1</sup> (hereafter Biles et al). There are in the West today basically two competing criminological approaches to the study of crime. The first, conventional (or official-mainstream) criminology, (hereafter OMC), focuses on perceived criminal behaviour and regards it as the central issue: what may be defined as a "social (or "law and order") problem" by politicians and the media becomes the object of criminological study.<sup>2</sup> The second, or alternative, criminological analysis presents the pattern of criminal behaviour as a symptom of a much more fundamental social problem: the social relations of society which produce substantial differences in wealth, power and life opportunity. Biles et al take the first, or conventional, view. They then proceed to explain criminal behaviour in Papua New Guinea in terms of some general developmental forces which are not then related to the specific nature of the social relations existing therein. These generalised forces are then seen to be essentially inescapable, a normal part of "development" which one "catches" as if the victim of a world-wide epidemic. Thus William Clifford argues that urban criminal behaviour "would appear to reflect more the effects of the world spread of an urban culture which the opening up of Port Moresby to an outside world has necessarily occasioned."<sup>3</sup> The superficiality of Clifford's OMC

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1. D. Biles (ed.), *Crime in Papua New Guinea* (1976). (Hereafter Biles).
2. Boehringer, "Sociology, Social Problems and Social Control", *Social Studies* 349-380 (1974).
3. Clifford, "Urban Crime in Papua New Guinea", in Biles, *op.cit.*, 12.

becomes clear if we pause to consider *how* Papua New Guinea was opened up and *why*, rather than ignoring the reality of imperialism as he and Biles et al constantly do. For the kinds of social relations which exist in Papua New Guinea and which produce anti-social behaviour were not "necessarily occasioned"; they are the result of a long period of imperialism during which a particular legal-socio-political structure was created on top of, and to protect, an economic base which functioned to provide an immense imbalance in the distribution of resources.<sup>4</sup>

One of the questions facing Third World countries today is the extent to which foreign aid, in any form, should be accepted, and if so upon what terms.<sup>5</sup> While there has been a mountain of writing produced on the issue of economic aid,<sup>6</sup> there has been comparatively little with regard to intellectual aid.<sup>7</sup> While the use of economic aid to create or maintain a dependency relationship is widely known to be a basic technique of modern imperialism or neo-colonialism,<sup>8</sup> it should also be recognised that successful economic exploitation of one country by another in contemporary circumstances is greatly facilitated by the presence in the servient nation of ideologies which support the system of exploitation. A relevant example would be the (false) idea that once political independence is gained former colonies are no longer subject to imperialist exploitation. If such a belief is widespread in a neo-colony, the possibility of peaceful exploitation is greater than it would be if the population believed *en mass* in the existence of neo-colonialism. This is not to argue that neo-colonialism can operate only where there is a false perception of freedom from it, but that modern imperialism is likely to be more secure and more profitable where it is not blatantly obvious to those being dominated.<sup>9</sup>

It is my purpose in this article to suggest that recent criminological work vis-as-vis the Third World is more accurately conceived of as having functions beyond the announced task of "crime control": It operates essentially as an ideological veil for those who might wish thereby to obscure the social reality arising out of the social formation bequeathed by the colonialists.

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4. Martin, "Legislatures and Socio-Economic Development in Commonwealth Africa" (Presented to Conference on Legislatures in Contemporary Societies, 1975). See J. Kaputin, *A Policy Statement* (1973).
  5. I. Shivji et al, *The Silent Class Struggle* (1973).
  6. T. Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism* (1971); C. Hensman, *Rich Against Poor: The Reality of Aid* (1971).
  7. I. Illich, *Celebration of Awareness* (1971). See A. Paliwala, "Towards a Political Economy of Law in Under-Developed Countries" 3:2 *Mel.L.J.* 367-375 (1975).
  8. R. Jenkins, *Exploitation* (1971), ch.10.
  9. See the dialogue between Mamak and Sharp on research in Bougainville, *Arena* no.41, (1976), 93-97.

The common sense view of the inter-relationship between crime and criminology in the Third World would be, I suppose, that where there is crime, and especially an apparent rising rate of crime, then there is an urgent need for a policy to solve the problem so defined.<sup>10</sup> Further, that experts in "crime control" should be invited by Third World governments to assist in developing an appropriate crime policy. Common sense can, of course, be quite misleading; it was common sense in earlier centuries to believe that the earth was flat or that the sun revolved around the earth. In the same way the phenomenon of crime may hide or distort the fundamental relationships in society, for example, those relating to the production and distribution of wealth. It is vital for imperialism that such relationships continue to be hidden and protected when challenged. The major task of "crime control" criminology, or OMC, is to aid in doing so. I have come to the conclusion that far from serving to aid in the control of crime in the Third World, criminology will function more fundamentally to maintain the political-economic system.<sup>11</sup>

That Western criminology, an "applied science" directly related to problems of "law and order" should make its appearance in post-independence Third World countries is not at all surprising, particularly in light of what we know about "applied anthropology" and its service to imperialism.<sup>12</sup> To discuss criminology in the Third World in isolation from the fundamental reality of imperialism would be fruitless, totally inadequate, and misleading. My argument is that crime is not an autonomous concept which applies to certain kinds of behaviour in all societies and can therefore be studied in itself.<sup>13</sup> Rather it is socially determined, essentially by the powerful groups in society for their own purposes; therefore anyone wishing to consider seriously the concept of crime must analyse the following: (a) what groups have power in society, (b) the purpose for which that power is exercised in relation to the designation of behaviour as criminal. Such an analysis will indicate that by and large a small minority with power in society determine which acts shall be considered criminal.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of colonial countries, the power lay with the colonial

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10. Wiles, "Criminal Statistics and Sociological Explanations of Crime", in W.G. Carson and P. Wiles, *Crime and Delinquency in Britain* (1971), 174-192.
  11. F. Pearce, *Crimes of the Powerful* (1976).
  12. See generally, T. Asad (ed.), *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (1973). See also Frank, "Anthropology - ideology, applied anthropology - politics", 17 *Race and Class* 57-68 (1975); Stauder, "The Relevance of Anthropology to Colonialism and Imperialism", 16 *Race* 29-51 (1974).
  13. R. Robertson and L. Taylor, *Deviance, Crime and Socio-Legal Control : Comparative Perspectives* (1973).
  14. W. Chambliss, "The State, the Law and the Definition of Behaviour as Criminal or Delinquent", in D. Glaser (ed.), *Handbook of Criminology* (1974), 3-43.

administrators and they exercised it partly through the legal system, primarily against the relatively powerless indigenous population. The fundamental purpose of the colonial legal system was to repress the indigenous population in order to allow the colonial link to be maintained, for economic or strategic (or both) reasons.<sup>15</sup> And I have recently suggested elsewhere that the study of crime in colonial Africa was part of a wider intellectual endeavour which was intended to assist the colonial administration in maintaining its dominance.<sup>16</sup> Criminology serves a similar purpose in capitalist countries, i.e., it functions most importantly to aid in maintaining the status quo, by providing the justification for repression of the working class both physically and ideologically.<sup>17</sup> It is therefore not surprising that OMC, which essentially ignores the function of the State, is being exported to and taken up by countries in the Third World who are following a capitalist path to development, upon which the repressive powers of the state will be increasingly deployed in a manner similar to that of the colonial period.<sup>18</sup>

In conventional criminology, the state is seen as a neutral body, a kind of referee, there to see that the ongoing societal "game" continues without disruption or substantial conflict. The game is conceived as being fought out by various competing groups (e.g. employers, employees) none of whom have any in-built advantage, none of whom have greater access to State power than do others. Thus the State is seen as essentially passive and reactive - like a fire brigade that reacts to fire alarms irrespective of who places the call and who is responsible for the fire. It is also an integral part of this approach that the State does, or can be made to, deal with all criminal offenders whomever they may be. Criminals must then be seen as a deviant minority, since society is made up of an over-whelming majority who have reached a consensus (promulgated as law by the legislative arm of the State) about what behaviour shall be criminal. And to explain why only a small minority appear to commit criminal acts, conventional criminology has produced a variety of explanations, each of which has proved incapable of explaining the causes of crime. Indeed, as Biles's volume shows, the emphasis is on control, administration, penology, procedure. Thus Clifford notes "in fact, studies of causation have not been popular among criminologists for a decade or more, because long years of research in the areas of nature and nurture, personality and environment seemed to produce more questions than answers".<sup>19</sup>

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15. Kaputin, *op.cit.* note 4. See also D. Pritt, *Law, Class and Society*, Book 3, (1971) 81, Y. Ghai and J. McAuslan, *Public Law and Political Change in Kenya* (1970), 34. Cf. H. Morris and J. Read, *Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice* (1972).
  16. Boehringer, "African Criminology : Towards the Necessary Dialogue", 11:1 E.A.L.J. 81-106 (1975).
  17. R. Quinney, *Critique of Legal Order* (1974).
  18. Sharp, "The Role of the Post-Colonial State and Neo-colonialism in Underdeveloped Societies : Some Preliminary Observations" (Presented to Class Analysis Conference, 1976).
  19. Clifford, *op. cit.*, 13. See Brown, "Criminology and Prison Research : Who Benefits?" (Presented to Alternatives to Prison Conference, 1975).

The alternative view of crime arises from an initial analysis of the State.<sup>20</sup> As opposed to conventional criminology, the alternative critique sees fundamental significance in State action. For in the form of parliamentary legislation, the State determines what behaviour shall be criminal, and which criminal behaviour shall be sanctioned.<sup>21</sup> This view is consistent with the generally accepted view that human behaviour is only given meaning within a specific set of social relations and the norms and values arising therefrom.<sup>22</sup> Thus rather than simply focusing on criminal behaviour and asking why it occurred, alternative criminologists confront a prior and more fundamental question: *why* is certain behaviour made criminal and other behaviour not? The answer is that the State, operating to maintain the social order, criminalises and penalises those activities which represent a threat to that order. Thus, many acts are socially injurious, but only some are condemned and penalised by the criminal law. If we look closely at the formulation and implementation of the criminal law we will find that it aids in maintaining the State (e.g. Public Order legislation) and in protecting the property of the powerful, both internal and external to the society (like for example, Bougainville Copper).<sup>23</sup> It is this fundamental political repressiveness of law which is ignored by Biles et al.

Interestingly, the alternative view of crime and the function of the State appears to be supported by Bernard Narakobi, Chairman of the Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission. Speaking at a seminar on crime, he stated "If the State will not control the selfish, then let the poor help themselves to what is due to them. What is the State doing about those nationals who are slowly digging their greedy feet into the earth so that they will control production and perpetuate the war between the rich and the poor, the capital and the labour, the employer and the employee."<sup>24</sup>

The causes of urban criminality, the primary concern of Biles et al, are not seriously dealt with: only vague and superficial generalities are presented which in the end can be reduced to "social (or individual) pathology."<sup>25</sup> Alternative criminology takes the view that crime cannot be understood in terms of simple pathological conditions, internal or external to the offender, as the main contributors in Biles et al suggest. Rather

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20. R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (1973).

21. For a perceptive analysis of the nature of law which provides a necessary complement to the analysis I am presenting here, see Fraser, "Legal Theory and Legal Practice", *Arena*, No. 43/44 (1976), 123-156.

22. P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966).

23. Cunningham, "Law and Order v Rule of Law - The Challenge of the Bougainville Incident", 3:2 *Mel.L.J.* 346-52 (1975). See Sharp "Bougainville Coppers", *Arena* no.38 (1975), 3-6.

24. *Post-Courier*, 7 Oct. 1976. Mr. Narakobi was speaking at the annual crime prevention seminar in Port Moresby.

25. Clifford, *op. cit.*, 13-15.

the behaviour most commonly defined as criminal can only be understood in terms of the over-riding value attached to private property in non-socialist countries. As I have commented elsewhere, "Indeed most crime is directly or indirectly related to that value whether it is the unlawful taking (theft or related), the failure to possess (vagrancy); behaviour which results from not having or rebelling against the need or pressures to have it (drug use of various kinds); behaviour which results from obsession with it (various forms of gambling and speculation); behaviour which results from an inability to separate the concept from social relationships (rape) and so on."<sup>26</sup>

Evidence that this alternative view is essentially correct comes, interestingly enough, from data on crime in Port Moresby: "About 90 per cent of all housebreaking offences so far examined, involve the selective theft of food, drink and small household items. Expensive jewellery, electrical equipment, and household items, the prizes normally sought by burglars, are mostly overlooked in favour of food, clothing and money. We have come across many instances when, in the absence of food and money, nothing was taken".<sup>27</sup> Such a comment suggests that the real problem is indeed one of the specific political economy of Papua New Guinea, rather than some kind of individual, or community, pathology. Indeed, "Until something is done about the unemployed, stealing and housebreaking will continue ... All the evidence so far indicates that housebreaking gangs are supplying an obvious community need. The redistribution of items of basic necessity from the haves to the havenots. In this context, housebreakers are seen as latter day Robin Hoods. This is a disturbing fact".<sup>28</sup> No doubt that it is - to those who have. Which points up the dangers of this kind of book : it is irrelevant to the defined crime problem, but it is a weapon in the hands of those in power against those who are without power, property or prospect. Thus the first of the major recommendations listed is the improvement of police efficiency. For crime control, or control of havenots?

## II. *The Colonial Past of Criminology: The African Connection.*

My analysis of the roots of African criminology, in which Clifford has played a substantial role, suggests that it is not simply a pale imitation of Western criminology but that it is in fact the grandchild of imperialism.<sup>29</sup> An examination of the intellectual sources of African criminology discloses the work of British anthropologists and colonial administrators in the period prior to World War Two. <sup>30</sup> The former were dominated by the functionalism

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26. Boehringer, "Alternative Criminology and Prisoners' Movements: Partnership or Rip-Off?" 1:1 *Alternative Criminology J.* 40 (1975).
  27. Mackellar. "Current research into law and order problems in Port Moresby", in Biles, *op. cit.*, 120-121.
  28. *Ibid.*, 122.
  29. Boehringer, *op.cit.*, note 16. See note 12, *supra*. See also the seminal article by Gough, "Anthropology and Imperialism", 19:11 *Monthly Rev.* 12-27 (1968).
  30. J. Driberg, *At home with the Savage* (1952), ch.1, epilogue; H. Barnett, *Anthropology in Administration*, (1956), Part 1.

(a form of positivism) which was being developed in British Africa - an ideology convenient to colonialism with its emphasis on the status quo but having little to offer in providing an understanding of criminal behaviour.<sup>31</sup> (It is worth pointing out that criminology in Africa has continued the tradition of a close relationship between social scientists and governments in the post-independence period).<sup>32</sup> A number of writings on African criminological matters were also produced at that time by people with legal backgrounds. These writings range widely, from reports on penal matters to more informal pieces dealing with African law, colonial justice, and related matters.<sup>33</sup> Thus the important intellectual influences upon African criminology lay primarily in two disciplines with close links to the colonial administration: anthropology and law. And to the extent that British criminology itself was an influence, this occurred mainly through the law and in two ways: first, a majority of the important criminologists working in Africa have been lawyers, or people connected with legal administration, and second, as Cohen has shown, British criminology was greatly influenced by people with legal training.<sup>34</sup>

It is now possible to understand more clearly why, for example, Clifford's African criminology lacks an adequate analysis of the legal component in criminology: because of the nature of the British legal heritage.<sup>35</sup> A thorough analysis of that heritage is too large an undertaking for the present, however Seidman offers a good starting point in his discussion of reception.<sup>36</sup> Seidman argues that the common law as exported to Africa differed from the homegrown British variety because of the exploitation imperative it sought to fulfill. To make his argument, Seidman concentrates on the differences in substantive law and, as far as it goes, it is an

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31. See the general critique of functionalism in A. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (1970). Regarding anthropology, see Goddard, "Anthropology : The Limits of Functionalism" in R. Blackburn (ed.), *Ideology and Social Science* (1972), 61-75.

32. The most notable case concerns a leading Nigerian criminologist who has at various times been University Professor and Dean, Federal Attorney General, and Minister of Justice.

33. Most of these materials are referenced in Boehringer, "Developments in Criminology in Tanzania" (Proceedings, U. of E. Africa Social Science Conf., 1968).

34. Cohen, "Criminology and the sociology of deviance in Britain", in P. Rock and M. McIntosh, (eds.), *Deviance and Social Control* (1974) 1-40.

35. W. Clifford, *An Introduction to African Criminology* (1974).

36. Seidman, " The Reception of English Law in Colonial Africa Revisited", 2 *E.A.L.R.* 47-85 (1969). See Fitzpatrick, "No Stronger Law . Colonial Rule and the White Women's Protective Ordinance", 3:1 *MeL.L.J.* 169-173 (1975).

analysis with which I agree. Nevertheless, I would go further to argue that British law is not, in its primary function, different at home from its overseas manifestations. For British law is bourgeois law, and operates to maintain a system of exploitation at home as well as abroad. Therefore, it is not based on "the rule of law" in Britain with, as Seidman's argument perhaps implies, derogations from that position overseas.

The essence of my general analysis is that British law undertakes those relevant tasks which the dominant political and economic structures require for stability and reasonably satisfactory performance. When that political economy is under pressure, whether from within or without, then the essential nature of British law is exposed. To extend the argument, as British conquerors moved into foreign lands near and far - from Ireland to Australia, and including Africa - British law assumed the structure and doctrines necessary for the purposes of British imperialism. Thus British law has assumed different modes throughout the world, depending on the degree and nature of resistance encountered (compare Ireland and Australia, or Africa) and the goal to be achieved (strategic protection, resource exploitation, etc.)<sup>37</sup> The common law cannot be understood properly if it is seen as containing a certain static level of justice or morality at home from which certain derogations have occurred abroad in the interest of the colonial imperatives.

For the purposes of this paper, the importance of the nature of the metropolitan law is emphasised because it is that law and legal culture which provide, in the main, the background for post-independence criminologists in the Third World. The common law is pragmatic, atheoretical, positivist and, inevitably, social control orientated.<sup>38</sup> Such was the legacy of British law to British criminology, and of both to African criminology. There is no reason to suppose the legacy in Papua New Guinea is substantially different. Indeed my analysis suggests parallels to the Australia - Papua New Guinea nexus. The recent work by Wolfers shows clearly the manner in which Australian law was applied in a "derogated" fashion to the Territories.<sup>39</sup> And the Australian Governor General's "coup" of 11 November 1975 suggests the extent to which the legal system and concepts such as the "rule of law" can be accommodated to what are alleged to be extreme economic circumstances.<sup>40</sup>

While it is not proposed here to attempt to write a comprehensive history of the development of criminology in Papua New Guinea, it is clear that, as in Africa, anthropologists and colonial officials have been a major intellectual influence on thinking about "law and order" and "crime control" in the country prior to independence.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, much of this was based on functionalism, and was conceived as being a contribution to the overall

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37. *Supra* note 15. See E.P. Wolfers, *Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea* (1975). See also the following: A. Ward, *A Show of Justice* (1974) re New Zealand; A. Sachs, *Justice in South Africa* (1974); E. Eggleston, *Fear, Favour or Affection* (1976), re Australian Aborigines; R. Evans, K. Saunders and K. Cronin, *Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland* (1975).

38. Boehringer, "The Dialectics of Capitalist Legal Policy" *Australian Left Rev.* no. 55, (1976).

39. *Supra*, note 37.

40. Tubbs, "Emergency Powers, Class and State" *Australian Left Rev.*, No. 56 (1977). See E.F. Hill, *Revolution and the Australian State* (1974).

41. See e.g. the work of M. Strathern, P. Lawrence and D. Fenbury.



administrative program of colonialism and that which was to follow. It also appears that criminology in Papua New Guinea has been importantly influenced, with several exceptions, by lawyers writing in the traditional positivist mould.<sup>42</sup>

### III. *Recent Criminological Excursions in Papua New Guinea.*

In his paper on police, Tufman was primarily concerned with speculating upon the developing role of the police after independence.<sup>43</sup> His paper is important because it suggests the kind of broad analysis which is necessary if criminology is to develop any explanatory power. Tufman argues that: "It is quite apparent of course that the role of the Police cannot be viewed in isolation from economic as well as social and political realities. Many of the problems faced by Police are self-perpetuating because of such realities. For example, lack of labour-intensive urban industries causes unemployment and thus an increasing crime rate, but because of the increasing crime rate foreign investment is discouraged thus maintaining unemployment and the increasing crime rate. Similar sorts of results flow from an unstable political situation".<sup>44</sup>

Unfortunately, Tufman's criminological analysis is based on an erroneous consensual view of politics, in which the police are a neutral force administering the law impartially. Without being able to prove him wrong with statistics (their unreliability, indeed paucity, needs no substantiation)<sup>45</sup> it is more than likely that the police are enforcing only some laws against only some offenders, e.g. the urban unemployed, and are therefore following the typical police pattern in Western countries and in much of the Third World.<sup>46</sup> Even more worrying is his acceptance at face value of the conventional wisdom about the role of police in society, particularly his willingness to legitimate the views of a police apologist. Thus Tufman begins his paper by quoting Sir Richard Mayne, the first Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police: "The primary object of an efficient Police is the

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42. See e.g. the work of R. O'Regan, J.A. Griffin, B.J. Brown. But see e.g. T.E. Barnett, "Crime, Kin and Compensation : The Law as Accessory to Pay Back", 1 *Mel.L.J.* 29-36 (1972).
43. Tufman, "The Role of Police in Papua New Guinea", 7 *Aust. and N.Z. J. of Criminology* 87-94 (1974).
44. *Ibid.*, 73. See also L. McDonald, *The Sociology of Law and Order* (1976) where unemployment is shown to be the only social condition with which high crime rates are associated consistently.
45. See generally R. Hood and D. Sparks, *Key Issues in Criminology* (1970), chs. 1 and 2. The issue is raised by several writers in Biles, *op. cit.* especially by Biles, "Crime and criminal justice statistics in Papua New Guinea, 159-174. Cf. Wiles, *op. cit.*
46. Enloe, "Ethnicity and Other Factors Shaping the Roles of Police in Third World Nations" (Presented to symposium on the Military, the Police and Domestic Order, 1975).

prevention of crime." Of course that is the ideology; but students of the police, particularly of the origins of the British police, have recently argued convincingly that the primary police function is to protect the interests of the dominant class.<sup>47</sup> These are the kind of "economic .... social and political realities" which Tufman gave superficial recognition to but failed to utilise in his argument. Indeed, that failure is reflected in his confused analysis of the future role of the police. He argued that the police role in Papua New Guinea need not change after Independence: that in pre-independence days it was the same as in Mayne's London (1829), and that it can be the same after Independence. He warns that if democratic government is not maintained (in his view one party government would be the death knell of democracy) the police will then develop a political role. His confusion arises from his failure to realise that historically the fundamental police role was, and remains, political.<sup>48</sup> This results in an emphasis on the anti-crime role of the police, which is only latently political, while the overtly political role of the police in maintaining the State is dismissed as irrelevant. Tufman's approach ignores the linkage between the dominant class or group (and their allied interests) and the political institutions through which it effectuates that domination: apparatuses of the State system, including the police, and other elements in the system of social control.<sup>49</sup>

Furthermore, Tufman fails to appreciate the inter-relationship between the concept of crime and the organisation of domination in society. By analysing criminal behaviour as an essentially discrete phenomenon separate from the political-economic structures, treating it then as a result of amorphous processes such as urbanisation, he performs the basic conjuring trick of OMC. He draws a veil over the fundamental cause - the political-economic organisation of society into conflicting, not consenting, groups - and focuses instead on the symptoms of that organisation, e.g. a particular kind of urban growth which is, of course, accompanied by certain forms of criminal behaviour. To say that urban development is the cause of crime is superficial and avoids the fundamental issue as does Clifford when he comments upon "the undesirable by-products of the inexorable process of urban concentration".<sup>50</sup>

Tufman's analysis of the crime situation is fairly typical of OMC. Thus he emphasises urbanisation and unemployment as the cause of crime, (see the quote above which is linked to the following comment): "The problem of the school leaver and the growing number of youngsters in towns and elsewhere who can find no place in the education or economic system is no closer to solution. In a country where urbanisation has outstripped employment opportunities there are bound to be *insoluble difficulties*. Labour intensive industries are no longer a feature of modern secondary industry ... Moreover, despite sometimes appalling living conditions more and more people are attracted to the towns."<sup>51</sup> (Emphasis supplied.).

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47. Boyle, "The Police in Ireland before the Union," 7 *Irish Jurist* (n.s.) 115-137 (1972).

48. Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," in D. Bordua (ed.), *The Police* (1967), 1-24. See Zakaria, "Police Forces and their Political Roles in S.E. Asia" (Unpublished, no date).

49. See the debate between Miliband and Poulantzas in Blackburn, *op. cit.*,

50. Clifford, in Biles, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

51. Quoted from the Annual Report of the Director of Child Welfare (1970/71) by Tufman, *op. cit.*, 89.

Once again we see the over-simplified approach typified by conventional criminology: crime is caused by certain social conditions which are primarily brought about by urbanisation and development generally.<sup>52</sup> There is a vulgar determinism which sees youth driven to commit crime because of their unemployment, coupled with a pathological model: those who do commit crimes must be treated, rehabilitated, etc. And to add insult to injury, development is seen as a monolithic process whereby inevitably massive urban problems, especially juvenile crime, will result. There is a failure here to appreciate other kinds of development based on different methods of organising the social and economic transformation of society.<sup>53</sup>

Occasionally Tufman is forced to admit that the problem of crime is indeed political. Interestingly, he does so only with regard to rural criminality, where in his view "The police, however, are merely nibbling at a problem which requires a political solution." Nevertheless he derogates from his position and attempts to reconcile the obvious contradiction in his argument, "At the moment the law is simply not able to effectively resolve disputes over land".<sup>54</sup> But the question he has not answered is: if rural crime needs a political solution, why does not the same apply to urban crime? The answer is that the basic purpose of "crime control" is to substitute for the political process. The urban crime problem is intractable because the political process has been played out; the government is locked into a situation where repression is the only viable policy. There is no possibility of an alternative solution in the urban areas, except by a revolutionary change of the "economic ... social and political realities". Crime control is therefore being resorted to in order to manage a social problem which arises out of the social formation that Australia created and left behind, and which the present dominant groups, national and expatriate, have no intention of allowing to be changed substantially.<sup>55</sup> By contrast, the rural situation probably can and will be dealt with in a political manner as Tufman implies; that kind of problem is not so intractable nor immediate in terms of the maintenance of the dominant internal and external economic and political interests. Of course where those interests are threatened, the police, allowed to overtly exercise their political role, are sent in to crush not crime, but political behaviour threatening the maintenance of the status quo, as for example in the Gazelle peninsula and on Bougainville.

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52. This view is not supported by research carried out in America; see E. Monkkonen, *The Dangerous Class: Crime and Poverty in Columbus Ohio 1860-65* (1975). See also J. Tobias, *Crime and Industrialised Society in the 19th Century* (1967).
53. Clifford suggests Japan as a possible model for African countries to follow, *supra*, note 35, 210, 222. See my critique of his view, *supra*, note 16. 99-104.
54. Tufman, *op. cit.*, 90. See "A Note from the Editor", 3:1 *Mel.L.J.* 5-8 (1975). See also Standish, "The Highlands", 8:3 *New Guinea* 4-41 (1973).
55. Standish, "Papua New Guinea Review", 47:1 *The Austr. Quarterly* 127 (1975).

While Tufman's paper does reflect some awareness of the need for a societal analysis in discussing the role of police, and incidentally the issue of crime, the work of Griffin et al,<sup>57</sup> (hereafter Griffin) is much less satisfactory in that regard, and probably reflects the influence of the legalistic tradition I have referred to above, written as it was by two lawyers trained in the British tradition, plus Tufman. It is a typical example of OMC and is thus similar to that which a number of writers are proposing for implementation in Third World countries.<sup>58</sup> Griffin's paper was clearly not intended as an exercise in criminological theory; but any proposal for governmental action, particularly where human rights are so obviously placed in jeopardy, must proceed from some theoretical position based on an analysis of the causes of the problem. Otherwise how can proposed measures which will inevitably lead to the diminution of liberty be justified?

What is Griffin's theoretical stance? This is a hard question to answer because the paper is written in a vague and general manner and, in fact, contains little overt theoretical analysis. However, I believe the following to be a fair summary, evidence for which can be found scattered throughout the paper. According to Griffin, crime in urban areas (which was the focus of their attention) is inevitably increased by socio-economic development; that crime is essentially a product of the social environment which often results in blocked opportunities leading to frustration and thence crime; that criminal offenders are mainly to be found amongst the powerless in society as opposed to the powerful; that given a more efficient police force more of the offenders can and should be subjected to the processes of criminal justice; and that given appropriate sentencing policy, many of the offenders can be rehabilitated if appropriate institutions and services are created. As summarised, Griffin's theory is simply a superficial mish-mash of OMV ideas. It is quite simply a recipe for failure at best, and disaster at worst. To follow the ill-conceived and unoriginal "plea" put forward in this paper would be to point the country towards the same downward slope upon which the western nations, and many Third World countries, find themselves. But OMC is not to be rejected simply because it hasn't been properly advocated. It can be challenged pragmatically, empirically and theoretically. It can be faulted pragmatically in that countries which have been dominated by OMC have not been able to keep their designated crime problem from worsening rapidly (e.g. United States of America; United Kingdom; Australia). It can be faulted empirically because it is based only upon supposition about the amount and distribution of crime in society, a fact that the authors of Griffin allude to themselves. And it can be faulted theoretically on a number of grounds: first, for the simplistic social determinism which suggests that the social environment causes crime. Not everyone subject to Griffin's criminogenic environment becomes a "criminal", nor do those who commit crimes all come from the poor social circumstances instanced in the paper. Second, it essentially ignores the criminality of the more powerful and focuses on the less powerful, a choice not justified in view of corporate, bureaucratic and leadership crime throughout the Third World, not to mention Watergate, Lockheed and so on. Third, it ignores the effect of the legal

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57. See Griffin, Boston and Tufman, "Crime Prevention in Papua New Guinea - a plea for national planning," in Biles *op. cit.*, 91-102. (Hereafter, Griffin).

58. M. Clinard and D. Abbot, *Crime in Developing Countries* (1973).

process, the negative consequences of arresting and labelling persons as criminals with all the consequent stigma and damage to self-conception which can lead the offender into further criminality.<sup>59</sup>

Another criticism of Griffin is the tendency to split the world into "good guys" and "bad guys"; and while not explicitly making the argument, references to treatment and rehabilitation clinics to meet the need for medical or psychiatric help, suggest that the criminal offender is substantially different, abnormal or psychopathic. Thus Griffin's theory leads, amongst other things, to the view that prisons and reformatories can be used to change the "bad guys" into "good guys". There is no reason to believe that in fact the process on balance isn't the reverse - people go into these institutions and come out embittered and far more knowledgeable about criminal techniques, networks and other useful information. Also, is it realistic to expect former offenders to return to their original social environment from penal institutions and remain impervious to those environmental circumstances which, according to Griffin, lead them into criminal behaviour in the first place?

The lack of a theory of crime with any explanatory value has meant that in offering a program for crime control, Griffin has merely suggested a number of standard reforms that have been employed throughout most of the English-speaking world for years, in many cases for decades. To the extent that these measures are ameliorative, helping to reduce the repressive effect of criminal law enforcement and administration and imprisonment they may be acceptable.<sup>60</sup> But there is little evidence to suggest that they will reduce the crime rate, which appears to be Griffin's view. Nor do they constitute a fundamental policy for dealing with crime. Here I wish to make one final, yet major criticism of the Griffin paper. Looked at carefully, it has a strong but implicit political bias. The first point that strikes one is the very limited view of development put forward as well as the contentious view of the relationship between development and crime. The essence of their view is that "crime cannot and will not be curbed by socio-economic development alone; indeed, it will inevitably be increased by it".<sup>61</sup> There follows approvingly a quote from a West African judicial figure to the effect that "The more a country develops, the more the crime increases. There is a relationship between the economic development of a country and the struggle against crime".<sup>62</sup> I think it is fair to argue that the kind of development assumed in both these comments is the typical development pattern in the non-socialist Third World, e.g. most Black African countries, and many other nations of Latin and South America, Asia

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59. See generally P. Rock, *Deviant Behaviour* (1973).

60. Brown, "Reform as Adaptation : An Examination of Decriminalisation" (to be published in 1977).

61. Griffin, *op. cit.*, 92.

62. Such a view of the relationship between crime and development does not surprise in view of the statement that the President of the country has a "preference for injustice rather than disorder," and the social reality of "The relative exclusion of the Ivorien labour force from participation in the process of economic expansion." See M.S. Cohen, *Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa* (1974), 228, 211.

and the Pacific. That is to say under-development, a process wherein these countries have been exploited by foreign countries and corporations, and to that end their economies, cultures and social organisations deformed and moulded to fit the imperatives of colonialism and, latterly, neo-colonialism.<sup>63</sup>

Throughout the Third World one finds the resultant common pattern: a large scale exodus into the cities where a minority become low paid workers, with the remainder a reserve army of unemployed, potential recruits to factory-fodder status. It is from amongst the latter, their urbanised descendants who subsequently form the nucleus of the lumpen element, and the unemployed youth generally, that much urban street crime appears to come. From this brief analysis it must be clear that Griffin is looking at the wrong problem and engaging, perhaps unconsciously, in an ideological operation or, in plainer language, a white-wash job. Just as the problem with a sick body is the disease, not the symptoms, so too with society. The real problem is the social formation - that is the disease, of which criminal behaviour is only the manifestation. Thus the answer to the "crime problem" is to change the problem rather than to attempt to "control" it, for which attempt there is in any case no prospect of success. In calling for a change in the problem, I am not denying that crime exists on the urban streets of the Third World.<sup>64</sup> I am arguing that crime *as it is presently identified* ought not to be the primary focus of attention, and certainly not the sole focus of attention which is the probable result of following a "crime control" policy based on OMC. Indeed it is essentially a decoy which is used in many countries to distract attention from the fundamental problem - the continuing development of under-development, a process based on exploitation by foreign economic and political interests and their local allies.<sup>65</sup>

#### IV. *Toward a Change in the Problem.*

One of the tactics of imperialism has been to impose an ideology upon the oppressed people.<sup>66</sup> In this way self regulation becomes a principle form of social control.<sup>67</sup> The process is achieved in numerous

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63. See e.g. A.G. Frank, *Lumpen bourgeoisie : Lumpen development* (1972); W. Rodney, *How Europe Under-developed Africa* (1976). See a general critique, Bryan, "Colonialism, Capitalism and Under-development" (presented to Class Analysis Conference, 1976).

64. Just as social and economic processes are not the same from country to country, so the pattern of urban crime varies. See W. Chambliss, "The Political Economy of Crime : A Comparative Study of Nigeria and the U.S.A.," in I. Taylor et al , *Critical Criminology* (1975) 161-180.

65. I. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, (1976).

66. Sharp, "Nuigini : The Politics of Integration," *Arena*, No. 27 (1971), 3-6; F. Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks* (1968).

67. Garner, "Fixing Niugini's Future," *Arena*, No. 28 (1972), 44-55; Vignola, "The Politics of Under-development" *Arena*, No.27 (1971), 21-29.

ways across a broad front of oppressor-oppressed relationships and through the use of numerous mechanisms,<sup>68</sup> e.g. education, religion, sport and law.<sup>69</sup> The significant result of this process for our purposes is the tendency to accept the concepts and definitions of the coloniser, a process referred to by Garner as "conceptual imperialism".<sup>70</sup> Thus crime is a concept with a fairly fixed meaning in most newly independent countries, a meaning essentially determined by the former colonial power. Since the defining of crime is a political act, and such acts were primarily in the interests of the colonial power, it is clear that a reassessment of criminal definitions is called for. However, that reassessment can only be significant if the power relationships in society are changed from those arising out of the society which colonialism "fixed" for the immediate post-independence era. Thus the kind of criminal law reform to which, for example, Clinard and Abbott allude,<sup>71</sup> and which has been undertaken in many ex-colonial countries, is basically a matter of moderate changes of the law in order to allow the "new order", e.g. national bourgeoisie, to maintain "law and order" in the conventional pattern, i.e. primarily in the interest of legitimating and consolidating their own interests.<sup>72</sup>

The argument then is that crime is a concept which can be applied to any form of social behaviour, and that it is applied, in general, in the interest of the dominant class or "group" relevant to each society. With regard to Third World countries, crime has been used by the foreign exploiters and their local allies, to focus attention on the individual behaviour of the exploited indigenous population for purposes of maintaining a particular kind of "law and order" conducive to stability, security and profit. Conversely, by concentrating attention upon individual behaviour in that manner, the focus has been directed away from the more comprehensive anti-social behaviour inherent in imperialism, e.g. to exploitative employment patterns which depend on rural depopulation; chaotic urbanisation; unemployment, bad health and housing conditions; inappropriate education; and other repressive ideological institutions.<sup>73</sup> Thus while even the "crime-control" advocates admit that it is the appalling socio-economic conditions in Third World countries which are responsible for most urban crime, and in some cases even argue the need to do away with such conditions, they nevertheless direct

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68. According to O'Connor "economic, political and cultural missions, labour union delegations, joint military training programs, military grants, bribes to local ruling classes in the form of economic "aid", substitute for direct colonial rule," in "The Meaning of Economic Imperialism", in R. Rhodes (ed.), *Imperialism and Underdevelopment* (1970) 138.

69. Barnes, "Colonial Education" in H. Barnes (ed.), *Niugini Reader* (1973) 6-9; Sharp, "Schooling Niugini for Take Off" *Arena*, No. 30 (1972) 49-63. And see Sharp, "Welfare for Niugini? The Management of Participation", *Arena*, No. 32-3, (1973) 49-64.

70. Garner, *op. cit.*

71. Clinard and Abbott, *op. cit.*, 266.

72. Brown, *op. cit.*

73. See the important analysis of the dialectical nature of imperialism, E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa* (1973), especially his explanation of the method in the Introduction. See also Bryan, *op. cit.*

attention toward the suppression of the "criminals" rather than toward the political economy which has produced the conditions. Thus in Tufman, Clifford and especially Griffin, one searches in vain for any significant degree of recognition that such an analysis would even be relevant.

Without a radical criminology, based on a political economy of international capitalism, there is no possibility whatsoever of developing an understanding of the real crime problems of Third World countries. And there can be no doubt that efforts to deal with urban street crime in the context of "development" will remain futile. But then to a considerable extent, that is the function of "crime control" criminology - to maintain a "problem" out of which comes so many benefits for the powerful. In the short run, the government is thereby able to create in the police a large body of armed men who will be in a position to help ensure its survival. In the longer term, one of the major effects of "crime control" criminology is to legitimise the belief that there is something wrong with "criminals" - indeed that they are essentially criminals despite other important social roles they may fill, e.g. father, husband, worker, etc. - that they must be "dealt with", "treated", "rehabilitated" so that their "criminal tendencies" do not continue to bring them into conflict with the law. In passing it can be pointed out that this process of denigration occurs mainly with urban crime for it is more difficult, though not impossible, to define an entire ethnic or geographical group as pathological and anti-social, particularly when it is fairly evident that the rural "crime" is in fact a political dispute. It is interesting that Griffin side-steps the rural situation with the comment that "conventional strategems" are holding the problem in check, and a nod toward the need for more research arising out of the Report on the Commission into Tribal Fighting.<sup>74</sup> While accepting that Griffin intended to discuss only urban crime, I would argue that "crime control" criminology equally has no relevance to the rural situation and therefore is seen as being invalid for any analysis of the issues involved in the present discussion. That it claims to offer an effective program for suppression of urban crime ought not to blind us to its lack of general explanatory value.

#### V. *Criminology and Capitalism.*

I have suggested above that conventional criminology has an important political function. The argument put forward was that criminology would be used in the Third World, as it is in the West, to aid in maintaining a system of exploitation, specifically the neo-colonial relationship. Because the repressive nature of OMC has been most fully developed in its relation to Western capitalism, it is to a discussion of that relationship I shall now turn. The function of OMC in the West can be understood only if the nature of the capitalist social formation is analysed, especially the role of the State as the Executive arm of the dominant class. The following propositions indicate briefly the inter-relationship between capitalism, crime and OMC:

First, in capitalist society, one class normally will be dominant; this domination is the result of its economic power. Political domination will follow from the economic ascendancy, although political power may be

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74. Griffin in Biles, *op. cit.*, 91.



exercised indirectly through a party or coalition which is not directly or even solely tied to the dominant class.

Second, occasionally, in certain circumstances (for example, with regard to certain issues, or in smaller and especially weak and newly independent countries), political power may be exercised by a class or fraction thereof on behalf of a number of "groups" all of which have separate and sometimes conflicting interests; some of the "groups" (e.g. a neo-colonial power, or a multi-national corporation), are external to the society and do not play a direct part in struggles for political leadership.

Third, for the dominant class, "law and order" is an essential concept, though not a reality. It is an enabling concept: the State, operating on behalf of the dominant class (and other powerful groups where relevant, see proposition above ) is able to pursue policies of domination for the purpose of maintaining "internal security" (i.e. its own dominance and general economic stability) under the rubric of "law and order".

Fourth, "law and order" is an emotive and euphemistic phrase which camouflages the actuality behind the appearance. It is an important ideological veil, for the State is primarily concerned with Order, or internal security, rather than the enforcement of Law as such. The fundamental mission of the police is to protect the State and the interests of those it primarily represents. Thus, to the extent that crime, especially street crime in urban areas, threatens internal security directly or indirectly, the police will be deployed to deal with it.

Fifth, in order to maintain the State and the dominant interests in their positions of power, a general system of social control is created, developed and imposed by the State and those normally allied to it (e.g. the Church). Within the over-arching social control system there are various sub-systems forming a complex of inter-related, formal and informal, institutions, processes and phenomena whereby norms are established and enforced, and ideology is created and implanted.

Sixth, the law is a major apparatus of social control. As such it operates in four ways: (a) establishes norms (e.g. criminal law); (b) supports, maintains and aids in necessary transformation of practices and institutions necessary to the economic organisation of society (e.g. laws on property relations; on commercial organisations and transactions); (c) aids in producing the ideology whereby members of subordinate classes accept their role in society - thus with self-control operative, the State needn't resort to massive, direct legal repression; and (d) a second ideological function is to prevent subordinate classes from developing the consciousness of the possibility of a society without repressive bourgeois law.

Seventh, the system of social control is "articulated": it has flexibility and is operated selectively and differentially; it is not totally effective in channeling and repressing behaviour. The State has the task of dealing with various forms of deviance; some of these may create a "law and order", thus an internal security, problem.

Eighth, deviance is not criminal until it is so labelled. The kind of behaviour to be designated criminal is formally determined by the legislature,

which is part of the apparatus of the State system. Furthermore, the substance of the law is ultimately determined informally through selective and differential enforcement and administration by other institutions of the State, e.g. judicial departments, law enforcement agencies, and related institutions.

Ninth, those institutions which formally determine the form and the substance of the criminal law - legislature, government departments and agencies - operate essentially in the perceived interests of the dominant class (and other "groups", as in second proposition above); the institutions are not autonomous but are, in the final instance, controlled by the State for that purpose.

Tenth, the State, in its own interests and those of the dominant class, (and in the interests of the other "groups"), will take action against behaviour which presently, or potentially, is seen to threaten internal security directly or indirectly.

Eleventh, activity directed against property, be it State, personal or corporate, very often threatens internal security because of the escalation potential, i.e. a State which cannot control such activity will be faced with internal political turmoil, the threat of economic withdrawal, and quite possibly foreign intervention. Also, widespread activity against property may result in a breakdown in social control through a rip in the ideological veil which has previously immobilised subordinate classes from questioning the unequal distribution of wealth in society.

Twelfth, most illegal activity is directed against property. Therefore, to maintain internal security through direct legal repression while maintaining the ideological veil, the concept of crime is employed, and consequently that of "crime control". The State is thus able to use its force legitimately in the eyes of the mass of people because it is thought to be attempting to "enforce the law" on everyone's behalf, rather than maintaining order and protecting property on behalf of the dominant class.

Lastly, official-mainstream criminology functions essentially as ideological social control: it provides a mystifying intellectual veneer for State action. It performs this function by (a) justifying in a "scientific" manner the political decisions which result in the creation and implementation of criminal law; (b) diverting attention away from the role of the State in protecting the economic organisation of society which determines, ultimately, the nature and extent of "crime" in society; (c) oppressing the working class through the implications - widely disseminated and accepted - of positivist criminology and "crime control" programs (i.e. that crime is anti-social, perpetrated by anti-social people, and that these people are almost entirely working class); and (d) implying that criminological experts and concepts provide the truth about how to organise social relations in order to bring about the kind of society in which only "controlled" amounts of crime exist.

If it is correct that OMC has a social control function which assists in maintaining the exploitative relationship between the capitalist or dominant class and the working class, then we ought to find that the theory carries over to other relations of domination, e.g. within the framework of neo-colonialism. That criminology in the colonies remained underdeveloped during the colonial period is certainly true, but not inexplicable. In that relationship there was little hesitancy about using overt legal repression and to that extent there would have been relatively little need for some of the ideological apparatuses such as social science, including

criminology. Then too, there would have been in normal circumstances, especially in the early period following the initial subjugation, little in the way of security - threatening behaviour, thus the "law and order" problem would have been minimal. However, once such "problem, began to impinge upon security and exploitation,<sup>75</sup> it is not surprising that criminology has begun to develop as did other fields of study.

If we look at Africa and the development of criminology there we find that OMC was most highly developed in (1) South Africa (internal colonialism) where the level of conflict and the immensity of the problem of keeping the Blacks subjugated required the use of ideological social controls as well as the overt and brutally repressive ones;<sup>76</sup> and (2) Central Africa, one of the richest areas of British colonial rule. Here again the organisation of exploitation called for the development of ideological social controls.<sup>77</sup> One of the leading criminologists in Central Africa was William Clifford.<sup>78</sup> In a recent article I commented, "Thus although Clifford is concerned with the social policy needs of African countries ... his approach is essentially atheoretical, pragmatic, positivist-based and social control-orientated in which the emphasis is upon solving 'the crime problem'. This perspective on crime makes certain assumptions about the nature of human interaction which are highly questionable ... here let me say that at the most basic level, Clifford's approach will not succeed in its attempt to form the basis of a relevant social defence policy for an African continent undergoing rapid social change. Western countries have had little success following the type of approach Clifford recommends by implication, and there is no reason to believe that contemporary African criminology will have any greater success ... [Clifford's approach] is seriously marred by the lack of any indication that he has even noticed, let alone seriously considered, the recent theoretical debate which has shaken American criminology and, subsequently, torn British criminology asunder. That debate has raged over the very issue Clifford ignores: should there be a 'new criminology' based on an independent sociological critique of society, or should the traditional social control model remain dominant?"<sup>79</sup>

#### VI. *Criminology and the Transition to Neo-colonialism.*

In this section I want to begin to develop the method of a new and critical criminology for the Third World. To do that our first task is to analyse "crime control" thinking the in the political-economic matrix of the international capitalist system.<sup>80</sup> A vacuum exists in Third World "crime control" criminology: there is no recognition that the imperialist

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75. Vignola, *op. cit.*

76. H. Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination* (1971).

77. Clifford, "Crime and Criminology in Central Africa", in T. Grygier et. al. (eds), *Criminology in Transition* (1965) wherein particular emphasis is placed on psychological studies of Africans carried out in South Africa.

78. Boehringer, *supra*, note 26.

79. Boehringer, *supra*, note 16.

80. R. Murray, *The Internationalisation of Capital* (Spokesman Offprint, 1973).

or neo-colonial relationship has any bearing on the pattern of the defined crime problem.<sup>81</sup> It might seem extraordinary that the most fundamental fact in the lives of Third World people, imperialism and the system which depends upon it, should be ignored. Yet it is a revealing void, and supports my argument that OMC has primarily an ideological function: bourgeois social scientists, whether criminologists or otherwise, are not in the business of analysing the political-economic relationships of colonialism and neo-colonialism, but of supporting and justifying them.<sup>82</sup> However, it must be remembered that, as I have suggested above, "crime control" policies may fulfil that function in various ways under different circumstances. Thus whereas pre-independence colonialism was based on a considerable degree of direct oppression which was primarily the responsibility of the colonial power, the imperialist system operates now mainly through an oppression which is the responsibility of the local State in Third World countries.<sup>83</sup> This difference in the nature of imperialist oppression is reflected in the difference in pre- and post-independence studies in the general field of criminal justice. In Africa, prior to independence, criminology was very much orientated toward the practical problems of the colonial regime, and was the result of a need to continually assess and modify the system of colonial administration in order to keep it operating reasonably effectively, and especially late in the day, to ensure that the indigenous people would have a system with which they were somewhat familiar and sufficiently satisfied to maintain essentially intact. This last was important for the stability of the future neo-colonial relationship that was to follow the transition to political independence.

Post-independence criminology in Africa has developed considerably from the earlier, incipient criminology of colonial days. Rather than the studies of customary law, crime and courts referred to above, which served the fairly direct political purpose of aiding colonial judicial administration, criminology in Africa today has a much more comprehensive brief: general social control.<sup>84</sup> Many African and other ex-colonial countries have taken over, and developed, systems of social control which in turn enable exploitation to continue. In order that imperialism may function effectively in any country there should be a relatively stable government, a local bourgeoisie which has sufficient support to maintain its positions of economic, social and political ascendance, and a divided, oppressed working class and rural population. Given these conditions, exploitation can be carried on peacefully and at a satisfactory rate of

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81. Garner, *op. cit.*, 54. See Fitzpatrick and Blaxter, "Colonialism and the Informal Sector", 11 *Aust. and N.Z. J. of Soc.* 42-46 (1975).
  82. C. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya* (1975) preface; Moskos, "Personal Remarks on Sociological Research in the Third World", in I.L. Horowitz (ed), *Sociological Self Images* (1970) 101-116.
  83. Leys, *op. cit.*, Chap. 1. See also R. Sandbrook, *Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case, 1960-72*, (1975) Chap. 1.
  84. Clifford's book on African criminology is a good example, with its emphasis on prediction and "treatment".

profit. As I have argued above, OMC assists in this enterprise.

The brief analysis sketched above suggests the following propositions by way of summary:

1. Criminology may appear to function for the purpose of fulfilling the security (personal and property) needs of all individuals in society, e.g. "crime control";
2. Criminology of the "crime control" or OMC variety is better understood as a response to the needs of only the dominant group(s) in society;
3. The needs which fundamentally determine the nature of the criminological response are politico-economic;
4. The determining politico-economic needs will change over time, as will the dominant class or group(s);
5. Criminology, either in its incipient or established form, will change in response to changes in the politico-economic needs and/or to changes of the dominant class or group(s);
6. The needs of contemporaneous dominant groups (i.e. State, multi-national corporations) will not always be entirely coincident;
7. The different needs of contemporaneous dominant groups may be met by either (or both) (a) manifest "crime control" policies aimed at repressing specific problems, e.g. police enforcing the criminal law against rioters seeking improved working conditions; (b) latent effects of "crime control" criminology which are directed toward general problems, e.g. the legitimisation of political and economic elite domination.

I want now to elaborate briefly the nature of the process of change which I see as bringing about the present policies of "crime control" in Papua New Guinea. The analysis suggests that the transition to and maintenance of neo-colonialism requires the development of certain kinds of ideological and repressive forces. Neo-colonialism has been described satisfactorily for our purposes as:

"A particular form of imperialism. It is the continuing exploitation of a nation which has undergone the transition from a stage of direct colonisation by a particular metropolis (in the case of Niugini, Australia) to a stage of formal independence, but continuing informal and formal dependence on either the previous metropolis, or a combination of metropolises. In the pure case of neo-colonialism, there is a transfer of power to a domestic ruling class by its former colonial masters, but the allocation of economic resources, investment effort, legal and ideological structures remain substantially unchanged".<sup>85</sup>

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85. Thompson, "Growth and Underdevelopment", in Barnes, *op. cit.*, 12-33.

Colin Leys has pointed up the necessity for redressing the balance of academic concern by focusing upon the ideological and repressive forces that have operated alongside and on behalf of the economic forces that have been major determinants of the emerging structural relationships, internally and externally, of the neo-colonial nexus.<sup>86</sup> And, Thompson's definition of imperialism highlights the necessity for the kind of analysis which I intend to develop below: "Imperialism is primarily the economic domination of one region or country by another; formal or informal control is exercised over economic resources in a manner advantageous to the metropolitan power, and at the expense of the local power. Although the motive force of imperialism is economic, its application involves a complex interrelation of controls over the political, social and cultural (as well as the economic) aspects of the dominated nation".<sup>87</sup>

It is not necessary, nor does space permit me, to make an extended analysis of the economic and strategic aspects of Australian primary and surrogate imperialism in Papua New Guinea.<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless it is important to make explicit certain aspects of imperialism in Papua New Guinea which are of particular relevance for an understanding of the concept of crime, the organisation of the repressive forces, and the evolution of current "crime control" policies based on OMC.

In the case of Papua New Guinea, "crime" and its ideological counterpart OMC have been used to attempt to create a more stable political order and at the same time provide an attractive haven for foreign investment.<sup>89</sup> My argument presumes the existence of an exploitative colonial relationship and a transition to neo-colonialism over the past ten to fifteen years;<sup>90</sup> it is my intention to outline briefly some aspects of that latter process in order to integrate my analysis with it.

Essentially my argument parallels that of other writers who have discussed the decade of preparation for neo-colonial independence coupled with further development of economic exploitation.<sup>91</sup> In order to success-

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86. Leys, *op. cit.*, esp. Chap. 2.

87. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 12.

88. Thompson, *op. cit.*; Vignola, *op. cit.*; McQueen, "Living Off Asia", *Arena*, no. 26 (1971) 13-37; McFarlane, "A Neo-Colonial Policy for the Pacific Rim", *Arena*, no. 32-33 (1973) 29-34; Evans, "Australia and Developing Countries", in J. Playford and D. Kirsner (eds), *Australian Capitalism* (1972) 186-196.

89. Garner, *op. cit.*; Sharp, *supra*, note 69; Sharp, "Strategists of Neo-Colonialism", *Arena*, no. 28 (1972) 38.

90. The following papers analyse important aspects of the colonial relation and transition; Fitzpatrick, "Really Rather like Slavery: Law and Labour in the Colonial Economy in Papua New Guinea" (unpublished, 1976); Amarshi and Blaxter, "Notes toward the Definition and Understanding of the Working Class in Papua New Guinea" (unpublished, 1975); Good, "Class formation in Colonial Situations" (unpublished, 1975).

91. For example the work cited above by Sharp, Barnes, Garner, Thompson.

fully establish the neo-colonial link, the Australian Administration had to make some policy changes and administrative reforms. Thus it is clear that by the beginning of the 1960s changes in the administration of justice were seen to be necessary, and that these were going to be implemented as a part of the program of political and economic "development" on the path to "independence". During the course of the next few years some very important events occurred which can be given their proper meaning only if we see them as a part of the process of transition to neo-colonialism. In effect, at the beginning of the 1960s the Australian administration was preparing for the development of a new kind of external relationship with the Territory, while internally it was preparing the way for a changing political-economic structure.

Thus ideas about law, and crime, were changing as the relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea changed.<sup>92</sup> Professor Derham said in 1960: "Although the system for the administration of justice in the Territory has probably been reasonably adequate for times when the dominating aim was to bring order, and the benefits of European administration, to a primitive and dispersed people without greatly disturbing their existing ways of life, it is not adequate to aid the achievement of the aims for the territory to which the commonwealth of Australia appears to be presently committed ... It is suggested ... that this report should be treated as the first step in a larger task which should involve detailed planning for the development of the legal system in the territory over a period of years ... The territory is experiencing a transition from pure executive government of a paternal kind to a form of government more in accord with Western notions .. It is progressing from direct rule by the executive towards rule by and in accordance with law. Order and government rule have been brought successfully to most parts of the territory. Law and Justice, which though different march together, have been introduced in form, but haltingly and slightly as to their reality and substance."<sup>93</sup>

It is implied in Derham's comments that the use of the law would in that transition period become more subtle and less overt. An important change, of course, came in the early 1960s when the administration decided to prohibit racial discrimination.<sup>94</sup> This move made easier the creation of a national elite. Nevertheless, having embarked on a transition to neo-colonialism, there was a continuing need for ideological domination, as well as more direct repressive potential which would have to "blend into the scenery" more than the previous colonial agents of repression had done. There was then a dilemma facing the Administration: the need for subtle social control, both ideological and normative, to allow the build-up of a

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92. For example, laws relating to consumption of alcohol were changed in 1963; see Fitzpatrick and Blaxter, 'Access and Licensing: On Being Fit for the Favours of the Bureaucracy', (unpublished paper, 1975).

93. D.P. Derham, *Report on the System for the Administration of Justice in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea* (1960) 5.

94. Sharp, *supra*, note 66, Wolfers, *op. cit.*, esp. Chs. 10-12.

national elite. The latter would, in turn, have an ever-increasing role in social control in order to gain a substantial grip on the country by the time Independence arrived. All of this had to be developed without jeopardising the development of the indigenous elite necessary for the neo-colonial linkage. A seemingly perfect device for resolving this dilemma was to substitute crime in place of race. By so doing, the administration created social phenomena which could be used selectively against the urban working class, lumpen elements and others without impinging on the life style or consciousness of the new elite. Crime would also be the excuse for developing a stronger police force which could be used to protect the government, State and interests of foreign investors,<sup>95</sup> and perhaps to operate as a useful counter force to the army. (The police have been seen in that role by Tufman, and recent studies have suggested that the police in the Third World have tended to be less radical and more inclined to support governments than have the army.)<sup>96</sup>

Thus my analysis suggests that a particular conception of crime, and more latterly the Western social scientific explanation of crime, OMC, are ideologically useful to the process of replacing direct rule with indirect rule and establishing the neo-colonial relationship. Of course OMC is only a part of the network of institutions and ideologies which make the country reasonably stable politically and therefore more attractive to foreign investors.<sup>97</sup> Development of a concept of crime which essentially applies only to the working class and lumpen elements in the towns is part of what Garner has referred to as "conceptual imperialism". According to my analysis, the primary function of "crime control" policy is political, and it fulfils this task not in isolation but (1) in conjunction with other apparatuses, especially ideological, of social control and (2) in support of the normative or repressive apparatuses of the criminal justice system, especially the police. If my analysis is correct there should be some parallel evidence in the development of other social control apparatuses which would be consistent with it.<sup>98</sup>

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95. See generally, on the inter-relationship of government, state and foreign interests, Game, "Multi-nationals and the Nation-State", *Aust. Left Rev.* no. 48 (1975) 17-23. See Sharp, *supra* note 23.

96. Enloe, *op. cit.*: Zakaria, *op. cit.*

97. A Sydney international investment lawyer recently confirmed to me that before advising clients a study is made of present and future prospects for political stability in countries being considered for investment. A Jordanian businessman commented upon Lebanon, in "Capital is a coward", *A. Financial Rev.* 1 Dec. 1975.

98. See generally, Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays* (1971), 122-173.



## VII. *Crime Control in Conjunction with Ideological Apparatuses of Social Control.*

The most obvious and perhaps the most important institution of social control is the education system.<sup>99</sup> Education policy played an important part in colonial domination,<sup>100</sup> particularly in the phase of the transition to neo-colonialism. In Papua New Guinea, education policy in the last decade or so before Independence was strongly orientated to the building of a national elite: "The praxis of a western style of education in underdeveloped nations is necessary to domesticate and dominate those it purports to educate. Schools are instruments of social control. In the Third World, western type schools act mainly as instruments of foreign domination".<sup>101</sup> Yet that instrumentality was not fully exploited until late in the piece: "It is only since World War II that the Australian government has made any serious attempts at educating in Niugini ... With the realisation in the late 50's and early 60's that the period of formal Australian dominance of Niugini would have to end rather sooner than had been anticipated, the emphasis of the program changed ... to one aimed at producing a skilled educated elite which would take over governing and administrative functions from Australia".<sup>102</sup>

As with elitest education policies in the "developed" nations, the legacy for Papua New Guinea has been a tragic waste of human potential. In addition to creating a national elite, education functioned to aid in establishing a psychological hegemony that would obviate the need for widespread use of violence in maintaining domination; to create the necessary pool of trainable school leavers for employment in the urban sector; to "school the imagination" so that Papua New Guineans would be drawn into the market economy and "hooked on a commodity life".<sup>103</sup> It is this latter function of education, the fostering of the needs and desires which are necessary to the elitest, commodity-centred society that is necessary for neo-colonialism to be successful. Nor does it matter that many do not go far in the education system, because the values inculcated through the education system seep out to those not processed by it and are diffused and supported in many ways, e.g. through the media.<sup>104</sup>

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99. See generally the work of P. Freire and I. Illich. See also Blackburn, "A Brief Guide to Bourgeois Ideology", in A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn (eds), *Student Power* (1969) 163-213.

100. See Conroy, "Dilemmas of Educational Policy" in A.C. Ross and S. Langmore (eds) *Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea* (1973) esp. at 147. The education process must be seen dialectically: it has progressive elements within it which contradict the negative control elements; see Brett, *op. cit.*

101. Barnes, *op. cit.*, 7. See also I. Illich, *Celebration of Awareness* (1970) Chaps. 8, 9.

102. Barnes, *ibid*; Conroy, *op. cit.*

103. Sharp, *supra*, note 69 at 53.

104. Hall, "Deviance, Politics and the Media", in Rock and McIntosh, *op. cit.*, 261-305. And see the analysis of the imperialist connection, R. Ainslie, *The Press in Africa* (1966).

Another function of the education system is to separate out not only the wheat but also the chaff: "Education holds the key to participation in the modern economy. But this participation is limited to very few in Niuginian society ... It is inevitable ... that by far the larger proportion of students will in fact be drop-outs ... regarded as having failed. The whole community suffers through participating in a system in which everyone competes, to attain these ends, and which legitimises the right of those who succeed to dominate others".<sup>105</sup> In addition to instilling the competitive, elitist ideology of Australian society, the education system ensures that there is a sizeable proportion of school drop-outs," now forming the greater part of the unemployed settling in squatter communities around the major towns".<sup>106</sup> It is from this group that urban crime is alleged to come in large numbers. That is not surprising: it is perhaps the "only heroic response" to the system of ideological oppression which has chewed them up and spit them out.<sup>107</sup>

To ignore the "internal" and "external" colonialism which depends on that oppression, while discussing offenders as either pathological or as victims of a process of modernisation, urbanisation or even development, is to ignore the fundamental reality, imperialism, which should be the primary focus of every social scientist's attention if he is working in the Third World.<sup>108</sup> But criminologists of the OMC type have no desire to reveal the oppressive nature of a system of which they are beneficiaries.<sup>109</sup> Thus they concentrate on the criminality of the urban masses; by so doing they aid in covering up the fact that much of the behaviour they portray simply as crime is better understood as political protest against the system which has been imposed upon them.<sup>110</sup> Running parallel to their work, the education system emphasises the liberal pluralist or consensus view of society, providing a fundamental ideology which prepares the citizenry for the necessary future repression of "criminal elements", i.e. urban street offenders, who do not appear willing to abide by the rules of the game.

#### VIII. *Criminology and Australian Neo-colonialism.*

I have tended to discuss the development of "crime control" thinking in terms of the general needs of imperialism without considering the specific interests of Australia particularly in the latter stages of the transition

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105. Barnes, *op. cit.*, 8.

106. *Ibid.*

107. The original remark by a British social worker to me was that in certain circumstances "the only resourceful and heroic response is in delinquency".

108. Sharp, "On the Politics of Ignorance: Notes on the Colonial Mentality", *Arena*, 41 (1976) 105-109.

109. Schwendingers, "Defenders of order or guardians of human rights?" in I. Taylor et al, *Critical Criminology* (1975), 113-146.

110. "A system which violates human sensibilities in turn calls for resistance and rebellion by the population", R. Quinney, *Critique of Legal Order* (1974) 132.

to neo-colonialism. A great deal has been written on the Australian imperialist role in Papua New Guinea, and there is no need to add to that general literature. Nevertheless, I shall briefly outline the relationship between OMC and Australian imperialist interests in Papua New Guinea. There are two interrelated themes running through the analyses which I have found most useful: (1) the need for security against some form of Asian threat, be it Communism or an expanding nationalism; and (2) the possibility of continuing economic exploitation after the granting of Independence. Of course the two interests - security and exploitation - are very much interrelated.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, Australia's neo-colonialist role in the Pacific has been greatly influenced and largely determined by the two super-powers, the United States and Japan.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless, assuming Australia has two interests, security and economic exploitation in its relations with Papua New Guinea, how does criminology, in the form that Clifford and others are presenting it, function in support of Australian policy?

The basic role that crime control criminology will be called upon to fill in the present neo-colonial phase is to legitimise government expansion and use of its agencies of social control - police and army. Criminology of the kind advocated by Clifford and others provides the concepts by which what is thought of as criminal is limited, by and large, to the physical violence and attacks on private property by the urban working class, the lumpen elements, generally speaking, those who have not gained admission to elite status. This, of course, is a high percentage of the urban population and is expanding as more people come off the land into the towns.

It is interesting to note that, according to Tufman, "In the mid-sixties, however, when urban crime increased both in sophistication and extent, when the force by becoming a statutory body freed itself of the shackles of 'Kiap' control, and when independence became a foreseeable reality, the Police launched upon a major overhaul".<sup>113</sup> It has been argued that the mid-sixties were the "consolidation of the 'new' imperialism in Niugini (Papua New Guinea)" and that "The appearance of CRA at Bougainville in 1964, and the World Bank mission of the same year, can be regarded, symbolically, as the embryonic start of this new imperialism in a country which came to be regarded as one of the few stable areas left in the world for foreign investment".<sup>114</sup> The World Bank policy, indicated in its report in 1964 and in subsequent representations, generally followed by the Australian Administration, was to encourage the inflow of foreign investment. Following on from the copper discoveries, the World Bank Report and the realisation that Papua New Guinea offered secure prospects for investment,

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111. See McQueen, *op. cit.*; R. Catley and B. McFarlane, *From Tweedledum to Tweedledee* (1974) Chap. 6.

112. Wiley, "Vietnam and the Pacific Rim Strategy", *Aust. Left Rev.* no. 23 (1970), 9-21; Rowley, "Japan: A New Centre of World Imperialism", *Intervention* no. 2 (1972) 5-46.

113. Tufman, *op. cit.*, 88.

114. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 12.

there was a new dynamic in Australian colonial policy, and an increasing interest shown by U.S., Japanese and British investors. And "concomitant with this development, the Australian government's administration in Niugini began taking a new role as mediator, and provider of incentives and infrastructure for foreign investment".115

To ignore the developments in changing police organisation is, it seems to me, to be taking a very narrow view of the relationship between governmental police policy and the changing structure of the economy, particularly in view of the formal undertaking by the colonial administration to provide, amongst other infra-structural facilities "police ... of the standard reasonably required to serve the company, its employees and any town, camp or other accommodation established or constructed by the company ... at no cost to the company ... other than the normal service charges (if any) made therefore".116 Although this agreement followed the police reorganisation mentioned by Tufman, such an undertaking would have been foreseen by the administration as part of the obligation normally expected of a colonial power vis-a-vis foreign investors.117

It is worth noting the comments of several academics who have studied the development of police power in Third World countries. Feith, particularly concerned with ASEAN countries, has noted that "All of the governments of the area have become concerned with the political dangers of an excessively large group of unemployed people, especially unemployed urbanites".118 The pattern of unemployment has been caused not simply by development, modernisation or urbanisation, rather "The present condition of Third World societies is largely a legacy of the ways in which they were integrated into the world capitalist system in the colonial period".119 Feith then notes the role of the agencies of repression in rural areas: "Government power, as exercised by army and police sergeants often in collusion with local landlords, has usually been predatory and oppressive," and in urban areas: "The power of governments vis-a-vis their urban lower class subjects is not usually exercised as arbitrarily, but its weight and deprivational effect are often even greater".120 These kinds of

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115. *Ibid*, 12.

116. See the *Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act*, 1967, clause 12(a).

117. Another analysis suggests that the police reorganisation was part of a general adoption of the "Australian model" at a time when more efficient methods of control were becoming necessary. (I am grateful to Ted Wolfers for this and other valuable comments on my paper.) But cf. Vignola, *op. cit.*

118. Feith, "Southeast Asia and Neo-Colonialism" in E.P. Wolfers (ed), *Australia's Northern Neighbour: Independent or Dependent* (to be published).

119. *Ibid*.

120. *Ibid*. See also Fitzpatrick and Blaxter, *op. cit.*, and note 81, *supra*.

governmental activities are necessitated by the increasing gap between the elite and the rest of the country's people, and the concomitant need to make the country safe for foreign investment and the coincidental exploitation. Thus Stauffer has commended upon "The creation of a new internal political system more in accord with the demands of the larger (international) system", and suggests that "The creation of authoritarian systems in poor nations in the name of stability is the analogue of relying on 'law and order' methods to deal with similar problems in any major American city".<sup>121</sup>

While I would agree with Feith and Stauffer about the development of fairly direct repression in a number of Third World countries (of which I have some personal experience, including some of the ASEAN countries), I would argue that an understanding of social control in the Phillipines, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Papua New Guinea requires a much more subtle analysis than one which concentrates on direct force, and which blurs the differences between various kinds of colonial or neo-colonial relationships. Thus social control operates at several levels - direct and indirect, normative and ideological - in unique combinations of these, depending on some of the following factors: the culture of the country and its colonial experience generally; the degree and kind of class formation and rigidification; the structural position of the country in the international capitalist system (at the edge of the Western dominated zone or further back and therefore more secure); the economic position of the country in the international capitalist system and the kind of exploitation imposed; and the degree of apparent political stability in the country. Finally, social control will be exercised within constraints imposed by both short and long-term contingencies.<sup>122</sup>

#### IX. *Conclusion.*

The analysis I have put forward in this article may seem strange to many people. But we live in a strange world where correct analysis often appears as an inversion of common sense or, not quite the same, the conventional wisdom. Thus Illich has argued that "Every dollar spent in Latin America on doctors and hospitals costs a hundred lives ... Had each dollar been spent on providing safe drinking water, a hundred lives could have been saved".<sup>123</sup> That argument rings true, and I think there is a parallel to the analysis I have put forward. Money spent on police, prisons and related apparatuses for treatment and control is money largely wasted on symptoms rather than applied to the source of the problem: the social formation bequeathed to Papua New Guinea by the Australians in the interest of neo-colonialism.<sup>124</sup>

No doubt it will be argued that whatever the truth about the existence of neo-colonialism, the nation needs "law and order". But that is to fall into the trap of dealing in discrete categories, separating interrelated

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121. Quoted in Feith, *op. cit.*

122. See Boehringer, "Dialectics of Capitalist Legal Policy", *Aust. Left Rev.* no. 55 (1976). See also I. Balbus, *The Dialectics of Legal Repression* (1973).

123. Illich, *op. cit.*, 134. (See also Illich, *Medical Nemesis* (1975)).

124. To what extent the "bequest" was conscious or not is impossible to know; I believe it was both.

processes and attempting to understand their function *in vacuo*. Thus whatever is happening in Papua New Guinea at present must be seen in the context of exploitation. As Pete Kavvo has noted there is a system of domination which involves schools, churches, hospitals, foreign aid, elitist bureaucrats and politicians and foreign experts.<sup>125</sup> Why should the police be excepted from this litany? And why should the foreign (and local) "crime control experts" be excepted? It may be that consciously they don't intend to support the neo-colonial system. There may be other more personal reasons for the policies they advocate, for as Illich has pointed out with regard to foreign experts, "There is a normal course for those who make development policies ... It is to define development and to set its goals in ways with which they are familiar, which they are accustomed to use in order to satisfy their own needs, and which permit them to work through the institutions over which they have power or control".<sup>126</sup>

Thus, for example, Clifford has recently written *appropos* his Institute's activities, "The Institute has been invited to send Mr. Biles to Papua New Guinea to help with the structuring of certain services ... and there have been proposals for closer liaison with the Institute in future".<sup>127</sup> Whatever the subjective intentions of the "crime control experts", there are objective results; as in other areas, indicated by Kavvo, institutions and concepts are being developed ostensibly to deal with a "crime problem" but which will play an important part in the system of exploitation. That this should be so ought not to be surprising; the Americans, Japanese and Australians wish to protect their interests in Papua New Guinea, and as recent events all over the world have shown, capitalist countries and multinational corporations will go to great lengths to do so. As Wolfe has commented "Powerful people in America now have interests all over the world, and along with the extension of those interests, has gone the expansion of methods to protect them. As repression developed domestically to prevent potential threats from those who benefited least from industrialisation, so repression must now expand outside the borders of the United States to meet a potential challenge from those who benefit least from imperialism".<sup>128</sup> More specifically, the former director of the Agency for International Development commented some years ago, "Plainly, the United States has very great interests in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order under humane, civil concepts and control. When there is a need, technical assistance to the police of developing nations to meet their responsibilities promotes and protects these interests".<sup>129</sup>

Wolfe's comments put the activities of AID, particularly its Office of Public Safety, in the proper perspective: "Bell's reference to 'nations' indicates that police repression exists in more places than in Vietnam. Indeed it does. According to the only information available - an operations report submitted to Congress once a year - \$29 million of the total budget of \$35 million of OPS was spent in Asia. The remainder was used in countries of

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125. Kavvo, "De-Mystifying the Myth of Development: A Mekeo Experience", *2 Yagl. Ambu* 143 (1975).

126. Illich, *op. cit.*, 142.

127. 3:1 *Aust. Inst. of Crim. Newsletter* 4 (1975).

128. A. Wolfe, *The Seamy Side of Democracy* (1971) 175.

129. Quoted in Wolfe, *Ibid.*, 102.

high economic importance to the United States, particularly Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, The Congo, Liberia, and Ethiopia. AID funds seem to have been used to repress anti-government riots in South Korea, help anti-communists win elections in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, supply Venezuelan police with up-to-date police equipment, suppress labour agitation at Goodyear and Gulf and Western plantations in the Dominican Republic, and pay for the training of Firestone Rubber's security police in Liberia. Here is the internationalisation of police repression in its most blatant form".<sup>130</sup> And it should not be overlooked that Canada, like other small capitalist countries a useful surrogate for American imperialism, has been lined up to train Papua New Guinea's police, a fact for which Clifford has recently taken some credit.<sup>131</sup>

While I have undertaken not to proffer "expert" advice myself, perhaps some remarks of a positive nature are called for. One practical suggestion follows from my analysis: Third World peoples must construct a criminology which is based upon and inseparable from the political economy of neo-colonialism.<sup>132</sup> Bearing in mind Kavov's warning that "the purpose of education even today, therefore, is not to train our peoples for independence but for their subevience",<sup>133</sup> I would recommend discarding totally "crime control" criminology and starting afresh. Lastly, I would rely again on Kavov to express my view of the agencies of social control which have been the focus of concern in this paper: "Used in the manner so as to genuinely benefit the whole community in total, they then become tools of development. Used in any manner otherwise, however, they become tools of gross exploitation of Papua New Guineans by capitalists".<sup>134</sup> Whether the former is to be the case will have to be decided by those who will continue to suffer from the latter situation: the non-elites, the common people of Papua New Guinea.

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130. *Ibid*, 202.

131. See note 127.

132. The same advice given to Western criminologists in I. Taylor et al. *The New Criminology* (1973) 268-282. And see Gordon, "Capitalism, Class and Crime in America" in C. Reasons, *The Criminologist: Crime and the Criminal* (1974) 66-88.

133. Kavov, *op. cit.*, 143.

134. *Ibid*.